The first part of the work is about the French fleet in World War II. Covers the period before the British Operation Menace against Dakar. The second part, published in Russian for the first time, describes the operations of the French fleet in remote areas, Operation Torch, the self-sinking of the fleet in Toulon and the revival of the fleet. The reader will also be interested in the appendices. The book is written in a very biased manner.
© Translation by I.P. Shmeleva
© E.A. Granovsky. Comments to the 1st part, 1997
© M.E. Morozov. Comments on part 2
© E.A. Granovsky, M.E. Morozov. Compilation and design, 1997
PREFACE
The victory over fascism in World War II was the result of coalition actions. France took its rightful place among the victorious powers. But her path to the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition was tortuous. The fleet shared all the ups and downs with the country. There is a book about its history by the French military historian L. Garros.
The material presented to the readers is divided into two parts. This issue includes chapters on the actions of the French Navy in 1939–1940: the Norwegian and French campaigns, the actions of the fleet in the war with Italy, and then the battles with the British in Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar. The second part of this book describes the events of 1941–1945: the armed conflict with Siam, actions off the coast of Syria in 1941, the Madagascar operation, events related to the North African landing of the Allies and the history of the naval forces of the Free French.
L. Garros's book is very original in some aspects. After reading it, you will probably notice a number of features.
Firstly, this is the French “specificity” of this work, which is unusual for our readers. L. Garros has a high opinion of Marshal Petain, considers General de Gaulle almost a traitor, the history of the French Navy in World War II is essentially reduced to the history of the Vichy fleet, for which the naval forces of the Free French were the enemy.
Secondly, the absence of a number of known episodes is puzzling. The book does not say a word about the participation of French ships in the search for German raiders and intercepting blockade breakers, the convoy activity of the fleet is poorly reflected, the raid of destroyers on Gibraltar in September 1940 and some other operations are not described, and the outstanding successes of the underwater minelayer "Ruby" are ignored. ... But there are a lot of fictitious victories and savoring, perhaps courageous, but actions that did not have any influence on the course of the war. Sometimes the author almost slips into a frankly adventurous genre, for example, describing the adventures of officer Boilambert, who does not know where and with whom he spent the night.
Part 1
FRENCH NAVY IN 1939
When the war began in September 1939, the French fleet consisted of seven battleships, including two old battleships, Paris and Courbet, three old, but modernized in 1935-36. battleships - "Brittany", "Provence" and "Lorraine", two new battleships "Strasbourg" and "Dunkirk".
There were two aircraft carriers: the aircraft carrier Béarn and the air transport Commandant Test.
There were 19 cruisers, of which 7 1st class cruisers - "Duquesne", "Tourville", "Suffren", "Colbert", "Foch", "Duplex" and "Algerie"; 12 2nd class cruisers - "Duguet-Trouin", "La Motte-Pique", "Primogue", "La Tour d'Auvergne" (formerly "Pluto"), "Jeanne d'Arc", "Emile Bertin", " La Galissoniere", "Jean de Vienne", "Gloire", "Marseillaise", "Montcalm", "Georges Leygues".
The torpedo flotillas were also impressive. They numbered: 32 leaders
Six ships each of the Jaguar, Gepar, Aigle, Vauquelin, Fantask types and two Mogador types; 26 destroyers - 12 Bourrasque type and 14 Adrua type, 12 Melpomene type destroyers.
The 77 submarines included the cruiser Surcouf, 38 class 1 submarines, 32 class 2 submarines and 6 underwater minelayers.
COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 1939 TO MAY 1940,
In September 1939, the disposition of the French fleet was mainly directed against Italy, although it was not specified how it would behave.
The British believed that the French fleet should guard the Strait of Gibraltar, while they concentrated their fleet almost entirely in the North Sea against the Kriegsmarine. On September 1, Italy made it clear that it would not take any hostile action, and the French disposition was changed: the Mediterranean Sea became a secondary theater of operations, which would not present any obstacles to navigation. Convoys delivering troops from North Africa to the North-Eastern Front and the Middle East moved unhindered. Anglo-French superiority at sea over Germany was overwhelming, especially since the latter was not ready to wage a naval war.
The Kriegsmarine command expected that hostilities would begin no earlier than 1944. Germany had only two battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, three pocket battleships, five light cruisers, 50 destroyers, 60 submarines, of which only half were ocean-going
The total displacement of the ships of its fleet was only 1/7 of that of the Allies.
By agreement with the British Admiralty, the French fleet assumed responsibility for operations off the French coast of the North Sea, then in the area south of the English Channel, as well as in the Bay of Biscay and in the western Mediterranean.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
As it became increasingly clear that Italy would enter the war, ships of the Atlantic Fleet assembled in the Mediterranean in late April 1940. They stood on the roadstead of Mers el-Kebir under the command of Vice Admiral Zhansul:
1st squadron (Vice Admiral Zhansul) - 1st division of battleships: "Dunkirk" (Captain 1st Rank Segen) and "Strasbourg" (Captain 1st Rank Collinet); 4th Cruiser Division (commander - Rear Admiral Bourrage): "Georges Leygues" (Captain 1st Rank Barnot), "Gloire" (Captain 1st Rank Broussignac), "Montcalm" (Captain 1st Rank de Corbières).
2nd Light Squadron (Rear Admiral Lacroix) - 6th, 8th and 10th leader divisions.
2nd Squadron (Rear Admiral Buzen) - 2nd Division of battleships: "Provence" (Captain 1st Rank Barrois), "Brittany" (Captain 1st Rank Le Pivin); 4th division of leaders.
4th squadron (commander - Rear Admiral Marquis) - 3rd cruiser division: "Marseieuse" (captain 1st rank Amon), "La Galissoniere" (captain 1st rank Dupre), "Jean de Vienne" (captain 1st rank Missof ).
