The second Chechen war also had an official name - the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, or KTO for short. But it is the common name that is more known and widespread. The war affected almost the entire territory of Chechnya and the adjacent regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 with the entry of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The most active phase can be called the years of the second Chechen war from 1999 to 2000. This was the peak of the attacks. In subsequent years, the second Chechen war took on the character of local skirmishes between separatists and Russian soldiers. 2009 was marked by the official abolition of the CTO regime.
The second Chechen war brought a lot of destruction. The photographs taken by journalists testify to this in the best possible way.
background
The first and second Chechen wars have a small time gap. After the Khasavyurt agreement was signed in 1996, and Russian troops were withdrawn from the republic, the authorities expected calm to come. However, peace has not been established in Chechnya.
Criminal structures have significantly stepped up their activities. They did an impressive business on such a criminal act as kidnapping for ransom. Their victims were both Russian journalists and official representatives, as well as members of foreign public, political and religious organizations. The bandits did not disdain the kidnapping of people who came to Chechnya for the funeral of loved ones. So, in 1997, two citizens of Ukraine were captured, who arrived in the republic in connection with the death of their mother. Businessmen and workers from Turkey were regularly captured. Terrorists profited from the theft of oil, drug trafficking, production and distribution of counterfeit money. They committed acts of violence and kept the civilian population in fear.
In March 1999, G. Shpigun, an authorized representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for Chechnya, was captured at the Grozny airport. This egregious case showed the complete inconsistency of the President of the CRI, Maskhadov. The federal center decided to strengthen control over the republic. Elite operational units were sent to the North Caucasus, the purpose of which was to fight against bandit formations. From the side of the Stavropol Territory, a number of rocket launchers were put up, designed to deliver pinpoint ground strikes. An economic blockade was also introduced. The flow of cash injections from Russia has sharply decreased. In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for bandits to smuggle drugs abroad and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories had nowhere to sell. In mid-1999, the border between Chechnya and Dagestan turned into a militarized zone.
Bandit formations did not abandon attempts to unofficially seize power. Groups under the leadership of Khattab and Basayev made forays into the territory of Stavropol and Dagestan. As a result, dozens of servicemen and police officers were killed.
On September 23, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially signed a decree on the creation of the United Group of Forces. Its goal was to conduct a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. Thus began the second Chechen war.
The nature of the conflict
The Russian Federation acted very skillfully. with the help of tactics (luring the enemy into a minefield, sudden raids on small settlements), significant results were achieved. After the active phase of the war passed, the main goal of the command was to establish a truce and attract former leaders of gangs to their side. The militants, on the contrary, relied on giving the conflict an international character, calling for participation in it of representatives of radical Islam from all over the world.
By 2005, terrorist activity had dropped significantly. Between 2005 and 2008, no major attacks on civilians or clashes with official troops were recorded. However, in 2010 there were a number of tragic terrorist acts (explosions in the Moscow metro, at Domodedovo airport).
Second Chechen War: Beginning
On June 18, CRI carried out two attacks at once on the border in the direction of Dagestan, as well as on a company of Cossacks in Stavropol. After that, most of the checkpoints to Chechnya from Russia were closed.
On June 22, 1999, an attempt was made to blow up the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of our country. This fact was noted for the first time in the entire history of the existence of this ministry. The bomb was located and promptly defused.
On June 30, the Russian leadership gave permission to use military weapons against gangs on the border with the CRI.
Attack on the Republic of Dagestan
On August 1, 1999, the armed detachments of the Khasavyurt region, as well as the citizens of Chechnya supporting them, announced that they were introducing Sharia rule in their region.
On August 2, militants from the CRI provoked a violent clash between Wahhabis and riot police. As a result, several people died on both sides.
On August 3, a shootout took place between policemen and Wahhabis in the Tsumadinsky district of the river. Dagestan. There were no losses. Shamil Basayev, one of the leaders of the Chechen opposition, announced the creation of an Islamic shura that had its own troops. They established control over several districts in Dagestan. The local authorities of the republic are asking the center for the issuance of military weapons to protect the civilian population from terrorists.
The next day, the separatists were pushed back from the regional center of Aghvali. More than 500 people dug in in positions that had been prepared in advance. They did not put forward any demands and did not enter into negotiations. it became known that they were holding three policemen.
At noon on August 4, on the road of the Botlikh region, a group of armed militants opened fire on a line of police officers who were trying to stop a car for inspection. As a result, two terrorists were killed, and there were no casualties among the security forces. The settlement of Kekhni was hit by two powerful missile and bomb attacks by Russian attack aircraft. It was there, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that a detachment of militants stopped.
On August 5, it becomes known that a major terrorist act is being prepared on the territory of Dagestan. 600 militants were going to penetrate the center of the republic through the village of Kekhni. They wanted to seize Makhachkala and sabotage the government. However, representatives of the center of Dagestan denied this information.
The period from August 9 to 25 was remembered by the battle for the Donkey Ear height. The militants fought with paratroopers from Stavropol and Novorossiysk.
Between September 7 and 14, large groups invaded from Chechnya under the leadership of Basayev and Khattab. The devastating battles continued for about a month.
Bombing of Chechnya from the air
On August 25, Russian armed forces attacked terrorist bases in the Vedeno Gorge. More than a hundred militants were destroyed from the air.
In the period from September 6 to 18, Russian aviation continues to carry out mass bombardment of separatist gathering places. Despite the protest of the Chechen authorities, the security forces say they will act as necessary in the fight against terrorists.
On September 23, Grozny and its environs are bombarded by central aviation forces. As a result, power plants, oil refineries, a mobile communication center, radio and television buildings were destroyed.
On September 27, VV Putin rejected the possibility of a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Chechnya.
Ground operation
Since September 6, martial law has been in effect in Chechnya. Maskhadov calls on his citizens to declare gazavat to Russia.
On October 8, in the village of Mekenskaya, a militant Ibragimov Akhmed shot 34 people of Russian nationality. Of these, three were children. At the gathering of the village of Ibragimov, they beat him to death with sticks. Mulla forbade his body to be buried in the earth.
The next day they occupied a third of the CRI territory and moved on to the second phase of hostilities. The main goal is the destruction of gangs.
On November 25, the President of Chechnya appealed to Russian soldiers to surrender and go into captivity.
