Allies. Meeting on the Elbe

Even in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, full of various events, the date of April 25, 1945 occupies a prominent place. On this day, Soviet and American troops met in the center of Germany on the Elbe River.

In order for this meeting to take place, each of the parties has made its own way. The turning point in the fierce bloody battle with fascism, achieved thanks to the victories of the Red Army at Stalingrad, Kursk and on the Dnieper, forced the Western allies to reconsider their strategy for waging war. Massive aerial bombardments of Germany, successes in the Battle of the Atlantic, advances on the Italian front, as well as growing Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union, diverting the main forces of the Wehrmacht, were no longer enough. Perhaps decisive for the opening of the second front was the Anglo-Saxons' realization that, in the words of US President Roosevelt, "... if things continue in Russia as they are now, it is possible that next spring a second front will not be needed."

The landing in June 1944 of the allied troops in Normandy meant that at last the Western Allies entered the struggle on the European continent in full force. Together with the Red Army, they squeezed the still fiercely resisting Third Reich in an iron grip. By the spring of 1945, the forces of the Nazis were already running out. As the British historian Hastings writes, on the Western Front they now offered only "sluggish and poorly organized resistance." Meanwhile, the fighting in the East, he notes, "became one of the most terrible military clashes in the history of warfare, while Eisenhower's armies waited behind the scenes."

At some point, this circumstance gave rise to the hope among some in Washington and especially in London that it would be possible to take Berlin before the Russians arrived there. “It seemed that nothing could prevent the Western Allies from occupying Berlin,” British Prime Minister Churchill later sighed. But still, common sense told the Anglo-Saxons that after the Yalta agreements on the zones of occupation of Germany, the “race ahead” could turn into unpredictable consequences for relations with the Soviet Union and the final phase of the war in Europe (and the final phase of the war against Japan was still ahead). Moreover, on April 16, the Red Army launched an offensive against Berlin and on April 25 (!) closed the encirclement around the capital of the Reich.

South of Berlin, by this time, the advanced units of the Soviet troops had reached the Elbe River, on the opposite bank of which the American troops were waiting for them. Some confusion in the reports to the command, in determining their location, gave rise to a description of the first Soviet-American contacts that did not always coincide. It is generally accepted that the “official” meeting took place on April 25 on the Elbe near the city of Torgau, where the soldiers of the Soviet 58th Guards Rifle Division and the American 69th Infantry Division met. Almost all the newspapers of the world were covered by a photograph of Lieutenant W. Robertson and Lieutenant A. Silvashko shaking hands and smiling against the background of the inscription "East meets West."

This was followed by meetings at the level of commanders of regiments, divisions, and corps. Contacts between Russians and Americans spread along the entire line of contact between the armies of the two countries. The culmination was the reception on May 5 by the Soviet side in the person of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I.S. Konev and a large group of Soviet generals and officers of the commander of the 12th Army Group, General Bradley, and the American military accompanying him.

Despite the tendency to regulate everything common in the Soviet system (keep military secrets, behave in a disciplined and affable manner, observe uniforms, etc.), by many accounts, the atmosphere at these first Soviet-American meetings was, as a rule, the most relaxed and friendly. American officers, noted in one of the Soviet reports, sought to "get some kind of memory from the Russian soldiers, for this purpose they removed stars from our officers from shoulder straps, presented their insignia, exchanged watches, handkerchiefs."

The meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe had not so much military significance (Germany, which was one step away from final collapse, was cut in half), but political and psychological. It has become a symbol of the military alliance of the USSR and the USA in the fight against a common mortal enemy and a joint victory over him. The cooperation and mutual understanding of the two strongest powers gave all peoples yearning for a creative, peaceful life the hope that in the post-war period they would be guaranteed peace, development and prosperity. That very day, April 25, 1945, in San Francisco, the international conference to draw up a charter for the United Nations was called upon to serve such purposes.

S. M. Monin
to. and. PhD, professor at MGIMO (University)

- the event of the final stage of the hostilities of the armed forces of the anti-Hitler coalition in Europe. The meeting of the troops of the Soviet and American armies took place on April 25, 1945 in the Torgau region on the Elbe River.

The historic meeting of the allies took place on the Elbe on April 25, 1945, near the city of Torgau. Then units and subunits of the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st American Army and the 58th Infantry Division, which is part of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal Ivan Konev, met. It was they who, as a result of military operations, turned out to be closest to each other. The Red Army troops were ordered to stop at the Elbe. The Americans took up positions at Mulde. The distance between them was 25 kilometers.

It was impossible to fix all the isolated contacts between the allies. The first Soviet servicemen who met with the American patrol sent to meet the Russian troops were Senior Lieutenant Grigory Goloborodko with Sergeant Alexander Olshansky and several other people. Later, Lieutenant Colonel Gordeev joined them. The Allied patrol was commanded by Lieutenant Albert Kotzebue. This informal meeting took place in the southern part of the proposed contact zone, while the historic meeting took place in the northern part. On the Soviet side, the moment of contact was determined by a combat report dated April 25 from the headquarters of the 58th Infantry Division: “At 15.30 on April 25, 1945, in the area of ​​the bridge, east of Torgau, a meeting took place between the officers of the 173rd Infantry Regiment and a patrol of the Allied troops ... ".

On a dilapidated bridge in the middle of the Elbe, the platoon commander of the 58th Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Alexander Silvashko, and the commander of the reconnaissance group of the 69th American Infantry Division, Lieutenant William Robertson, met.

The photo of the Soviet and American lieutenants, who were the first to shake hands during the fraternization of the Allied forces on the Elbe, went around the publications of the whole world in a matter of hours. Moscow saluted the meeting at Torgau with 24 volleys of 324 guns, and similar celebrations took place in Times Square in New York. Meetings of the soldiers of the US and British armies with Soviet soldiers and officers resulted in a demonstration of the friendship of comrades-in-arms.

As a result of the meeting of the Allied forces, the remnants of the German Armed Forces were split into two parts - northern and southern.