June Truce
While the described fighting was going on, the government and the general staff were increasingly inclined to think about the need to conclude a truce, since it was clear that further resistance was impossible. On June 10, the Admiralty evacuated its headquarters from Montenon to Er-et-Loire, 75 km from Paris, and soon to Guéritand, where there was a communications point; On June 17, following the incoming army, the admiralty moved to the castle of Dulamon near Marseille, on the 28th it reached Nérac in the Lot-et-Garonne department, and finally, on July 6, it ended up in Vichy.
Beginning on May 28, Admiral Darlan, anticipating the worst, informed his subordinates that if hostilities ended in a truce, under the terms of which the enemy demanded the surrender of the fleet, he “does not intend to obey this order.” Nothing could be clearer. This was said at the height of the evacuation from Dunkirk, when the British were feverishly loading ships. The fleet does not give up. This was stated clearly, precisely, definitively.
At the same time, it was assumed that ships capable of continuing the fight would go to England or even Canada. These were normal precautions in case the Germans demanded the release of the fleet. Neither Prime Minister Paul Reynaud nor Marshal Petain thought for a minute to leave the fleet still capable of fighting to such a sad fate. Only a few ships were lost at Dunkirk - not too many that the sailors lost the will to resist. The fleet's morale was high; it did not consider itself defeated and did not intend to surrender. Subsequently, Admiral Darlan said to one of his loved ones: “If a truce is requested, I will end my career with a brilliant act of disobedience.” Later his way of thinking changed. The Germans proposed as a condition of the armistice that the French fleet be interned at Spithead (England) or scuttled. But in those days when the army's resistance was weakening and when it was clear that the victor would make his demands, and he could demand everything he wanted, Darlan had a strong desire to preserve the fleet. But how? Go to Canada, America, England at the head of your squadrons?
ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH FLEET
By this term we mean all those operations that unfolded on July 3, 1940 against French ships taking refuge in British ports, as well as those gathered in Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria.
England has always in its history attacked the naval forces of its enemies, friends and neutrals, which seemed to it too developed, and did not take into account anyone's rights. The people, defending themselves in critical conditions, disregarded international law. France always followed it, and in 1940 too
After the June truce, French sailors had to be wary of the British. But they could not believe that the military camaraderie would be forgotten so quickly. England was afraid of Darlan's fleet going over to the enemy. If this fleet had fallen into the hands of the Germans, the situation would have gone from critical to disastrous for them. Hitler’s assurances, in the understanding of the British government, did not matter, and an alliance between France and Germany was quite possible. The English have lost their cool
Interesting facts in honor of Russian Navy Day
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Every last Sunday in July is celebrated as Russian Navy Day. On this day, all those who guard the maritime borders of Russia, all those who connect years of life and service with ensuring the combat readiness of ships and naval units, family members of military personnel, workers and employees of naval institutions and enterprises, veterans of the Great Patriotic War celebrate their professional holiday war. In honor of this holiday, we, together with Wargaming, have collected some interesting information about the fleet of the Second World War.
USSR Navy and trophies of the Second World War
The Great Patriotic War was a difficult test not only for the Soviet fleet, but also for the shipbuilding industry of the USSR. The fleet suffered losses, which were replenished with great difficulty, since the most important shipbuilding centers were either lost or largely destroyed.
At the end of the war, as the victorious power, the Soviet Union took part in the division of the Axis naval forces. As a result of reparations, the USSR received dozens of fully combat-ready ships. Thus, the Navy's lists were replenished with a former Italian battleship, two cruisers, and more than a dozen destroyers and torpedo boats. In addition, a number of heavily damaged or disarmed ships were captured, including two German heavy cruisers and several Japanese destroyers and destroyers. And although all these ships could not be considered a full-fledged replenishment of the striking power of the fleet. They gave Soviet sailors and engineers an invaluable opportunity to become acquainted with many achievements of the foreign shipbuilding industry.
Division and destruction of Kriegsmarine ships
During the Second World War, the German fleet suffered enormous losses, and yet at the time of surrender it still represented an impressive force - over 600 warships and about 1,500 auxiliary ships.
After the end of hostilities, the Allies decided to divide the remaining combat-ready ships of the Kriegsmarine between the three main victorious powers: the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. For all three, the main goal was, of course, not to replenish their naval forces, but the opportunity to study German technologies in the field of weapons and shipbuilding. And most of the German submarine fleet, which once sowed terror in the sea, was to be completely destroyed: 165 submarines were to be sunk. Ultimately, 452 warships were divided between the Allies, including 2 cruisers, 25 destroyers and destroyers, and 30 submarines.
The British Navy at the beginning and end of World War II
By the beginning of World War II, the British Empire's possessions spread throughout the world. The metropolis, located on an island that was by no means abundant in resources, had to maintain a large fleet to protect its communications with the colonies, therefore a feature of the British Navy were numerous cruisers with a long cruising range.
The Second World War and six years of war at sea markedly changed the Royal Navy. Only at the cost of colossal effort did the British industry manage to maintain the number of cruisers at the pre-war level, and the former pride of the “Mistress of the Seas” - battleships - alas, were lost among other classes of ships. The number of destroyers—the “workhorses” of the war—has increased by one and a half times, despite their enormous losses. Submarines have also proven their effectiveness and have taken a significant place in the fleet.
But a new weapon of war at sea came to the fore—aircraft carriers. The British government fully realized their role: between 1939 and 1945 the number of aircraft-carrying ships increased eightfold, almost exceeding the number of cruisers.
US Navy at the beginning and end of World War II
By the time it entered World War II, the United States had already surpassed Great Britain in the number of battleships, which were still considered the embodiment of the power of any world power. At the same time, pragmatic Americans also understood the value of submarines - weapons that are relatively cheap and effective.
In less than four years of the war, the US fleet has grown several times, coming very close to being ahead of all other countries combined in the number of battleships. However, by that time the armored giants had already lost primacy in the international arena: the scale of military operations in the oceans required “universal fighters,” and the absolute number of cruisers and destroyers increased sharply. However, when comparing the relative “weight” among the main classes of ships, both destroyers and cruisers only retained their positions. The most formidable force at sea became aircraft carriers, which took the leading place in the Navy. By 1945, the United States had no equal in its numbers in the world.