In December 1999, Russian combat forces liberated almost all of Chechnya from militants. About 3,000 terrorists dispersed over the mountains, and also hid in Grozny.
Until February 6, 2000, the siege of the capital of Chechnya continued. After the capture of Grozny, massive battles came to naught.
Situation in 2009
Despite the fact that the counter-terrorist operation was officially terminated, the situation in Chechnya did not become calmer, but, on the contrary, became aggravated. Cases of explosions became more frequent, militants became more active again. In the autumn of 2009, a number of operations were carried out aimed at the destruction of gangs. The militants respond with major terrorist acts, including in Moscow. By mid-2010, the conflict was escalating.
Second Chechen War: results
Any hostilities cause damage to both property and people. Despite the compelling reasons for the second Chechen war, the pain of the death of loved ones cannot be eased or forgotten. According to statistics, 3684 people were lost on the Russian side. 2178 representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were killed. The FSB lost 202 of its employees. More than 15,000 people were killed among the terrorists. The number of civilians who died during the war is not exactly established. According to official figures, it is about 1000 people.
Movies and books about the war
The fighting did not leave indifferent and artists, writers, directors. Dedicated to such an event as the second Chechen war, photographs. Exhibitions are held regularly, where you can see works that reflect the destruction left after the battles.
The second Chechen war still causes a lot of controversy. The film "Purgatory", based on real events, perfectly reflects the horror of that period. The most famous books were written by A. Karasev. These are "Chechen stories" and "Traitor".
Russia waged numerous wars against the invaders, there were wars as obligations to the allies, but, unfortunately, there were wars, the causes of which were associated with the illiterate activities of the country's leaders.
History of the conflict
Everything began quite peacefully under Mikhail Gorbachev, who, announcing the beginning of perestroika, actually opened the way for the collapse of a huge country. It was at this time that the USSR, which was actively losing its foreign policy allies, got problems within the state as well. First of all, these problems were associated with the awakening of ethnic nationalism. They manifested themselves most clearly in the territories of the Baltic and the Caucasus.
Already at the end of 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen people was convened. It was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, Major General of the Soviet Army. The purpose of the congress was to secede from the USSR and create an independent Chechen Republic. Gradually, this decision began to materialize.
Back in the summer of 1991, dual power was observed in Chechnya: the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, continued to work there. But in September 1991, after the unsuccessful actions of the State Emergency Committee, the Chechen separatists felt that an opportune moment had come, and Dudayev's armed guards seized the television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. In fact, there was a coup d'état.
Power passed into the hands of the separatists, and on October 27 parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic. All power was concentrated in the hands of Dudayev.
Nevertheless, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin considered it necessary to introduce a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic and thereby created the reason for the start of a bloody war. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were a large number of Soviet weapons in the republic, which they did not have time to take out.
For a while, the situation in the republic was contained. An opposition was created against Dudayev, but the forces were unequal.
The Yeltsin government at that time had neither the strength nor the political will to take any effective measures, and, in fact, Chechnya became virtually independent from Russia between 1991 and 1994. It formed its own authorities, its own state symbols. However, in 1994 the Yeltsin administration decided to bring constitutional order to Chechnya. Russian troops were brought into its territory, which was the beginning of a full-scale war.
The course of hostilities
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Federal aviation strike on airfields in Chechnya. Destruction of militant aircraft |
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The entry of federal troops into the territory of Chechnya |
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Federal troops approached Grozny |
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The beginning of the assault on Grozny |
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Capture of the presidential palace |
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Creation of the "South" grouping and the complete blockade of Grozny |
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Conclusion of a temporary truce |
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Despite the truce, street fighting continues. The militants leave the city |
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The last district of Grozny has been liberated. A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by S. Khadzhiev and U. Avturkhanov |
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Capture of Argun |
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Shawls and Gudermes taken |
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Fighting near the village of Semashki |
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April 1995 |
Completion of the fighting in flat Chechnya |
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The beginning of hostilities in mountainous Chechnya |
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Taking Vedeno |
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The regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken |
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Terrorist act in Budyonnovsk |
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First round of negotiations. Indefinite moratorium on hostilities |
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Second round of negotiations. An agreement on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of federal troops, the holding of free elections |
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Militants capture Argun, but after the battle they are knocked out by federal troops |
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Gudermes was captured by militants and a week later cleared by federal troops |
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Elections were held in Chechnya. Defeated Doku Zavgaev |
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Terrorist act in Kizlyar |
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Attack of militants on Grozny |
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Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev |
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Meeting in Moscow with Z. Yandarbiev. Armistice agreement and exchange of prisoners |
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After the federal ultimatum, strikes on militant bases resumed |
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Operation Jihad. Separatist attack on Grozny, assault and capture of Gudermes |
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Khasavyurt agreements. Federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001 |
The results of the war
Chechen separatists perceived the Khasavyurt agreements as a victory. Federal troops were forced to leave Chechnya. All power remained in the hands of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria. Instead of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov took power, who was not much different from his predecessor, but had less authority and was forced to constantly compromise with the militants.
The end of the war left behind a devastated economy. Cities and villages were not restored. As a result of the war and ethnic cleansing, all representatives of other nationalities left Chechnya.
The internal social situation has changed critically. The one who used to fight for independence has slipped into criminal squabbles. The heroes of the republic have turned into ordinary bandits. They hunted not only in Chechnya, but throughout Russia. Kidnapping became a particularly lucrative business. Neighboring regions especially felt it.
We present you the release of photographs by Alexander Nemenov about the First Chechen War and the history of this military conflict. (Warning! This issue contains photographic materials that may seem unpleasant or frightening)
1. The First Chechen War (the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, the First Chechen campaign, the Restoration of the constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - the fighting between the troops of Russia (the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, in order to take control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.
2. Officially, the conflict was defined as "measures to maintain constitutional order", military operations were called the "first Chechen war", less often the "Russian-Chechen" or "Russian-Caucasian war". The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, there were facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya.
3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War, and a wave of terror that swept through Russia.
4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements became more active. One of these organizations was the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OKCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by the former General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power developed in the republic.
