Schlieffen plan. Quick Win Plan

By the end of the 19th century, the inevitability of world war was obvious. Here and there conflicts arose between leading powers striving for world domination. European countries increased their military power and strengthened their positions around the globe - this invariably led to contradictions, which ultimately led to global carnage. One of the main instigators of the First World War was the German Empire. By the beginning of the 20th century, the following situation had developed: either continue to expand sales markets, capitalist expansion, running into conflicts, or artificially reduce the rate of economic growth and military construction, which would lead to an aggravation of the internal situation, and this was clearly not in the plans of Wilhelm II.

So, after the signing of the “Concord of the Heart” between France and Russia, Germany faced the real prospect of a war on two fronts. In order to avoid this, it is necessary (in theory) to defeat one of the opponents before the other has time to come to his aid. And this defeat must be lightning fast.
German generals saw lightning war as a panacea for all problems, but they thought in old categories: the wars of the second half of the 19th century showed that it was not enough to defeat the enemy only by military means, it was also necessary to crush his economic and political structures, that is, the war turned into total. And in a total war, a quick victory is impossible by definition. But the Germans simply decided not to notice such a problem and postulated that they would be able to achieve a quick victory. The work on the plan to defeat the enemy was led by the head of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen(1833-1913).

Count, Prussian Field Marshal (1 January 1911), Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1905.
Participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. In the 1880s - head of a department of the General Staff. Retired since 1906.
In his writings, during war games and maneuvers, he developed the theory of encircling and destroying the enemy by means of a crushing blow on his flanks (or one of them) followed by a move to the rear. Author of the plan for Germany to wage war on two fronts against France and Russia. Schlieffen prepared the army for a lightning attack, hoping to achieve victory within one summer campaign. Schlieffen's views had a great influence on the formation of German military doctrine in the First and Second World Wars.

In his plan, he allocated 39 days for the capture of Paris and 42 days for the surrender of France. According to the count's calculations, this time should have been enough to prevent the armed forces of the Russian Empire from mobilizing and attacking East Prussia. But the plan did not provide for deviations from the schedule and unforeseen accidents - this was one of its weak points.
It’s worth making a small clarification here. The Schlieffen Plan is an expression of the idea of ​​blitzkrieg - lightning war. This idea is based on the defeat of the enemy who did not have time to mobilize, that is, Germany a priori became the aggressor. In addition, an invasion of neutral countries - Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg - was initially planned.
The plan provided for the concentration of 91% of all German troops on the Western Front. Next, with the right wing through Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, go to the rear of the French standing on the border. The essence of the plan was not to capture the cities and commercial centers of the country, but to force the French army to surrender and capture as many soldiers as possible, that is, to repeat the course of the Franco-Prussian War.

This is another weak point of the plan: the semi-encirclement of the French army is not lethal.
By the way, Alfred von Schlieffen’s main work, “Cannes,” is dedicated to the complete encirclement and defeat of the enemy. But the Germans did not have the strength to give France its own mega-Cannes.

After Schlieffen's resignation in 1906, the plan was modified Helmut von Moltke Jr.(1848-1916).

Count, German military leader, colonel general; nephew of Moltke the Elder. from 1880 his adjutant. From 1891 aide-de-camp to Wilhelm II. In 1899-1902 he commanded infantry. brigade, then infantry. division... Since 1903, Quartermaster General, since 1906, Chief of the General Staff. He was an active participant in the outbreak of the 1st World War, and in preparing it he based the plans of his predecessor, Gen. A. Schlieffen: defeat of the French. armies ch. forces and defense in the East. Prussia, and then a blow to Russia. Being the chief of headquarters of the Headquarters and at the same time being the chief of the general staff (in fact, the commander-in-chief), M. turned out to be unable to lead all the German armies. In the Battle of the Marne in 1914, he lost control of his troops, which was one of the reasons for the defeat of the German armies on the Marne. 14 Sep. 1914 M. was removed from office.