Don't forget to congratulate the sailors you know and everyone involved!
During the Great Patriotic War, our country was defended by four fleets - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific. All of them were in different conditions, which influenced the characteristics of their combat operations.
Disposition
By the beginning of the war, about a thousand ships of various classes were in service with the USSR Navy. Among them are 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, 54 leaders and destroyers, 287 torpedo boats, 212 submarines. In addition, the fleet was strengthened by more than 2.5 thousand aircraft and 260 coastal defense batteries. It was a powerful force, capable of significantly influencing the course of combat operations both at sea and in the coastal zone of ground forces operations.
The Soviet fleet also had plenty of weak points. First of all, this is the low level of operational-tactical training of command personnel, which emerged during the Soviet-Finnish war. Historians place the main blame on mass repressions, as a result of which the fleet lost more than 3 thousand competent and mature commanders. The officers who replaced them, as a rule, were poorly prepared to perform their duties. Later this became one of the reasons for great losses and painful defeats.
A serious obstacle to the successful conduct of a war with Germany at sea was the geographical isolation of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets. The situation was aggravated by the fact that a significant part of the forces (50% of torpedo boats, 45% of naval aviation, 40% of submarines, 30% of minesweepers) were located in the Far East. The enemy successfully used this at first.
The large losses in the navy in the first period of the war can also be explained by the failures of our ground forces and the air supremacy of German aviation. The most unfavorable period for the Soviet fleet was the period 1941-1942, when we lost three times more ships than the enemy. However, all the failures were compensated by the fierce resistance of the Soviet sailors, which is why the countries of the Hitlerite coalition were never able to achieve an obvious advantage at sea.
Black Sea Fleet
The Black Sea Fleet was one of the most trained formations of the USSR Armed Forces. It consisted of about 300 ships and boats of various classes, in particular, 1 battleship, 6 cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 600 aircraft of various types. The fleet had five bases: in Odessa, Nikolaev, Novorossiysk, Batumi and the main one in Sevastopol.
Already on June 22, 1941, German aircraft bombed Sevastopol. However, it was not possible to take the Soviet sailors by surprise. The attack was repulsed thanks to the timely detection of the enemy squadron by the radars of the cruiser Molotov. And on June 25, the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and aviation launched a series of attacks on the Romanian city of Constanta. According to German data, several oil tanks and railway tanks caught fire from shell hits, and a train with ammunition exploded.
Until July 21, Soviet sailors installed 7,115 mines and 1,404 mine defenders, which, unfortunately, subsequently caused more losses to the Black Sea Fleet than to the enemy. Thus, in 1941–1942, three destroyers were blown up by their own mines.
Ships of the Black Sea Fleet took part in the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and in the battle for the Caucasus. Not only at sea. Black Sea residents joined the ranks of the marines and garrisons defending the cities. Because of their fury in battle, the Germans nicknamed them the “Black Death.”
The Black Sea Fleet maintained independence from the army ground command longer than others, which, according to military experts, in specific conditions had much more negative consequences than positive ones.
The Black Sea Fleet included a unique ship - anti-aircraft floating battery No. 3, which was a steel square with cannons and anti-aircraft machine guns. This ship, designed by Captain 1st Rank Grigory Butakov, managed to destroy more than 20 German aircraft during 9 months of fighting.
The submariner, captain of the 3rd rank Mikhail Greshilov was also noted in the battles on the Black Sea. On the M-35 submarine he sank 4 enemy transports, and at the end of 1942, switching to the Shch-215 boat, he added 4 more enemy transports and two barges to his combat tally.
The turning point in the Black Sea theater of military operations occurred at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. The landing on Malaya Zemlya on February 4, 1943 was the first offensive operation of the Black Sea Fleet in two years of fighting since the beginning of the war.
Northern Fleet
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Northern Fleet had relatively modest resources. There were 8 destroyers in service, including 2 old ones, 7 patrol ships, 15 submarines, several torpedo boats and minesweepers. However, during the war, the fleet was replenished with aircraft and ships from the Pacific Ocean and the Caspian Sea.
Military-geographical conditions favored the actions of the Northern Fleet. The location of Polyarny (the main base of the fleet), Vaenga and Murmansk (the rear base) in the depths of the Kola Bay favored their defense from the sea.
In addition to coastal defense, the Northern Fleet provided internal and external maritime transport, and also operated in the area of enemy sea communications and provided support to the coastal flank of the 14th Army. In 1944, the Northern Fleet took part in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, as a result of which the Germans were completely driven out of the Soviet Arctic.
Due to a large accumulation of German mines in 1942, the Northern Fleet lost 9 submarines. In May of the same year, the submarine K-23, under the command of captain 3rd rank Leonid Potapov, moved to the Norwegian coast to operate against enemy transport ships. On May 12, the submarine managed to sink one transport ship, but due to damage it was forced to surface.
The wounded submarine entered into an artillery duel, sinking two more German patrol ships. German ships and aircraft called by a reconnaissance plane surrounded the boat, and the crew, in order not to surrender to the enemy, decided to plunge into the depths of the sea.
The Northern Fleet directed a lot of efforts to disrupt enemy maritime transport along the coast of Norway. During the first two years of the war, these operations involved mainly submarines, and from the second half of 1943, naval aviation units came to the fore.
In total, during the war years, the Northern Fleet destroyed over 200 enemy warships and auxiliary vessels, more than 400 transports with a total tonnage of over 1 million tons, as well as about 1,300 aircraft.
Baltic Fleet
On the eve of the war, the Baltic Fleet consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 7 patrol ships, 2 gunboats, 65 submarines, and also included minelayers, minesweepers, submarine hunters, and boats.
On June 22, 1941, at 3:60 am, Rear Admiral Ivan Eliseev gave the order to open fire on enemy aircraft that had invaded USSR airspace. This was the first order to repel Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War.