6. During the "August coup" in Moscow, the leadership of the CHIASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of a "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. On this occasion, the head of the Chechen Republic Zavgaev D. G. spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma "Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided), the war began in the fall of 1991, namely the war against a multinational people, when the criminal criminal regime under some support of those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation here, these people were covered in blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. , during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Republic. When Besliev, Vice-Rector of the State University, was shot dead in the street. When Kankalik, the Rector of the same State University, was killed. When up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny every day in the autumn of 1991. When, starting from the autumn of 1991, and until 1994 Grozny's morgues were packed to the ceiling, made ads on local television asking to be picked up, to identify who is there, and so on. - Zavgaev D.G., Head of the Chechen Republic, transcript of the meeting of the State Duma dated July 19, 1996.
8. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov then sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Republic's Armed Forces." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the Republic. These elections were recognized by the Russian Federation as illegal
9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)". After these actions of the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic deteriorated sharply - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was frustrated, the Decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)" was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots.
10. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: Two launchers of an operational-tactical missile system in a non-combat ready state. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 training aircraft, converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 planes and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60s; about 7 thousand GSh-23 air shells. 42 T-62 and T-72 tanks; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 MLRS Grad and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 memory devices of various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. ZUR S-75. 590 units of anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGMs, 51 Metis ATGMs, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuel and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing items, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.
12. In June 1992, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Pavel Grachev, ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic be transferred to the Dudaevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the "transferred" weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.
13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former CHIASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia as part of the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not been defined to date (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops entered the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time to solve the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
16. As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, as a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, emblem and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was supposed to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of their own state currency - nahara. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, CRI was characterized as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal treaty with the Russian Federation.
17. In reality, the state system of the CRI proved to be extremely inefficient and in the period 1991-1994 was rapidly criminalized. In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders took place on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers in the amount of 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed in armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994
18. A special trade was the manufacture of false advice notes, on which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992, 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.
19. Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and forbade employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and resold abroad.
20. The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being expelled from their homes, leaving or selling apartments to Chechens at a low price. Only in 1992, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, 300 were missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was kindled by relevant literature, direct insults and appeals from government stands, desecration of Russian cemeteries[
21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply aggravated in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, in which meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; thus, a coup d'état took place in CRI. The constitution, adopted last year, was amended, Dudayev's regime of personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament
22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which held several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
23. Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to prevail in the struggle.
25. Only in Urus-Martan in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, on September 12 and October 15, 1994, carried out offensive actions in Grozny, but every time they retreated without achieving decisive success, although they did not suffer heavy losses.
26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
27. Entering troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression "the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya", according to the deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.
Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government, which justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering on Chechnya and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen Grad rocket artillery installation and then entered the battle for this settlement.
The Kizlyar group reached the village of Tolstoy-Yurt on December 15.
The new offensive of the units of the OGV began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th airborne regiment blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
28. Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)
In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bombing of the city center was carried out. Many civilians (including ethnic Russians) were killed and wounded during artillery shelling and bombing.
Despite the fact that Grozny was still not blocked from the south side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. The Russian troops were poorly trained, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated city plans in limited quantities. The means of communication were not equipped with closed communication equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were ordered to occupy only industrial buildings, squares and inadmissibility of intrusion into the houses of the civilian population.
The western grouping of troops was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. The federal forces were surrounded - according to official data, the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin died, more than 100 servicemen were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became the commander of the West group.
The Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aircraft. Fierce street fighting ensued in Grozny.
Two groups moved towards the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV had been increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the boundary of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.
29. Establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, persuading local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.
Despite this, local battles were going on in the western regions of Chechnya. March 10 began fighting for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, the combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martanovsky district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" of Shamil Basayev). After the Russian servicemen entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and skirmishes began on the streets of the village.
According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency "Chechen-Press", however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the human rights center "Memorial", these data "do not inspire confidence." According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians who died during the cleansing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied the dominant heights above the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.
30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The blows of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Also, as in the plains, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times
31. Terrorist act in Budyonnovsk (June 14-19, 1995)
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, drove trucks into the territory of the Stavropol Territory and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The building of the GOVD became the first object of attack, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, about 2,000 hostages were in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands on the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Because of the leak of information, the terrorists had time to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; as a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except the main one), releasing 95 hostages. Spetsnaz losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees of law enforcement agencies) and 415 wounded, the losses of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded
32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but not as members of illegal armed groups, but as "self-defense units." There were local battles throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions could be resolved through negotiations. So, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoi-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militants were in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their positions, because, according to them, these were "self-defense units" that had the right to be in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was launched on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Dokka Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, it took Russian troops about a week of “cleansing operations” to finally take Gudermes under their control.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, having received over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all military personnel of the UGV participated in the elections.
33. Terrorist act in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar. Initially, the goal of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the soldiers guarding the base. The Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to pull up to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiment in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations were held from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship with threats to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
On January 18, under the cover of night, the militants broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya.
The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 78 people dead and several hundred wounded.
34. Attack of militants on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996) On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when withdrawing, took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. The losses of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
35. Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996) On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing column of the vehicle, thus the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.
36. Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment was installed for the bearing of a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev's motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the aircraft reached the target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation
37. Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of the forthcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided once again to negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the abolition of military duty.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaykhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.
38. Operation Jihad (August 6-22, 1996)
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2,000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not set out to capture the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at roadblocks and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.
Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the building of the commandant's office).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
“If they started to have a normal dialogue with Maskhadov and Dudayev, I think there would be no such bloodshed”
“You don’t expect beautiful stories about the Chechen war from me,” my interlocutor begins. “I can't tell them. And yes, war is rubbish. How can you talk about dirt beautifully? War is also pain. Is there romance in pain?
I agree with him. It is necessary to speak about the war simply and honestly. Or be silent. However, no, you can not be silent. And now, after dozens of films have been made about the Chechen war, hundreds of books have been written, we again remember it. Including in order to find out whether "all wounds are licked"? Who are Chechens today for "Chechens" (soldiers who went through the war)?
Valery Yuryev, deputy commander of one of the reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces, went through both Chechen campaigns from beginning to end. His unit lost 46 fighters, 11 received the title of Hero of Russia (there were more than 800 people in total).