This significantly weakened their resistance, deprived them of maneuverability, disrupted the unified control system, and accelerated the final defeat of the Wehrmacht.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

The Soviet state endured the greatest hardships of the struggle against Nazi Germany. The entire military power of the Wehrmacht fell upon him, and for the full three years the Russian people fought almost alone. Since the spring of 1942, the Soviet leadership insisted on opening a second front in Europe, but the members of the anti-Hitler coalition were in no particular hurry. The meeting on the Elbe that went down in history, connecting Soviet and American troops, took place only in April 1945.

Opening a second front

In the spring of 1942, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov flew to London to negotiate with representatives of the United States and Great Britain, members of the anti-Hitler coalition, on the opening of a second front in Western Europe in order to pull back part of the forces of the Third Reich, thereby weakening their onslaught on the Soviet Union. The first meeting did not lead to the desired result. The allies did not want to rush and jeopardize their forces. At the second meeting, which went down in history as the Tehran Conference, which was attended by the first persons of the states: US President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, an agreement was reached on opening a second front in the spring of 1944.

The second front was opened in France in early June 1944. Until the moment when the famous meeting on the Elbe took place, a year had passed since the Allies had landed in Normandy. Then the famous Normandy operation was implemented, which lasted all three summer months.

Overlord

Early in the morning of June 6, 1944, military units of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, under the leadership of General David Eisenhower, landed in the North of France, in Normandy, thereby opening a second front. The operation was called "Overlord", which in English means "supreme lord", "ruler". Landing operation with the landing of more than three million people to this day remains the largest in world history. It took place in two stages: the first was aimed at creating and strengthening a bridgehead, the second - to continue the offensive deep into France and advance to the French-German border.

Since in preparation for the operation a regime of the strictest secrecy was introduced, to the extent that those participating in the operation were isolated, the command responsible for the operation managed to achieve the effect of surprise. Already at the end of the month, the allies fortified themselves on a bridgehead 100 km wide, deepening 40 km. In August, when the second stage of the Normandy operation was successfully unfolding, the Allies landed in the south of France. Having significantly weakened the German forces, the Allies broke through to Paris and liberated the city on August 25.

In autumn, the coasts of France and Belgium were completely cleared of German troops. The entire western border of Germany was under the control of the Allies, in some places the troops even entered the country itself. At the beginning of winter, as a result of offensive operations in northeastern France, the Third Reich almost completely lost its positions in Western Europe.

On the way to Germany

In the first quarter of 1945, the Allied forces were already close to Germany. The defeat was already obvious, but for every inch of German land, the Wehrmacht fought with all its might. Nevertheless, in March, the Nazis were forced to retreat and withdraw across the Rhine River. Thanks to forced actions, the Allies managed to recapture the Ruhr from the Nazis, thereby depriving the Hitler Reich of the main industrial center and, in fact, destroying the West German front.

To the place where the well-known meeting on the Elbe took place, the American and British troops left already on April 12-14 and remained to wait for the Russian allies.

Berlin: to take or not to take?

As the allied forces moved deeper into Germany, all the participants began to understand that the outcome of events was moving from the military plane to the political plane. The final defeat of the Nazis was already a matter of time, and the prospects for a further correlation of political forces throughout Europe emerged in the first place. By the time the meeting on the Elbe took place, Winston Churchill turned to Commander-in-Chief Eisenhower with the question of who would take control of Berlin after all?

Sir Churchill rightly believed that it was the country that would put the final end to the war by capturing the capital of German imperialism that would then be able to dictate its terms in the distribution of zones of influence. However, Eisenhower did not support the position of the British Prime Minister. He replied that the American side had no intention of taking Berlin, because they did not see any special military value in this. In addition, as the future US president replied, there is already an agreement with Moscow to place a demarcation line 150 km west of Berlin. As another argument, Eisenhower put forward estimates of approximate losses, which could be up to 100 thousand people.

Stalin, as you know, stood on a categorical position to take Berlin at any cost.

The meeting that became a legend

The meeting on the Elbe River took place on 25 April. The day before, Allied contact with Red Army units had been reported by the US Press and Psychological Warfare Department. Contact with units of the First Ukrainian Front took place in the area of ​​the city of Torgau. Marshal Ivan Konev acted on the part of the Soviet troops, and General Omar Nelson Bradley spoke on the part of the American troops.

The meeting on the Elbe was held in a very warm and friendly atmosphere: mutual banquets were given, gifts were given, concerts were arranged. Marshal Konev presented O'Bradley with a Don stallion and an award pistol with a carving on the handle. He, in turn, presented the Soviet marshal with a carbine and a jeep with a trunk full of cigarettes.

Results

The meeting on the Elbe, no matter what political and military features it carried, was an important milestone - the outcome of the war became more than obvious. The military forces of Germany were divided into northern and southern parts. The disrupted command and control system and the lost ability to maneuver significantly weakened the resistance of the Nazis. The meeting on the Elbe, dated April 25, 1945, had both diplomatic and political significance. Hitler, knowing about the contradictions between the allies and the Soviet Union, hoped for the development of a military conflict between them. However, a few days after the meeting, Stalin received a telegram in which the Allies confirmed their intention to completely defeat Germany.

On April 25, 1945, near the city of Torgau on the Elbe, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front met with the troops of the 1st US Army.

As a result of the meeting of the Allied forces, the remnants of the German armed forces were split into two parts - northern and southern.

The first meeting took place when an American patrol under the command of First Lieutenant Albert Kotzebue crossed the Elbe. On the east coast, they met Soviet soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Gordeev. On the same day, another American patrol (under the command of US Army Second Lieutenant William Robertson met with Soviet soldiers of Lieutenant Alexander Silvashko on the destroyed bridge over the Elbe near Torgau.

Happy second lieutenant W. Robertson and lieutenant A. S. Silvashko against the background of the inscription "East meets West", symbolizing the historic meeting of the allies on the Elbe

Soviet officers with American in a jeep.

Memorial sign at the meeting point

Mikhail Zhdanov In those memorable days

This obelisk monument is installed at the entrance to the city of Torgau on the western bank of the Elbe River. The words are inscribed on it: “Here, on the Elbe, on April 25, 1945, the troops of the First Ukrainian Front of the Red Army united with the American troops. Glory to the victorious Red Army and the valiant troops of our allies who defeated Nazi Germany. Everyone who happens to be in Torgau honors the memory of those dead and living with a minute of silence, who, at the cost of huge irreplaceable sacrifices, reached these places and brought the long-awaited victory over German fascism closer.

