Although the scenario of the 4th Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905, 1938-1939, 1945) is unlikely, it is still necessary to know the capabilities of a potential enemy.
Tokyo's current hysterics are a sign of the decline of the Land of the Rising Sun. Japanese civilization is seriously ill, its Spirit is affected, which is clearly manifested in the psychological state of the population and endless economic stagnation.
But instead of forgetting past mistakes and agreeing to large-scale cooperation with Russia, which would give Japan a second wind, Tokyo prefers to blow on the embers of old and imaginary grievances; it would be more logical to present claims to the United States, which still occupies their territory and subjected them to cities under nuclear bombardment.
Japan Self-Defense Forces
The number is approximately 300 thousand people, the number of reservists is about 50 thousand. The recruitment principle is voluntary. The population is more than 127 million people, which is comparable to the population of the Russian Federation.
Ground forces- about 150 thousand (as of 2007), 10 divisions (9 infantry and 1 tank), 18 brigades (3 infantry, 2 mixed, airborne, artillery, 2 anti-aircraft artillery, 5 engineering, helicopter, 3 training), 3 groups Air defense. Armament: about 1000, approximately 900 units of armored vehicles, about 2000 artillery and mortars (including self-propelled guns, anti-aircraft guns), 100 anti-ship missile launchers, more than 100 MLRS, approximately 700 ATGM units, 500 military air defense systems, approximately 450 helicopters - of which about 100 drums.
Air Force: The number of personnel is 43-50 thousand people, 250 fighters and fighter-bombers (including 160 F-15 Eagle), 10 F-4 Phantom II (RF-4E) reconnaissance aircraft, approximately 50 electronic warfare aircraft, radars, tankers, 30 transport aircraft, 240 training (can be used as reconnaissance aircraft, light fighters, bombers) - for example: 20 Mitsubishi F-2B fighter-bombers. The Air Force also has more than 50 utility and transport helicopters.
Kawasaki T-4 training aircraft
Japanese Navy: The number is approximately 45 thousand people. Composition: 1 destroyer-helicopter carrier of the Hyuga type, 4 destroyer helicopter carriers of the Shirane and Haruna type, 8 guided missile destroyers of the Atago, Kongo, Hatakaze type, 32 destroyers (5 Takanami type, 9 Murasame type, 8 Asagiri type, 10 Hatsuyuki type), 6 Abukuma type frigates, 20 submarines - 2 Soryu type (2009-2010, several more are being built), 11 Oyashio type , 7 type "Harushio".
There is also 1 minelayer, 2 minesweeper bases, 3 sea minesweepers, 3 large Osumi-class landing ships (1 under construction), 2 small landing ships, 7 missile boats, 8 landing boats (including 6 hovercraft of Project 1) , 25 mine-sweeping boats, 5 sea tankers, 4 training ships, 2 training submarines, 2 control ships, 2 search and rescue vessels.
Marine: 172 aircraft and 133 helicopters (2007).
Coast Guard - more than 12 thousand people.
Air defense: approximately one and a half hundred long-range Patriot complexes (analogous to our S-300), more than 500 MANPADS and air defense systems, approximately 70 short-range Tan SAM Toure 81 complexes. Air defense is reinforced by E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft and 10 AWACS - “ Boeing 767." All this is combined with the automated control system and air defense systems "Badge" of the Navy.
Features of the Japanese Navy: all ships are new, the “oldest” are from the mid-80s, most of them are new, from the 90s, 2000s.
Northern Army: Japan's most powerful army, created to counter the USSR. Currently, Tokyo is strengthening the southern direction, but the process has only just begun. It contains: 1 tank division, 3 infantry, artillery brigade, air defense brigade, engineering brigade. They are armed with approximately 90% of coastal PC systems, more than half of the tanks, 90 MLRS, a third of air defense systems and artillery, and a quarter of anti-tank systems of all the Japanese Armed Forces.
Our forces in the Far Eastern theater of operations
Pacific Fleet: In 2010, the fleet had 5 strategic missile submarines, 20 attack submarines (twelve of them nuclear-powered), 10 ocean and sea surface combatants, and 32 littoral ships. But part of the roster is mothballed or requires major repairs - all the ships are from the 1980s and early 90s, only one missile boat of the Molniya type from 2004. For example: the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Lazarev is mothballed, out of 4 x three destroyers in mothballing and repair (from mothballing, a rare ship returns to the fleet).
In Vladivostok the brigade Marine Corps, a separate marine regiment and engineer battalion. 1 separate coastal missile regiment. In Kamchatka, the anti-aircraft missile regiment is S-300P.
Fleet problems: reconnaissance, target designation, dilapidated ships, air support and aerial reconnaissance are not enough.
Naval aviation: 1 separate mixed air regiment - Kamenny Ruchey (in service with Tu-22M3, Tu-142M3, Tu-142MR), separate mixed anti-submarine air regiment (Nikolaevka) with Il-38, Ka-27, Ka-29; separate transport aviation squadron (Knevichi) with An-12, An-24, An-26; separate mixed air regiment (Elizovo) Il-38; separate shipborne anti-submarine helicopter squadron (Elizovo) with Ka-27.
Air Force: There are no aircraft on the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, one base in Kamchatka - approximately 30-35 MiG-31 fighter-interceptors, an air base near Vladivostok - 24 Su-27SM, 6 Su-27UB (combat training) and 12 MiG-31 ( how many are combat-ready is unknown). In comparative proximity - in Siberia there are two air bases with 30 Su-27 and 24 short-range bombers Su-24M, 24 Su-24M2. But there are no air refueling tankers or AWACS aircraft. That is, airplanes do not “see far” and their presence in the air is limited.
Ground troops: on Sakhalin, a motorized rifle brigade, on the Kuril Islands, one machine-gun and artillery division is not covered from the air, there is no air force, and military air defense is insufficient.