Helmuth von Moltke weakened the right flank and the left flank, and the capture of Holland was also canceled. He decided to regroup the troops and transfer a significant part of the army from France towards the Russian borders.
At the very beginning of the war, following the directives of Plan 17, France began mobilizing and later transferring its army to the German border in order to regain control of the province of Alsace-Lorraine. These actions fit exactly into Schlieffen’s idea of ​​a double encirclement of the French army. But due to Moltke’s decision to transfer troops to Russia in order to prevent the capture of East Prussia, the plan was thwarted.

So, what factors negatively affected the Schlieffen Plan?

1. Italy's refusal to enter the war: The entry of Italy, Germany's partner in the Triple Alliance, into the war was a necessary condition for the success of the plan. Firstly, the Italian army, advanced to the border with France, was supposed to divert a significant part of the French troops. Secondly, the Italian fleet, combined with the Austrian, would pose a serious threat to Entente communications in the Mediterranean. This would force the British to maintain large naval forces there, which would ultimately lead to the loss of absolute supremacy at sea. In reality, both the German and Austrian fleets were practically blocked in their bases.
2. Strong resistance from Belgium: despite the fact that the Belgian army was only a tenth of the German army, Belgian soldiers held the country's defense for about a month. The Germans used "Big Bertha" to destroy the Belgian fortresses at Namur and Antwerp, but the Belgians did not surrender, bringing the constant threat of the German army losing. Also, Germany's attack on neutral Belgium caused many neutral countries to reconsider their views regarding Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm. In particular, it was the violation of Belgian neutrality, and not the allied treaties, that became the reason for Great Britain to enter the war.
3. The unexpected appearance of the British Expeditionary Force also delayed the First German Army: it turned east and, instead of bypassing Paris, exposed its flank to the attack of the Parisian garrison.
4. The Russian army completed mobilization earlier than planned and went on the offensive. The capture of Prussia completely discouraged the German command. These events forced the command to transfer even more people to the eastern front. This backfired: after the victory at the Battle of Tannenberg in early September 1914, the German army did not win any battles on the Western Front.
5. The French railways worked well and ensured the prompt delivery of reinforcements to important areas.
6. Schlieffen did not consider the issue of supplying the German army at all. But Napoleon also said that the secret of war is in its messages. The Germans were never able to establish normal delivery of ammunition, supplies and reinforcements for the army.
7. The headquarters of the German command was too far from the front. Communication with the front was inadequate, and control was lost: each army acted independently, there was no coordination of actions.
8. And finally, the plan required an unrealistic pace of attack from the right-flank First and Second armies. It is not humanly possible to advance by forced march for a month in a row.

As a result, the first attempt at a large blitzkrieg failed, and a positional war began, which ultimately exhausted the forces of Germany and led to its surrender in November 1918.

Not only the Russian and French, but also the German strategy had significant flaws. The German Empire opposed Russia and its Western allies to the Schlieffen Plan. Count Alfred von Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1906, a fanatically dedicated professional, who participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Schlieffen Plan

Based on the experience of wars in the 19th century, German theorists aimed the army at victory in one general battle. Having planned to throw all their forces into battle at once and win, the Germans underestimated the role of strategic reserves.

The left wing at this time was supposed to pin down the enemy in battle. It was noted that if the left wing of the German army, under pressure from the advancing forces of the French army, which planned to deliver the main blow in the center of the front, retreats, then this will even be beneficial in order to more successfully envelop the enemy. The penetration of the French army into German territory will lead to even more catastrophic consequences for it, after the completion of the envelopment of the right flank. Schlieffen believed that the enemy would not get further than the Ardennes, a wooded and hilly area. And then the main forces will go to the rear of the French strike group and the result will be a huge “Cannes”, the French will be forced to capitulate.