REFERENCE "MK"
Valery Yuriev was born in 1957 in Mariupol. Guard Colonel of the Reserve. He served in the military intelligence of the Airborne Forces and in the GRU General Staff. He was the commander of a reconnaissance platoon, a company, an airborne battalion, the chief of staff of a paratrooper regiment, a teacher at the Military Diplomatic Academy, etc. Participated in hostilities in Afghanistan, in two Chechen campaigns, in Dagestan; in resolving ethnic conflicts - in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh; in the peacekeeping operation - in Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia). He was awarded two Orders of the Red Star, two Orders of Courage, the Order of Military Merit, the Medal of Military Merit and other medals, personalized firearms.
“Novorossia reminds me of Chechnya”
- You probably asked yourself more than once - was it possible to prevent this war? Did you find an answer?
- I didn’t ask, because I always knew that it was possible. The leaders of Chechnya Dudayev and Maskhadov were professional soldiers. One is a general, the other is a colonel. Literate people, not religious fanatics, not Nazis. If a normal dialogue had been conducted with them from the very beginning, then, I think, there would not have been such bloodshed. But they were simply ignored, just as the Donetsk and Luhansk republics are now ignored in Ukraine.
Are you afraid to draw such historical parallels?
- Not. If the Ukrainian authorities in Donetsk and Lugansk had been allowed to speak Russian, they would have been given some kind of independence, and there would have been no war. But the leadership of today's Ukraine did not make concessions. And here's what's happening now...
A similar situation was then with Chechnya. If Yeltsin and his entourage had entered into a dialogue (it's no secret that Chechnya is now financed better than many regions, so why not give it money from the very beginning?), they would not have generated such popular resistance.
- Tell us how Chechnya met you then, 20 years ago.
- About a month and a half before the start of hostilities, our unit was concentrated at the airfield in Mozdok (North Ossetia). I, as deputy commander of the unit, was responsible for combat training. And contrary to all the prohibitions (it was impossible to shoot there), I organized firing from all types of weapons, except for heavy machine guns. Taught the guys tactics. I knew what war was, and I trained soldiers in a serious way. But there were no specific tasks before us.
The reconnaissance groups of our unit by that time, of course, were already on the territory of Chechnya. That is, before the official deployment of troops (this date is considered December 11, 1994).
— What were they doing there?
- The main task was to understand whether there will be resistance from the local population and, if so, to what extent.
- So you had hope that everything would work out?
- Yes! We did not believe that there would be a big confrontation. But then intelligence reported that the situation was serious. My subordinates spoke with the leaders of the gangs - they unequivocally said that they would go to the end.
— Have you personally communicated with the locals? What did they say?
“You see, I talked to them when this war was already unleashed. The first Chechen campaign began with the assault on Grozny, the massive use of troops, when everyone mixed up in a bloody mess - both Chechens and ours. There is no time for talk.
Photo from personal archive
But in the second Chechen campaign there was time for that. Our unit was part of the Vostok group, it was headed by Gennady Troshev, who himself lived in Grozny at one time, knew the Chechen language. And his main course was not to suppress the separatists, but to dialogue. Then there were meetings with local residents (especially with the elders). We persuaded them that armed resistance is pointless, because it will only lead to the destruction of cities and the death of people. The elders treated with understanding and did everything so that the gangs left the settlements that our troops occupied. Sometimes even without a fight. I think it was thanks to the elders that Akhmat Kadyrov came over to our side.
- Military historians believe that the first soldiers of the first Chechen war were just cannon fodder. Do you agree?
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is a former paratrooper himself. In Afghanistan, he severely punished commanders who had losses. But politics intervened here. And mistakes followed one after another. And each cost lives. Just one example. From the servicemen of the Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divisions, supposedly tank units of volunteers were formed, which entered Grozny without any cover. It was not clear why they went there at all ?! I'm sure it was a deeply thought-out provocation. As a result, they were surrounded by local formations, captured, most of the people were killed.
- Is it true that the troops were often commanded by special services, and not by the Ministry of Defense?
- To some extent. The army command should deal with the introduction of troops, and sometimes it was not them, but it was not clear who did it. Everything was organized stupidly and unprofitable. And it was visible even in small things. Once I was returning from one operation and noticed a flare in the sky. I approached and saw the following picture: one Russian soldier is standing at his post, unhappy, frightened, not understanding anything. He allegedly guards a small group of military personnel who sleep there. It didn't take the militants even 5 minutes to put them all down! Well, who fights like that?! What is this preparation?
— But when you went to Chechnya, you had no illusions about the political situation, did you? Were you not scared because the orders come from above completely ill-conceived or even criminal?
- Not scary. Until they start shooting, it seems to many that this is not happening to them.
And there is no discussion about the execution of orders in the army. Yes, killing a person is a crime. And we all went to kill. You see, even from Afghanistan, where I was a reconnaissance company commander, I got used to carrying out even stupid orders of superiors with the highest quality and with minimal losses. They told me: go straight ahead and capture this settlement. I told them "eat!" and did not go straight, but to the left, but captured. The task is eventually completed, and the winners are not judged.
- Yes, our company participated in this operation, but I personally, unfortunately, was on vacation. When our losses began - in my unit four people were wounded - I returned on my own initiative: I deceived my wife, said that they were calling me, got on a plane and flew.
The assault was completely unprepared, and not so much the military as politicians are to blame for this. It was they who gave the unexpected order to occupy Grozny, no matter what. Due to the haste, the units were even equipped with sailors from ships! Collective hodgepodge, roughly speaking. Plus, it was the end of 1994, the army was in moral decline after all the coups. In those years, if an officer walked along a Moscow street in uniform, he could be caught and beaten. Why do you think the Ministry of Defense later allowed officers to go to work in civilian clothes?
We in Chechnya did not understand how we should generally act in this or that situation. I somehow listened to the negotiations, I learned that our convoy of 200 cars in one of the settlements was stopped by the local population. Commanders ask: “What to do? We are not OMON, we do not have the means to disperse the demonstration.” As a result, the column turned around. The task was cancelled.
And against the backdrop of all this, Grozny is being stormed ...
Grozny during the Chechen war. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
"The cards were old and the soldiers were too young"
- What shocked you in this war?
- The fact that individual Chechens acted like savages: they cut their throats, cut off their ears, fingers. I'm sure a mentally normal person can't do that. They all used it for one purpose - to intimidate. You know, I'm glad that none of my soldiers were captured or tortured. All 46 men I lost died in action.
- But at the same time, the Chechens fought competently, professionally?