... Somehow I was called from the front to Moscow and offered to prepare to leave as a war correspondent for TASS to our allies. And so, early in the morning of April 24, I arrived at the headquarters of the 1st American Army, General Hodges. It was located 40 kilometers west of the Elbe, not far from Torgau. General Hodges took me for an official representative of the Red Army, sent to clarify the agreement on the time and place of the meeting of the allied armies. I had to explain to him that I was a TASS war correspondent for the allied forces and had no official authority to organize a meeting of the troops. Then, after thinking for a while, he said: “Well, nothing, you are a major in the Red Army, and we ask you to stay in this role for a while. Help us to contact one of the parts of your army and determine where a meeting of our troops can take place.

Hodges ordered that one of the field radios be placed at my disposal.

For a long time no one answered. My messages were obviously mistaken for a German provocation, but about an hour later, a Soviet radio operator, Lieutenant Karasev, answered. He asked me in detail about the deployment of American troops, then said that their units were not far from the city of Torgau. When I reported on the negotiations with Lieutenant Karasev to General Hodges, he ordered that two reconnaissance groups be formed and sent for reconnaissance to the Elbe.

One of the reconnaissance groups was assigned to lead Second Lieutenant William Robertson. A handsome, very sociable guy was then 20 years old. I asked permission to go on reconnaissance with this group, they allowed me. On April 25 we departed in the direction of Torgau. Soon we drove up to the Elbe and noticed our Soviet soldiers on its eastern bank. They looked at us with surprise. Worried, I began to explain that I was a major in the Red Army, a war correspondent, I was in the American troops, and next to me were American intelligence officers. We and they approached the bridge and on its blown up farms, Soviet and American soldiers exchanged their first greetings and handshakes.

Bill Fox Met on the Bridge

In San Francisco, the delegates of the United Nations Conference, at their first meeting, began to discuss the problem of maintaining world peace after the war.

In Lekvitsa at 11.30 am, an American lieutenant and members of his patrol group saw a Russian soldier riding into the yard of a rural house.

At 4 p.m. in Torgau, another American lieutenant, hanging on the beam of the destroyed bridge, along which he crossed the Elbe, with a cry of jubilation slapped another Russian soldier who was making his way towards him in the same risky way.

In Klanschwitz at 4:45 pm, an American major and patrolmen subordinate to him poured out of their "jeeps" and, unable to suppress their emotions, rushed towards a detachment of Russian cavalrymen.

It was April 25, 1945. The events described above took place: the first - in the United States, the rest - in the center of Europe, in Germany. One of them was attended by statesmen who had gathered to chart the paths for peaceful coexistence. In others, they are soldiers who dreamed of ending the war as soon as possible. The meetings that took place at three points near the Elbe were the first between the American and Russian armies, between the western and eastern fronts of the Second World War. United, Russian and American troops cut the Nazi armies in half, and this contributed to the speedy end of the war.

A historic meeting took place between parts of the famous armies. On the American side, the 273rd Infantry Regiment of the 69th Infantry Division took part in it; on the Russian side, the 173rd and 175th Rifle Regiments of the 58th Guards Division took part. The 69th Division was part of the 5th Corps under the command of Major General Clarence Huebner, who, in turn, was part of the 1st Army of General Courtney Hodges. These formations were part of the 12th Army Group under the command of General of the Army Omar Bradley. The 58th Guards Division was part of the 34th Corps under the command of Major General G. Baklanov; the corps, in turn, was part of the 5th Guards Army, commanded by Lieutenant General A. Zhadov. And all of them were part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal I. Konev. The American units and formations named above were the first to land in Western Europe; Russian troops marched with battles from Stalingrad to the Elbe.

On a cold, foggy morning on April 25, two combat motorized patrols moved east from the American army line at Trebzen on the Mulde River. The third patrol, sent out late the evening before, headed east of Kyuren. The fourth, unauthorized patrol crashed into enemy positions, captured prisoners and returned back. All four patrols were from the 273rd Infantry Regiment, 69th Infantry Division. All patrols were ordered not to go more than 5 miles east of Mulde. Despite the order, three patrols reached the Elbe and met with the Russian army. The fourth patrol turned back.

In the days preceding the first meeting of the two powerful armies, there were many rumors, unofficial reports, in a word, the excitement grew. The German troops were defeated by both the Red Army and the armies of its allies, and their connection at some point on the front was inevitable in those days. The American soldiers on the front line were unaware that the Red Army had been ordered to stop at the Elbe. The Americans were ordered to stop at Mulde. Closest of all to each other were the 1st American Army and the 5th Soviet Army, which reached the indicated rivers on April 21. Having occupied the planned lines, the troops were waiting for a meeting with the units that were on the opposite side.

The unrest on the American front increased, and therefore every hillock was mistaken for a “Russian tank”, and every unfamiliar voice on the radio was an attempt by the Russians to establish contact with the Americans. At the beginning of the third week of April, messages began to be sent from some units of the 9th US Army about the establishment of radio contact with the Russian army. On April 23, the sergeant of the headquarters of the 6th motorized division allegedly got into radio contact with the Russians. On the same day, the 1st Battalion of the 273rd Infantry Regiment reported the appearance of a Russian tank with an identification mark agreed by the parties - a white stripe on the hull. But when we looked closely, the “tank” turned out to be just some kind of hillock with clotheslines stretched along the slope. Similar messages now and then came from various sectors of the front. Some units, such as the motorized reconnaissance group of the 104th Infantry Division, sent people outside their zone in the hope of being the first to meet the Russians.

By noon on 24 April, contact had still not been made. The whole army was literally waiting for him. In the afternoon, the commander of the 273rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel C. Adams, sent a patrol forward under the command of Senior Lieutenant Albert Kotzebue. Kotzebue was the commander of the 3rd platoon of G Company. He was ordered to "make contact with the Russians" within a 5-mile zone established by the high command. Kotzebue made reconnaissance in the agreed zone, reached almost Dalen and, not finding the Russians, returned to Küren. There he stayed overnight, as the order to return to the regiment came only late in the evening.