In the east they planned to leave a slight barrier. The German command counted on the slow mobilization of the Russian army: in Germany it was planned to be completed in 10 days, but in Russia it then lasted 30 days. After the defeat of France, they were going to transfer troops to the Eastern Front, using the developed network of German railways. Kaiser Wilhelm II said: “We will have lunch in Paris and dinner in St. Petersburg.” On the Eastern Front they also dreamed of repeating “Cannes”: delivering converging attacks - the Germans from the north, and the Austrians from the south, from Krakow. Allied forces meet in the Warsaw area, encircling the Russian army in Poland. The defeat and surrender of the main forces of the Russian army should have led to the defeat of Russia. The result is complete victory in the West and East. And in the shortest possible time.

Schlieffen did not count on a strong alliance with Italy, although this country was part of the bloc of the Central Powers. In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy signed the secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance. In 1887 and 1891 the treaty was renewed, and was automatically extended in 1902 and 1912. However, there was little hope for a lasting alliance with Italy. Italy wanted significant territorial concessions from Austria-Hungary and already in 1902 entered into an agreement with France, pledging to remain neutral in the event of a German attack on France. This forced Schlieffen to abandon the idea of ​​conducting two flank attacks, with the participation of the Italian army.

According to Schlieffen's theoretical calculations, it was necessary to deploy 35 army corps (70 infantry divisions) and 8 cavalry divisions against France; in the second echelon there were another 8 reserve corps (16 divisions). They united into 7 armies. German troops, with the Metz, Diedenhofen (Thionville) area as their axis of entry, had to deeply bypass the enemy’s left flank to Amiens or further west to Abbeville and even along the sea coast of France, covering Paris from the northwest. Corps of 5 armies (1-5) took part in the attack, one army held the right flank. The troops remaining in Alsace and Lorraine (about 4 1/2 corps - 10 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) could retreat under enemy pressure to the line of Metz, Strasbourg and even to the Rhine. This drew the French armies into encirclement. The French troops planned to be destroyed approximately in the Alsace region or pressed towards Switzerland.

In total, Schlieffen planned to deploy 48 corps (96 infantry divisions) and 11 cavalry divisions against France. But that was in theory. In fact, by 1905 Germany had 62 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. According to the 1905 plan, the ratio of forces north and south of Metz was 7:1. It was a risk. Thus, criticizing the balance of forces between the right and left flanks of the German army, Schlieffen’s student Ludendorff noted in his memoirs: “Such limited forces, which Schlieffen left in Alsace-Lorraine without any compulsory basis, could create a danger unnecessary for success, which was the most dangerous strategic game.” . The French army, with skillful leadership and a certain determination, could put the German army in a very difficult situation by intercepting the communications routes of the German wings.

In addition, the question arose about supplying the huge mass of troops on the right flank of the German army. So, already two weeks after the start of the offensive operation, the right wing began to feel a significant shortage of supplies, and this despite the fact that the army group was significantly weakened when the plan was improved by the new Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke. In addition, Schlieffen assumed that German troops would reach the Franco-Belgian border by 30 days from the start of mobilization. But during this significant period of time, the French should have learned about the movement of huge masses of German troops on their left flank and, taking advantage of their powerful French railway network, regrouped their armies, depriving the enemy of their operational advantage.

Moltke's changes

Despite the significant shortcomings of the Schlieffen plan, it was still retained, although significant changes were made to it. Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke (Moltke the Younger), who in 1906 headed the Great General Staff of the German Empire, under pressure from disgruntled military leaders and Kaiser Wilhelm II, improved the Schlieffen Plan. Schlieffen's ideas were considered too risky, for fear of leaving too weak a group on the left flank of the Western Front.