- Well, how can a peasant fight competently? Of course, there was nothing like that, especially at the initial stage. But they had advantages. Here again I will give a parallel with Afghanistan. Everyone said: they say, the Afghans are more hardy and excellent warriors. We fought with them in the mountains, each carried a weapon and equipment of 40 kg. And the Afghan carried a maximum of 5 kg: a machine gun, thin pants and a T-shirt, a handful of nuts, a flask of water. Which of us will be more resilient? So here. The Chechens fought in their own area. And we did not understand where we were going, because the maps were old.
But the main thing is that the Chechens had higher motivation, they knew what they were fighting for. And we were just following orders. Our fighters are conscripts, young people. What about them? Adult bearded men who are not afraid to die.
“But we had a lot of contract soldiers who went to kill for money.
- In the first campaign, they were practically non-existent. And it would be wrong to say unequivocally that the contractors went precisely for the money. And was it big money? On average 15-18 thousand. Mercenaries in any foreign army are paid ten times as much. There were many who fought for the idea.
— What?!
- The idea appears when your comrade is killed in front of your eyes. Then the desire for revenge is already born. I knew those who were conscripts in the first campaign, and came to the second campaign as a contract soldier, and precisely because of this, to get even for a killed friend.
And here's another story about money. Andrey Nepryakhin worked in the security service of Lukoil, received a lot of money, but he took it and left to fight in Chechnya. Why? Because he wanted to save the youth - he had experience, he was a deputy battalion commander. As a result, he led one of our groups near Gudermes. She was the first to arrive at the place of death of the 6th company, ensured the evacuation of the survivors, then took out the bodies of the dead. During another operation, he was wounded, but he remained to cover his group. He received the title of Hero of Russia.
- Chechens were trained during the second campaign by foreign special services or is it a "duck"?
Yes, but not as massively as they try to present. These were intelligence agencies mainly from the Middle East, Arab. And during the war, the Chechens learned from their own experience, respectively, the tactics of their actions were constantly improved, based on the experience they received.
How did you prepare your soldiers?
- Until the seventh sweat. A soldier generally cannot be spared during preparation, this will save his life in battle. He must know what maneuver to do in what situation. When to shoot, when to lie down, when to run and where. Only in this case he has a chance to survive. When the shooting starts, it is useless to command. Don't yell. I have a hoarse voice, do you think from what? From screaming.
I'll give you another example. To the machine - 450 rounds, each weighing 10 grams, a total of 4.5 kg. I ordered to carry two sets of ammunition, that is, 9 kg each. Hard. But I knew that they would definitely be enough for a fighter to fight. It's bad when individual commanders, supposedly taking care of their subordinates, say: come on, don't take a lot of ammunition with you. And, as a rule, if they are surrounded, they run out of ammo in 10 minutes.
- And what about the discipline they had and we had? Once I was talking to a man who went through two Chechen campaigns. He talked about the drugs they had. About the drinking parties that were arranged before the fight in order to gain courage.
- In our reconnaissance it was excluded, but in other units it could be. I remember that in Afghanistan the Americans used such tactics as the free distribution of heroin to discredit and disintegrate our army. Bichata boys ran along the barbed wire and for a can of porridge, for gloves they gave our soldiers a bundle like a package of ascorbic acid. The main task, of course, was not to make money, but to spread this poison.
About alcohol - we didn’t have any combat hundred grams. But Chechens sold alcohol in the markets, there was an opportunity to buy and get drunk. And yet I will not say that there was some kind of unrestrained drunkenness. The soldiers were under strong control.
- Did the Chechen fighters go into battle stoned?
- Somehow we arrived in Khasavyurt, a day or two before that there was a bloody battle, and I see: the corpses of militants are lying, and syringes are lying around.
- However, their management thought more than sensibly. What was worth only the Khasavyurt agreement... By the way, how was it signed?
- A special detachment of our unit ensured the security of the delegation headed by Alexander Lebed. There were 10 of our military men, and they actually went to their deaths. We understood that they could be shot at any moment. They rode in Niva jeeps, in each car there was one authoritative Dagestani as a guarantor of safety. But rather it was a formality - his presence would hardly have saved.
The agreement was signed on enslaving terms, it's true. We undertook to withdraw the troops, but the most important thing is that in 5 years Chechnya was supposed to secede from Russia.
Unfortunately, it was not without betrayal both in political circles and in the military. Throughout the campaign, secret information was "leaked" to the Chechens. I think for money. For crazy money. Who paid? Arabs mostly. But the Americans also took part in this, but where would we be without them, “relatives” ...
- Did the Chechen commanders give a reward for your head?
— No, as far as I know. But they threatened to kill our families. Our wives and children then lived in a military town - I will not name the place, and they were heavily guarded. Nothing happened to anyone.
- And now the Chechens are enemies for you? How do you generally feel about the current leadership of Chechnya?
No, not enemies. They are part of our people, and this is how I treat them. With their "jumps", of course. But what nationality does not have them? I have a close friend - a Chechen. And the Chechens are now “more Russian than the Russians themselves,” and this is the merit of the current leadership of Russia and Chechnya.
— Were you in Chechnya after the war?
- No never. Probably, I would like to look at modern Grozny. But I see what he has become on TV. Sometimes I don't even believe it. In my memory, after all, this is a city where devastation, blood, pain, tears reign ...
On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Accords were signed, ending the First Chechen War. Journalist Olesya Yemelyanova found the participants of the First Chechen campaign and talked to them about the war, their life after the war, Akhmat Kadyrov and much more.
Dmitry Belousov, St. Petersburg, senior warrant officer of OMON
In Chechnya, there was always a feeling: “What am I doing here? Why is all this necessary? ”, But there was no other work in the 90s. My wife was the first to say to me after the first business trip: “Either me, or the war.” Where will I go? We tried not to get out of business trips, at least there we paid our salaries on time - 314 thousand. There were benefits, "combat" paid - it was a penny, I don’t remember exactly how much. And they gave me a bottle of vodka, it was sickening without it, in such situations you don’t get drunk from it, but it helped to cope with stress. I fought for a paycheck. The family is at home, it was necessary to feed it with something. I did not know any background of the conflict, I did not read anything.
Young conscripts had to be slowly soldered with alcohol. They are only after training, it is easier for them to die than to fight. Eyes run wide, heads are pulled out, they do not understand anything. They will see the blood, they will see the dead - they cannot sleep.
