LAST BATTLE IN TRANSBAIKAL AND PRIMORYE
In the Far East, the Red Army was opposed not by the defeated in 1919 parts of the white movement and nationalist regimes, but by the 175,000-strong army of Japan. Under these conditions, the Soviet government decided to create on April 6, 1920, a buffer democratic state - the Far Eastern Republic (FER), closely connected with the RSFSR. The FER included the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorsk, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka regions. G. Kh. Eikhe, who had previously commanded the 5th Army of the Soviet troops in Siberia, was appointed head of the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the FER. Parts of the NRA during 1920 fought with the troops of Ataman Semenov and Kappel's detachments, which controlled a significant part of the territory of the Far East. Only as a result of the third offensive on October 22, 1920, units of the NRA took Chita with the support of partisans.
With the help of the Kappel and Semenovites who retreated from Transbaikalia, Japan fortified itself in Primorye, where on May 26, 1921, the power of the Primorsky Regional Administration was overthrown and the pro-Japanese government of S. D. Merkulov was created. At the same time, units of R. F. Ungern invaded Transbaikalia from Mongolia. In the current difficult situation, the Soviet government provided military, economic and financial assistance to the Far East. Eikhe was replaced by V. K. Blyukher as commander of the NRA FER. In June, Ungern retreated to Mongolia, where in August 1921 most of his troops were surrounded and destroyed by units of the NRA. In the autumn of 1921, the situation escalated again, but in the end, as a result of fierce fighting near Volochaevka (January-February 1922), in a 40-degree frost, units of the NRA turned the tide and returned the previously lost Khabarovsk. The further offensive of the NRA units (new commander I.P. Uborevich) took place in October 1922. On October 25, the NRA troops entered Vladivostok, and on November 14, 1922, the People's Assembly of the Far East Republic announced the establishment of Soviet power in the Far East and the entry of the Far East into composition of the RSFSR. Soviet power established itself in all regions where civil war had flared before.
I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia
"THROUGH THE VALLEYS AND TOWARDS THE HILLS": THE HISTORY OF THE SONG
The biography of Peter Parfyonov, which is closely connected with Siberia, is amazing. He managed to combine the talents of a poet, writer, historian, military leader, diplomat, head of a major Russian government department and party functionary.
Perhaps his name would have long been forgotten if it were not for the most famous song composed by him “Across the valleys and over the hills”.
Petr Parfyonov, in the article “The History of the Partisan Song”, recalled:
“The song “Along the valleys, over the mountains” has a long history. The text has been revised by me several times. The song took its final form under the following circumstances.
After the liquidation of Kolchakism and the liberation of Vladivostok, the political commissioner (as military commissars were then called - A.M.) under the head of the Nikolsko-Ussuriysk garrison made a report on the political and moral state of the military units, pointed out the complete absence of good revolutionary songs.
“For five months we have been standing, and our Red Army soldiers are singing Kolchak's Canary, and we can offer them nothing in return. It's a disgrace, comrades!" the delegate said.
Taking advantage of the next Sunday afternoon, when there was less operational work, I found my notebook with verses and, borrowing from it the melody, theme, form and a significant part of the text, wrote a new song “Partisan Anthem” in one evening:
In the valleys, in the mountains
Divisions went forward
To take Primorye with a fight -
Stronghold of the White Army.
To drive out the invaders
Outside your native country.
And do not bend before their agent
Labor of his back.
Standing under the banner
Created a military camp
Remote squadrons
Amur partisans.
Glory will not cease these days
Will never forget
How dashing is our lava
Occupied cities.
Preserved, just like in a fairy tale
Age-old like stumps
Stormy nights of Spassk,
Nikolaev days.
How we drove the chieftains,
How we smashed the gentlemen.
And in the Pacific
Your trip is over."
Later it turned out that the legendary "Partisan Song" had other predecessors. The researcher of Russian song history Yuri Biryukov revealed that back in 1915 a collection of poems “The Year of the War. Thoughts and Songs” by Vladimir Gilyarovsky, the famous Moscow reporter “Uncle Gilyai”. One of his poems “From the taiga, the taiga far away” became a song that was sung in the Russian army. The song was subtitled "Siberian Riflemen in 1914":
From the taiga, the dense taiga,
From the Amur, from the river,
Silently, a formidable cloud
Siberians went to battle...
And in recent years, the “March of the Drozdovsky Regiment” has been published, which is considered the first double of the “Song of the Siberian Riflemen” in terms of appearance. The words of the “Drozdovsky March” were composed by P. Batorin in memory of the 1,200-verst-long transition of the 1st separate brigade of Russian volunteers under the command of Colonel Drozdovsky from Romania, where they were caught by the revolution, to the Don.
Trekking from Romania
There was Drozdovsky glorious regiment,
To save the people
Carried heroic heavy duty.
So, two different songs were born for one motive: “red” and “white” (since later Drozdovsky’s brigade fought with weapons in their hands against the Bolsheviks), which often happened in those days of a tragic break in the life of Russia. There is also pathos in the song of the Drozdovites, but the people demand salvation in the name of holy Russia:
The Drozdovites walked with a firm step,
The enemy fled under pressure:
Under the tricolor Russian flag
The regiment gained glory for itself!
Both songs remained in history, in songbooks, although the original source was forgotten for a long time. And the song of Pyotr Parfyonov, which became a kind of symbol of the era of the Civil War, gained world fame. The words from this song are minted on the monuments of partisan glory in Vladivostok, in Khabarovsk:
Glory will not cease these days,
Will never fade.
Partisan detachments
They occupied the cities...
ICE EPILOGUE OF THE CIVIL WAR
While living in Harbin, in the spring of 1922, General Pepelyaev entered into relations with two delegates from the population of the Yakutsk region who rebelled against the Bolsheviks: P. A. Kulikovsky and V. M. Popov, who arrived in Vladivostok to seek support from the government of S. D. Merkulov. This government, however, did not show an active interest in Yakut affairs, and the delegates then managed to interest General Pepelyaev in them, who, after long requests and insistence, agreed to help the people of Yakutia in their fight against the communists. Deciding to organize a military expedition to this distant Siberian region, A.N. Pepelyaev moved to Vladivostok in the summer of 1922.
Persons and institutions that had nothing to do with either the Japanese or the Merkulov government helped Kulikovsky and Pepelyaev to prepare food, uniforms and weapons for the expeditionary detachment. Recruitment gave the gene. Pepelyaev up to 700 volunteers, mostly former soldiers of his Siberian army and Kappelevites.
On September 1, 1922, when General Dieterichs already held power in Primorye, Pepelyaev's detachment was ready to leave Vladivostok. It received the name of the Siberian Volunteer Squad, but officially it was an expedition to protect the Okhotsk-Kamchatka coast.
To send a detachment to the ports of the Sea of Okhotsk, two steamships were chartered.
Upon the arrival of the expedition to the place, it turned out that the popular anti-Soviet movement in the Yakutsk region had already been liquidated by the Bolsheviks. According to one of the participants in the campaign, the help of the Siberian Volunteer Squad was at least three months late.
General Pepelyaev now faced the question of whether to create a new anti-Bolshevik movement in Yakutia or immediately return to Vladivostok. A meeting was arranged with local people who assured Pepelyaev that it was easy to create a movement in the region again, since there were still many partisan detachments in the taiga, and it would be enough for the squad to move forward, as it would quickly be strengthened by new volunteers.
Even before the arrival of General Vishnevsky in Ayan, Gen. Pepelyaev, with a detachment of 300 fighters, went to Nelkan to take the local red garrison by surprise there with its food and weapons supplies and shipping facilities. The detachment had to travel a distance of 240 miles through deserted terrain and on the way cross the difficult Dzhukdzhur Range, which during the autumn thaw, with insufficient means of transportation, was an extremely difficult task.
Nevertheless, this path was passed, and the detachment reached Nelkan, but three defectors warned the Reds about the approach of the enemy, and they managed to sail away on barges along the May River to Aldan.
Thus, the squad was forced to settle down for the winter at two points: in Nelkan, with General Pepelyaev, and in Ayan, with General Vishnevsky ... On November 19, a detachment from the port of Ayan, led by Gen. Vishnevsky, and now only the third battalion of the squad remained in Ayan.
Pepelyaev's squad stayed in Nelkan for about a month, organizing their transport and collecting intelligence information. Information was received about the location of the red units in the area. It turned out that there were up to 350 red fighters in the Amga settlement, almost the same number in the villages of Petropavlovsky and Churapcha. In the regional city of Yakutsk, the number of red fighters was not found out. It was assumed that their main forces were here, led by the commander of all the red detachments in the region, Baikalov ...
On January 22, 1923, a detachment was sent from Ust-Mili to take the village of Amga, under the command of Colonel Renengart with a strength of up to 400 fighters with two machine guns ... The distance of 200 miles from Ust-Mil to Amga, the Renengart detachment passed at 40–50 ° along Réaumur in six days.