Scenarios of the 4th Russian-Japanese
- Short-term private operation: Japan launches a surprise attack (they will not warn, this is a fact, as in 1904 and 1941 - they surprised the Russians in Port Arthur and the United States in Pearl Harbor) on the fleet bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, while simultaneously ironing out the 18th division from the air and seas (possibly Sakhalin), then a landing operation, we lose the Kuril Islands and, possibly, Sakhalin. If they want to capture Sakhalin, they will. They will try to destroy most ships and infrastructure of the Pacific Fleet. Then, with the support of the United States and the international community, they will demand peace, returning Sakhalin, but solving the problem of the Northern Territories. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will not even have time to really “wake up” until the war ends. This is the most possible option.
The Japanese Armed Forces have enough strength for this.
If the Russian Federation does not agree to peace, it will have to restore the Pacific Fleet, prepare landing transports, and it is necessary to create a complete 2-3-fold superiority over the Japanese Navy and Air Force, otherwise the islands will not be recaptured. This is more than one year and big losses, because over these years Tokyo will create a powerful system of fortifications of the islands. And the world community will strongly condemn the aggressive preparations of the Russians.
Full scale war: the most unlikely scenario. Tokyo is not ready for it, but in principle it can prepare in a few years, if the Pacific Fleet continues to rust and grow old, and the Air Force and ground forces in the Far Eastern theater of operations are not strengthened. Nobody canceled the “Great Japan” plan to the Urals. Let's say, in 5-8 years Japan delivers a surprise strike, instantly captures the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, destroys the remnants of the Pacific Fleet, lands airborne divisions in Primorye and Kamchatka. Moscow does not make demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, throwing units from Siberia, the Urals and the European part of Russia into battle; everything comes not together, but in parts. As a result, Japan, suffering losses, will capture Far East, but there is not enough strength for further advancement.
China, threatening an attack from the south, will demand its share, the United States will want its share - Chukotka and Kamchatka. Tokyo will have to come to terms and give in to the great powers. Moscow will be able to win only by using nuclear weapons (a few strikes on enemy troops are enough) or by militarizing the Far East.
US position
He will morally support his ally and secretly “ask” Moscow not to use nuclear weapons. They will not fight themselves; in the event of a full-scale war and the defeat of the Russian Federation, they will demand a share. He will try to become a mediator - offering to “make peace” by giving Tokyo the islands.
China
He will condemn Tokyo’s aggression, but will not interfere; in the event of total success for Japan, he will demand a share, threatening war. It may “quietly” occupy Mongolia and part of Central Asia.
What to do to prevent such scenarios
Strengthen your armed forces, including the Pacific Fleet, Air Force, and ground forces.
Diplomatically clearly state that we will never give up what we have, and in the event of war and the insufficiency of conventional armed forces, we will respond with all available means.
Begin a large-scale development program for the Far East, encouraging the resettlement of surplus population there from the European part of Russia and demographic programs for the growth of the indigenous population (stimulating families with three or more children).
- If possible, take the place of the United States as Japan's ally, proposing joint space exploration programs, jointly developing industrial, scientific projects, Russia is huge - Japanese investments will find worthy use.
August 23, 1939 between Germany and Soviet Union The well-known Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded. Less than a year later, on April 13, 1941, another agreement was signed in Moscow, this time on neutrality between the USSR and Japan. The purpose of concluding this pact was the same as when concluding: to at least temporarily delay the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Second world war both in the West and in the East.
At that time, it was also important for the Japanese not to allow a start with the USSR until a moment that they (the Japanese) would consider favorable for themselves. This is the essence of the so-called strategy " ripe persimmon" That is, the Japanese always wanted to attack the Soviet Union, but were afraid. They needed a situation where the USSR would be involved in a war in the West, weaken, and withdraw its main forces in order to save the situation in the European part of the country. And this will allow the Japanese, with little loss of life, as they said, to grab everything that they were aiming for back in 1918, when they intervened.
Japanese logic actually worked: Germany attacked the Soviet Union, there was a clash, but the Japanese never carried out their aggressive plans. Why?
On July 2, 1941, an imperial meeting was held at which the question was decided: what to do next in the context of the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union? Strike to the North, help Germany and manage to capture what was planned, that is, the Far East and Eastern Siberia? Or go to the South, because, as you know, an embargo was declared, and the Japanese faced the prospect of an oil famine?
Japanese infantry during the attack on Hong Kong, December 1941. (pinterest)
The fleet advocated that it was necessary to go to the South, because without oil it would be extremely difficult for Japan to continue the war. The army, traditionally aimed at the Soviet Union, insisted on one in a thousand chances, as it called it, to take advantage of the Soviet-German war in order to achieve its goals regarding the USSR.
Why couldn't they? Everything was already prepared. The Kwantung Army, which was located on the border with the Soviet Union, was strengthened and increased to 750 thousand. A war schedule was drawn up, and a date was set - August 29, 1941, when Japan was supposed to treacherously stab the USSR in the back.
But, as they say, it didn’t happen. The Japanese themselves admit this. Two factors interfered...
Yes! Why was August 29th set as the deadline? Because then autumn, thaw. Japan had experience of fighting in winter, which ended extremely unfavorably for it.
Hitler's Blitzkrieg: a failure of strategy
So, first, he did not fulfill his promise to carry out a blitzkrieg and capture Moscow in 2 - 3 months, as planned. That is, “the persimmon is not ripe.” And the second, most important thing is that he still showed restraint and did not reduce the number of troops in and in Siberia as much as the Japanese wanted. (The Japanese planned for the Soviet leader to reduce the troops by 2/3, but he reduced them by about half. And this did not allow those who remembered the lessons of Hassan and the Japanese to stab the Soviet Union in the back from the East).