Murder is unnatural for a person, although he gets used to everything. When the head does not think, the body does everything on autopilot. Fighting Chechens was not as scary as fighting Arab mercenaries. They are much more dangerous, they know how to fight very well.
We were prepared for the assault on Grozny for about a week. We - 80 riot police - were supposed to storm the village of Katayama. Later we learned that there were 240 militants there. Our tasks included reconnaissance in force, and then the internal troops were supposed to replace us. But nothing happened. Ours also hit us. There was no connection. We have our own police radio, tankers have their own wave, helicopter pilots have their own. We pass the line, artillery strikes, aircraft strikes. The Chechens got scared, they thought they were some kind of fools. According to rumors, the Novosibirsk OMON was originally supposed to storm Katayama, but their commander refused. Therefore, we were thrown from the reserve to storm.
Among the Chechens, I had friends in the opposition areas. In Shali, for example, in Urus-Martan.
After the hostilities, someone drank himself, someone ended up in a madhouse - some were taken directly from Chechnya to a psychiatric hospital. There was no adaptation. The wife left immediately. I can't remember a good one. Sometimes it seems that it is better to erase all this from memory in order to live on and move forward. And sometimes you want to speak up.
Benefits seem to be, but everything is only on paper. There are no levers on how to get them. I still live in the city, it’s easier for me, but it’s impossible for rural residents. There are arms and legs - and that's good. The main trouble is that you are counting on the state, which promises you everything, and then it turns out that no one needs you. I felt like a hero, received the Order of Courage. It was my pride. Now I look at everything differently.
If I were now offered to go to war, I would probably go. It's easier there. There is an enemy and there is a friend, black and white - you stop seeing shades. And in a peaceful life, you need to twist and bend. It's tiresome. When Ukraine began, I wanted to go, but my current wife dissuaded me.
Vladimir Bykov, Moscow, infantry sergeant
When I got to Chechnya, I was 20 years old. It was a conscious choice, I applied to the military registration and enlistment office and in May 1996 I left as a contract soldier. Before that, I studied at a military school for two years, at school I was engaged in bullet shooting.
In Mozdok we were loaded onto a Mi-26 helicopter. There was a feeling that you see footage from an American movie. When we arrived in Khankala, the fighters, who had already served for some time, offered me a drink. They gave me a glass of water. I took a sip, and my first thought was: “Where would I throw it out?”. The taste of "military water" with bleach and pantocide is a kind of point of no return and understanding that there is no turning back.
I didn't feel like a hero, and I don't. To become a hero in a war, one must either die, or commit an act that has become public knowledge, or be close to the commander. And commanders, as a rule, are far away.
My goal in the war was minimal casualties. I did not fight for the Reds or Whites, I fought for my guys. In war there is a reassessment of values, you begin to look at life differently.
The feeling of fear begins to disappear after about a month, and this is very bad, indifference to everything appears. Each of them came out in their own way. Some smoked, some drank. I wrote letters. Described mountains, weather, local people and their customs. Then I tore these letters. Sending was still not possible.
Psychologically, it was difficult, because it is often not clear whether you are a friend or an enemy. It seems that during the day a person calmly goes to work, and at night he comes out with a machine gun and fires at roadblocks. During the day you are on good terms with him, and in the evening he shoots you.
For ourselves, we divided the Chechens into lowland and mountainous. Plain more intelligent people, more integrated into our society. And those who live in the mountains have a completely different mentality, a woman is nobody for them. You ask the lady for documents for verification - and this can be perceived as a personal insult to her husband. We came across women from mountain villages who didn't even have passports.
Once, at the checkpoint at the intersection with Serzhen-Yurt, we stopped the car. From it came a man who had a yellow ID card in English and Arabic. It turned out to be Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov. We talked quite peacefully on everyday topics. He asked if there was anything he could do to help. We then had difficulty with food, there was no bread. Then he brought two trays of loaves to us at the checkpoint. They wanted to give him money, but he did not take it.
I think that we could end the war in such a way that there would be no second Chechen one. It was necessary to go to the end, and not conclude a peace agreement on shameful terms. Many soldiers and officers then felt that the state had betrayed them.
When I returned home, I threw myself into my studies. I studied at one institute, at the same time at another, and also worked to keep my brain occupied. Then he defended his PhD thesis.
When I was a student, I was sent to a course in psychosocial care for survivors of hot spots organized by a Dutch university. I then thought that Holland had not been at war with anyone lately. But I was told that Holland participated in the Indonesian war in the late 40s - as many as two thousand people. I suggested that they show a video cassette from Chechnya as educational material. But their psychologists turned out to be mentally unprepared and asked not to show the recording to the audience.
Andrey Amosov, St. Petersburg, SOBR major
That I would be an officer, I knew from the third or fourth grade. My dad is a policeman, now retired, my grandfather is an officer, my brother is also an officer, my great-grandfather died in the Finnish War. At the genetic level, this has borne fruit. At school, I went in for sports, then there was the army, a special forces group. I always had a desire to give back to my homeland, and when I was offered to go to a special rapid reaction unit, I agreed. There was no doubt whether to go or not, I took an oath. During the military service, I was in Ingushetia, it was clear to me what kind of mentality awaits me. I understood where I was going.
When you go to SOBR, it's stupid not to think that you can lose your life. But my choice was conscious. I am ready to give my life for my country and for my friends. What are the doubts? Politics should be dealt with by politicians, and combat structures should follow orders. I believe that the introduction of troops into Chechnya both under Yeltsin and under Putin was correct so that the radical theme would not spread further on the territory of Russia.
For me, the Chechens have never been enemies. My first friend in the technical school was a Chechen, his name was Khamzat. In Chechnya, we gave them rice and buckwheat, we had good food, but they were in need.
We worked on the leaders of gangs. We captured one of them with a fight at four o'clock in the morning and destroyed it. For this I received the medal "For Courage".
On special assignments, we acted in a coordinated manner, as a single team. Tasks were set different, sometimes difficult. And it's not just combat missions. It was necessary to survive in the mountains, to freeze, to sleep in turns near the potbelly stove and to warm each other with hugs when there was no firewood. All boys are heroes to me. The team helped to overcome fear when the militants were 50 meters away and shouted "Surrender!". When I remember Chechnya, I imagine more the faces of friends, as we joked, our unity. The humor was specific, on the verge of sarcasm. I think I underestimated it before.