The main idea of ​​​​the main attack on the right flank through Belgium was retained. However, the left wing was significantly strengthened to the detriment of the strike force on the right flank. Moltke's deployment plan, with which the German Empire entered the war in 1914, was as follows. In the Metz area and north of it, they planned to deploy 26 1/2 corps, including reserve ones (and Schlieffen proposed deploying 35 and a half corps), almost all cavalry units and 17 landwehr brigades. This army group was supposed to bypass the left flank of the French armies with its right wing, advancing through Belgium, and provide its left wing with the fortified area of ​​Metz and Didenhofen. There were 11 corps (400 thousand soldiers) in the German center; after taking Luxembourg, they covered the right flank of the main strike force. The main strike group - 16 corps (700 thousand people) was supposed to pass through Belgium, crushing two powerful fortresses of Liege and Namur along the way, cross the Meuse River, take Brussels on the 19th day of mobilization and cross the Belgian-French border on the 28th day. Then the troops were to advance to the west and south, reaching Paris from the north on the 39th day. Moltke promised the Austrians that on the 40th day the German command would begin transferring troops to the east in order to crush Russia together with the Austro-Hungarian army.

The left wing of the German army was significantly strengthened: 8 army corps were deployed in Alsace and Lorraine - 320 thousand people (according to the Schlieffen plan there were 4 and a half). As a result, the ratio of forces between the northern and southern groups became 3:1 (for Schlieffen it was 7:1). Although these troops were hardly capable of containing the bulk of the French troops. But this one was not required of them. Retreating, they had to lengthen the lines of communication of the French strike forces, complicate their interaction in mountainous and wooded areas, lure the largest possible number of French troops into an area that did not decide anything in the general course of the war, and then slam the trap.

Thus, there was a significant weakening of the right wing of the German army, a significant strengthening of the Alsace-Lorraine group. These were the most significant differences between the 1914 plan and the Schlieffen plan. In addition, if Schlieffen on the Eastern Front was going to limit himself to defense with the help of Landwehr formations, then Moltke the younger sent 3 field and 1 reserve corps to the Russian border, not counting reserve divisions, Landwehr and reinforced garrisons of fortresses.

The main reasons that forced the German command to change the Schlieffen plan were the following:

1) the threat of a strong blow on the left flank and the general lack of forces did not allow a radical strengthening of the right wing of the German army. The German command did not take risks, since with an active offensive by the French army, the entire rear of the German armies was threatened, the French could intercept communications and disrupt the offensive on the right wing;

2) industrial circles feared severe destruction and devastation of the Alsace-Lorraine region, which had become very important in industrial terms. In 1905, when the Schlieffen plan was drawn up, it had not yet risen to the same height as in 1914. They wanted to save the area from destruction, so it could not be given to the enemy, as Schlieffen proposed;

3) under pressure from the Prussian Junkers (nobility), the high command decided to divert quite significant forces for the defense of East Prussia. The 8th Army under the command of General Maximilian von Prittwitz (200 thousand people) was deployed against the Russian Empire in East Prussia. Military considerations were sacrificed to the economic interests of the German Junkers;

4) an assessment of Germany’s transport capabilities to supply such a huge mass of troops, which Schlieffen intended to concentrate on the right flank, showed that during the offensive it would be impossible to provide it with everything necessary.

In addition to the objective lack of forces, one can see the great influence on the German command of the German industrial bourgeoisie, as well as the Junker landowners. The German military could not help but take into account the interests of the nobility and the big bourgeoisie. As a result, the German Empire entered the war in 1914 with high hopes of achieving its goals, but the Second Reich simply did not have enough strength and resources to achieve all its goals. In addition, the German military-political leadership underestimated the opponents, the forces and means of Russia, France and England, which concealed the prerequisites for the future defeat of the German Empire.

It should be noted that a number of researchers believe that when implementing the original Schlieffen plan, the German army had a chance of success. And the 1914 plan led to a dispersal of forces, which deprived the German army of any chance of success in the 1914 campaign. Other historians believe that Moltke’s “mistakes” were not the reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg. There were many objective reasons for the failure, including the technical unpreparedness of the armies of that time for such a rapid movement, the inability to calculate all factors, including the rapid and successful offensive of Russian troops in East Prussia. The German plan was smooth only on paper; it did not take into account many factors.