Leaders of the "Big Three" of the anti-Hitler coalition. (pinterest)
Note that from the allies, that is, from the Third Reich, pressure was exerted on Japan. When Matsuoko, the Japanese Foreign Minister, visited Berlin back in April 1941, Hitler believed that he could easily deal with the Soviet Union and would not need Japanese help. He sent the Japanese south, to Singapore, to Malaya. For what? In order to fetter the forces of the Americans and the British there so that they would not use them in Europe.
And yet, in February 1945, during the war, Stalin violated the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact: the USSR entered the war with militaristic Japan at the urgent requests of its allies.
Interesting fact. The day after, Roosevelt turned to Stalin with a request to help in the war with Japan, to open a second front in the Far East. Naturally, Stalin could not do this then. He very politely explained that, after all, the main enemy for the USSR at that time was Germany, and made it clear that let’s first defeat the Reich, and then return to this issue. And, indeed, they returned. In 1943, in Tehran, Stalin promised, after the victory over Germany, to enter the war with Japan. And this greatly inspired the Americans. By the way, they stopped planning serious ground operations, expecting that this role would be fulfilled by the Soviet Union.
But then the situation began to change when the Americans felt that they were about to have an atomic bomb. If Roosevelt was completely “for” the second front and repeatedly asked Stalin about it, then Truman, having come to power, was anti-Soviet. After all, it was he who owned the phrase said after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union: “Let them kill each other as much as possible...”.
But Truman, having become president, found himself in a very serious situation. On the one hand, the entry of the Soviet Union into relations with Japan for political reasons was extremely unfavorable for him, since this gave Stalin the right to vote in the settlement of affairs in East Asia. And this is not just Japan. This is huge China, the countries of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the military, although they were counting on the effect atomic bomb, but were not sure that the Japanese would surrender. And so it happened.
Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army surrender. Iwo Jima, April 5, 1945. (Pinterest)
It is worth noting that the date nuclear strike Stalin didn’t know about Hiroshima. In Potsdam, Truman, outside, so to speak, the framework of the conference, somewhere during a coffee break, in agreement with Stalin, approached Stalin and said that the United States had created a bomb of enormous power. Stalin, to the surprise of the American president, did not react at all. Truman and Churchill even thought that he did not understand what they were talking about. But Stalin understood everything perfectly.
But the Americans about the entry date Soviet army they knew very well during the war against Japan. In mid-May 1945, Truman specially sent his assistant Hopkins to the USSR and instructed Ambassador Harriman to clarify this issue. And Stalin openly said: “By August 8 we will be ready to take action in Manchuria.”
Kwantung Army. Is it a millionth?
A few words about the Kwantung Army. Politicians and historians often use the term “million-strong Kwantung Army.” Was this really so? The fact is that the word “millionth” means, in fact, the Kwantung Army, plus 250 thousand military personnel of the puppet regime of Manchukuo, created on the territory of occupied Manchuria, plus several tens of thousands of troops of the Mongolian prince De Wang, plus a fairly strong group in Korea, troops on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Now, if we combine all this, we will get an army of millions.
In this regard, the question arises: “Why did the Japanese lose? They're not the worst warriors, are they? It must be said that the USSR's victory over Japan was the highest manifestation of operational art and strategy that was accumulated by the Soviet Union during the years of the war with Nazi Germany. Here we must pay tribute to the Soviet command, which brilliantly carried out this operation. The Japanese simply did not have time to do anything. Everything was lightning fast. It was a real Soviet blitzkrieg.
In my textbook they are silent about the quality of the Kwantung Army (History of Russia, grade 9 by A.A. Danilov)
1) Japan was not a continental power; they gave all their best to naval aviation and the navy during the war. They had no chance against the Soviet rink, and the flat terrain of Manchuria could not help the Japanese with defense.
The Soviets had 5 times more tanks and self-propelled guns, the quality was much higher (IS-2 and T-34-85 could penetrate Japanese tanks from 2 km, while the bulk of Japanese tanks were pre-war production and could not penetrate Soviet equipment, even close ). The Japanese did not have a single heavy tank/breakthrough tank, the infantry anti-tank weapons were 37mm caliber, this would not have been enough to scratch Soviet equipment.
Vasilevsky had more than 2 times more aircraft than the Japanese, and if in a maneuverable battle Kawasaki and Nakajima (Kishki) could compete with Soviet fighters at any altitude, then they were powerless against American aircraft because the Yankees were superior to the Japanese in weapons and characteristics at high altitudes, which allowed the Americans to choose when to attack and when to safely retreat from the battle. In total, the Americans donated 2,400 P-63 Kingcobras to the USSR under Lend-Lease for use against Japan (the Japanese had only 1,800 aircraft in Manchuria).
For the first time, the Japanese felt the destructiveness of massive enemy artillery fire; a salvo from the SU-76/100/152 and Katyusha tore apart their defenses. The advance of the Red Army was so rapid that the advanced units had logistical problems (like Rommel in France). The Red Army had an advantage of 200k-600k fighters and consisted entirely of 100% combat-ready units, while many Japanese were considered only 15% ready and a significant part were poorly trained Chinese. The Japanese did not expect the Soviet invasion in April, so they were taken by surprise (intelligence fault).
I think we can draw serious conclusions about the superiority of the forces of the parties and the lack of experience of the Japanese General Staff in conducting defensive operations on the scale of an entire front. The Japanese also took their best fighters and equipment back home in anticipation of Operation Downfall. Honestly, I don't see how they could stop the red juggernaut, in any scenario.
2) I can’t understand why the Americans asked the Soviets for help. After the nuclear strike, the Japanese were ready to split. As a result of the Manchurian offensive operation A huge amount of imperial army equipment, including tanks, fell into Mao's hands, and the communists gained virtual control of the entire region. The communists also occupied northern Korea, where this rudimentary abomination of nature exists to this day. If there had been no Soviet intervention in China, perhaps the CCP would not have come to power, and this would have radically affected the geopolitical situation throughout Asia...