It was easier for us to adapt, because we worked in the same unit and went on business trips together. Time passed, and we ourselves expressed a desire to go to the North Caucasus again. The physical factor worked. The feeling of fear that adrenaline gives had a strong influence. I regarded combat missions as both a duty and a rest.
It would be interesting to look at modern Grozny. When I saw him, he looked like Stalingrad. Now the war is periodically dreaming, there are disturbing dreams.
Alexander Podskrebaev, Moscow, GRU special forces sergeant
I ended up in Chechnya in 1996. We did not have a single conscript, only officers and contractors. I went because the homeland should be defended by adults, and not by young puppies. We didn’t have travel allowances in the battalion, only combat ones, we received 100 dollars a month. I did not go for money, but to fight for my country. “If the homeland is in danger, then everyone should go to the front,” Vysotsky also sang.
The war in Chechnya did not appear out of the blue, it is Yeltsin's fault. He armed Dudayev himself - when our units were withdrawn from there, all the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District were left to him. I talked with ordinary Chechens, they saw this war in the coffin. They lived normally, life suited everyone. Not the Chechens started the war and not Dudayev, but Yeltsin. One solid base.
Chechens fought some for money, some for their homeland. They had their own truth. I didn't feel like they were absolute evil. But there is no truth in war.
In war, you are obliged to follow orders, there is no getting around, even criminal orders. After you have the right to appeal them, but first you must comply. And we carried out criminal orders. That's when, for example, the Maykop brigade was brought into Grozny on New Year's Eve. The scouts knew that this could not be done, but the order was from above. How many boys were driven to death. It was betrayal in its purest form.
Take, for example, the cash-in-transit KamAZ with money, which was standing near the headquarters of the 205th brigade when the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Bearded guys came and loaded bags of money. The FSB members allegedly gave money to the militants for the restoration of Chechnya. And we didn’t get paid, but Yeltsin gave us Zippo lighters.
For me, the real heroes are Budanov and Shamanov. My chief of staff is a hero. While in Chechnya, he managed to write a scientific work on the rupture of an artillery barrel. This is a man due to whom the power of Russian weapons will become stronger. The Chechens also had heroism. They were characterized by both fearlessness and self-sacrifice. They defended their land, they were told that they were attacked.
I believe that the emergence of post-traumatic syndrome is highly dependent on the attitude of society. If they say “Yes, you are a killer!” in your eyes all the time, it can injure someone. There were no syndromes in the Great Patriotic War, because the homeland of the heroes met.
It is necessary to talk about the war from a certain angle so that people do not engage in nonsense. There will still be peace, only part of the people will be killed. And not the worst part. There is no sense from this.
Alexander Chernov, Moscow, retired colonel, internal troops
In Chechnya, I worked as the head of a computer center. We left on July 25, 1995. There were four of us: I, as the head of the computer center, and three of my employees. We flew to Mozdok, got off the plane. The first impression is wild heat. We were taken by turntable to Khankala. By tradition, in all hot spots, the first day is non-working. I brought with me two liter bottles of White Eagle vodka, two loaves of Finnish sausage. The men put out Kizlyar cognac and sturgeon.
The camp of internal troops in Khankala was a quadrangle surrounded by barbed wire. A rail hung at the entrance in case of artillery raids to raise the alarm. The four of us lived in a trailer. It was quite convenient, we even had a refrigerator. The freezer was full of water bottles because the heat was unbearable.
Our computer center was engaged in the collection and processing of all information, primarily operational. Previously, all information was transmitted via ZAS (classifying communications equipment). And six months before Chechnya, we had a device called RAMS - I don’t know how it stands for. This device made it possible to connect a computer to ZAS, and we could transmit secret information to Moscow. In addition to internal work such as all sorts of information, twice a day - at 6 am and 12 midnight - we sent an operational report to Moscow. Despite the fact that the volume of files was small, the connection was sometimes bad, and the process dragged on for a long time.
We had a video camera and we filmed everything. The most important shooting is the negotiations between Romanov (deputy minister of internal affairs of Russia, commander of internal troops Anatoly Romanov) and Maskhadov (one of the separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov). There were two operators at the talks: from their side and from our side. The secretaries took the cassette from us, and I do not know its further fate. Or, for example, a new howitzer appeared. Romanov told us: "Go and film how it works." Our cameraman also filmed how the heads of three foreign journalists were found. We sent the film to Moscow, where it was processed and shown on television.
May 1996, the airfield of the military base in Khankala
The war was very unprepared. Drunken Grachev and Yegorov sent tankers to Grozny on New Year's Eve, and they were all burned there. Sending tanks to the city is not quite the right decision. And the staff was not prepared. It got to the point that the Marines were removed from the Far East and thrown there. People should be run in, and then the boys were almost immediately thrown into battle from training. Losses could have been avoided, in the second campaign they were an order of magnitude smaller. The truce gave a little respite.
I am sure that the first Chechen one could have been avoided. I believe that the main culprits of this war are Yeltsin, Grachev and Yegorov, they unleashed it. If Yeltsin had appointed Dudayev as Deputy Minister of the Interior, entrusted him with the North Caucasus, he would have put things in order there. The civilian population suffered from the militants. But when we bombed their villages, they rose up against us. Intelligence in the first Chechen worked very poorly. There were no agents, they lost all agents. Whether there were militants in the destroyed villages or not, it is impossible to say for sure.
My friend, a military officer, his entire chest in orders, took off his shoulder straps and refused to go to Chechnya. Said it was the wrong war. He even refused to issue a pension. Proud.
My sores worsened in Chechnya. It got to the point where I couldn't work on the computer. Another such mode of operation was that he slept only four hours, plus a glass of cognac at night to fall asleep.
Ruslan Savitsky, St. Petersburg, Private of Internal Troops
In December 1995, I arrived in Chechnya from the Perm region, where I had training in an operational battalion. We studied for six months and went to Grozny by train. We all wrote petitions to be sent to the war zone, not to be forced. If there is only one child in the family, then in general he could easily refuse.
We were lucky with the staff. They were young guys, only two or three years older than us. They always ran ahead of us, they felt responsible. Of the entire battalion, we had only one officer with combat experience who had gone through Afghanistan. Only riot police directly participated in the cleansings, we, as a rule, held the perimeter.