Schlieffen Plan- a strategic plan developed by the command of the German Empire, the essence of which was to achieve a quick victory on the Western Front against the forces of France, and on the Eastern Front against the forces of the Russian Empire.

The German command planned to gain victory in the first month. However, the plan was not followed; the Germans did not expect such resistance from the French on the Marne - this battle resulted in a crushing defeat for Germany. Also, Germany was not prepared for a counterattack by the Russian army, which led to trench warfare for many years.

Plan

Within 39 days, Germany planned to take the capital of France, Paris, by doing this it wanted to break the morale of the French. And 42 days should have been enough to completely bring France to its knees. Why such a short time? A quick victory would prevent Russia from launching an attack on the Eastern Front, since Germany would transfer the armies of the Western Front there. In addition to France, the BENELUX countries were supposed to fall during this time. The Germans managed to capture part of Paris, but the other part was tightly controlled by the French army.

Germany assumed that Russia would not be able to quickly mobilize its armies, which would make it possible to actively operate on the Western Front, and when France fell, all forces should have been thrown at Russia.

Emperor Wilhelm II spoke of a quick victory like this: “We will have lunch in France and dinner in St. Petersburg.”
When Schlieffen left, the chief was General. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became the headquarters and insisted on changing the plan. He considered this plan too risky and began reworking it. He changed the balance of power - troops were sent to the Eastern Front. He also called off the attack on the Netherlands.

Problems that arose and prevented Germany from implementing the plan for a quick victory

1. Italy refused to go to war with France.

Germany really counted on Italy's entry into the war with France on the Western Front. The command believed that the entry of this ally into the war would entail the diversion of significant forces of the French army. And the Italian fleet was supposed to serve as an excellent rival to the Entente fleet. Then Britain would lose its main advantage in naval power. As a result, the fleets of Austria and Italy found themselves locked in their naval bases. The German army was given the mission to fight all the forces of the French army, which it did not plan to do.

2. Stubborn resistance from Belgium.

The Belgian army was outnumbered by about 10 times the German army, but this did not stop it from holding the country for more than a month. Germany certainly did not foresee such serious resistance. The Germans even had to use the Big Bertha guns, since the Belgians did not agree to surrender their fortresses any other way. Germany's attack on neutral Belgium forced other countries to reconsider their views on Germany, and in the future they acted as opponents to the Germans.

3. Rapid mobilization of the Russian army.

Mobilization in the Russian Empire occurred much faster than Germany had envisaged. Rapid mobilization allowed Russia to invade East Prussia. This forced the transfer of some troops from the Western Front to the Eastern Front. This led to irreparable consequences, after which the German army did not receive a single important strategic victory in the west.

4. Instant mobilization of France. Railways

Since the Germans were delayed for a long time in Belgium, France at this time carried out active mobilization and this time allowed it to transfer significant forces to the border. Germany did not provide for the use of railways by the French army. In addition, the French transferred their troops by absolutely any means, even in taxis. And when the Germans came to France, it was already in full combat readiness. Thanks to their mobility, French troops were always where they needed to be.

Contemporaries call the Schlieffen plan one of the biggest miscalculations and point out that it was not perfect. They consider the main problem to be confidence in the lightning speed of the German attack, which was supposed to subjugate France in a month. They did not expect serious resistance. And also the German army was absolutely not ready for defense; there was no defense plan as such at all. The Germans planned a quick victory and did not foresee a counterattack.

This is what, according to military analysts, contributed to Germany’s defeat in the First World War. Germany did not foresee a long war, which severely depleted Germany's resources and made it impossible to hold two fronts. This mistake will also be typical in World War II, when there was no plan for long-term military operations, and the blitzkrieg failed.