The Baltic Sea is relatively small in size, characterized by shallow depths and an indented coastline. This favored the use of mine weapons and the organization of anti-submarine defense. The enemy often managed to mine the waters in the operational zones of the Soviet fleet without interference, which is why our ships sank to the bottom without even firing a shot.
On August 28, the Germans captured the main base of the Baltic Fleet - Tallinn, which allowed them to block the surface fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt with minefields. On August 30, the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet broke through from Tallinn to Kronstadt. Of the 200 ships that left, 112 warships, 23 transport and auxiliary ships arrived at their destination, on which over 18 thousand people were delivered.
The most fierce battles in the Baltic took place over the Moonsund Islands. In the most difficult conditions, for 49 days, ships of the fleet and units of the ground forces, inferior in numbers and armament to the German army, held back the enemy’s onslaught. During the defense of the Moonsund Islands, the Nazis lost up to 25 thousand soldiers and officers, a lot of military equipment and weapons, as well as over 20 ships.
The submarine fleet also operated successfully in the Baltic Sea. At the cost of large losses, he managed to periodically break the blockade and disrupt the enemy’s sea communications. In January 1943, the Baltic Fleet assisted the ground forces during the operation to lift the siege of Leningrad.
Pacific Fleet
On the night of August 8-9, the USSR Pacific Navy entered the war with Japan. The fleet was fully prepared for the upcoming battles. It consisted of 2 cruisers, 1 leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 10 minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine hunters, 204 torpedo boats, 78 submarines.
Despite the fact that our Pacific Navy was inferior to the Japanese fleet in the number of large surface ships, this was compensated by complete air superiority. Among the tasks facing the fleet commander, Admiral Ivan Yumashev, was the destruction of Japanese sea communications between Manchuria, North Korea and Japan, as well as assisting the troops of the Far Eastern Front in their offensive in the coastal direction.
The first target of our amphibious assault was the Seishin naval base. On the morning of August 14, soldiers of the first echelon of the landing force landed in Seisin, and on August 15 - of the second echelon. The landing of the third echelon was not required, since the forces of 6 thousand sailors were enough to capture the city. Now the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to use this base for the transfer of reinforcements, equipment, ammunition from the mother country and for the evacuation of the wounded and material assets to Japan.
After the capture of Seisin, the Pacific Islanders liberated two more large enemy strongholds - the ports of Odetzin and Wonsan. In the last operation, 6,238 Japanese soldiers and officers were captured. Toro and Maoka also fell before the end of August. A Soviet landing force of 1,600 people landed in Otomari (now Korsakov). The Japanese garrison, numbering 3,400 people, was so stunned by the Russian victories that they surrendered almost without resistance.
The forces of the Pacific Fleet sunk 2 destroyers, up to 40 warships, 28 transports, 3 tankers, 12 barges and schooners belonging to Japan. Over a hundred more ships were captured at sea and in occupied ports, and 9 Japanese aircraft were shot down and destroyed at airfields. The naval artillery destroyed several dozen coastal and field guns, an armored train and numerous military installations.
After the defeat of Japanese troops in Manchuria and Sakhalin, favorable conditions were created for the liberation of the Kuril Islands from the enemy. By September 1, the Pacific Fleet took control of the entire southern part of the Kuril Islands, and up to 60 thousand Japanese troops were captured. The Kuril landing operation was the last operation of the Second World War.
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Italian Navy in World War II
Italian fleet on the eve of the war
Preparation
During the international crisis that erupted with the outbreak of the Ethiopian Campaign in the spring of 1935, the Italian fleet was mobilized for the first time since the First World War. After the conclusion of the Ethiopian operation, many of the fleet's support services were cut, but the fleet remained mobilized at the end of 1936. The Spanish Civil War, various international crises and finally the occupation of Albania - all this forced the fleet to be kept on alert.
Such events, of course, had a negative impact on preparations for a future world conflict. The constant readiness of ships led to wear and tear on the mechanisms and fatigue of the crew, and interfered with long-term planning. Moreover, the Italian government notified the armed forces that the outbreak of war was not expected to begin until 1942. This was confirmed during the signing of the Axis Treaty between Italy and Germany. The fleet made its plans based on this date.
On June 10, 1940, when hostilities were about to begin, many of the components of what was called "readiness for war" had not yet been completed. For example, the initial plans called for building 4 new powerful battleships and completing the complete modernization of 4 old ones by 1942. Such a core of the fleet would force any enemy to respect itself. In June 1940, only Cavour and Cesare were in service. Littorio, Vittorio Veneto, Duilio and Doria were still completing their fitting out at the shipyards. It took another 2 years to complete the battleship Roma, at least 3 to complete the Impero (In fact, the Roma was completed in the spring of 1943, work on the Impero was never completed). The premature outbreak of hostilities saw the construction of 12 light cruisers, many destroyers, escort ships, submarines and small craft. The outbreak of war delayed their completion and equipment.
In addition, an additional 2 years would make it possible to eliminate deficiencies in technical equipment and crew training. This is especially true for night operations, torpedo firing, radar and asdic. The biggest blow to the combat effectiveness of Italian ships was the lack of radar. Enemy ships and planes attacked Italian ships with impunity at night, when they were practically blind. Therefore, the enemy developed new tactics for which the Italian fleet was completely unprepared.
The technical principles of the radar and asdic operation have been known to the Italian fleet since 1936. But the war interrupted scientific work on these weapons systems. To bring them to practical use required expensive industrial development, especially for radar. It is doubtful that the Italian fleet and industry would be able to achieve significant results, even with those same 2 years. However, the enemy would lose the surprise advantage of using them. By the end of the war, only a few aircraft radars were built, and then rather experimental installations.
During the war, the Italian navy paid dearly for these and other minor shortcomings, which often prevented them from taking advantage of a favorable situation. However, the Italian fleet was well prepared for the war and was fully worth the investment.