In Grozny, we lived in a school for half a year. Part of it was occupied by the OMON unit, about two floors - by us. Cars were parked around, the windows were covered with bricks. In the classroom where we lived, there were potbelly stoves, stoked with firewood. Bathed once a month, lived with lice. It was undesirable to go beyond the perimeter. I was taken out of there earlier than the others for two weeks for disciplinary violations.
Hanging around at school was boring, although the food was normal. Over time, out of boredom, we began to drink. There were no shops, we bought vodka from Chechens. It was necessary to go beyond the perimeter, walk about a kilometer around the city, come to an ordinary private house and say that alcohol was needed. There was a high probability that you would not return. I went unarmed. For one machine gun alone, they could kill.
Destroyed Grozny, 1995
Local banditry is a strange thing. It seems like a normal person during the day, but in the evening he dug up a machine gun and went to shoot. In the morning I buried the weapon - and again normal.
The first contact with death was when our sniper was killed. He fired back, he wanted to take the weapon from the dead, he stepped on the stretch and blew himself up. In my opinion, this is a complete lack of brains. I had no sense of the value of my own life. I was not afraid of death, I was afraid of stupidity. There were a lot of idiots around.
When I returned, I went to work in the police, but I did not have a secondary education. I passed the exams externally and came again, but they gave me a ride again, because I got tuberculosis in Chechnya. Also because I drank a lot. I can’t say that the army is to blame for my alcoholism. Alcohol in my life and before it was present. When the second Chechen war began, I wanted to go. I came to the military registration and enlistment office, they gave me a bunch of documents, it discouraged my desire a little. Then another conviction for some garbage appeared, and my service in the army was covered. I wanted courage and buzz, but it did not work out.
Daniil Gvozdev, Helsinki, special forces
I ended up in Chechnya on a call. When it came time to go to the army, I asked my coach to arrange me in good troops - we had a special-purpose company in Petrozavodsk. But at the assembly point, my surname sounded with those who go to Sertolovo to become grenade launchers. It turned out that the day before, my coach had left for Chechnya as part of a combined SOBR detachment. I, along with the whole “herd”, got up, went to the train, spent three months in the training unit. Nearby was a part of the paratroopers in Pesochnoye, he repeatedly wrote applications there to be accepted, he came. Then I realized that everything was useless, I passed the exams for the radio operator of the command and staff vehicle of the 142nd. At night, our captain and officers got us up. One walked with tears, said how he respects and loves all of us, the second tried to warn. They said we were all leaving tomorrow. The next night it was so interesting to look at this officer, I did not understand why he shed tears in front of us, he was less than I am now. He cried: “Guys, I will worry about you so much!” One of the guys said to him: "So get ready and go with us."
We flew to Vladikavkaz via Mozdok. For three months we had active studies, they gave me the 159th radio station behind my back. Then they sent me to Chechnya. I stayed there for nine months, I was the only signalman in our company who more or less understood something in communication. Six months later, I managed to knock out an assistant - a guy from Stavropol, who did not understand anything, but smoked a lot, and for him Chechnya was a paradise in general.
We performed different tasks there. Of the simple ones - they can dig up oil there with a shovel and they put such devices: a barrel, under it a gas or diesel heater, they drive the oil to a state where gasoline is obtained at the end. They sell gasoline. They drove huge convoys with trucks. ISIS, banned in Russia, is doing the same in Syria. Some won't come to an agreement, his own people are handed over - and his barrels are on fire, but some calmly does what is needed. There was also constant work - we guarded the entire leadership of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, we guarded Shamanov. Well, reconnaissance missions.
We had a task to capture a militant, some language. We went out into the night to search on the outskirts of the village, saw that cars were coming there, pouring gasoline. We noticed one comrade there, he constantly walked around, changed the heating under the barrels, he has a machine gun, well, if a machine gun means a militant. He had a bottle; The task of capturing the language has gone by the wayside, you must first capture vodka. They crawled through, found a bottle, and there was water! This made us angry, we took him prisoner. This guy, a militant, so thin, after interrogation in the intelligence department, was sent back to us. He said that he used to do Greco-Roman wrestling and did a handstand with a broken rib, I respected him greatly for this. He turned out to be the field commander's cousin, so he was exchanged for two of our soldiers. You should have seen these soldiers: 18-year-old guys, I don’t know, the psyche is clearly broken. We wrote this guy on a green handkerchief: "Nothing personal, we do not want war."
He asks, "Why didn't you kill me?" We explained that we were wondering what he was drinking. And he said that they had one Russian left in the village, they didn’t touch her, because she was a sorceress, everyone went to her. Two months ago, she gave him a bottle of water and said: "You can be killed, drink this water and stay alive."
We were constantly located in Khankala, and worked everywhere. The last we had was a demobilization chord, they released Bamut. Have you seen Nevzorov's film "Mad Company"? So we went along with them, we were on the one hand along the pass, they were on the other. They had one conscript in the company and it was he who was killed, and all the contract soldiers are alive. Once I look through binoculars, and there are some bearded people running around. The commander says: "Let's give them a couple of cucumbers." They asked for the radio station, they tell me the coordinates, I look - they ran in, waving their hands. Then they show a white whale - what they wore under camouflage. And we realized that it was ours. It turned out that their batteries did not work for transmission and he could not transmit, but he heard me, so they began to wave.
You don't remember anything in combat. Someone says: “When I saw the eyes of this man ...” But I don’t remember this. The battle has passed, I see that everything is fine, everyone is alive. There was a situation when we got into the ring and caused fire on ourselves, it turns out that if I lie down, there is no connection, and I need to correct so that they don’t hit us. I wake up. The guys shout: “Good! Lie down." And I understand that if there is no connection, they will cover their own.
Who came up with the idea of giving children weapons at the age of 18, giving them the right to kill? If they gave it, then make sure that when people return, they will be heroes, and now Kadyrov's bridges. I understand that they want to reconcile the two nations, everything will be erased in a few generations, but how can these generations live?
When I returned, it was the dashing nineties, and almost all my friends were busy with something illegal. I came under investigation, a criminal record… At some point, when my head began to move away from the military fog, I waved my hand at this romance. With the guys veterans opened a public organization to support war veterans. We work, we help ourselves, others. I also paint icons.
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