At the end of the 19th century, military theory underwent serious dimensions and at the same time received a powerful impetus for development. The emergence of new types of troops, communications equipment, the construction of powerful armored ships armed with large-caliber artillery, airships and airplanes forced the generals of many countries to think about what the war of the future would be like. It was then, in 1891, that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff began to work on the famous Schlieffen Plan. This product of German militarism will then, two decades after the shameful defeat, loom again like a ghost, in the form of new aggressive strategic theories and dispositions. The lesson didn't go well.

History cannot be forgotten; it itself will remind bad students of itself. The article will outline Schlieffen's plan briefly, since in detail it would take up too much space, and the details in this case are not so important. What matters is its essence and the political circumstances that prompted the count, the chief of the General Staff, to remember Napoleon.

Myth of the Nibelungs

There is a myth about a certain “German military machine” that acted clearly and mercilessly, perfectly organized and based on traditional Teutonic discipline. Naturally, cultural figures had a hand in creating this image, in particular filmmakers, who made many films in which huge columns of “iron kaputs” crawl uncontrollably forward to terrible music, and soldiers in horned helmets pace, kicking up road dust. If we consider the facts impartially, it turns out that until the nineteenth century the German army somehow did not have time to cover itself with the laurels of military glory, if only because, as a single state, Germany existed, by historical standards, for a very short time, and the exploits of the rulers of individual lands also happened infrequently. At the end of the 19th century there were some successes (more on them later), but one can only talk about some kind of exceptional Aryan militancy under the impression received from Wagner’s operas about the Nibelungs and Valkyries.

As for the twentieth century, yes, the Germans distinguished themselves. They started two world wars, and suffered crushing defeats in both. There are several explanations for this. Proponents of a technocratic and formalist view of history argue that the fault of German failure is the lack of material and human resources. Lovers of the occult point to the unfavorable location of stars in the sky. There were also theories against the smart, strong, but gullible Germans. Realists see the reason for the collapse of the “German military machine” in both world wars in the fact that the aggressor is defeated sooner or later.

Nevertheless, it is very interesting to consider attempts to create ingenious plans to conquer neighboring countries. They are somewhat similar to projects of perpetual motion machines or the search for the philosopher's stone. Now it is clear that these problems have no solution, but what arouses curiosity and even to some extent respect is the resourcefulness of the human mind during the thought process itself. So what do we know about the Schlieffen Plan?

Reasons for hope and optimism

Out of mere curiosity, strategy theorists don't work. It is no coincidence that the Schlieffen Plan was developed. This work of military theoretical science was in demand by the leadership of the two empires.

The aggressive mood of the German military at the end of the 19th century was due to two circumstances. Firstly, Austria-Hungary did not have colonies, which greatly upset the ruling elite of the empire. France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Denmark and even small, seemingly harmless Belgium had overseas possessions, not to mention the “mistress of the seas” Great Britain (at that time it was the largest country in the world, much larger than the Russian Empire ). A feeling of deprivation, also sometimes called envy, tormented Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern. But that's not all, there was a second circumstance. There were two relatively recent victories that could be called brilliant. In 1866, the Prussians, under the leadership of von Moltke the Elder (the great Moltke), defeated the troops of Austria-Hungary. Victoria was also defeated over France (1870-1871). Then even Emperor Napoleon III himself was captured (near Sedan), and with him 549 cannons and 104 thousand soldiers. This inspired cautious optimism and hope for future victories. If you succeeded once, then what could prevent you from developing success further? Except perhaps the lack of a good military plan. Of course, the army itself needs to be modernized, as well as its military equipment, but the main thing is theory. The first column marches here, the second - there, etc.

Difficulties

However, some circumstances did not inspire optimism. It was with them in mind that the Schlieffen Plan was drawn up. This is, first of all, the need for military operations on two fronts. Both von Bismarck and Field Marshal Moltke believed that in this case collapse was inevitable. The fact is that already in the period of time being described, success in war largely depended on the resource base. This concept refers to mobilization potential, including human, industrial and raw materials. But in this regard, neither Austria-Hungary could boast of any particular abundance. Actually, it was precisely for the sake of capturing resources that the Schlieffen Plan was drawn up. This meant that it was necessary to fight quickly and victoriously.