Amga was taken after a short resistance by the Reds ... This was the first success of the Whites, but the further development of the struggle brought them nothing but disappointment and serious disasters.
On February 12, information was received that the red garrison of the village of Petropavlovsky, under the command of Strodt, had withdrawn and went to Yakutsk. General Vishnevsky was sent to meet him with an instructor company and the 1st battalion, which was supposed to ambush and defeat the Reds while they were resting in one of the villages.
Strodt, however, learned of the proposed ambush and prepared to meet the enemy. In the Yakut ulus (village) Sigalsysy on February 13, a battle began ...
Strodt's detachment was surrounded; guards were posted around him in the forest. The Whites made an attempt to take Sigalsysy by storm, but the Reds developed destructive machine-gun fire, and this attempt was not successful.
In view of the impossibility of taking the enemy out of battle, the Whites decided not to lift the siege until the Reds, under the pressure of hunger, surrendered themselves. On February 25, information was received about the movement of the Churapchinsky Red Detachment to the rescue of Strodt. Gene. Pepelyaev sent part of his squad to meet this detachment, but again failed to destroy it.
Three days later, news came that a large detachment under the command of Baikalov himself had set out from Yakutsk. This detachment moved directly to Amga and on the morning of March 2 opened gun and machine-gun fire on it. The white defenders of the Amga fired back from the Reds to the last bullet, then some of them retreated to Ust-Mili, some were captured by the enemy.
The situation has now changed drastically, not in favor of the Whites.
March 3 Gen. Pepelyaev ordered the retreat of his squad back to the village of Petropavlovsky, at the mouth of the Mai River. Among other things, the order said:
Having experienced severe hardships on the road, the retinue of Gen. Pepelyaev in early April. 1923 reached Nelkan. In total, about 600 people remained in the squad after the campaign against Yakutsk, including 200 Yakuts.
After resting in Nelkan, the detachment then went to Ayan on the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk. This was in the summer of 1923. Having learned about the exit of the detachment of General Pepelyaev to the sea, the red authorities of Primorye sent a military expedition on three ships from Vladivostok under the command of Vostretsov.
On the night of June 18, with a strong wind and a storm at sea, the Reds landed on the shore near Ayan and approached the port unnoticed, surrounding Pepelyaev's headquarters and its combat units. Vostretsov offered Pepelyaev to surrender without a fight, warning that otherwise his squad would be destroyed by force of arms.
There was no way out: Pepelyaev agreed to surrender ...
Pepelyaev and his most important associates were taken to Siberia, where they were tried in the city of Chita. The general himself and ten people taken prisoner with him were sentenced to death, but this sentence was later commuted to ten years in prison...
A bourgeois-democratic revolution took place. The Qing dynasty was overthrown and a republic was proclaimed. Sun Yat-sen became its first president.
Taking advantage of the revolution, the local rulers of Mongolia actually seceded from China. On November 3, 1912, the ruler of Mongolia (khutukhta) concluded an agreement with the Russian government, according to which Russia was obliged to provide assistance to Mongolia in maintaining the "autonomous system" and received a number of unilateral economic advantages.
According to a secret agreement signed on June 25, 1912 by the Russian and Japanese foreign ministers, Sazonov and Motono, the part of Inner Mongolia located east of the Beijing meridian was recognized as the sphere of influence of Japan, and to the west of it - the sphere of influence of Russia. Under the agreement of November 5, 1913, Russia obtained recognition from China of the national autonomy of Outer Mongolia.
After the outbreak of the First World War, on July 24 (August 16), the Republic of China declared its neutrality in the war against all warring powers, including Germany, and asked them not to transfer hostilities to China. But German firms were no longer allowed to work on the territory of Zheltorossia. They had to liquidate or sell their businesses. So, for example, the Nyman company was closed, which was engaged in the sale of alcohol and grain products, with an asset of about 15 million rubles. German subjects were expelled from the exclusion zone to Changchun, where they lived quite freely before Japan entered the war and even engaged in propaganda in favor of Germany. The German military attaché remained in Beijing. He developed a plan to blow up the tunnels and bridges of the CER and formed a group of saboteurs in Inner Mongolia to blow up the Khingan tunnel. However, the saboteurs were arrested before they reached the place.
In October 1914, 6 regiments were sent to the Western Front from Harbin in full force of the Zaamur railway brigade. But from February 20 to March 15, 1915, 12 militia foot squads from Tomsk arrived in Zheltorossia.
The mobilization of the Russian population in Zheltorossia was not initially carried out. Only on August 31, 1915, mobilization was announced, but it did not apply to Russian subjects permanently residing in the exclusion zone, and to employees of the CER. Active service was recruited for those liable for military service who lived on the lands of the road, but were not connected with it by service. This situation left many loopholes for unscrupulous people. A mass of wealthy people rushed to Manchuria, seeking to avoid being drafted into the army. By hook or by crook they tried to get at least some service on the road.
Thanks to the war, the CER began to make a profit. Thus, in 1914 it amounted to 7.3 million rubles, in 1915 - 12.7 million, in 1916 - 18 million and in 1917 - 30.8 million rubles.
From the USA to the roads of the Far East in 1915-1917. Hundreds of locomotives and thousands of wagons arrived.
But the heyday of Zheltorossia in 1914-1917. not only military transportation contributed, but also the dry law introduced by Nicholas II in Russia in November 1914. The ban on the trade in vodka created huge price scissors in the Far East: if within Manchuria a bucket of vodka cost 7 rubles, then in the Trans-Baikal region it cost already 60 rubles, and in Irkutsk - 80 rubles. And the further, the more expensive, up to 100 or more rubles.
The scale of alcohol smuggling from Zheltorossia to the empire in 1914-1917. comparable only to similar smuggling in the United States during the Prohibition era. To stop the flow of alcohol across the Chinese and Mongolian borders, special Russian police units were created. But the smugglers kept changing tactics. Once, after an unsuccessful search, the customs officer nevertheless caught the smell of alcohol in the steam heating department in one of the cars. It turned out that alcohol was poured into the steam heating condenser. Later, a batch of soap was sent from Harbin to Vladivostok, and customs officers found vessels with alcohol in its five-pound pieces. Newspapers called it the last word in smuggled technology, but they were wrong. There were cases of alcohol being transported in ... sausage, in the belly of a large batch of chum salmon, and at the Manchuria station a batch of factory bricks was detained, in which bottles of cognac were found sealed.
In Fujiadian, all the liquor stores sold alcohol in containers specially made for clandestine smuggling: in different capacities, flat jars half an inch thick, in curved jars for tying to different parts of the body. This forced the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to ban the sale of alcohol in cans.
But the main route of smuggling was not the railroad, but the border. Smugglers in the border villages made a lot of money. They brought alcohol, silk and other goods in whole caravans to the Onon River, buried them on the shore in hiding places, and then, choosing a convenient moment, they transferred them to the Olovyannaya station of the Trans-Baikal Railway or to the Byrka station. The customs guard was unable to deal with these smugglers, who knew the area perfectly.
So, Zheltorossia in 1914-1917. experienced an economic boom. An indirect, but very characteristic sign of prosperity was the tour of the Milan Opera in Harbin. And this is during the war years.
The First World War became, without exaggeration, "manna from heaven" for Japan. On August 15, 1914, the Japanese government turned to the German government with "advice" to withdraw its troops and ships of the fleet from Chinese waters, and also offered "assistance" in the disarmament of those units and ships that are not in a position to immediately evacuate. Ports and naval bases on the territory of Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo were brought to load part of the expeditionary army, which was supposed to go to the coast of Shandong and to the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands in the Pacific Ocean.
Although the date of the ultimatum was indicated - August 23, at dawn on August 17, the infantry division allocated for the expedition to Shandong was loaded onto ships. At the same time, on the islands of Sado and Okishima in the Sea of Japan, maneuvers were carried out by the fleet and infantry units, which practiced interaction during the landing. The total number of troops trained for operations reached 78,000; it provided for the participation of 17 warships, 120 field guns and 136 naval artillery guns.
The German government left the Japanese ultimatum unanswered and on August 22 withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Tokyo. The next day, August 23, Emperor Yoshihito declared war on Germany. Germany tried to transfer the management of the Shandong concession to the Chinese government, that is, to the rightful owner, but Japan ignored this decision.
On August 23, 1914, Japanese naval artillery opened fire on the German fortress of Qingdao. The German garrison of the fortress was only one and a half thousand people. In addition, about three thousand residents of Qingdao took up arms. The Japanese landing many times exceeded the forces of the Germans, but they courageously resisted.