That same night, at the regimental command post at Trebzen, Colonel Adams briefed the commanders of two more patrols, who were to depart the next day on the same mission. Like the first patrol, they were instructed to meet the Russians within a 5-mile radius. They had to half-jokingly, half-seriously enter into a conspiracy - let's take it, no matter what restrictions, we will look for Russians until we meet. Still no news from Kotzebue.

At dawn on April 25, the reconnaissance platoon crossed the rickety bridge over the Mulde in the Trebzen area. The platoon was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Edward Gumpert. He was accompanied by the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the regiment, Major James Sykes, his deputy, Captain Faye Long, and Captain Hans Trefus, sent from the 5th Corps, an officer in the department for interrogating prisoners of war. This group was followed by a patrol of Y and H Companies under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Howard of Y Company. Accompanying this patrol were the deputy chief of staff of the regiment, Major Fred Craig (senior officer of the group), assistant chief of intelligence of the regiment, captain George Morey, and captain William Fox, specialist in military history of the 1st Army. The groups divided among themselves the zone located to the east of the river. The reconnaissance platoon went to the northern sector, and Craig's group to the southern one. There was still no news from Kotzebue.

The morning of April 25 was cold. In search of the Russians, the patrols continued to inspect their zones, and at the same time they captured desperate German soldiers, freed prisoners from the Allied armies and accepted the surrender of enemy cities. From their reports it followed that the Russians were either in Turpin, then in Gorniewice, then in Oschats, then in Strel, or even simply “very close”. Having reached the boundaries of the established zone, the patrols began to request permission to move on. With each time their requests sounded more insistent. And each time, feeling that the excitement in the patrols was growing, Colonel Adams gave the order to stop.

It's noon. One o'clock. Two hours. Three hours, three o'clock. The day crept slowly into evening. The reconnaissance platoon, where people were more restrained and more conservative, remained within its zone in the Frauwalde region. Craig's patrol was west of the Deutsch-Luppa. Both patrols were ordered to return. The reconnaissance platoon immediately moved back. Kotzebue was still silent.

And suddenly - a stunning message: “The task is completed. We agree on a meeting between the commanders. Coordinates 870170. No casualties.” Kotzebue poisoned him at 13.30. At the regimental command post it was received at 15.15. The message was accompanied by an explanation that the lieutenant failed to establish direct communication with his regiment and he sent a message to the rear, from where it was transferred to its destination.

So, the deed is done. The day before, a request had been sent from the 5th Corps for information to be collected and instructions to be followed by a patrol coming into contact with the Russians. One of the points of the instructions provided for negotiations on organizing a meeting of the command.

The message to Kotzebue didn't say anything specific, but Colonel Adams understood exactly what had happened and how important it was. He immediately connected with the division commander, Major General Emil Reinhardt and the chief of staff, Colonel Charles Lynch, and broke the news to them. The general was furious like a mad bull, because it turned out that his order was disobeyed. He ordered Adams to check the accuracy of the information, as he did not want to endanger himself due to another inaccurate report. He then telephoned the corps commander, General Clarence Huebner. He, in turn, informed the commander of the army, General Courtney Hodges, about the incident. (The message was no doubt passed on to the White House, the Kremlin, and Downing Street.) Soon back along the same chain came an order to delay the notification, definitely not yet arrange a meeting of the command and double-check the message about the established contact.

Meanwhile, the regimental command post was flooded with correspondents and photographers, fueling the already hectic atmosphere of the headquarters. The regimental commander was secretly sure that the meeting had taken place. But the available information was not enough to draw up a complete picture. After all, it could be that the patrol, miraculously slipping through the location of the Germans, was cut off from their own.

An hour later another message came from Kotzebue. From it it was clear that negotiations with the Russians were continuing. It remained unclear, however, whether the sector between the fronts was free from the Germans and with whom exactly Kotzebue had made contact. All he conveyed was: “The terms of the meeting have not been fully discussed. I'll get in touch later."

From Kotzebue's point of view, the matter was clear. Having entered Lekwitz at 11.30, his patrol found in the courtyard of one of the farms, as mentioned above, a Russian cavalryman, surrounded by a crowd of so-called displaced persons who worked here as farm laborers. The cavalryman was taciturn, but Kotzebue still managed to ask him where the headquarters of his unit was located. From Lekwitz, the lieutenant headed for the Elbe, passing Strela, which Kotzebue on his map confused with Coffin. He approached the west bank of the Elbe at 12:05 p.m. and crossed to the other side at 12:30 p.m. to establish contact between the two armies. If the first meeting with the rider was unremarkable, then subsequent meetings with the Russians were extremely cordial. Kotzebue wanted the regiment to know about the course of events. But in the radio messages, he refrained from giving details of the meeting with the Russians.

After Kotzebue met and spoke with several soldiers and an officer, he was taken to a ferry located to the north and transferred to the east bank of the Elbe. Before crossing the river again at the village of Krajnitz, Kotzebue sent an urgent message to Colonel Adams. As it turned out later, the coordinates indicated in it were incorrect. In Krajnica, Kotzebue met with the commander of the 58th Guards Rifle Division, Major General Vladimir Rusakov.

While Kotzebue with his patrol was on the Russian coast and celebrated the meeting, Colonel Adams made every effort to achieve at least a preliminary agreement on a meeting with the Russian command. “In arranging a meeting for the Treihard 6 (Colonel Adams, — Note. ed.), select a point to the east no further than 670162, ”the colonel radioed. These coordinates corresponded to the city of Kalbitts, located halfway to the Russians. The regimental headquarters felt that the proposed rendezvous point would be acceptable to the Russians.

American map of military operations in the Elbe region.

Time passed slowly. There were no specific reports from the meeting place. Both in the regiment and in the headquarters of the division lived in anxious expectation. In the end, General Reinhardt decided to try another way to get more accurate information. He ordered the division chief of staff to hold Adams back. As a result, at 5:30 p.m., Adams sent the following instructions to his patrol: “Temporarily refrain from certain meeting arrangements. Do not report, I repeat - do not report by radio, but only through a courier, the composition and other data for identifying the Russian unit, the time and place of the meeting, the type of communication that the Russian unit uses to contact the higher command. Keep in touch with me and let me know your every move."