Two countries were named as the main potential opponents: the Russian Empire and France. One is in the West, the other is in the East. Moreover, the border on the French side is well fortified along its entire length.

Teutonic trick

The Schlieffen Plan called for a war on two fronts, contrary to Bismarck's strong recommendation. There was only one caveat: this situation should not last long. To be even more specific, as a result of the energetic actions of the Triple Alliance, one of the main opponents should be defeated in a short time, and then all efforts should be switched to the second, with whom there is no need to rush, although there is no point in delaying. The Schlieffen Plan named France as the first target of destruction. As already mentioned, its border was fortified quite powerfully, and a frontal attack might not have succeeded. However, having failed to achieve success in the West, Austria-Hungary and Germany were guaranteed to fall into the trap of a protracted conflict, which cannot be allowed to happen, because this is the path to defeat. There seemed to be no solution. The main thing of Schlieffen's plan was to solve a complex problem in the simplest way. Hitler used it in 1939.

Speed, pressure and treachery

Belgium was a neutral country, its security was guaranteed by Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary and, by the way, Prussia itself (now Germany). The same is true for Luxembourg. The transfer of troops through both of these neutral countries was provided for by the Schlieffen Plan. This treacherous violation of the international treaty of 1839 did not bother the author of the idea at all. He understood that immediately after the capture of Belgium, Britain would inevitably enter the war, but the main bet was on lightning speed. The blow must be quick and to the very heart - in this case, Paris. After this, the English landing becomes problematic, the French army is squeezed by a flanking maneuver and is surrounded, and the Russians will turn around and catch up... A little more, and the full power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire will hit them, and they will not resist. This was the essence of the Schlieffen plan: quickly, in 40-50 days, deal with France, push Britain away from the coast and turn towards Russia. There is no need to capture it all - it is too time-consuming and expensive, and in general there is no need (as it was believed then) - but some western regions, in particular Poland and the Baltic states, could well be taken away.

Who was to be fought with?

The Schlieffen Plan envisaged waging an aggressive war against three countries that had superior resources and military power. Britain owned the most powerful navy in the world, which Germany was never able to create. The Russian Empire had a large army, the rearmament of which had already begun, with an excellent food supply (food cards were not introduced even when they were used to supply the population of all other warring states) and a defense industry capable of producing almost any type of weapon. France was also preparing for war. The Schlieffen Plan provided for the rapid crushing of the weakest link in the land theater of operations. The naval confrontation with Great Britain was viewed as a separate episode of the war, not of vital importance, and Russian troops, according to it, should only have been kept on the Galicia-southern Poland line.

Source of inspiration

General Alfred von Schlieffen, who led the German General Staff, was not only a strategist, but also a military historian. From his youth, he considered his favorite episode to be the Battle of Cannes (216 BC), during which Hannibal defeated the Roman troops, enveloping them with a bold maneuver from the flanks into a double ring. At its core, the Schlieffen plan briefly repeats this tactical technique, creating an asymmetrical movement of armies with the cutting off of most of the French troops from sources of supply, their blockade and strangulation.

In addition, some operations carried out by Bonaparte at the beginning of the 19th century were taken as examples. These techniques are quite appropriate during operations in the European theater of operations, characterized by relatively short distances and a dense network of railways in conditions of possession of the strategic initiative. Ultimately, the Schlieffen Plan was put into action by the command of the combined forces of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany, although with some changes. The fact is that its author fell into disgrace. He was removed from his post, and Colonel General Moltke Jr. was appointed to lead the Bolshoi instead. Perhaps his famous surname played a role.