The fleet's preparatory measures included the accumulation of all kinds of supplies, and when the war began, the reserves of many types of supplies were sufficient to meet any requirements. For example, shipyards operated without delays throughout the war and even after the armistice almost exclusively from pre-war stocks. The growing demands of the Libyan Front forced the fleet to re-equip some ports - more than once - and solve sometimes unexpected problems, resorting only to its own reserves. Sometimes the fleet complied with requests from other branches of the armed forces.
Fuel supplies were completely inadequate, and we will see later how acute this problem became. In June 1940, the fleet had only 1,800,000 tons of oil, collected literally drop by drop. At the time, it was estimated that the monthly consumption during the war would be 200,000 tons. This meant that naval reserves would only last 9 months of the war. Mussolini, however, believed that this was more than enough for a “three-month war.” In his opinion, hostilities could not drag on longer. Based on this assumption, he even forced the Navy to transfer part of the reserves - a total of 300,000 tons - to the Air Force and civilian industry after the start of the war. Therefore, during the war, the navy was forced to limit the movements of ships in order to reduce oil consumption. In the first quarter of 1943 it had to be cut to the ridiculous figure of 24,000 tons per month. Compared to the original estimate of 200,000 tons as the minimum required, it is easy to see the impact this had on operations.
All these shortcomings were balanced by the magnificent spirit of the officers and sailors. Throughout the 39 months of fierce fighting before Italy signed the armistice, the personnel of the Italian fleet more than once showed examples of mass and individual heroism. Following its traditions, the fleet resisted the inculcation of fascist political views. It was difficult to bring oneself to hate Britain, whose fleet had always been considered a natural ally.
But when the die was cast, the fleet, driven by a sense of duty, began the battle, straining all its strength. He was opposed by powerful opponents, but he passed the test of fire with honor and courage.
Navy opposition to the war and its original plans
At the beginning of 1940, suspicions that Italy would enter the war were already in the air. However, Mussolini had not yet specifically told the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces that he intended to intervene in the conflict. In the first months of this fateful year, the government, in order to support exports, forced the navy to sell 2 destroyers and 2 destroyers to Sweden. This fact was quite naturally understood by the navy as a sign of the government's reluctance to enter into war, at least in the near future. But within a few days of von Ribbentrop's visit to Mussolini in March 1940, which was immediately followed by a visit from Sumner Welles, the government's real attitude towards the war began to become clear. This decision was communicated to headquarters on April 6, 1940.
On this day, Marshal Badoglio, the Chief of the General Staff, convened a meeting of the three chiefs of staff of the armed forces and informed them of the Duce’s “firm decision to intervene at the time and place of his choosing.” Badoglio said that the war on land would be fought defensively, and offensively at sea and in the air. Two days later, on April 11, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Cavagnari, expressed his views on this statement in writing. Among other things, he noted the difficulty of such events due to the enemy's superiority in forces and the unfavorable strategic situation. This made offensive naval warfare impossible. Besides, the British fleet could quickly replenish!” any losses. Cavagnari declared that this was impossible for the Italian fleet and would soon find itself in a critical position. The admiral warned that it would be impossible to achieve initial surprise, and that operations against enemy shipping in the Mediterranean would be impossible, since it had already ceased.
Admiral Cavagnari also wrote: “Since there is no possibility of solving strategic problems or defeating enemy naval forces, entering the war on our initiative is not justified. We will only be able to conduct defensive operations." Indeed, history knows no examples of a country that started a war immediately going on the defensive.
Having shown the disadvantageous situation in which the fleet would find itself due to inadequate air support for naval operations, Admiral Cavagnari concluded his memorandum with these prophetic words: “Whatever character the development of the war in the Mediterranean may take, in the long run our losses at sea will be heavy. When peace negotiations begin, Italy may well find itself not only without territorial gains, but also without a navy and perhaps without air power.” These words were not only prophetic, they expressed the point of view of the Italian fleet. All the predictions made by Admiral Cavagnari in his letter were completely justified, with the exception of one. By the end of the war, Italy was left without an army and air force, destroyed by powerful opponents, but still had a fairly strong navy.
Mussolini, fearing that peace would return to Europe before Italy had its say, ignored these warnings. Moreover, he simply brushed them aside, relying on his confidence that military operations would be very short - no more than three months. However, the Italian fleet was preparing for war on the basis of operational plans that had been expressed more than once before. They can be summarized as follows: keep naval forces concentrated to obtain maximum defensive and offensive power; as a consequence - not to participate in the protection of merchant shipping except in special rare cases; abandon the idea of supplying Libya due to the initial strategic situation. Having France as an enemy, it was considered impossible to conduct ships through the Mediterranean.
Mussolini did not object to these concepts. He assumed that the conflict would not drag on, and therefore coastal shipping could be reduced, and Libya would survive for six months on the supplies that were collected there. It turned out that all of Mussolini's assumptions were wrong. The Italian fleet found itself forced to do something it had absolutely no intention of doing. Exactly 3 days after the start of the war, a demand came to Rome from Libya to urgently deliver urgently needed supplies. And these demands, which were growing at an alarming rate, had to be fulfilled, of course, by the fleet.
On June 16, 1940, the submarine Zoea began loading ammunition for delivery to Tobruk. Due to the proximity of the base to the front line and its distance from other Italian bases, the command did not want to send transports there, even accompanied by an escort. The submarine went to sea on June 19. This was the first of countless trips to Africa.
These operations, carried out under the pressure of circumstances, became the main occupation of the Italian fleet, although not the most beloved. They led to a serious dispersion of forces. On June 20, a flotilla of destroyers led by Artillere left Augusta for Benghazi to transport anti-tank guns and gunners. After 5 days, the first guarded convoy left Naples for Tripoli, carrying various supplies and 1,727 soldiers. On the same day, the submarine Bragadin went to sea with a cargo of materials for Tripoli airport. These few examples clearly show how self-sufficient Libya was. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, demanding that Admiral Cavagnari send the first 3 or 4 convoys to Libya, each time firmly assured that “this is the last time.”