Japanese small arms from the Second World War period are little known outside the land of the rising sun itself, although many of these samples are extremely interesting, since they are an original mixture of peculiar national traditions, formed under the influence of foreign samples.
At the start of the war, Japan was the most industrially developed country in Asia. In those years, the Japanese arms industry, formed in 1870-1890, included both state arsenals and private arms firms. But the beginning of active hostilities in 1941 revealed a sharp lag in production volumes from the needs of the army and navy. It was decided to expand the production of weapons by involving a number of civilian engineering and metalworking firms in the military program. Speaking about weapons production in Japan of that period, it is necessary to mention: the lag of the technical base led to the fact that when all industrialized countries switched to new technologies in the manufacture of small arms (stamping of parts from sheet steel, welding, etc.), the Japanese continued to use traditional processing methods on metal-cutting machines, which restrained the growth of product output and influenced its cost.
The experience of the war in China and the battles at Lake Khasan forced the Japanese command to bring its concept of combat into line with the requirements of modern warfare. In October 1939, a new field manual for the Japanese Army was adopted, which became the guide for the ground forces until the end of the war in 1945. It noted that the main type of combat operations was an offensive, with the goal of “surrounding and destroying the enemy on the battlefield.” The regulations gave priority to the infantry over other branches of the military. To more effectively solve problems on the battlefield, it was assumed that it would be maximally saturated with automatic weapons.
In 1941, the Japanese rifle division was armed with: rifles - 10369, bayonets - 16724 (some infantrymen were armed only with bayonets), light machine guns - 110, PTR - 72. The cavalry brigades were armed with: carbines - 2134, sabers - 1857, light machine guns - 32, heavy machine guns - 16, heavy machine guns - 8. This may have been enough for the war in China, but by that time it was clearly enough to conduct active combat operations against the Allied troops, who were many times superior to the Japanese in terms of the degree of saturation of automatic small arms. not enough.
One of the main miscalculations made by the Japanese military command during the war was the fact that, having placed the main emphasis on machine guns as the most important means of infantry weapons, it was not able to appreciate in time the full significance for modern warfare of new types of small arms - submachine guns and self-loading rifles. The lost time, as well as the large losses of personnel in infantry units suffered by the Japanese in the battles for the islands in the Pacific theater of operations in 1942-1944, were caused precisely by the lack of much-needed infantry support weapons.
Speaking about Japanese weapons, it is necessary to dwell in more detail on their complicated designation. It usually consists of a two-digit number - according to recent years adoption of this model for service. The chronology in Japan began in 660 BC and was carried out according to the periods of reign of the emperors. Emperor Meiji reigned from 1868 to 1911, so the designation of the rifle "Type 38" corresponds to the 1905 model. Emperor Taisho reigned from 1912 to 1925, and the Type 3 heavy machine gun was adopted by the Japanese Army in 1914. Since 1926, the throne of the Land of the Rising Sun was occupied by Emperor Hirohito. Under him, the name of small arms models received a double interpretation. Thus, weapons adopted in 1926-1940 were designated according to the last years of the all-Japanese calendar, i.e. started in 2588 (1926). In 1940, in the 16th year of the Showa era (Hirohito's reign), the Japanese calendar turned 2600 years old, therefore, in order not to associate ourselves with a multi-digit complex designation, it was decided to count the year 2600 as 100, and when identifying weapons, to simplify the number, omit the number "10", leaving "0". Thus, the 1940 model submachine gun was called the “Type 100”, and the Type 5 rifle became the 1944 model.
In Japan at that time, the development of small arms was led by the Army Weapons Department, to which all research institutes and institutions working on the creation of weapons were subordinate. The designers sought to make maximum use of the achievements Western countries in weapons, combined with the features of the national identity inherent in the Japanese. When developing new types of weapons, they sought to minimize their weight and size characteristics, first of all taking into account the specific conditions of future theaters of military operations. This can be confirmed by the fact that all Japanese machine guns developed in the 1920-1930s had an air-cooled barrel, enhanced by the use of multi-tiered transverse cooling fins, since it was intended to fighting in the arid semi-desert areas of China.
By the beginning of World War II, the weapons of the Japanese army consisted of both outdated models of small arms, which were used mainly to arm the territorial units of the occupation forces on the continent and in the metropolis, and the latest models, which were mainly in service with linear units.
The Arisaka system rifle is one of the notable examples. Using its example, the excess power of classical rifle cartridges was indirectly proven, and the world’s first automatic rifle was created under its cartridge by Vladimir Fedorov. Arisaka was used not only by the Japanese. Finns, Albanians, and even Russians used it - by purchasing Arisaka in the First World War, our government compensated for the shortage of three-line guns.
Arisakami, in particular, armed the famous Latvian riflemen, who played a significant role in the history of the revolution and civil war.
Stocks of Arisaka rifles were used in the Battle of Moscow to arm the militia.
But not only Russia bought Arisaka - the British fleet also used it until 1921. The Chinese had it in service even during the Sino-Vietnamese War. Due to its high combat accuracy, it was used as a sniper.
However, let's start from the beginning. The history of Japanese rifled small arms began in 1877, when Japanese Major Tsuniyoshi Murata arrived in France with the aim of purchasing a batch of Gra system rifles to suppress the Satsuma Uprising of Japanese samurai that broke out in Japan.
The choice of France was not accidental - in those years, European countries tried to preserve the backwardness of Japan, caused by long-term self-isolation, so that it would remain only a market for colonial goods. Therefore, they refused to supply the Japanese with modern weapons. The only exception was France, which, even during the Japanese civil war, Boshin Senso (戊辰戦争, literally “War of the Year of the Dragon”) supplied the latest Shaspo rifles to the shogun’s army. Returning to Tokyo, Murata proposed establishing the production of Namban guns in Japan itself. Nambans, that is, southern barbarians, have been called in Japan for centuries since Europeans sailed to Japan in the 16th-17th centuries from the south.