The Chinese government of Yuan Shih-k'ai, encouraged by the United States, repeatedly protested to the Japanese government in connection with military operations on Chinese territory. Yuan Shih-kai was assured from Tokyo that the appropriate "orders had been given to the Japanese command." However, violations of Chinese sovereignty continued. The Chinese government announced that "the territory adjacent to the borders of the territory of China leased by Germany is declared a military zone, and therefore forbidden for military operations." In support of this statement, Yuan Shih-kai's government ordered the provincial governor to deploy his troops on the coast. This made it difficult for the Japanese command to complete the task on time, since it was impossible to supply the troops besieging Qingdao without a collision with Chinese troops by land communications.
On November 8, 1914, the Qingdao garrison capitulated. The losses of the Germans during the siege amounted to 800 people, the Japanese - 2000 people.
From August 18, 1914, that is, even before the start of hostilities against Qingdao, the Japanese began to seize the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands, which were in the possession of Germany. Thus, under the control of Japan came a huge region of the Pacific Ocean, commensurate in area with the whole of Western Europe.
This was the end of Japan's participation in the First World War, except for the participation of Japanese cruisers in the hunt for German military and merchant ships. Aunt Entente repeatedly invited the valiant Japanese infantrymen to take part in the battles on the Western Front. However, the Japanese government politely declined such proposals, because the climatic conditions of Europe are not suitable for Japanese soldiers.
In connection with the decrease in the supply of industrial goods to China, Indo-China, the Dutch colonies, etc., Japanese exports of industrial goods increased several times. The Japanese economy was booming.
In 1915-1916. The tsarist government took a number of steps to improve relations with Japan. This was done in order to ensure their rear and to be able to purchase weapons and strategic materials in Japan. So, in 1916, Grand Duke Georgy Mikhailovich was sent to the coronation of the Japanese emperor, accompanied by the head of the Far Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kazakov. In negotiations with them, the Japanese expressed their readiness to conclude a new treaty, but sought all sorts of benefits from the tsarist government: the transfer to them of that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Changchun-Harbin), which, according to them, was in the Japanese sphere of influence, since it was connected with South Manchuria; granting Japan new concessions for fishing in Russian waters and easing customs tariffs. Under these conditions, the Japanese agreed to sell Russia a certain amount of weapons and conclude an alliance treaty with it.
It is worth noting that, with the exception of the 234 mm Vickers howitzers and 107 mm guns mod. 1910, all other guns were simply rubbish. So, all 28-, 24- and 20-cm guns turned out to be unusable and were sent to the rear fortresses, and the Russian guns from there were sent to the front.
In addition, Japan in 1915-1916. sold to Russia 486-75 mm Arisaka field guns and 100-75 mm Arisaka mountain guns - veterans of the Russo-Japanese War. Through Japan and England, the Russian army received 163.5 thousand Japanese Arisaka rifles.
The Russian fleet purchased several dozen Japanese naval guns of 120-47 mm caliber. In 1915-1916. Japan sold part of its trophies of 1904-1905 to Russia for a decent amount, including the battleships Poltava, Peresvet and the cruiser Varyag. "Peresvet" during the transition to Russia died in December 1916, blown up by a mine in the Mediterranean Sea near Port Said. "Poltava" (renamed "Chesma") and "Varyag" did not take direct part in the hostilities.
During the First World War, Japan was considered an ally of Russia, so the tsarist government began the total disarmament of land and sea forces in the Far East. Most of the combat-ready divisions and brigades were sent to the Western Front. The construction of new fortifications in Vladivostok immediately ceased. So, 305-mm twin-gun turrets, for which foundation pits had already been dug in Vladivostok, were sent to the Baltic. In addition, in 1915-1916. almost all the combat-ready guns of the Vladivostok fortress were sent to the west, and only old junk remained in the fortress.
The cruiser "Askold" was sent from the Siberian Flotilla to the Mediterranean Sea, and the cruiser "Zhemchug" - to the port of Panang in Malaya. There, the ship's commander and a number went "on business" to the shore, and then, unfortunately, the German light cruiser Emden entered the harbor and within a few minutes smashed the Pearl to pieces.
From the Amur flotilla, most of the messenger ships (armored boats) were taken to the west. It was difficult to take the monitors and gunboats away, and most importantly, there was nowhere to go. But the authorities managed to remove most of their guns, and diesel engines from the monitors. The guns were sent to the coastal batteries of the Baltic Sea, where they were captured by the Finns in 1918, and diesel engines were installed on submarines under construction. So by October
In 1917, the armed forces in the Far East were in a state of incapacity for combat.
On March 14, 1917, the Chinese ruler Duan Qirui declared war on Germany. The formal reason was the message of the British press that in Germany, which experienced in 1916-1917. food shortages, they feed the pigs the corpses of soldiers killed at the front. In 1922, two British journalists told how they made this "duck".
China's participation in the war consisted in the capture of several German gunboats and merchant ships located in seaports and on the rivers of China, as well as in the internment of citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Duan Qirui sent free labor to help the Western allies: 150,000 coolies were transferred to England and 40,000 to France.
By declaring war on Germany, the Duan Qirui clique, which enjoyed the support of the northern militarists, hoped to consolidate their power. But they achieved just the opposite result. In contrast to Beijing, the Military Government of the South of China headed by Sun Yat-sen was formed in Guangzhou in the fall of 1917, and military clashes between the northern and southern governments did not subside throughout 1918.
The hopes of Duan Qizhui and K˚ that the Entente would return the “German inheritance” in China to the owner in exchange for participation in the war did not come true. Under the Treaty of Versailles, China received literally crumbs. He was released from financial obligations under agreements with Germany and received part of the buildings, structures and property located on the territory of German concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. Themselves, these concessions, formally returned under Chinese sovereignty, were declared open to foreigners to live and trade, with the preservation of their rights of extraterritoriality. Other German concessions were simply transferred to other states: in Guangzhou - England, in Shanghai - France.
At the conference in Versailles, the question of the leased territory of Germany, located in Shandong, was acute. The Chinese delegation demanded the return of all rights to it to China, while recalling that Japan, before the occupation of Shandong in 1914, assumed the corresponding obligations. Japan categorically insisted on maintaining its positions in Shandong. The British delegation, headed by Prime Minister Lloyd George, came out in defense of the Japanese. The British Prime Minister said: “Great Britain adheres to the same position as Japan and Italy. She has a definite agreement with Japan, set out in the note of the British Ambassador in Tokyo dated February 16, 1917. The position of the British delegation had a decisive influence on the final decision. According to the Treaty of Versailles, the movable and immovable property of Germany, its rights and privileges in Shandong were transferred to Japan.
On June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of all Soviet people was interrupted by the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. The main slogan in those years was: "Everything for the front, everything for victory!". Volunteers left for the war from all regions of the country, and those who remained in the rear showed no less heroism, working overtime in factories and helping the front with everything necessary. The Far East was no exception.
The Far East during the Great Patriotic War: a special situation
From the very beginning of the war, the Far East was in a special position. On the one hand, military operations were not conducted on its territory, and in relation to the western regions of the country, which were attacked by Germany and its satellites, it was a deep rear. On the other hand, throughout the Great Patriotic War, the Far East could turn into a theater of operations, remaining dangerously close to Japan, Germany's ally in this war. And even in the pre-war period, after several military provocations and a number of border violations, at the suggestion of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in 1938, the Far Eastern group of troops was transformed into the Far Eastern Front (FEF).
The front received its baptism of fire already in July-August 1938 in the area of Lake Khasan. And in May 1939, the troops of the Far Eastern Fleet helped stop the invasion of the Kwantung Army into Mongolia. As a result of the fighting in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River, which lasted several months, the Japanese units were surrounded and defeated. Under these conditions, the postponement of the war in the West, which Stalin achieved by signing a non-aggression pact with Germany, allowed the USSR to avoid a war on two fronts. And it also made it possible for the Far East to better prepare for possible military operations.
Stalin's acquaintance
By the middle of 1941, thanks to the measures taken in advance to strengthen the Far East, the Far Eastern Fleet included dozens of well-trained divisions, tank, artillery and aviation units. The total number of personnel reached 704 thousand people, slightly exceeding the forces of the Kwantung Army, which included 700 thousand people. Colonel-General Iosif Rodionovich Apanasenko (1890-1943) was appointed to command the forces of the Far Eastern Fleet.
Iosif Rodionovich, whose military career began back in the First World War, had known Stalin since the Civil War. He fought on the side of the Soviet government as part of the First Cavalry Army. In 1918, during the battles near Tsaritsyn, he met Joseph Vissarionovich. However, in the future, their paths practically did not intersect. According to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Apanasenko was interrogated in 1937 as a suspect for participating in the Tukhachevsky conspiracy, however, there were no reprisals against him. We can only say with certainty that at the beginning of 1938, Stalin called Apanasenko to the Kremlin, before his appointment to Tashkent.
Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
By the way, later sending Iosif Rodionovich to the Far East, Stalin was aware of the potential dangers of the future wartime, and set quite specific tasks for the general: to make the region an impregnable fortress for the Japanese and be ready, without weakening the defense, to provide assistance to the western fronts. From which it can be seen that Joseph Vissarionovich understood the inevitability of a future conflict and was preparing for a possible war on two fronts.
Apanasenko responsibly approached the Far Eastern assignment, and, first of all, started looking for vulnerabilities. These were the transport routes. The first thing that the new commander of the Far Eastern Fleet drew attention to was the absence of a motorway along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In the event of hostilities, this could lead to disastrous consequences: by blowing up several bridges and tunnels on the Trans-Siberian, a potential enemy (Japan) could deprive the army of both supplies and maneuverability. According to Apanasenko's decision, the construction of a highway with a length of a thousand kilometers began. By September 1, 1941, a road was laid from Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya (now Belogorsk) in the Amur Region to Khabarovsk. Roads were also created to all military garrisons in Primorye.
Troops to the front!
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Far East turned into a forge of reserves for the army in the field. Spare parts and formations were formed here, conscripts were trained, command, political and engineering personnel were trained. And, of course, during periods of aggravation of the situation on the Soviet-German front, military units with already trained personnel were sent from the Far East. Of course, no one forgot about the danger of opening a new front in the Far East. Therefore, draft contingents of youth and conscripts from the reserve were constantly sent to the region, not only from the region itself, but also from Siberia and the European part of the country.
But back to sending the Far Eastern units to the front. For the first time, troops from the Far East were brought to the West on the eve of the Great Patriotic War! In connection with the aggravation of the situation in Europe in the second half of April 1941, it was decided to strengthen the western grouping of troops. By June 22, 1941, 57,000 people, more than 670 guns and mortars, and 1,070 light tanks had left the Far Eastern Fleet and the Trans-Baikal Military District. All of them were already used in the first months of the war in defensive operations in the western and southwestern directions.
The next transfer of troops from the Far East took place at the initial stage of the war. From June 22 to December 5, 1941, 12 rifle, 5 tank and one motorized divisions were sent from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Almost all of them were concentrated in the western direction.
With someone's light hand, the opinion was established that Moscow was saved by the Siberian divisions. But let's not forget that for Muscovites everything beyond the Urals is Siberia. The divisions that arrived along the Great Siberian Railway and participated in the battle for Moscow were not Siberian, but Far Eastern!
From May 1 to November 18, 1942, the Far Eastern units were already replenishing the Stalingrad, South-Eastern and Bryansk fronts. And so it continued until 1944, when, during the summer-autumn campaign, the last regrouping of troops from the Far East to the west was made. In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, 23 divisions and 19 brigades were sent from the region!
Replenishable reserve
Often the rate of dispatch of troops was so high that they left at the loading station on alarm. Because of this, the units could be understaffed - some of the personnel could be outside the location. In some places there was a shortage of weapons and transport - after all, at the very beginning of the war, the entire mobilization stock of weapons and ammunition was sent to the west. And Moscow demanded full staffing! And Apanasenko organized the check-out station Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya (Belogorsk), which housed the residence of the headquarters of the 2nd Army, and a reserve of all weapons, vehicles and personnel was created to make up for the shortage.
In order not to leave the region defenseless, Iosif Rodionovich immediately formed new divisions in place of the departed divisions. For this, a general mobilization of all ages up to and including 55 was announced! But since there were not enough people, on the orders of Apanasenko, the prosecutor's office checked the affairs of the camp contingent and freed everyone who was possible and sent them to the troops.
And yet the front!
Japan closely followed the Far Eastern frontiers. But the transportation of troops was organized so skillfully (additional secrecy was provided by the railway tunnel built on the eve of the war under the Amur near Khabarovsk), and the contingent of departing units replenished so quickly that it even caused a skirmish between the Germans and the Japanese. German intelligence claimed that "under the nose" of Japan, divisions from the Far East were being transferred to the west. The Japanese secret services denied this, insisting that the Far Eastern divisions remained in their places of deployment.
The Japanese General Staff in 1941 was seriously engaged in preparing for war and even developed a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Far East. On August 29, 1941, the start of hostilities themselves was already planned, and everything was planned to be completed by mid-October. However, the blitzkrieg not only failed, but did not even begin. The course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front convinced Japan not to rush the offensive, and already in early July the terms were revised.
And in the Soviet Far East, preparations for a possible war were in full swing. In the border zone, it was required to create an insurmountable line of defense of the land state border and the sea coast. Formations and units were not just put on alert - they dug trenches, equipped command posts, laid roads, and created anti-tank obstacles. At sea, ships of the Pacific Fleet already in the first days of the war set up defensive minefields on the outskirts of Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk.
The construction of the field defense was completed by October 1, 1941. But even when in December 1941 Japan got involved in a war against the United States, even when in 1942 it became clear that the Japanese were seriously bogged down in this struggle, defensive work in the Far East did not stop. In 1942-1943, military units worked on defensive lines six days a week, and only in 1944-1945 four days a month. Not only the front line was fortified. The forces of the troops and the local population in Khabarovsk and other large cities of the Far East created three to four barricade lines.
All this is only a part of what was done by the Far East during the war years. There was also a mass departure of volunteers to the front, and heroic work at workplaces with overfulfillment of plans, and the evacuation of some enterprises to the region (there was no mass evacuation - the region was considered as a potential front throughout the war years). And at the last stage of the war, the Far East also became a springboard for military operations against Japan. So, throughout the Great Patriotic War, the region was both the rear, in which the Victory was forged, and the front, ready at any moment to start hostilities on its territory.
PHOTO: safe-rgs.ru, echo.msk.ru, pravoslavie.ru
Soviet troops in the Far East, being an integral part of the Armed Forces of the USSR, during the years of the war with fascist Germany went through basically the same stages of development as all the troops of the active fronts. The combat experience acquired on the Soviet-German front was of decisive importance in this process.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the formations and units of the Far Eastern grouping, in terms of organizational structure, combat composition, the presence of weapons and military equipment, as well as deployment, fully corresponded to the tasks that followed from the operational plan for covering the Far Eastern borders, developed on the eve of the attack of fascist Germany. On June 22, 1941, the Far Eastern grouping was staffed: for Ground searches - by 100 percent, by the Air Force - by 88.6 and by the Navy - by 97.4 percent
In 1941 - 1945 The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the experience of the war with Nazi Germany, paid great attention to the development of the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Navy in the Far East. At the same time, the Stavka had information that militaristic Japan was systematically building up the combat power of its ground forces in Manchuria, therefore, in strengthening the Far Eastern grouping, a course was pursued towards the predominance of ground forces in it. This is confirmed by the data presented in Table 1.
The years of the Great Patriotic War were characterized by great changes in the organizational forms, combat and strength of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. The main factors that influenced the improvement of the structure of the Soviet troops, as well as the change in their combat and numerical strength, were: the military-economic capabilities of the socialist system, the continuous buildup and improvement of technical means of combat, the growth in numbers and improvement of the combat strength, the scientifically based ratio of types and military branches, based on a correct assessment of the strongest aspects of each of them and the nature of the tasks that they had to perform, the skillful use of the vast experience of military operations acquired on the Soviet-German front. At the same time, the development of the Armed Forces was influenced by the peculiarities of the military-political goals of the Soviet Union in the Far East, as well as the peculiarity of the Far Eastern nature and climate.
Table 1. The ratio of the types of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Far East during the Great Patriotic War (in terms of the number of personnel in percent)
The development of optimal organizational forms of formations and units, the correlation of types and branches of troops, the determination of the size and combat composition of the Far Eastern group, the implementation of all plans and calculations for the defense of the country in this theater during the tense years of the Great Patriotic War were carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, commands and the headquarters of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the formations and formations that were part of them.
To lead the Soviet troops in the Far East during the war with Nazi Germany, the General Staff created special areas of operational control - the Far East and Transbaikal. In addition, in the most difficult time for the country (1941-1942), the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Far East was established.
During the war years, the direct military control bodies of the Far Eastern grouping were: the commands and field administrations of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the commands and headquarters of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, the administrations and headquarters of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country.
The overall growth of the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces made it possible to increase the combat capability of the Far Eastern grouping. The main concern was to increase fire capabilities, increase maneuverability and striking power of formations and units.
Up to 70 percent of the personnel of the ground forces of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts were in rifle formations. The number of rifle formations and units was constantly growing, which were saturated with new types of military equipment and weapons. For example, the number of machine guns in a rifle division from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 increased almost 21 times, light machine guns - more than two times. With the growth in the production of artillery equipment, more advanced guns and mortars were supplied to the arsenal of divisions in increasing numbers. However, transport provision remained insufficient. This was due to the difficult terrain of the Far Eastern Theater, which limited the mobility and maneuverability of the division. Rifle troops in the Far East doubled over the years of the war, despite the fact that a large number of formations were sent from here to the Soviet-German front.