The confidence that the war would end in 3 months soon dissipated. Mussolini was misled by Hitler's propaganda claims about the landing in England. In reality, at the end of August 1940, the Italian High Command, based on information received from Berlin, had to give the order to prepare for a protracted war that would last several years.
Unfortunately for the Italian fleet, the premises on which its operational planning was based turned out to be fundamentally flawed. Nevertheless, the fleet fought tenaciously for 39 long months under difficult - and sometimes hopeless - conditions and inflicted heavy losses on the powerful enemy. Despite the bloody trials, Italian sailors, from the admiral to the last sailor, always remained faithful to duty, the spirit of self-sacrifice and unfailing courage. Their devotion was simply remarkable, since it was not the result of blind obedience, but a manifestation of a conscious will, which was confirmed at every stage of the struggle.
At the beginning of the war, the core of the Italian fleet consisted of 2 old, but modernized battleships and 19 cruisers. The British and French had 11 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and 23 cruisers stationed in the Mediterranean. The already enormous superiority of the Allies became simply overwhelming when one took into account their forces outside the Mediterranean theater, which could be used as reinforcements and to make up for losses. Roughly speaking, Italy had a navy with a total displacement of about 690,000 tons, and the enemy had four times that.
It is important to consider the deployment of the warring parties' fleets. Anglo-French forces were based in Toulon, Gibraltar, Bizerte and Alexandria. At this time there were no ships in Malta. Italian ships were mainly divided between Naples and Taranto, with several cruisers based at Sicilian ports. These forces could unite using the Strait of Messina, although they were exposed to the danger of attack while passing through it. Only a few submarines and torpedo boat formations for coastal defense were based in the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea.
The Adriatic was an inland sea, the strategic cover of which was provided from Taranto. Tobruk was an advanced outpost close to enemy lines, so only light patrol ships were based in the din. The Dodecanese islands and their main base on Leros were effectively blocked, since Greek waters could not be considered neutral. Only patrol and sabotage units could be based here. The Red Sea base of Massawa, home to a group of obsolete destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats, had been completely isolated since the start of the war and was of limited importance.
Therefore, we can say that the deployment of the Italian fleet corresponded to the geographical factor. The main forces were in the center of the Mediterranean, and the rest were in a number of peripheral points. The situation at the beginning of the war did not foretell immediate clashes unless both opposing fleets took overtly aggressive positions. The Italian fleet could not do this and, as was shown earlier, did not even intend to. However, as the enemy declared, his fleet would wage an offensive war, especially the formation commanded by Admiral Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham.
The Decisive Factor of Air Support
Another big question for the Italian navy is how much can it rely on air cooperation? She had to solve three tasks: conduct reconnaissance; cover your ships; strike at the enemy. The four largest navies in the world after the First World War studied this problem and came to the conclusion that they absolutely needed to have aircraft carriers and their own specialized aviation units.
The Italian Navy also created its own air force during the First World War, and it did a good job then. After the war, the Navy dealt with the complex problems of interaction between ships and aircraft that were expected to inevitably arise in the future. But after the creation of the Italian Air Force in 1923, the Navy was ordered to cease all work in the field of aviation due to a radical difference of opinion between it and the Air Force. Mussolini and the Air Force defeated supporters of the creation of naval aviation. For the Duce and his supporters in the Air Force, the Italian Peninsula was imagined as a huge aircraft carrier in the center of the Mediterranean Sea. They were of the opinion that Air Force aircraft, operating from coastal bases, would excel in any naval warfare mission. Therefore, every proposal from the fleet to build an aircraft carrier and create its own specialized air units was met with hostility. However, it should be noted that the Chief of Staff of the Navy in 1938 allowed Mussolini to convince himself that the construction of aircraft carriers was not necessary. But in 1941, Mussolini himself realized his mistake and gave the order to convert two large airliners into aircraft carriers.
The only compromise reached in this dispute was the issue of aerial reconnaissance. As a result, the so-called “aviation FOR the fleet” was created. In reality, the “compromise” gave the fleet little. He received operational control of the reconnaissance aircraft and was allowed to send his observers to them. Despite all the clumsiness of such a scheme, it could still be accepted if mutual understanding could be reached between the Navy and the Air Force. However, the pilots greatly exaggerated their capabilities, and therefore the fleet was never able to achieve serious attention to the problems of interaction between ships and aircraft. The Air Force based its doctrines on the premise of "independent air warfare under its own laws." The fleet has never been able to understand these laws.
For these reasons, at the beginning of the war, when Italian aviation was more numerous than the enemy, effective cooperation between the navy and air force could not be achieved. However, such cooperation was absolutely necessary for the smooth conduct of naval operations. The Italian air force fought with enormous energy, completely oblivious to the actions of the fleet. As a result, this lack of coordination limited the success of both naval and air operations at sea.
The enemy's British fleet controlled its own air units from the very beginning. Although there were not too many of them, they were well trained in joint actions with ships, and combined operations took place with the closest cooperation between the participants. Under such conditions, it is quite understandable why the Italian fleet was unable to carry out many operations that simply suggested themselves.
The result of such restrictions can be seen in the history of the creation and use of torpedo bombers. The idea of such an aircraft in the fleet arose at the very dawn of aviation - in 1913. The first attempts to implement it were made in 1918, and by 1922 some success had been achieved. Great hopes were placed on the new weapon. Almost from its birth as an independent branch of the armed forces, the Air Force categorically rejected this idea. The Air Force managed to prevent the Navy from conducting its own experiments. In 1938, information was received that the British fleet was intensively working on the creation of a torpedo bomber, and the Italian fleet again tried to overcome the resistance of the Air Force. He wanted to revive torpedo bomber units. In vain. By the beginning of the war there was not even a hint of a solution to this problem.