Later, about ten minutes after the order to "postpone meeting" was given, a message came from Major Craig's patrol: "Contacted with Kotzebue. He established contact with the Russians."

The situation got worse. Now there were two messages about the meeting. Both contained nothing specific. The regiment could not understand who the second patrol met.

General Reinhardt, wanting to know what was going on, decided to send his representative, one of the senior officers, to the place of contact. At the suggestion of General Huebner, he sent liaison aircraft to the meeting point indicated by Kotzebue, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Conran from the Operations Department and an interpreter. However, the coordinates turned out to be wrong. The liaison planes flew as far as Ryza, circled over it, found no sign of being met; they were fired upon by a small anti-aircraft battery and returned to the division. This caused even more confusion and bewilderment. Time passed slowly.

With Craig, a slightly different story happened. His patrol climbed "a little further" than ordered. In Klanschwitz, he came across two "jeeps" from Kotzebue's patrol and learned that a few hours earlier Kotzebue had met with Russians who were located very close, on the east bank of the Elbe. Craig immediately gave the order to move forward and join Kotzebue. When their "jeeps" were already at the exit of the city, they saw a column of horsemen through the trees, heading towards the city from the east along a parallel road. Suddenly the column stopped. The riders turned and galloped towards the Americans. Those just dropped their jaws: Russians! It happened at 16.45, but the meeting was short. The Russians moved on, following orders to get to Dresden.

The Americans rushed to Strela. Finding no one there, they turned north and crossed to the eastern bank of the Elbe near Krainitz, where they appeared before General Rusakov. It quickly became clear that in front of the general were not representatives of the command, whose arrival he expected after meeting with Kotzebue, but another patrol. Rusakov arranged a solemn reception for these Americans as well. All this happened at the location of the 175th Infantry Regiment. This regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Gordeev, holder of many orders, one of the best officers of Rusakov's division.

So far, there was nothing left but to rest, toast and wait. At 18.05, a message was received from the regiment stating that two liaison aircraft with an officer of the operations department of the division headquarters on board were in flight.

An hour passed, and the Americans, who were going to join Kotzeb and Craig in Krajnica, did not appear. Major Craig turned out to be the senior American in Krajnice and took over the leadership of the negotiations for the meeting. He needed to know if Colonel Adams would take part in the meeting with the Russian general. At 2000, the major's inquiries were received at the command post, where there was deep confusion, after the sent liaison planes returned empty, and General Reinhardt ordered Colonel Adams to go in person to try to meet the Russians himself. They still did not know whether the final terms of the meeting had been discussed and whether it was possible to reach the place of already established contact without hindrance.

At 20:04 Colonel Adams signaled to Craig that he would leave as soon as final arrangements were made for the meeting. Hunched over, he sat in his chair in the corner of the room. Everything was still unclear. The two expelled patrols, as they were ordered, met with the Russians, but outside the zone where they were supposed to stay. The division commander was indignant, but sought to consolidate the contacts established with the Russians. And the colonel did not know how to do it specifically. In the depths of his soul, he was sure that the long-awaited meeting of the two armies had taken place.

Chaos reigned at the command post of the regiment, only in the premises of the reconnaissance of the operational departments it was relatively calm. The room was flooded with chandelier light. Colonel Adams was staring at the large maps of the front that hung on the opposite wall. Shortly before that, he removed from the room correspondents and photographers who turned the CP into a lunatic asylum. Adams glanced at the clerks at the desks in the partitioned off part of the room, then at the thick carpet underfoot.

The phone rang.

It was Major Victor Conley, commander of the 1st Battalion. What? What he says? My God! Conley has four Russians in the command post and wants to know what to do with them. Where did they come from? Who brought them? How? Robertson? Lieutenant William Robertson went after the prisoners, but he brought the Russians? Adams ordered them delivered to regimental headquarters. Hanging up the phone, he reported what he had heard to those present. The news was not slow to spread, and soon the whole CP was in a state of excitement.

At the battalion command post at Wurzen, Major Conley, recovering from his astonishment at the appearance of the Russians in Robertson's jeep, quickly gathered everyone to his place. We made several toasts to the meeting and went to the regimental headquarters in Trebzen. At 20.50 they were already racing along the road leading to the eastern bank of Mulde. At Trebzen they crossed the old bridge and ended up at the checkpoint.

Finally everything became clear. Contact was made not only in the southern part of the zone by patrols of Kotzebue and Craig, but also in its northern part, near Torgau, by Robertson's patrol. Within minutes of Robertson's arrival, Colonel Adams telephoned the division chief of staff for the first details. The significance of the event determined the atmosphere at the command post. You feel it when you read the regimental journal, where the stenographer simply, without embellishment, wrote down what was said around. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a telephone conversation between Colonel Adams and the division chief of staff, Colonel Lynch: “Tell the general. I have a Russian officer in the rank corresponding to our major. Major Conley brought him. I forbade everyone from entering here, except for the closest employees. I am trying to get the information requested by the corps through an interpreter. The Russian proposes to hold a meeting of the commanders of both armies tomorrow at 1000 in Torgau. I'll let you know the details later."

The log continued: “Lieutenant Robertson met them near the bridge. They came from the location of the Russians in Torgau on the Elbe. The only contact known to Red 6 (Major Conley) took place in the afternoon. Separate patrol of the battalion (1st battalion of the 273rd infantry regiment. - Note. ed.) accompanied the Germans to the POW camp. Coordinates 6441. To the north-east of Torgau. There was one of the Jeeps. Also Russian captain and lieutenant. A patrol from Major Conley's unit. Nobody sent this patrol. The reconnaissance unit headed east for the prisoners, but it was fired upon in the city. The prisoners reported that the Russians were on the other side. There were no intentions to meet with the Russians. We learned about everything when the lieutenant returned with a Russian officer. Something happened - couldn't tell 5 miles from 25. Tracer 6 (General Reinhardt) wants to know how it happened. They were ordered not to move more than 5 miles. Wants to know why he was so far away."