Artillery represented the main firepower of the ground search. During the war years, the artillery of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts grew significantly in quantity and quality. Since the end of 1943, each combined-arms army was assigned a cannon, anti-tank, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery regiments. During the war years, the artillery fleet of the Far Eastern group of ground forces increased by 1.8 times, despite the fact that about 5.5 thousand guns and mortars were transferred from here to the Soviet-German front during this time. This was achieved thanks to the efforts of the rapidly recovering and rapidly developing defense industry, which during the war years sent about 11 thousand guns and mortars to the Far East. In 1943 alone, the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern Fronts received more than 8,000 guns and mortars, or 23.8 percent of deliveries of the same type of weapons to the active army during this time.
It is known that during the years of the Great Patriotic War, a fundamentally new and effective means of combating enemy manpower and equipment appeared in the Soviet Armed Forces - rocket artillery. In the summer of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command found an opportunity to implement it in the ground forces of the Far East, sending one regiment of rocket artillery to the Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts for combat training.
Large artillery formations, such as artillery corps, divisions and brigades, which became widespread in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front, appeared as part of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts only after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Throughout the Great Patriotic War, the main formation in the military artillery, artillery of the RGK and anti-aircraft artillery in the Far East was the regiment. In total, during the war years, 107 artillery, anti-tank destroyers were formed there. mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, some of which were sent to the Soviet-German front. By the end of the war with Nazi Germany, the artillery of the Far Eastern group of ground forces was gradually transferred from horse-drawn to mechanized.
Armored and mechanized troops, being the main strike and maneuver force of the ground forces of the Far Eastern group, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were represented by 8 tank and motorized divisions and a motorized armored brigade.
The experience of combat operations on the Soviet-German front required the improvement of the organization of armored and mechanized troops. In this regard, in 1941, tank (with the exception of two) and motorized divisions in the Far East were disbanded, and their personnel and materiel transferred to the organization of lighter and more maneuverable formations - tank brigades, separate tank regiments and battalions. During the war years, 27 tank and mechanized brigades were formed here. While new types of tank formations - armies and corps - were being created on the Soviet-German front, in the Far East, due to the weakness of the material and technical base of armored and mechanized troops, this process was delayed. The 10th mechanized corps, the only one in the entire Far Eastern grouping of ground forces, began to form there only in December 1944.
However, until 1945, both the organization and armament of armored and mechanized troops in the Far East made it possible to use them effectively in cooperation with other branches of the military in the event of defensive operations against Japan. To carry out offensive tasks, a decisive reinforcement was required, or rather, the creation of a new grouping of armored and mechanized troops. Therefore, during the period of preparation for the war with Japan, the armored and mechanized troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts underwent a significant reorganization and were significantly strengthened as a result of regrouping from the west.
During the entire war with fascist Germany, the tank fleet of the Far Eastern group of ground forces did not practically change either in qualitative or quantitative terms. Light tanks in 1941 accounted for 100 percent of the tank fleet, and in 1942-1945. - from 90 to 95 percent. Their low efficiency in the conditions of the mountainous-swampy-taiga relief reduced the scope of the use of these combat vehicles. A new type of armored weapons, which became widespread on the Soviet-German front, - self-propelled artillery installations - in 1941-1944. in the composition of the Far Eastern fronts was completely absent.
In the Far Eastern grouping of the Soviet Air Force in 1941 - 1945. their organizational structure underwent the most significant changes. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to abandon, as in the army, the dispersion of aviation and unite aviation formations and units into larger formations - air armies. In this regard, in August 1942, all front-line aviation in the Far East was concentrated in four air armies. The creation of air associations was a major step in the improvement of the organizational structure of aviation in the Far East.
Another important measure in strengthening the Far Eastern Air Force grouping was the transition in 1942, as in all the Air Forces, from formations and units of mixed composition to homogeneous formations and units of bomber, attack and fighter aircraft.
Improving the organizational structure of the Air Force led to changes in their combat composition. All these measures allowed the command of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, if necessary, to use aviation more massively and purposefully, which facilitated its interaction with ground forces.
Since 1944, the aircraft fleet of the Far Eastern Air Force has been replenished with new types of combat aircraft: Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-7 fighters, Il-4, Tu-2 bombers and Il-2 attack aircraft. If by the beginning of the war the bulk of the aircraft fleet in the Far East were bombers (42.2 percent), then, given the combat experience of aviation on the Soviet-German front, the command began to gradually change the ratio of aviation branches in the direction of increasing the number of fighters. By the time Nazi Germany surrendered, the aircraft fleet of the Air Force in the Far East was as follows: 55 percent of it was fighters, 22 bombers, 16 attack aircraft and 7 percent scouts. In terms of tactical and technical data and numbers, the aircraft fleet of Soviet aviation significantly surpassed the Japanese Air Force grouping in Manchuria.
During the years of the war with Nazi Germany, the Air Defense Forces of the country in the Far East did not undergo significant changes. If at the Western Theater in 1941 - 1945. their structure was constantly improved, combat and numerical strength increased, then here the air defense system underwent a radical reorganization only once - at the end of 1941, when the corresponding formations were transferred from the Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts to the direct subordination of the commanders of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal air defense zones of the country and parts.
The Far Eastern grouping of the country's Air Defense Forces included fighter aircraft (united in each air defense zone into one division) and anti-aircraft artillery (united in the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Ash in three brigade districts, and in the Far East - in seven). Air surveillance, warning and communications (VNOS) was carried out by battalions created in each air defense brigade area. Such an organization of the air defense forces ensured sufficiently flexible control, as well as the concentration of forces and means in order to cover the troops and the most important objects in the Far East from possible attacks by Japanese aircraft.
The forces of the USSR Navy in the Far East during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Pacific Fleet (with the Northern Pacific Flotilla included in it) and the Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla. The strategic task of the Far Eastern grouping of the Navy in 1941 - 1945. It consisted in jointly with other branches of the Armed Forces the reliable defense of the coast of the Soviet Union and the protection of their sea lanes from the aggressive actions of militaristic Japan.
Throughout the war, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was significantly inferior to the Japanese Navy. It did not have aircraft carriers, battleships, and there were only two cruisers, and even then only by the beginning of 1945. However, it had quite powerful aircraft, coastal artillery and a significant number of submarines. The Red Banner Amur military flotilla in all respects was superior to the Japanese Sungarian military flotilla.
Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War, focusing on the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front, improved the organizational structure, strengthened the combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces in the Far East. Far Eastern warriors persistently studied the combat experience of the active armies and fleets. Many officers and generals were sent to active fronts for training. Upon returning to the Far East, they passed on their experience to the troops. The sending to the Far East of soldiers, foremen, officers and generals who had already accumulated combat experience on the Soviet-German front was also of positive importance.
During the period of preparation for the war with Japan, the composition and organization of the Far Eastern group underwent a radical change. During May - July 1945, the organs of the operational-strategic leadership of the Soviet troops in the Far East were reorganized taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the features of the Far Eastern theater: the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was created. This was due to the great remoteness of the theater of operations from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as well as the huge spatial scope of the upcoming hostilities in this theater. All the ground forces deployed in the theater, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy were transferred to the subordination of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.
At the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff still had direct contact with the fronts and the fleet. The organization of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East made it possible to promptly carry out the instructions of the Supreme High Command to defeat the Kwantung Army, to take comprehensive account of all changes in the strategic and operational situation, and to respond to them in a timely manner.
In the spring and summer of 1945, an intensive and significant build-up of combat forces and means necessary for decisive offensive operations was carried out in the Far East. For this purpose, a large number of personnel, weapons and military equipment were deployed, mainly ground and air forces - combined arms and tank armies, aviation corps and divisions, and air defense formations of the country. At the same time, the formations and units of all the Armed Forces, types and branches of the armed forces, which were located throughout the war with Nazi Germany in the Far East, were reorganized organizationally.
In the ground forces, rifle divisions were completely transferred to a full-time organization, which had proven itself well in the final battles against Nazi Germany. Most of them were reinforced with modern types of weapons and military equipment - self-propelled artillery mounts, automatic small arms, trucks and mechanical traction.
During May - June 1945, heavy and medium tanks and self-propelled guns, both supplied by industry and transferred from the west, entered the formations and units of the armored and mechanized troops. As a result, by August 9, heavy and medium tanks and self-propelled guns accounted for up to 45 percent of the total tank fleet in the Far East. Artillery has changed qualitatively and quantitatively. The result of the measures taken was an increase in the artillery fleet by 1.4 times.
During the period of the strategic deployment of Soviet troops in the Far East, all three fronts had an air army, and the 12th air army was attached to two RVGK bomber aviation corps. and the long-range bomber aviation corps is operationally subordinated to the 9th Air Army. In three months, the size of the aircraft fleet, thanks to revenues from industry and the transfer from the Soviet-German front, increased by almost 20 percent, the ratio of aviation branches changed somewhat (basically, the number of bombers increased). Taking into account the peculiarities of the area of forthcoming operations, the High Command reinforced the air armies with transport aviation divisions and regiments. As a result of this restructuring, the striking power of the Soviet Air Force increased significantly by August 9.