As a result of Murata's efforts, already in 1880 the Japanese Imperial Army received the Type 13 rifle, so designated after the 13th year of the reign of the then emperor.
The rifle was a synthesis of design ideas embedded in the French Gras rifle and the Dutch Beaumont rifle.
Murata Type 13, created for an 11-mm metal cartridge with a sleeve length of 60 mm, had a length of 127.6 cm with an 813-mm barrel length and weighed 4.09 kg. A 5.28 gram smokeless powder charge threw a 27.2 gram bullet at a speed of 437 m/s. Another modification of the cartridge with a 26-gram bullet provided a 455-meter initial velocity. There was also a carbine, the barrel of which was 459 mm long. A special cartridge was used for it with a lightweight 24-gram bullet fired at a speed of 400.2 m/s.
The Murata Type 13 suffered from many childhood ailments and, after going through two improvements, eventually evolved into the Murata Type 18 rifle by 1885.
Murata Type 18
The Japanese closely followed military innovations in civilized countries, and in 1889 they adopted the Murata Type 22 rifle.
Murata Type 22
The rifle had a caliber of 8 mm and was equipped with an under-barrel magazine of the Kropachek system for eight rounds.
The barrel length of the new rifle was 750 mm. From this barrel, a 15.9-gram bullet ejected by a 2.4-gram charge of smokeless powder flew at a speed of 612 m/s. The carbine, which had a 500 mm barrel, had an initial bullet speed of 590 m/s.
Murata Type 22 carbine
Carbine based on the Murata Type 22 rifle
The Sino-Japanese War became a test for Murata, and although Japan emerged victorious, the joy of victory did not overshadow the identified shortcomings.
The Murata Type 22 had all the disadvantages inherent in rifles with under-barrel magazines. Firstly, filling such a magazine took time and, having quickly fired the entire magazine, the shooter was forced to manually insert each cartridge separately, turning the rifle into a single-shot one. Secondly, as the cartridges were consumed, the center of gravity of the rifle shifted, which negatively affected accuracy. But a third problem also emerged, which turned out to be specific to Japan. The fact is that the height of the average Japanese conscript was only 157 centimeters, and weight, as a rule, did not exceed 48 kilograms. The years of great changes and related civil wars, which affected the birth and childhood of the soldiers of the 1890s, took their toll - almost all of them suffered from dystrophy before the army, and Murata, created by European standards, turned out to be too heavy for many soldiers, and her the payoff is irresistible.
That is why, when switching to a rifle with a middle magazine, the new head of the rifle department of the Tokyo Arsenal, Colonel Naryakira Arisaka (有坂 成章), who replaced Major General Murata in this post in 1890, decided to abandon the 8-mm cartridge.
The weakest cartridge at that time was the Italian 6.5 mm cartridge from the Carcano rifle. It contained 2.28 g of Solemit brand smokeless powder. Such a charge made it possible to push a 10.45-gram bullet out of a 780-mm barrel at a speed of 710 m/s. True, there is evidence that sometimes this cartridge was equipped with 1.95 grams of ballistic nitroglycerin powder, which made it possible to increase the initial speed to 745 m/s.
Arisaki cartridge with blunt bullet
Arisaka decided that the cartridge could be made even weaker, and poured only 2.04 g of nitrocellulose flake powder into it. At the same time, to prevent gunpowder from falling into its lower part when manipulating the cartridge, without contacting the primer, a cardboard wad was placed in the cartridge, which was later abandoned. The sleeve had a length of 50.7 mm, which made it possible to designate its parameters as both 6.5 × 50 and 6.5 × 51 mm.
In those years, there was a serious debate between gunsmiths about which cartridge case was better, with a flange or with a groove. Without waiting for the end of this dispute, Arisaka equipped the sleeve with both a groove and a flange. At the same time, the flange protruded beyond the dimensions of the cartridge by only 0.315 mm, while for our rifle this figure was 1.055 mm.
The capsule socket of the sleeve had a central anvil and two seed holes. The Berdan type brass capsule usually had a convex surface. Occasionally he made two radial strokes.
A blunt-nosed bullet weighing 10.4 g with a spherical tip consisted of a lead core and a cupronickel silver shell and developed a speed of 725 m/s in an 800-mm-long barrel.
The long barrel length, combined with a small powder charge, led to an almost complete absence of muzzle flash and a significant reduction in the sound of the shot.
The rifle, adopted for service in 1897, received the designation Infantry Rifle Type 30 (三八式歩兵銃) - this was the 30th year of the reign of Emperor Mutsuhito, who ruled under the motto of Meiji (明治) - enlightened rule (mei 明 = light, knowledge; ji 治 = rule).
Arisaka type 30
The bolt is disassembled: 1 - bolt stem, 2 - coupling, 3 - ejector, 4 - firing pin, 5 - mainspring, 6 - receiver cover.
The Arisaki barrel had six right-hand rifling, and along the outer surface the barrel had a variable cylindrical cross-section, decreasing towards the muzzle. In the rear part there was a thread cut into which the receiver was tightly screwed onto. The latter was of the same type as the receiver of the Mauser rifle, but had one notable feature - a cover that moved with the bolt.
On the rear jumper of the receiver there was a cranked cutout to accommodate the bolt stem handle, and on the left there was a boss with windows for the bolt stop with a reflector.
The bolt stem had three lugs, two of which were symmetrically located in the front, and the third, additional, was the base of the handle. To lock the barrel, you need to move the bolt forward and turn the barrel handle to the right. Inside the bolt stem there is a channel for placing the firing pin with a mainspring, which passes in the front part into a hole for the firing pin to exit. In the rear part of the stem there is a screw section that interacts with the firing pin cocking, and a socket for placing the firing pin when the bolt is open.