Contribution of General Moltke the Younger

It is unknown how successfully the strategic operation would have developed if the Schlieffen plan had remained unchanged. According to the original plan, the main forces in the amount of seven armies rushed to Paris, while only one was deployed against Russia. At the same time, the command was aware of the possibility of losing (temporarily) Alsace, Lorraine, and this “gambit” made it possible to gain the time necessary for the complete defeat of France. However, Moltke the Younger considered the seven-fold superiority on the Western Front excessive and reduced the number of armies on it to three. In addition, he strengthened the eastern direction (again at the expense of troops aimed at Paris). The Schlieffen Plan was adopted with such changes that almost nothing remained of the original plan. The expectation that with the help of railway transport it would be possible to quickly transfer huge masses of troops to the Russian front also turned out to be incorrect. Ultimately, what Schlieffen was so afraid of happened. Blitzkrieg failed, the Austrians were stuck in trench warfare. It could only end in defeat.

It was smooth on paper...

In fairness, it should be remembered that not a single military plan in the entire history of mankind has ever been fully implemented. There were always reasons, justifications too, and for the most part they were objective. Either frosts suddenly hit, or, on the contrary, mud and mud. The expectation that the Russian army would be a weak enemy, clumsy and stupid, turned out to be wrong. Despite the fact that the eighty-thousand-strong group strengthened the defensive positions of the Austrians, they were unable to stop the offensive; it developed rapidly and raised fears that Berlin would fall before France could be defeated. The 1st Russian Army near the German city of Gumbinnen completely defeated the German VIII Army. The failure of the Schlieffen plan became increasingly obvious.

The Sorrows of Alfred von Schlieffen

The author described in great detail the disposition of each military unit, its movements and the chronology of actions. The Schlieffen Plan in the First World War is perhaps the most striking example of careful study of all possible details, which had no equal at that time. Work on it went on for several years, and the count devoted himself to work with the fanaticism of a true ascetic or maniac. Sometimes he behaved like a madman, seeing in any beautiful landscape only the situation for tactical maneuver and perceiving rivers or lakes only as water obstacles that had to be crossed. Schlieffen did not live to see the war, but thought about it constantly. According to the stories of people close to him, he, dying in 1912, begged not to weaken the troops on the right flank. Apparently, Moltke, who replaced him, did not fully understand what Schlieffen’s plan was, nor how fatal any changes made to it could be. However, there is no evidence that the document was drawn up flawlessly. There may have been errors in it, system ones at that.

About the dangers of illusions

Schlieffen was a military man and understood little about politics. Like a true technocrat, he enthusiastically developed solutions to various problems, caring little about the consequences of “side effects.” Belgium, captured out of strategic necessity, became a symbol of the aggressiveness of the Triple Alliance and actually served as the reason for the blockade of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Britain's entry into the war also greatly undermined the economic foundations of commodity-dependent states, and the Royal Navy did everything to impede supplies by sea. The psychological impact that the Schlieffen Plan had on the consciousness of German politicians was also great.

It was not possible to implement it in the first European massacre, but there was a person who decided to try again. The attempt began in 1939 and ended six years later with another complete defeat of Germany. At the same time, the emphasis was again placed on rapid coverage (this time with large armored formations) and lightning-fast suppression of enemy resistance. It seemed that just a little more and the enemy would be defeated. A war on two fronts again led to disaster. Belief in the omnipotence of the blitzkrieg played a bad joke, especially in the event of an attack on Russia. Was this lesson useful?

Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the First World War could have gone completely as planned. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen’s plan.

Blitz War Plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning for a major war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, clearly harbored plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war in these conditions

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was supposed to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For final victory - 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short period of time. After the victory over France, German troops will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying the famous phrase: “We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg.”

Failure of the Schlieffen Plan

Helmuth von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen as chief of the German General Staff, accepted the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it excessively risky. And for this reason, I subjected it to thorough revision. In particular, he refused to concentrate the main forces of the German army on the western front and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to envelop the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but were also able to deliver a powerful counterattack.

The reliance on the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. The invasion of East Prussia by Russian troops literally stunned the German command. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.