The country's air defense forces in the Far East have also undergone a reorganization. Their new organization was based on the principle of the country's air defense system, which had developed on the Soviet-German front. On the basis of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones, three air defense armies were created to cover the troops of the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern fronts. The previously existing air defense brigade areas were reorganized into air defense divisions. In addition, 3 air defense corps arrived here from the west. As a result of this reorganization and increase in combat forces, the artillery fleet of the country's Air Defense Forces in the Far East has almost tripled in three months, while fighter aviation has increased by 13 percent.
The Fleet Air Force was equipped with new aircraft; the ship structure of the Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet) - frigates, patrol ships, landing craft. The Marine Corps was replenished with personnel who had combat experience. However, the Pacific Fleet was still inferior to the Japanese fleet in large surface ships.
During the period of preparation for military operations against Japan, the Soviet Supreme High Command reorganized the Armed Forces in the Far East. In a short time, a powerful offensive strategic grouping of troops was created, capable of defeating Japanese troops in Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
When front-line administrations, formations and formations were transferred to the Far East, specific experience gained in the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front was taken into account. Formations and formations that had experience in breaking through heavily fortified positions were included in the 1st Far Eastern Front. The troops, who had the skills to act in mountainous conditions, were sent mainly to the Trans-Baikal Front, which had to overcome the Greater Khingan.
The organizational and combat composition of the fronts was greatly influenced by the characteristics of each strategic sector, the capacity of operational sectors, the nature of the defense, and the size of the enemy grouping. Since there was no prepared defense in front of the Trans-Baikal Front, the Soviet command sent more tanks and self-propelled guns there, and more artillery and mortars to the 1st Far Eastern Front, where there was a continuous zone of long-term defensive fortifications.
The experience of operational-strategic cover for the deployment of Soviet troops is instructive. In this direction, it was necessary to carry out major measures, because the enemy had more than a million strong grouping, ready for active operations.
During the period of deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, the troops and fortified areas located in Primorye and Transbaikalia were put on full combat readiness, a plan for conducting defensive operations was developed, an air defense system was created for unloading stations prepared in advance, important road junctions, areas of concentration, measures were provided for combating air landings, the defense of the sea coast was organized and brought to full readiness, reconnaissance was strengthened in every possible way. In the course of defensive work, the issues of camouflage and disinformation of the enemy were resolved.
A certain role was played by the border troops, which not only strengthened the protection of the state border and provided the arriving units with intelligence data on the enemy grouping and the state of the terrain in the border zone, but also took a direct part in the combat operations of the front troops.
Extremely interesting and instructive are the measures to ensure the covert transfer of a large mass of troops from west to east, large intra-front regroupings, operational-strategic deployment of troops and the concentration of materiel. Throughout the complex system of preparations for the Manchurian operation, the requirements of secrecy were strictly taken into account.
The Japanese command knew about the upcoming offensive, but they did not know either the time of its start, or the true scope, or the direction of the strikes. Consequently, the Soviet troops on the scale of the entire campaign managed to achieve surprise, which was of strategic importance.
The campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was short-lived. Its goals were achieved in the course of the Manchurian strategic offensive, the South Sakhalin offensive and the Kuril landing operations. The Manchurian operation was the main one in the Far East campaign. It was attended by three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, the border troops and the Air Defense Forces of the country in the Far East.
The most important feature of the Manchurian operation is that the strategic goals of the war were achieved at its beginning. As an operation, it is also characterized by some other features typical of the initial period of the war: secrecy in the concentration and deployment of groupings of troops, a sudden transition to the offensive at night, and a crushing initial strike involving the maximum of forces and means in the first echelon. All this required a clear organization of interaction between the three fronts, the fleet and the river flotilla in terms of time, objects and lines.
Consequently, in the war with Japan, the Soviet Armed Forces gained experience in preparing a major operation designed to seize the strategic initiative, quickly maneuver part of the troops and aviation over long distances, and organize interaction between ground forces and the Air Force and Navy. At the same time, experience was gained in organizing and conducting a major offensive operation in the conditions of the mountain-taiga and desert-steppe theater of military operations.
The development of the strategic plan and plans for the Manchurian operation was the result of the intense creative activity of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, the commands and staffs of the fronts and the fleet. When planning the operation, personal visits by the Commander-in-Chief and front commanders to the main sectors of the fronts, their familiarization with the troops, and reconnaissance were of great importance. After appropriate discussions, the necessary changes were made to the previously adopted plans. A problem of strategic importance was the determination of the number of forces needed for the Manchurian and other operations.
The strategic plan of the Manchurian operation was notable for its purposefulness, decisiveness of actions and ensured the rapid defeat of the Kwantung Army. The decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to deliver two powerful strikes in opposite directions in order to encircle the main forces of the Kwantung Army fully justified itself. The offensive plan made it possible to keep the initiative in the hands of the Soviet command throughout the entire operation. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that the enemy's border fortifications and the Great Khingan mountain range were overcome on the fifth or sixth day of the operation.
The directions of the main attacks were chosen exceptionally well. Their choice was determined primarily by the form of the strategic encirclement operation. In addition, the favorable configuration of the state border, the nature of the location of the fortified areas of the Japanese, the peculiarities of the grouping of the main forces of the Kwantung Army (two-thirds on the Manchurian Plain and in the area of Korean ports), and the insufficient network of internal communications, which limited the enemy's ability to maneuver with reserves, were taken into account.
The directions of the main attacks brought Soviet troops to the flanks and rear of the main enemy grouping, deprived him of communication with the mother country and with the strategic reserves located in North China. Thus, the Trans-Baikal Front reached the coast of the Yellow Sea in the shortest direction (from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic to Kalgan, Beijing) and completed its task of isolating Manchuria in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the main forces of this front dismembered the troops of the 1st and 3rd fronts of the Kwantung Army with a deep cutting blow against Shenyang, Luishun, Dalian, which hastened their surrender.
Such decisiveness and purposefulness of actions are also indicative of the operations of other fronts. The 2nd Far Eastern Front, with the operationally subordinate Amur military flotilla, rapidly advanced in the Sungarian direction, which subsequently made it possible to clear Northern Manchuria.
The troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, having broken the reinforced concrete belt of fortified areas, during fierce battles, entered the Central Manchurian Plain and rushed to join the Trans-Baikal Front, and on the left wing, in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet, liberated North Korea and deprived the enemy of communications with the mother country. On the 13th lane of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the main efforts were shifted from the main direction to the auxiliary attack direction, where a more decisive success was indicated. This became possible thanks to the pre-planned options for the actions of the troops, as well as the presence of significant reserves in the front commander.
As a result of a series of strong blows to the enemy's defenses, he was pinned down along the entire length of the Soviet-Manchurian and Mongol-Manchurian borders and was unable to determine where the Soviet troops were delivering the main blow.
A feature of the operation was that, due to the geographical conditions of all strategic directions, the Soviet troops did not advance on a continuous front, but only on selected operational directions, often hundreds of kilometers apart from one another. The disunity of operational areas determined the relative independence in the actions of fronts, armies, and even formations. For example, between the 6th Guards Tank and 17th armies, which were part of the main strike force of the Trans-Baikal Front, there was a gap of 200 km.
The flanks of the fronts were separated by hundreds of kilometers of inaccessible mountainous taiga or swampy terrain. Because of this, the interaction of the fronts was organized according to the time, tasks and directions of the main, as well as auxiliary strikes. This made it possible to expose the enemy's defenses to simultaneous strong blows on a huge front.
The actions of the fronts and armies in the Manchurian strategic operation unfolded over a vast area. The width of the offensive zone of the Trans-Baikal Front reached 2300 km (active sector - 1500 km), the 2nd Far East - 2130 km (active sector - 520 km), the 1st Far East - 700 km. The depth of front-line operations was: for the Trans-Baikal Front - 800 km (access to the Chifeng, Shenyang, Changchun, Buhedu line), for the 1st Far East - 200 km (access to the Mudanjiang River). The performance of tasks by the fronts to such a great depth was ensured by the power of the initial strike, high swiftness, courage and continuity of the offensive of the troops, the presence of strong mobile formations, the dominance of aviation, as well as the absence of defensive zones in the operational directions deep in the enemy’s position. The scope of the advance of fronts and armies is shown in Table 2.
The high command of the Soviet troops in the Far East, taking into account the peculiarities of the theater of operations, the high individual training, stamina and fanaticism of the Japanese soldier, expected stubborn resistance from the enemy. Therefore, front-line operations were planned for a period of 20-25 days. The strong strike groupings created in the most important areas and the high activity of the Soviet troops made it possible to more than double the pace of the offensive and reduce the duration of operations to an average of ten days.