Finally, the division commander, Reinhardt, was informed. He exploded. At first he wanted to give all the guilty to the tribunal - his order was violated. Having reported the incident to the corps commander, General Huebner, Reinhardt himself received a thrashing from him. All were given the same order: not to climb more than 5 miles east of Mulde. But it was already too late.

What happened next? There is some information in this regard in the journal - an excerpt from a conversation between Colonel Adams and Chief of Staff Lynch. It follows from it that the meeting took place in Torgau at 16.40. 173rd company (a typo, meaning the 173rd rifle regiment. - Note. ed.) is part of the 58th Guards Division. The commander - Major General Rusakov - insists on a meeting tomorrow at 10.00 in Torgau. Trihard 6 (Colonel Adams) agrees.

But before authorizing any definite steps, General Reinhardt decided to find out all the details himself. He gave, judging by the magazine, the order: to deliver the Russian major to the divisional command post in order to personally, together with the intelligence officer, figure everything out.

At the regimental command post at Trebzen, excitement reached its breaking point. Information came in fragmentary and chaotic. On the Elbe, two patrols were still at the disposal of the Russians, not understanding what was happening in the regiment. They sent two reports to the regiment, and they themselves decided to remain in place until the arrival of Colonel Adams. They also knew that on the way back to the regimental positions, the detachments would not meet any resistance.

The journal further states: “Captain Maury and Lieutenant Kotzebue made contact with the Russians. They are ordered to keep in touch with the forward unit... The patrols of Lieutenant Kotzebue and Captain Maury are on the Elbe, or at least they were there. These patrols were the first to meet the Russians.”

This was how the situation at the headquarters of the regiment appeared on the night of April 25 before the departure of Colonel Adams with the Russians to the divisional command post at Naunhof. It is known for certain that Kotzebue was the first to make contact. Additional information was extremely scarce and rarely received. Everyone was on edge. All attention was concentrated on four Russians. Tried to clarify the situation in an official or unofficial way. Of course, there were other contacts with the Russians. But these were visible and obvious. As a result, the rest of the patrols were forgotten in the confusion, and thanks to information-hungry correspondents, the erroneous version of the first meeting with the Russians spread around the world. When the next message came from Craig and Maury, no one doubted it anymore: "Met the general and drank to our armies."

The message also said that General Rusakov wanted to meet at the Russian position east of the Elbe, at the ferry crossing. Craig and Morey said they would stay where they were until the guides they sent out returned with command officials.

And again, because of the prevailing excitement and the drama of what was happening, no one attached any importance to these messages. It was necessary to get the Russians to the divisional headquarters as soon as possible, since they declared that they were participating in a combat operation and wanted to immediately return to their unit.

At about 9:00 pm on April 25, the representatives of the press present were also officially banned from distributing information about the meeting. According to a preliminary agreement between the allies, the official announcement of the meeting was to come from the capitals of the United States, the USSR and Great Britain.

After the reception and numerous toasts at the regimental command post, the whole company, accompanied by many correspondents, went in a noisy procession to the division headquarters in order to report on the events, the picture of which was now beginning to take shape. It was about 22.30. The road to the command post of the division did not take much time.

At Naunhof, the Russians were introduced to General Reinhardt. The division commander heard the same thing that he had been told before. Robertson, a short, heavily stubbled young man, tired but calm, recounted his story in detail. He went to take prisoners, but it turned out that he was going for glory, although he was not the first to come into contact with the Russians. His task was to collect prisoners of war and clear the sector of displaced persons. His four-man patrol moved along the road from Wurzen to Torgau. Soon the Germans stopped coming across, but the patrol decided to move on. Finally they reached the city. Standing undecided on the banks of the Elbe, Robertson pulled out a makeshift American flag and waved it at the Russians on the east bank. Then he climbed onto the ruined bridge near the castle. On the other hand, a Russian soldier began to make his way across the bridge towards him. They met about a hundred feet from the east bank of the Elbe. That's the whole story.

General Reinhardt was at first clearly unhappy that his order had been ignored. By the end of the story, he calmed down and even felt a surge of pride from the fact that his division was the first to meet the Russians.

The toasts followed one after another. A spirit of goodwill reigned at the table. However, the Russians insisted that they be sent back to the unit. They offered the colonel to go with them so that tomorrow at 10:00 he could be at the meeting point in Torgau.

At about one in the morning, everyone returned to the regimental headquarters, in Trebzen. Since the Russians were in a hurry, everyone immediately went on to Torgau. Colonel Adams, remembering the two patrols at Krajnice, relayed instructions to Craig and Kotzebue before leaving. Ego was at 2.25 am. The instruction was: "Delay the decision to meet until further notice."

There was no information about what happened to Kotzebue and Craig. The patrols went to the river to settle down for the night in the hope that in the morning they would finally have something to do.

The center of events moved to Torgau, where Colonel Adams' group arrived at about 5.30 am on April 26th. The Russians ferried them over in two large racing eight-boats. On the east coast, the group was met by Russian soldiers and officers of the 173rd regiment. Guests were received in a Spartan setting. Everything reminded that only a day ago the front line passed here. It was very difficult for the Americans to get rid of the feeling that the danger was very close.

For friendly toasts time ran quickly. A little later than the appointed time - at 10 o'clock in the morning - on the road running along the eastern bank of the Elbe, an official meeting took place between Colonel Adams and Major Efim Rogov, commander of the 173rd Infantry Regiment. It was a calm, friendly meeting of the regimental commanders, who were aware that this act symbolized the imminent end of the war in Europe.

After the crowds of photographers and correspondents were completely satisfied, Adams and Rogov returned to the table. The celebration continued until noon, when it was time for Adams to go to Trebzen to see General Reinhardt, who was to meet with the commander of the Russian division at 1600. The colonel left several subordinates in Torgau to participate in the preparations for the meeting of General Reinhardt.