It should be mentioned that the Italian fleet has created an air torpedo that is superior in its characteristics to the English one. It could be dropped from a height of 100 meters at a speed of 300 km/h - compared to 20 meters and 250 km/h for the British air torpedo. The Navy built up some stock of these torpedoes, which were used by torpedo boats. When the Air Force, at the height of the war, decided to adopt torpedo bomber aircraft, they were faced with the problem of creating weapons for them, which had already been solved by the fleet. Therefore, the Navy transferred a large number of torpedoes and personnel to maintain them to the Air Force.
During the war, the Air Force made Herculean efforts to improve the overall situation, including its relationship with the Navy. However, creating the doctrine of combined operations and gaining practical experience to successfully conduct this type of military action required many years of work. Of course, during the war, which crushed people and equipment, there were no opportunities left to make up for lost time. Therefore, in terms of air support, the Italian fleet was seriously inferior to its opponents throughout the war.
Supermarina
Before the beginning of the chronological description of the events of the war, the apparatus of the high operational command of the fleet, which was responsible for conducting operations at sea, must necessarily follow. This headquarters is known as Supermarina.
The current state of communications and military art make it absolutely necessary to concentrate in one structure, located ashore in a well-protected headquarters, the functions of collecting and coordinating information about naval operations. This requirement is especially significant when operating in such a relatively narrow water area as the Mediterranean Sea. Only such a command organization can properly coordinate the disposition of all available military assets. Therefore, the Italian Supermarina had its headquarters in the Ministry of the Navy until Rome was declared an open city. Later, its headquarters were relocated to a huge underground radio communications center in Saita Rose on Viz Cassia.
In a large and complex organization of this kind, the naval groups themselves form only a small part, although the example of the Italians shows that they are the most important pieces on the chessboard of naval warfare. Such a system leads to the fact that the admiral, who previously commanded the fleet at every step, becomes bifurcated. One part becomes the strategist, who studies and plans the preliminary phases of the battle and directs the deployment of forces from a permanent central headquarters on the shore. And the second part is the tactician who commands the fleet directly in battle.
In the case of Supermarina, this system, like any creation of human hands, had a number of disadvantages. The most important thing, apparently, was the desire to centralize control more than was really required.
The second serious drawback was that the commanders on shore, just like the commanders of formations at sea, constantly felt the invisible presence of Supermarina behind them, sometimes preferring to wait for orders or even demand instructions, although they could, and sometimes simply had to, act independently . However, as the author himself could notice, Supermarina was more often mistaken in refraining from interfering than in cases where she took leadership upon herself. Trying not to limit the freedom of action of the highest commander at sea during the deployment phase and the battle itself. Supermarina often did not convey directives that were required to be conveyed, according to her own assessments, or those that were dictated by a more complete vision of the situation. A retrospective study of these battles suggests that the directive could have led to more successful results.
Another flaw in Italian command structures was Supermarina's hierarchical organization. At the top stood the Chief of the Navy Staff, who was also the Deputy Minister of the Navy, and was therefore heavily loaded with the affairs of the ministry. As a result, in practice, the operational management of Supermarina ended up in the hands of the deputy chief of staff, who was often the only person familiar with all the details of the current situation, but whose activity and initiative were limited. His position was complicated by the fact that only his superior personally discussed all operational problems with Mussolini, who was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and with the Italian High Command. As mentioned above, the Chief of Naval Staff did not always know the nuances of the situation well enough to convince the High Command to accept the Navy's point of view. The state of affairs became even more deplorable, since the Italian High Command itself had little understanding of the strategic and technical problems of the naval war that was being waged in the Mediterranean.
The head of the German Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, an intelligent and well-informed observer, told Marshal Rommel: “The Italian fleet is, in the main, of high quality, which will enable it to stand up to the best navies in the world. However, his High Command lacks decisiveness. But most likely this is the result of the fact that he has to act under the direction of the Italian High Command, which is controlled by the army."
The work of various departments contributed to the functioning of Supermarina as a whole. The most important of them was the so-called Operations Center. All reports passed through him, he gave all special and extraordinary orders. Using a file cabinet of large wall maps, the Operations Center tracked the location of all ships, friendly and enemy, at sea and in ports. The Operations Center was the point from which the fleet as a whole and all Italian ships, from battleships to the last tug, were controlled. This nerve center of the Italian fleet functioned continuously from June 1, 1940, when Supermarina began operating, until September 12, 1943, when the Chief of the Naval General Staff, arriving in Brindisi after the signing of the armistice, took command of the fleet there.
Overall, Supermarina was a highly effective organization, and its Operations Center performed its duties quite satisfactorily throughout the war. The rest of Supermarina's departments generally lacked the imagination to find that ingenious solution among thousands of options that would be the key to success. This weakness was not a fault of individual Supermarine officers. Rather, it was a consequence of their overload with clerical work, which did not leave them time to develop and clearly formulate “operational ideas.” This was especially true for officers holding senior positions.
Supermarina's work was closely connected and dependent on the functioning of communications systems, whose role is so great in all areas of modern warfare. From the very beginning, the Italian fleet paid maximum attention to all types of communications. After all, Marconi’s first experiments in radio communications at sea were carried out by the Italian fleet. At the start of the war, the navy had its own extensive and highly efficient communications network, which included telephone, radio and telegraph. The complex “nervous system” had its center at Supermarina headquarters. In addition to it, there was its own separate secret telephone network that connected all naval headquarters on the peninsula and in Sicily. From Supermarina it was possible to contact the flagships when they were in La Spezia, Naples or Taranto. In this way, it was possible to transmit the most secret and urgent messages directly over the phone from the Operations Center without outside interference. When you remember the millions of telephone, radio and telegraph messages transmitted over the naval communications networks during the war years, it is easy to evaluate the effectiveness of their work. Until September 8, 1943, the Rome center alone recorded more than 3,000,000 messages.