The magazine box of a vertical type rifle with a staggered arrangement of cartridges was filled with cartridges from the clip. when squeezing cartridges from the clip, the lower cartridge lay on the plane of the feeder and, compressing its spring, jumped over the right edge of the lower window of the receiver. The second cartridge pressed on the first and, pressing the feeder inside the magazine box, jumped over the left edge.
The fifth cartridge, having entered under the right edge of the receiver window, could not fall out, since it was pressed against the edge by the fourth cartridge.
Arisaki sight: 1 - sighting block, 2 - sighting frame, 3 - sighting frame spring, 4 - clamp, 5 - clamp latch.
When the bolt moved forward, the lower part of the bolt stem sent the cartridge into the chamber. The cartridge was guided by the slope of the cartridge case along the oval bevels of the receiver. When the barrel bore was locked, the ejector hook jumped over the rim of the cartridge case. The next cartridge, under the action of the feeder spring, rose up all the way to the lower plane of the bolt stem, pressing against the left wall of the lower window of the receiver.
Arisaki's frame sight consisted of a sighting block, which is integral with a tubular base, fitted onto the barrel with an interference fit and, in addition, reinforced with a screw: a sighting frame; springs of the sighting frame and clamp with a latch.
The sighting frame, connected to the sighting block with a pin, had three sighting slots, two of which were on the sighting frame itself, and the third on the movable clamp. Sighting range divisions are marked on the front side of the aiming frame in hundreds of meters.
In addition to the infantry rifle, a carbine was also created, which was used in cavalry, artillery and sapper units. The length of its barrel was reduced to 480 mm.
Arisaka type 38 served the Japanese militarists faithfully for three decades. With its help, they held our Far East in 1918-22. With its help, they occupied Manchuria and started the war with China.
Its last improvement was the introduction of a sniper modification, designated Type 38 - by that time two emperors had changed and a new chronology from the founding of Japan was introduced. Its starting point was the year 660 AD, when, according to legend, Emperor Jimmu founded the Japanese state. According to this calculation, 1938 was 2598 or simply 98. It was in this year that the sniper rifle was introduced.
However, the following year the Arisaku Type 38 was awaiting replacement. The fact is that in China the Japanese encountered Chinese tankettes (more precisely, English ones supplied to China) that had bulletproof armor. The bullet from Arisaka did not penetrate it, but when the Japanese tried to shoot at them from our three-line guns, the armor of the wedges began to crack like eggshells.
Arisaka Type 99
Arisaka's grave at Yanaki Cemetery
Not wanting to waste armor-piercing shells on Chinese tank-types, the Japanese decided to equip their infantry with rifles chambered for a stronger cartridge. As a result, a 7.7x58mm wafer rifle cartridge was developed. During development, the British cartridge .303 British was taken as a basis, but, firstly, it was deprived of the flange, and secondly, it was equipped with a 3.1-gram powder charge instead of 2.58-gram. The barrel length was shortened to 650 mm, and the 11.3 gram bullet flew out of it at a speed of 741 m/s. The rifle chambered for this cartridge received the designation Type 99, and in memory of the late Arisaka, who died in 1915, it was finally officially named after him.
Shortening the barrel made it possible to replace both long infantry rifles and carbines with one modification. The Type 99 rifles were produced in this form until 1945; their total production amounted to over three and a half million units. By the end of the war, Japan's resources were seriously depleted, and the quality of the Arisaka rifles, initially very high, had dropped dramatically. The design of late-release rifles used low-grade steel and parts without heat treatment, so such rifles were often dangerous not only for the enemy, but also for the shooters themselves.
Twenty years before the start of the war with China and the subsequent offensive throughout Southeast Asia, the Empire of Japan began the formation of its armored forces. The experience of the First World War showed promise and the Japanese took note of it. The creation of the Japanese tank industry began with a careful study of foreign vehicles. To do this, starting in 1919, Japan purchased small quantities of tanks of various models from European countries. In the mid-twenties, the French Renault FT-18 and the English Mk.A Whippet were recognized as the best. In April 1925, the first Japanese tank group was formed from these armored vehicles. Subsequently, the purchase of foreign samples continued, but was not particularly large in size. Japanese designers have already prepared several of their own projects.
Renault FT-17/18 (The 17 had an MG, the 18 had a 37mm gun)
Mk.A Whippet tanks of the Imperial Japanese Army
In 1927, the Osaka Arsenal presented the world with the first Japanese tank of its own design. The vehicle had a combat weight of 18 tons and was armed with a 57 mm cannon and two machine guns. The weapons were mounted in two independent towers. It is quite obvious that the first attempt at independently creating armored vehicles was not particularly successful. The Chi-I tank was, overall, not bad. But not without the so-called. childhood illnesses, which was excusable for the very first design. Taking into account the experience of testing and trial operation among the troops, four years later another tank of the same weight was created. The Type 91 was equipped with three turrets containing 70 mm and 37 mm cannons, as well as machine guns. It is noteworthy that the machine gun turret, being intended to defend the vehicle from the rear, was located behind the engine compartment. The other two turrets were located in the front and middle parts of the tank. The most powerful weapon was mounted on a large middle turret. The Japanese used this armament and layout scheme on their next medium tank. The Type 95 appeared in 1935 and was even built in a small series. However, a number of design and operational features ultimately led to the abandonment of multi-tower systems. All further Japanese armored vehicles were either equipped with a single turret, or made do with a wheelhouse or machine gunner's armored shield.