In the regiment, the general received a detailed report on the preparations for his meeting with the Russian general. After staying there for some time, Reinhardt went to Torgau via Eulenburg. Having reached the Elbe without incident, he and his party in the same boats crossed to the opposite bank. There they were met by Russian staff officers. After a slight delay caused by inconsistencies in determining the time of arrival, General Reinhardt was received by Major General Rusakov. After exchanging greetings, the generals with their subordinates proceeded to the house where Colonel Adams and Major Rogov had previously celebrated their meeting. Everything happened again. Photographers and correspondents were also hovering around, constantly clicking the shutters of cameras. After a two-hour warm welcome, the commander of the 69th division left for Naunhof.

All this time, the soldiers of the Kotzebue and Craig patrols continued to sit on both sides of the Elbe in the Krainitz region. They still knew nothing about the events in the regiment and in Torgau. Inquiries as to whether anyone was going to visit them received no response. Tired and disappointed, they sat and waited. Finally, at about 5:00 pm, a patrol under the command of the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel George Knight, arrived to them, who brought a message about a meeting with the Russians.

After a long period of stress, the recession set in. That evening in Trebzen everyone was busy trying to remember everything that had happened over the past two days. The exact picture of the night was not yet clear, but the chain of events was already acquiring some kind of logical sequence. The next day, April 27, everyone lived in joyful anticipation of the official announcement of the meeting. Finally it became known that it would be broadcast on the radio at 18.00. From Washington, London and Moscow, President Harry Truman, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph Stalin will simultaneously inform the world of the event.

The meeting on the Elbe became history. The meeting between the high command was yet to come. But the main thing has already happened. Two weeks later, World War II in Europe ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Sources

Wikipedia

Meeting on the Elbe. Memoirs of Soviet and American Participants of World War II

On April 25, 1945, at half past two in the afternoon Moscow time, on the front line in Germany, near the city of Torgau on the Elbe River, a historic meeting of Soviet and ...

On April 25, 1945, at half past two in the afternoon Moscow time, on the front line in Germany, near the city of Torgau on the Elbe River, a historic meeting of Soviet and American troops fighting against fascism took place. Having destroyed the desperately resisting Wehrmacht grouping, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front united under the command of Marshal of the USSR I.S. Konev and the American Expeditionary Force under the command of General Omer Bradley.

As the 1st Ukrainian Front approached the Elbe, allied and Soviet staff officers began to receive reports of radio signals coming from both the Red Army and the Allied armies.

Every day, the people fighting on this side of the Elbe looked forward to reports on the progress of the Allied troops approaching the Elbe from the west. On the headquarters map one could see how the two front lines were approaching each other closer and closer.

Between them lay the Elbe, and the distance separating us from the allies was shrinking every hour. Our radio operators were the first to come into contact with units of the 1st American Army. The conversation between our and American radio operators took place at a moment when the advanced units of the 1st Ukrainian Front were already less than thirty kilometers from the Americans. The German stations tried to silence the conversation, but failed.

We will meet with you soon, - our radio operators radioed the Americans. - We know your location. Our tanks are coming towards you. We do our best to meet you as soon as possible.

Among the radio operators in the forward units of the 1st American Army were people who knew Russian. They kept in touch with our radio operators, conveying greetings from the Americans to them, informing them that in all parts of the 1st American Army they were anxiously awaiting a meeting with the Red Army ...

Marshal Zhukov issued the following directive regarding the upcoming meeting:

"Directive of the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to the commander of the armies of the front on the actions of the Soviet troops when meeting with the troops of the allies No. 00604 / op on April 24, 1945

“When meeting our troops with American or British troops, be guided by the following:

1. The senior military commander, in whose sector the meeting took place, first of all, contact the senior commander of the American or British troops and establish a demarcation line with him everywhere in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters ...No information about our plans and combat missions of our troops is to be given to anyone.
2. Do not take the initiative in organizing friendly meetings.When meeting with allied troops, treat them kindly. If the American or British troops wish to organize a solemn or friendly meeting with our troops, do not refuse this and send their representatives. Report all such invitations immediately on command and send your representatives in each case with the permission of a senior commander no lower than the corps commander. After such a meeting, our troops should invite representatives of the American or British troops to their place for a return meeting.Invitations of representatives of American or British troops for a return meeting should be made with the permission of senior commanders no lower than the corps commander. Officers and generals appointed as representatives to participate in friendly meetings with representatives of American or British troops, as well as those selected to participate in return meetings, are carefully instructed on the behavior and procedure for dealing with representatives of American or British troops in accordance with the requirements of this directive, turning with special attention to the preservation of military secrets.
3. Our troops in all cases to be a model of discipline and order. All generals and officers must strictly observe the uniform and have a neat appearance. The same must be demanded of all troops that may come into contact with units of American or British troops.In cases of visits to our units by representatives of American or British troops, pay special attention to the clear order and organization of their meeting. The reception of these representatives in the working premises of the headquarters should not be carried out, but specially prepared premises should be provided for this purpose.
4. Report all cases of meetings with the allied forces to the headquarters of the front, indicating the place, time and numbering of the units encountered.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov.

Member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Telegin.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General Malinin.

The allies also prepared for this meeting. Military historian and memoirist William Fox during the war he was an officer of the Information and Historical Service of the 5th Corps of the 1st American Army. After the war, he worked as a correspondent for UPI and the Los Angeles Times. He recalled waiting for the meeting as follows:

“In the days preceding the first meetings of the two powerful armies, there were many rumors, unofficial reports, in a word, the excitement grew. The German troops were defeated by both the Red Army and the armies of its allies, and their connection at some point on the front was inevitable in those days. The American soldiers on the front line were unaware that the Red Army had been ordered to stop at the Elbe. The Americans were ordered to stop at Mulde. Closest of all to each other were the 1st American Army and the 5th Soviet Army, which reached the indicated rivers on April 21. Having occupied the planned lines, the troops were waiting for a meeting with the units that were on the opposite side.

The unrest on the American front increased, and therefore every hillock was mistaken for a "Russian tank", and every unfamiliar voice on the radio was an attempt by the Russians to establish contact with the Americans. At the beginning of the third week of April, messages began to be sent from some units of the 9th US Army about the establishment of radio contact with the Russian army. On April 23, the sergeant of the headquarters of the 6th motorized division allegedly got into radio contact with the Russians. On the same day, the 1st Battalion of the 273rd Infantry Regiment reported the appearance of a Russian tank with an identification mark agreed by the parties - a white stripe on the hull.