A characteristic feature of the offensive operations of the fronts and armies was the bold massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks. With a total length of the front in Manchuria of 5130 km, active offensive operations were carried out on 2720 km, and the main groupings struck on an even narrower front: the Transbaikal Front - 300 km. 1st Far East - 200 km, 2nd Far East - 330 km. The Trans-Baikal Front concentrated 70 percent of rifle troops and up to 90 percent of tanks and artillery in the direction of the main attack. This made it possible to create superiority over the enemy: 1.7 times in infantry, 4.5 times in guns, 9.6 times in mortars, 5.1 times in tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2.6 times in aircraft. On the 29-kilometer breakthrough section of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the ratio of forces and means was as follows: in people - 1.5: 1, in guns - 4: 1, in tanks and self-propelled guns - 8: 1. It was approximately the same in the breakthrough areas in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Far Eastern Front.
The operational formation of troops in the fronts and most of the armies was two-echelon, and the second echelons of the combined arms armies were brought into battle earlier than planned. This was determined by the successful development of army operations and the need to use the favorable situation to increase the pace of the offensive.
On the Trans-Baikal Front, the operational formation of troops was distinguished by the presence of a tank army and a cavalry-mechanized group in the first echelon, which was caused by the need to forestall the enemy in capturing the Greater Khingan passes and quickly reach the Manchurian Plain. In the 1st Far Eastern Front, the 10th Mechanized Corps acted as an echelon for the development of success. With the first echelons of rifle divisions, up to 30 separate tank brigades advanced on all fronts. They provided a high rate of advance.
Airborne landings in Changchun, Shenyang, Harbin, Jilin, Luishun, Hamhung, Pyongyang and other major cities and ports played a significant role in the offensive. They paralyzed the work of the rear communications of the enemy, before the approach of the ground forces they took under protection the most important military and industrial facilities, preventing their destruction and destruction.
Table 2. The scope of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Manchurian operation (as of August 19, 1945)
| armies | Promotion depth, km | Width of the offensive zone, km | Average daily rate of progress, km |
| Transbaikal Front In the direction of the main attack 6th Guards Tank Army |
820 | 200 | 82 |
| 39th Army |
380 | 200 | 38 |
| 17th Army |
450 | 200 | 45 |
| Transbaikal Front On other directions 36th Army |
450 | 700 | 45 |
| Horse-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops |
420-550 |
300 | 42-55 |
| 1st Far Eastern Front In the direction of the main attack 1st Red Banner Army |
300 | 135 | 30 |
| 5th Army |
300 | 65 | 30 |
| 1st Far Eastern Front On other directions 35th Army |
250 | 250 | 25 |
| 25th Army |
200 | 285 | 20 |
| 2nd Far Eastern Front In the direction of the main attack 15th Army |
300 | 330 | 30 |
| 2nd Far Eastern Front In the direction of the main attack 2nd Red Banner Army |
200 | 150 | 20 |
| 16th Army |
360 | 150 | 24 |
(~1) The 16th Army went on the offensive on 11 August.
The depth and pace of advance of Soviet troops in each of the directions depended on the nature of the enemy's defense, the forces and composition of his groupings, the degree of resistance, and also on the terrain. Thus, in the offensive zone of the Trans-Baikal Front, the enemy built fortified areas only in certain directions. The nature of the terrain made it possible to bypass these fortified areas. The enemy withdrew the main forces into the depths, and the covering forces were insufficient to offer serious resistance to the powerful blows of the armies of the Trans-Baikal Front. As a result, these armies advanced to a great depth in ten days at a high average daily rate.
The situation was different on the 1st Far Eastern Front, where the enemy had an almost uninterrupted chain of fortified areas in the border zone of Manchuria and deployed more troops than in front of the Transbaikal Front. In addition, the Soviet troops were blocked by hard-to-reach mountain ranges and taiga. Naturally, all this affected the pace of the advance of the armies of the 1st Far Eastern Front.
In the Manchurian operation, the experience of breaking through fortified areas at night, without artillery and aviation preparation, deserves attention. The sudden appearance of Soviet advanced detachments in the strongholds of the Suifenhe, Tungning and other fortified regions caught the Japanese garrisons by surprise, and the swift actions of the troops ruled out the possibility of organized resistance. Strongpoints were bypassed or blocked. Large gaps formed in the enemy's defense, where the main forces of the advancing troops rushed. This decided the fate of most of the enemy fortified areas, which were captured in the very first days of the operation.
Forward detachments played an important role in achieving high rates of advance. They were created in almost all divisions and corps of the first echelons of the armies. The detachment included from a tank battalion to a tank brigade, from several companies to an infantry regiment in vehicles, a self-propelled artillery battalion, an artillery battalion (regiment), anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions and other support units.
In some cases, separate tank brigades acted as forward detachments, capable of a rapid offensive even in isolation from the main forces of the formations.
Surprise, bold and decisive actions formed the basis of the combat operations of the forward detachments. Their task included: capturing and holding advantageous lines until the main forces approached, enveloping the enemy's flanks and reaching his rear, and simultaneously pursuing the retreating enemy. The forward detachments advanced at a speed of 100-150 km per day; the main forces of the armies - rifle troops - 35 - 40 km, cavalry - 50 - 60 km per day.
The rate of advance of the armored and mechanized troops of the Trans-Baikal Front on some days reached 150 - 160 km and averaged 70 - 90 km per day, in the 1st Far Eastern Front - 50 km, in the 2nd Far Eastern Front - 40 - 50 km per day . The troops of the 16th Army in South Sakhalin, in cooperation with naval and airborne assault forces, advanced to a depth of 360 km during the 15 days of the offensive at an average rate of 24 km per day.
Combat operations in Manchuria unfolded mainly along the roads laid in the mountains, and often outside of any roads - along the ridges, mountain valleys, along the centuries-old taiga, unsteady swamps and deserts. They were in the nature of the offensive of individual columns, operating without a direct tactical connection between themselves. Therefore, even before the start of the offensive, all the necessary measures were provided for combat, engineering, road, material and aviation support for such columns, giving them complete independence.
The Soviet Air Force, covering from the air the main groupings of troops of the fronts, attacked the enemy's railway facilities, defensive structures, command posts, accumulations of his manpower and equipment, forbade the approach of reserves from North China and Korea, conducted intensive aerial reconnaissance on all major lines of attack for troops. The actions of front-line aviation were characterized by the unification of the efforts of three air armies and a separate bomber aviation corps of long-range aviation under the unified leadership of the commander of the Soviet Army Air Force, which, given the disunity of the offensive directions, as well as the special geographical and meteorological conditions of the theater, was important. In order to disrupt enemy railway transportation and prevent the approach of reserves, up to 85 percent of all bomber sorties were made in the offensive zone of the Transbaikal Front alone.
As a result, the battle areas were isolated from the influx of fresh enemy forces, the measures to evacuate material assets from the border areas, as well as the withdrawal of formations from the blows of the advancing troops, were thwarted.
Another feature in the operations of military aviation was the involvement of a significant number of forces for conducting aerial reconnaissance in the interests of the command of the fronts, combined arms and tank armies. The need for this was caused by the lack of accurate data about the enemy and the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive immediately after the declaration of war. The air armies spent from 20 to 33 percent of all sorties on this task.
With the development of the offensive of the ground forces, aviation efforts switched to supporting forward detachments and mobile formations. A special role was assigned to aviation in its interaction with the 6th Guards Tank Army. When overcoming the Greater Khingan ridge, two assault and one fighter air divisions interacted directly, and two bomber air divisions struck at enemy resistance nodes along the path of the tankers.
In the course of the further offensive of the combined arms and tank armies, transport aviation played an active role, delivering fuel and ammunition to the advancing formations. Subsequently, she carried out the tasks of landing airborne assault forces on the airfields of important political, administrative and industrial centers of Manchuria, North Korea, and South Sakhalin, carried out in order to hasten the surrender of the Kwantung Army troops and prevent the destruction of material values.
The landing of airborne troops was provided by the actions of combat aviation of two air armies and special air reconnaissance. Fighter and bomber aircraft patrolled over the landing airfields, ready to support the landing forces at any moment.
The interaction of the Pacific Fleet with the ground forces consisted in covering the coastal flank of the 1st Far Eastern Front during its offensive into North Korea. The Red Banner Amur military flotilla closely cooperated with the main grouping of troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front throughout the entire Sungaria operation.
The most typical for the actions of the fleet and the flotilla were air strikes, landing and support of amphibious assaults in the ports of Yuki, Seishin, Rasin, on Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands, where nine landings were landed. This made it possible to quickly liberate the important ports of the northeastern coast of Korea, suppress enemy resistance, and seize the Kuril Islands, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. In most cases, naval warships, especially torpedo boats, were used for landings, and only in a few cases - special landing craft. The use of torpedo boats, which had a high speed, was dictated by the need to quickly capture enemy ports and bases. Marines usually landed in the first throws, showing examples of courage and courage. Bravely acted in landings and part of the ground forces.