The first Japanese medium tank, which was called 2587 “Chi-i” (sometimes called “medium tank No. 1”)
"Special tractor"
After abandoning the idea of a tank with several turrets, the Japanese military and designers began to develop another direction of armored vehicles, which eventually became the basis for a whole family of combat vehicles. In 1935, the Japanese Army adopted the Type 94 light/small tank, also known as the TK (short for Tokubetsu Keninsha - literally "Special Tractor"). Initially, this tank with a combat weight of three and a half tons - because of this, in the European classification of armored vehicles it is listed as a wedge - was developed as a special vehicle for transporting goods and escorting convoys. However, over time the project developed into a full-fledged light combat vehicle. The design and layout of the Type 94 tank subsequently became classic for Japanese armored vehicles. The TK hull was assembled on a frame made from corners of rolled sheets; the maximum thickness of the armor was 12 millimeters on the upper part of the forehead. The bottom and roof were three times thinner. In the front part of the hull there was a motor-transmission compartment with a Mitsubishi “Type 94” gasoline engine with a power of 35 horsepower. Such a weak engine was enough for a speed of only 40 km/h on the highway. The tank's suspension was designed according to the design of Major T. Hara. Four track rollers were attached in pairs to the ends of the balancer, which, in turn, was mounted on the body. The shock-absorbing element of the suspension was a coil spring installed along the body and covered with a cylindrical casing. On each side, the chassis was equipped with two such blocks, with the fixed ends of the springs located in the center of the chassis. The armament of the “Special Tractor” consisted of one “Type 91” machine gun of 6.5 mm caliber. The Type 94 project was generally successful, although it had a number of shortcomings. First of all, complaints were caused by weak protection and insufficient weapons. Just one rifle-caliber machine gun was effective only against a weak enemy.
"Type 94" "TK" captured by the Americans
"Type 97"/"Te-Ke"
The technical specifications for the next armored vehicle implied higher levels of protection and firepower. Since the Type 94 design had a certain potential for development, the new Type 97, also known as Te-Ke, in fact became its deep modernization. For this reason, the suspension and hull design of the Te-Ke were almost completely similar to the corresponding Type 94 units. At the same time, there were differences. The combat weight of the new tank increased to 4.75 tons, which, combined with a new, more powerful engine, could lead to serious changes in balancing. To avoid putting too much stress on the front road wheels, the OHV engine was placed at the rear of the tank. The two-stroke diesel engine developed power up to 60 hp. At the same time, the increase in engine power did not lead to an improvement in driving performance. The speed of the Type 97 remained at the level of the previous TK tank. Moving the engine to the stern required changing the layout and shape of the front part of the hull. Thus, thanks to the increase in free volumes in the nose of the tank, it was possible to create a more ergonomic workplace for the driver with a more comfortable “wheelhouse” protruding above the front and top sheets of the hull. The Type 97's level of protection was slightly higher than that of the Type 94. Now the entire body was assembled from 12 mm sheets. Besides, top part the sides of the hull had a thickness of 16 millimeters. This interesting feature was due to the angles of inclination of the sheets. Since the frontal one was located at a greater angle to the horizontal than the side ones, the different thicknesses made it possible to provide the same level of protection from all angles. The crew of the Type 97 tank consisted of two people. They did not have any special observation devices and used only viewing slits and sights. The tank commander's workplace was located in the fighting compartment, in the turret. At his disposal was a 37 mm cannon and a 7.7 mm machine gun. The Type 94 gun with a wedge breech was loaded manually. An ammunition load of 66 armor-piercing and fragmentation shells was placed along the sides, inside the tank's hull. The penetration of the armor-piercing projectile was about 35 millimeters from a distance of 300 meters. The Type 97 coaxial machine gun had more than 1,700 rounds of ammunition.
Type 97 Te-Ke
Serial production of Type 97 tanks began in 1938-39. Before its cessation in 1942, about six hundred combat vehicles were assembled. Appearing at the very end of the thirties, “Te-Ke” managed to take part in almost all military conflicts of that time, from battles in Manchuria to landing operations 1944. At first, the industry could not cope with the production of the required number of tanks, so they were distributed between units with special care. The use of the Type 97 in battles was met with varying degrees of success: weak armor did not provide protection from a considerable part of enemy firepower, and its own weapons could not provide the necessary firepower and effective fire range. In 1940, an attempt was made to install a new cannon with a longer barrel and the same caliber on the Te-Ke. The initial velocity of the projectile increased by one hundred meters per second and reached a level of 670-680 m/s. However, over time it became clear that this weapon was also insufficient.
"Type 95"
A further development of the theme of light tanks was the “Type 95” or “Ha-Go”, created a little later than the “Te-Ke”. In general, it was a logical continuation of previous cars, but not without major changes. First of all, the design of the chassis was changed. On previous machines, the idler also played the role of a road wheel and pressed the track to the ground. On the Ha-Go, this part was raised above the ground and the caterpillar acquired a more familiar appearance for tanks of that time. The design of the armored hull remained the same - frame and rolled sheets. Most of the panels were 12 millimeters thick, which is why the level of protection remained the same. The basis of the power plant of the Type 95 tank was a six-cylinder two-stroke diesel engine with a power of 120 hp. Such engine power, despite a combat weight of seven and a half tons, made it possible to maintain and even improve the vehicle’s speed and maneuverability compared to previous ones. The maximum speed of the Ha-Go on the highway was 45 km/h.
The main weapon of the Ha-Go tank was similar to that of the Type 97. It was a 37 mm Type 94 cannon. The gun suspension system was made in a rather original way. The gun was not fixed rigidly and could move in both vertical and horizontal planes. Thanks to this, it was possible to roughly aim the gun by turning the turret and adjust the aiming using its own rotation mechanisms. The gun's ammunition - 75 unitary shells - was placed along the walls of the fighting compartment. The additional armament of the Type 95 was initially two 6.5 mm Type 91 machine guns. Later, with the transition of the Japanese army to a new cartridge, their place was taken by Type 97 machine guns of 7.7 mm caliber. One of the machine guns was installed in the rear of the turret, the other in a swinging installation in the front plate of the armored hull. In addition, on the left side of the hull there were embrasures for firing from the crew’s personal weapons. The Ha-Go crew, for the first time in this line of light tanks, consisted of three people: a driver mechanic, a gunner technician and a gunner commander. The responsibilities of the gunner technician included control of the engine and firing from the front machine gun. The second machine gun was controlled by the commander. He loaded the cannon and fired from it.