But when we looked closely, the “tank” turned out to be just some kind of hillock with clotheslines stretched along the slope. Similar messages now and then came from various sectors of the front. Some units, such as the motorized reconnaissance group of the 104th Infantry Division, sent people outside their zone in the hope of being the first to meet the Russians.

Soldiers of the Red Army meet a boat with American infantrymen

General Dwight Eisenhower wrote:

“Urgent issues were no longer connected with grand strategy, but were purely tactical in nature. One of the main difficulties was in identifying each other.

Because of the linguistic difference, front-line walkie-talkies were useless as a means of communication between two converging factions. The only solution to the problem seemed to lie in a timely agreement on markings and meeting procedures. As early as the beginning of April, the aviation of the Western Allies and the Russians came into contact, sometimes with unfavorable results - with firing at the allied forces. Well, they didn’t kill anyone out of ignorance ...

Annoying skirmishes sometimes took place between our and Russian planes - the personnel of the air units mistook each other for a "rare variety of fascist aviation", were shot down. The danger of more serious clashes grew. The task of introducing a system of identification signals was difficult, and it was completely solved only by 20 April.

By this time, both sides had already agreed to adhere to the lines of limitation for air operations and, exercising caution, which was largely accompanied by luck, did not make more or less serious mistakes.

There was also an agreement between us and the Russians that when the troops of the two converging groupings met, the commanders on the ground would establish lines of contact, taking into account the peculiarities of operational plans and the terrain. As a common dividing line between us and the Russians, we wanted to have a well-identifiable natural frontier.

For this reason, the agreed line on the central sector of the front ran along the Elbe and Mulda rivers. At the same time, it was understood that the withdrawal of our troops to the limits of their occupation zones would be carried out within the time limits that our governments would set in the future.

On April 21, Eisenhower sent through the US military mission in Moscow to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General A.I. Antonov information about his plans and offered the line of the Elbe and Mulda rivers to connect the Anglo-American troops with the Soviet ones.

Antonov agreed. On the possibility of meeting with the troops of the Western Allies, Marshals G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev and K.K. Rokossovsky was warned in advance on April 20, when they were informed of the signals agreed with the allies for mutual identification.

According to the instructions received, the commanders of the armies were to meet, by agreement with the senior commander of the allied troops, to establish a time line that excluded their mixing.

Meeting of Lieutenant Kotzebue's group

Omer Bradley wrote:

“Like Eisenhower, I did not trust predetermined identification signals and even less relied on radio communications with Red Army units. Identification signals can be confused, and ignorance of the language can negate all the advantages of radio.

While still at Argentan, I stopped Patton's troops, partly out of fear that he might run into the only English division at Falaise. Now, with almost a hundred times as many troops scattered on the front from the shores of the North Sea to Switzerland, I shuddered involuntarily at the thought of the possibility of a collision that could easily develop into a real fight.

Not only were our troops completely unaware of each other, but I became aware that as the Russians moved westward, their audacity and self-confidence grew.

The only way out could be found in the establishment of a demarcation line on which both our troops and the troops of the Red Army would stop. Undoubtedly, this demarcation line could only be a well-defined natural boundary. After studying the map, Eisenhower and I came to the conclusion that the Elbe could best serve as such a frontier.

It not only flows from south to north, but also represents the last, largest natural obstacle on the way between the Rhine and the Oder. South of Magdeburg, where the Elbe turns east, a rendezvous line could be set up on the Mulde River all the way to the border with Czechoslovakia. Eisenhower decided to propose this line as a demarcation line

The next day, when the Russians poured across the Oder, launching their last major offensive in this war, we, for our part, gave the order to launch an attack on the Danube. The 1st and 9th armies were to take up defensive positions in the center of our front, from the Czechoslovak border to that point on the Elbe where the American occupation zone bordered on the British.

The 7th Army was advancing in the direction of Munich, and Patton was advancing down the Danube. However, the Red Army, having captured Vienna, moved further west, trying to reach Linz. The Soviet command seemed to be trying to prevent us from going one step further in Austria than was necessary.

For almost two weeks we were marking time on the Elbe and Mulda, waiting for the Russians to approach. With each passing day, the nervousness of our army commanders increased.

They were afraid of a collision with the Russians if the latter began to advance further west from the Elbe, trying to occupy their entire zone of occupation. We did not know what orders the Soviet command gave to its troops, but I instructed the commanders of the armies to hold forward positions until we could begin an organized withdrawal to our zone of occupation.

However, in case the Soviet commanders began to insist on an immediate advance to the border of the Soviet zone of occupation, I allowed the army commanders to enter into direct negotiations with the Soviet troops and take measures to withdraw their troops.

The fact that the meeting will take place near the city of Torgau was agreed in advance. A participant in the events quite directly testified to this - war correspondent Boris Polevoy:

“In the morning General Petrov called me again. He was sitting at a large desk. He was strict, official, in a tunic with sashes, fastened with all buttons.

"Comrade Lieutenant Colonel," he said dryly. - I'm giving you the task of command. On the Second Ukrainian, you acted with us on the part of foreign affairs. Remember, the Yugoslav military delegation was also brought to my army. So, you have a task for the same, for the foreign part.

- But I ... Such events, I'm a correspondent for Pravda!

- But first of all, you are an officer of the Red Army, aren't you, my dear? Map with you?

- Yes sir.

- Deign to find on it the city of Torgau, on the Elbe.

- Found. Is it in the area of ​​operations of Zhadov's army?

- More precisely, the corps of General Baklanov. So, tomorrow, April 25, a historic event will take place in this place, by the way, of interest to you and as a correspondent. The meeting of the allied armies, ours and the US. Please be there tonight. Contact the comrades from the army's seventh department and act together. »

Soviet and American military journalists, April 1945

On April 25, 1945, near the city of Torgau on the Elbe River, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the USSR Army met with the troops of the 1st US Army. As a result of the meeting of the Allied forces, the remnants of the German armed forces were split into two parts - northern and southern.

The first meeting took place when an American patrol under the command of the first lieutenant of the expeditionary forces, infantryman Albert Kotzebue, crossed the Elbe.