A feature of the landing operations of the Pacific Fleet to seize ports and bases in North Korea was their speed, which was achieved by capturing ports before the ground forces approached. As a result of the preemptive strikes by the fleet, the Kwantung Army lost its sea lanes and found itself in complete isolation.
The important tasks of the flotilla were the landing of troops and their artillery support, assistance to the ground forces in forcing wide water barriers, and the implementation of river transportation. So, almost completely the 2nd Red Banner Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and up to half of the forces and combat assets of the 15th Army were transferred across the Amur by the Red Banner Amur military flotilla. Of considerable interest is the interaction of the troops of the 15th Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front with formations and ships of this flotilla.
A major role was played by the thorough training of the interaction of the flotilla with the ground forces and the preparation of the personnel of the ships for operations against the enemy ground forces, which was carried out long before the start of the war with Japan.
The ships of the flotilla, having ground forces on board, continuously acted in the vanguard of the main forces of the 15th Army. At the beginning of the operation, landings and the crossing of troops on various sections of the Amur and Ussuri rivers were carried out. During the operation, the flotilla supported with artillery fire the landing detachments fighting to expand and hold bridgeheads, as well as the troops of the 15th Army advancing in the coastal strip. During the ten days of the operation, the main forces of the flotilla, interacting with the troops of the 15th Army, traveled over 900 km along the Amur and Songhua rivers - from Fuyuan to Harbin.
In turn, the troops of the 15th Army at the beginning of the operation, with artillery fire, provided the flotilla with landing troops, their capture and retention of islands and bridgeheads, and during the operation they covered the ships of the flotilla operating on the Sungari River from enemy impact from land. The operational subordination of the flotilla to the command of the front, and the brigades of river ships to the armies and the 5th separate rifle corps, fully justified itself.
Caught unawares, stunned by the force of the blows of the Soviet Armed Forces, the enemy was unable to use his Sungari flotilla in an organized manner.
The success of actions and their pace were largely determined by the correct and clear organization of interaction, which was achieved thanks to personal communication between the commanders of the interacting units and formations, the exchange of communications officers, and the control of heterogeneous forces from one command post. An important role was played by communication and joint operational training of front and flotilla officers in the period preceding the operation and in the course of its conduct.
The air defense forces of the country in the Far East campaign were in constant combat readiness, although they did not conduct major hostilities, since Japanese aviation did not show much activity.
During the preparation and during the campaign, the rear services faced tasks of great complexity. Logistic support was one of the important factors limiting the timing of the start of the Manchurian operation.
Measures related to the logistics of the troops began to be carried out as early as March 1945 and continued until the very beginning of hostilities, and some even with the onset of the Soviet offensive. On all three fronts, the main difficulty was the huge space, the limited means of transport, and the low possibility of using the local industrial and raw material base to provide the troops with ammunition and fuel. Most of these funds had to be delivered over many thousands of kilometers. Thanks to timely measures taken by the beginning of August 1945, the necessary reserves of ammunition of all kinds, as well as food, were created in the troops.
All the work done by the rear services during the preparatory period ensured the successful course of the operation. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops advanced 300-800 km in the first 10-15 days, they did not experience serious difficulties in supply, with the exception of temporary interruptions in the supply of fuel for the 6th Guards Tank Army.
Particularly noteworthy is the noble and selfless work of Soviet doctors, who sang a great deal of work to eliminate various epidemic diseases among the local population of Manchuria.
The brilliant victory of the USSR Armed Forces in the Far East once again confirmed the indisputable advantages of Soviet military art in the field of strategy, operational art and tactics. The Manchurian strategic offensive operation of three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla is one of the outstanding operations of the Second World War in terms of its concept, scope, dynamism, methods of accomplishing tasks and final results. The simultaneous infliction of several front and army strikes using all types of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, united by a common strategic plan, made it possible to achieve the complete defeat of the enemy in a short time.
Even bourgeois historians, who are trying to downplay the contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of militarist Japan, when analyzing the Manchurian operation admit that it “deserves careful attention and a certain place in the history of the Second World War,” primarily because the Soviet command “was forced to apply a new strategy here to deal with the Japanese defenses". This “new strategy”, in their opinion, manifested itself primarily in high rates of attack, close cooperation between the branches of the Armed Forces, open flanks, airborne landings in front of the advancing troops, etc. All these features, they argue, were more typical for “ post-war strategy and doctrine of the Soviet command”, rather than for the period of the war.
The Manchurian operation embodied the vast experience gained by the Soviet command, officers and soldiers in an uncompromising struggle against a strong and experienced enemy - fascist Germany. That is why it clearly manifested such features of military leadership and military skill as a high level of strategic planning, an unprecedented in scale and timing maneuver by part of the Armed Forces to a new theater, remote at 8 - 12 thousand km, the organization of a sudden and simultaneous offensive of three fronts, aviation, fleet and air defense forces in various strategic directions. It is also characterized by a great depth of front-line and army operations, an unusually high rate of advance in disparate operational areas, a wide maneuver using encirclement, detours and encirclement of the enemy grouping, the use of tank formations to rapidly overcome vast desert-steppe and desert-mountain regions. Indicative was the clear interaction of the ground forces with the fleet on the coastal flank, the dropping of airborne assault forces to interact with the advanced units and capture strategically important objects, the organization of close and comprehensive interaction of aviation with the ground forces and the fleet in the interests of their fastest advance. Thus, victory was achieved with lightning speed: in just 24 days, a powerful enemy grouping was utterly defeated.
Throughout World War II, the Kuomintang armies did not actually conduct combat operations against Japan; armed struggle took place only on the fronts of the 8th and 4th New People's Liberation Armies. By 1944, the number of regular troops led by the CPC had reached 910,000. There were 2.2 million people in the people's militia units. The 8th and 4th New PLA repulsed numerous campaigns of Japanese and puppet troops; by April 1945, there were 19 liberated regions in China with a population exceeding 95 million people. These armies pinned down most of the Japanese military in China - 64 percent of the Japanese and 95 percent of the puppet government's troops.
The Japanese command at the end of March 1944 launched the largest offensive during the war in China. Operations were conducted against the Kuomintang troops and aimed at occupying the entire coast of China, pushing the Kuomintang inland. By establishing a direct land connection from Singapore to Northeast China, the Japanese strategists completely eliminated the consequences of the naval blockade established by the US and British fleets. The consequences of all this would be very significant, as D. F. Dulles admitted: “The Japanese accumulated a large amount of military materials in Northeast China, hoping that they would be able to continue the war on the mainland, even if the islands themselves were lost.” The Japanese offensive lasted almost a year and was crowned with success. The Kuomintang armies were defeated, losing from 700 thousand to 1 million people. The Japanese connected their fronts in Central and South China, creating a wide corridor along the coast. They occupied the Chinese provinces with an area of about 2 million square meters. km with a population of 60 million people.
During the advance, Japanese troops captured 10 major air bases and 36 airfields. These bases were created with great difficulty by the Americans, during the retreat they had to abandon and burn the property available on them, and in order to deliver one ton of cargo to them, the Americans spent three tons of fuel; China's only supply route was by air, through the Himalayas. The unheard-of catastrophe in China overturned the entire Anglo-American strategy in the war in the Far East.
Combat operations in Burma developed extremely sluggishly throughout the war, and in March-April 1944, Japanese troops, with a sudden blow, threatened the Allied communications in Northern Burma. Further deterioration of the situation was avoided only as a result of the fact that the allied command finally allowed the arming of the Burmese partisans. Until then, Britain and the United States were afraid to give arms to the Burmese people. By the joint actions of the allied forces and the anti-Japanese resistance forces in Burma, led by the anti-fascist People's Liberation League, the Japanese troops were expelled from Burma by May 1945. However, success in this theater was of a local nature and by no means undermined the forces of the Japanese ground army. There was also no weakening of the will of the Japanese armed forces in the struggle. On the contrary, after more than three years of war, Japanese soldiers, as the enemy approached the Japanese islands, fought with even greater ferocity.
The American commanders in the Pacific saw no way to achieve victory over Japan before the end of 1946. In the final battles against her, the upcoming losses were estimated at a million people. MacArthur firmly told Naval Minister Forrestal that the help of at least 60 Soviet divisions was needed to defeat Japan. Many years later, in 1949, even Secretary of State Acheson frankly admitted: "The main concern of the American government was" to achieve the early entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan so that the Japanese army concentrated in Manchuria could not return to their native islands in critical moment." Truman wrote, "As our troops moved forward in the Pacific, paying with great blood each step, the entry of Russia into the war became more urgent. It meant saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans."
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