The first experimental batch of Ha-Go tanks was assembled back in 1935 and immediately went to the troops for trial operation. In the war with China, due to the weakness of the latter’s army, the new Japanese tanks did not achieve much success. A little later, during the battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese military finally managed to test the Type 95 in real battle with a worthy opponent. This test ended sadly: almost all of the Kwantung Army's "Ha-Go" were destroyed by tanks and artillery of the Red Army. One of the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol was the recognition by the Japanese command of the inadequacy of 37-mm guns. During the battles, Soviet BT-5s, equipped with 45-mm guns, managed to destroy Japanese tanks even before they came within striking distance. In addition, the Japanese armored formations included many machine-gun tanks, which clearly did not contribute to success in battles.
"Ha-Go", captured American troops on the island of Io
Subsequently, the Ha-Go tanks encountered American equipment and artillery in battle. Due to the significant difference in calibers - the Americans were already using 75 mm tank guns with all their might - Japanese armored vehicles often suffered heavy losses. By the end of the war in the Pacific, light tanks "Type 95" were often converted into stationary firing points, but their effectiveness was low. Last fights with the participation of the Type 95 took place during the Third Chinese Civil War. Captured tanks were transferred to the Chinese military, with the USSR sending captured armored vehicles to the People's Liberation Army, and the United States to the Kuomintang. Despite the active use of the Type 95 after the Second World War, this tank can be considered quite lucky. Of the more than 2,300 tanks built, only a dozen and a half have survived to this day in the form of museum exhibits. Several dozen more damaged tanks are local landmarks in some Asian countries.
Medium "Chi-Ha"
Soon after the start of testing the Ha-Go tank, Mitsubishi presented another project, dating back to the early thirties. This time, the good old TK concept became the basis for a new medium tank, called the Type 97 or Chi-Ha. It is worth noting that “Chi-Ha” had few similarities with “Te-Ke”. The coincidence of the digital development index was due to some bureaucratic issues. However, things were not done without borrowing ideas. The new Type 97 had the same layout as previous vehicles: the engine in the rear, the transmission in the front and the fighting compartment between them. The design of "Chi-Ha" was carried out using a frame system. The maximum thickness of rolled hull sheets in the case of the Type 97 increased to 27 millimeters. This provided a significant increase in the level of protection. As practice later showed, the new thicker armor turned out to be much more resistant to enemy weapons. For example, the American Browning M2 heavy machine guns confidently hit Ha-Go tanks at distances of up to 500 meters, but they only left dents on the Chi-Ha’s armor. More solid armor led to an increase in the tank's combat weight to 15.8 tons. This fact required the installation of a new engine. In the early stages of the project, two motors were considered. Both had the same power of 170 hp, but were developed by different companies. As a result, the Mitsubishi diesel was chosen, which turned out to be slightly more convenient to manufacture. And the ability to quickly and conveniently communicate between tank designers and engine engineers did its job.
Taking into account the current trends in the development of foreign tanks, Mitsubishi designers decided to equip the new Type 97 with more powerful weapons than previous tanks had. A 57-mm Type 97 cannon was installed on the rotating turret. Like the Ha-Go, the gun could swing on axles not only in the vertical plane, but also in the horizontal, within a sector 20° wide. It is noteworthy that fine horizontal aiming of the gun was carried out without any mechanical means - only physical strength gunner Vertical aiming was carried out in the sector from -9° to +21°. The standard ammunition for the gun included 80 high-explosive fragmentation and 40 armor-piercing shells. Armor-piercing ammunition weighing 2.58 kg penetrated up to 12 millimeters of armor per kilometer. At half the distance, the penetration rate increased by one and a half times. The Chi-Ha's additional armament consisted of two Type 97 machine guns. One of them was located in the front of the hull, and the other was intended for defense against attack from behind. The new gun forced the tank builders to increase the crew once again. Now it consisted of four people: a driver, a gunner, a loader and a commander-gunner.
In 1942, based on the Type 97, the Shinhoto Chi-Ha tank was created, which differed from the original model with a new gun. The 47-mm Type 1 gun made it possible to increase the ammunition load to 102 rounds and at the same time increase armor penetration. The 48-caliber barrel accelerated the projectile to such speeds that it could penetrate up to 68-70 millimeters of armor at a distance of up to 500 meters. The updated tank turned out to be more effective against armored vehicles and enemy fortifications, and therefore mass production began. In addition, a considerable part of the more than seven hundred Shinhoto Chi-Has produced were converted during repairs from simple Type 97 tanks.
The combat use of the Chi-Ha, which began in the very first months of the war in the Pacific theater of operations, until a certain time showed sufficient effectiveness of the solutions used. However, over time, when the United States entered the war, already having such tanks as the M3 Lee in its troops, it became clear that all the light and medium tanks Japan had simply could not fight them. To reliably destroy American tanks, precise hits were required in certain parts of them. This was the reason for the creation of a new turret with a Type 1 cannon. One way or another, none of the Type 97 modifications could compete on equal terms with the equipment of the enemy, the USA or the USSR. As a result of this, out of approximately 2,100 units, only two complete Chi-Ha tanks have survived to this day. Another dozen have been preserved in damaged form and are also museum exhibits.
Based on materials from sites:
http://pro-tank.ru/
http://wwiivehicles.com/
http://www3.plala.or.jp/
http://armor.kiev.ua/
http://aviarmor.net/
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