This communication system used various ciphers, the secrecy of which was especially important. It had to be preserved at all costs. Overall, this service worked very well, especially when you consider the huge amount of work done and the large number of ciphers used. The Italian Navy also established a highly efficient radio interception and decryption service. This department worked in conditions of strict secrecy, and even today it cannot be discussed. The Cryptographic Service, led by a small group of talented officers, did enormous and extremely useful work during the war. For example, the immediate decipherment of British intelligence reports was of great importance and helped the fleet to some extent compensate for the shortcomings of its own intelligence, since it allowed Supermarine to exploit the work of the enemy intelligence service.
The Second World War, which lasted almost 6 years, marked the existence of 5 strongest maritime states in the world, among which the first place was still given to Great Britain, and the second is Germany. The top five also included the Soviet Union, United States and partly France, which tried to influence the state of affairs of the Allies in Africa with the help of the fleet.
Many government officials knew about the imminent approach of war; already at the end of the 1930s, emergency work began in most large states to re-equip the army and navy, build new models of warships and submarines.
France, England, Germany and the United States urgently began building heavy warships and squadron submarines designed to accompany ships in order to protect them from attacks by enemy surface and submarine forces.
French submarine cruiser "Surku"Thus, in 1934, France began building the modern submarine cruiser Surku, which was armed with 14 torpedo tubes and two 203-mm guns. The deck and command room of the ship were covered with durable armor, capable of withstanding several powerful shots.
In the early 40s, the English fleet was equipped with underwater monitors, some of which were converted into submarine cruisers closer to the beginning of the war, with the gun turret being replaced by a hangar for a seaplane capable of landing directly on the water. In principle, at the beginning of the Second World War, the English fleet was still the most powerful in the world; the ships of the fleet were the fastest and most technically equipped, capable of moving at good speed over long distances. For example, the British military submarine X-1 was equipped with a diesel engine capable of giving it a speed of up to 20 knots per hour.
America did not lag behind Great Britain, striving to surpass all other states in the strength and power of its surface and submarine fleet, for which technical changes were constantly taking place in it, technical innovations in military equipment and equipment were being introduced. Almost every American warship and submarine had an air conditioning system for the compartments and cabins of sailors and officers; in this, the Americans followed the example of the Dutch, who had long been providing their own crews with a fresh supply of air.
British submarines were equipped with sonars that made it possible to detect the enemy and measure the distance to him even before making visual contact. Such a device, among other things, made it easier to find anchor mines. Also, almost all modern submarines of that time were equipped with devices that reduced the number of bubbles rising above the water surface after an underwater strike by a boat, and allowed minesweepers and aircraft to detect its location. Almost all submarines received new weapons in the form of 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, allowing them to fire at air targets.
Submarine sonar To assist submarines in transporting food, water and fuel on the high seas, the massive construction of tankers and other transport vessels began. The submarines were equipped with powerful electric motors and batteries, which, together with special engine equipment, significantly increased the time the boat spent under water.
Gradually, the submarine turned into a real ship, capable of staying under water not for several minutes, but for several hours. To improve the enemy surveillance system, submarines were equipped with completely new periscopes and radar antennas. It was quite difficult to detect a boat with such a periscope, while it found the enemy without much difficulty. Communication between ships was maintained by special radiotelephones.
As submarine navigation developed, the number of submarine crews grew, with the exception of German submarines, where preference was given to placing a large number of weapons rather than people. The newest German submarine “U-1407” was equipped with three combined-cycle turbines, thanks to which it could reach speeds of up to 24 knots per hour. But due to technical errors, this boat model was not put into mass production.
At the same time as the Germans and the British, the Japanese were also building submarines. However, the submarines of the latter were so imperfect that the noise and vibration they produced could be heard at a fairly large distance, which forced the government to almost completely abandon their use and move on to the construction of aircraft carriers, the first ships of this type in the world fleet. The aircraft carriers of the Japanese fleet were distinguished by good maneuverability, but were poorly armed and had virtually no armor, and therefore needed protection from cruisers and destroyers.
The British, entering World War II, also stocked up on a modern aircraft carrier. “Ark Royal” - that was the name of the ship, could reach a speed of 30 knots and accommodate up to 72 aircraft on its deck. The aircraft carrier was equipped with a large number of hangars, lifts, catapults and nets for catching aircraft that failed to land on their own, while the length of the landing deck reached 244 meters. There was no such deck on any aircraft carrier in the world. Trying not to lag behind European countries in any way, by the beginning of 1939 the Japanese had completely re-equipped and redesigned their old ships, turning many of them into modern aircraft carriers. By the beginning of the war, Japan had as many as two aircraft carriers capable of carrying 92 aircraft each.
English aircraft carrier Ark Royal However, despite the efforts of the British and Japanese, the championship in aircraft carrier construction belonged to the Americans, whose aircraft carriers turned out to be capable of accommodating over 80 aircraft. Midway-class aircraft carriers were the most powerful and largest at that time, since they were capable of carrying over 130 aircraft on deck, but they did not take part in the war, since their construction was noticeably delayed. During the 6 years of the war, America built 36 heavy aircraft carriers and 124 light ones, carrying up to 45 aircraft.
While Europe and America were playing race, the Soviet Union was also building its own submarines and aircraft carriers. The first submarine capable of matching the power of the American and English ones was the Leninsky Komsomol, which was capable of reaching the North Pole, as well as making a trip around the globe without surfacing, as part of a convoy of boats of the same type.
On the eve of the war, much attention in the Soviet Union was paid to the construction of missile boats, landing ships using an air cushion and torpedo boats equipped with hydrofoils. Many ships were equipped with anti-aircraft and nuclear weapons, missiles of various classes and types.
The Union's first aircraft-carrying ship was the aircraft carrier Moskva, capable of accommodating several military helicopters on board. The success of its design allowed engineers and designers to develop a few years later the Kyiv aircraft carrier, on board which could accommodate not only helicopters, but also aircraft in fairly large quantities.
Thus, the world powers thoroughly prepared for the Second World War, acquiring powerful and well-equipped naval fleets.
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