Brusilov did not accept Bolshevik power and waited for the haze that had entangled Russia to subside. But when the Poles occupied Kyiv in 1920, he said: “I obey the will of the people - they have the right to have the government they want. I may not agree with certain provisions, the tactics of the Soviet government, but ... I willingly give my strength for the good of my dearly beloved Motherland.
The beginning of the battle
One of the brightest and most original military leaders of the First World War, Brusilov was an officer - hereditary. His father, Alexei Nikolaevich, took part in the Battle of Borodino as a major, was wounded, reached Paris, and then rose to the rank of general.
The future hero of the First World War, Alexei Alekseevich, was born in August 1853 in Tiflis, lost his parents early, but received a good primary education, and then graduated from a privileged military educational institution - the Corps of Pages.
Lieutenant gained combat experience during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Being an adjutant of the dragoon regiment, which was responsible for staff and economic affairs, he successfully coped not only with his direct duties. Brusilov repeatedly took part in military sorties, the command noted his initiative and personal courage. For military distinctions, he was awarded three military orders and early promotion to staff captain.
In 1881, Aleksey Alekseevich entered the Cavalry Officer School, which had just opened in St. Petersburg, where he graduated brilliantly, for exemplary studies he was promoted to captain and left as a permanent member of the school. He served in the school in various positions, and from 1902 became its head.
offensive general
By the beginning of World War I, Aleksey Alekseevich Brusilov had the rank of cavalry general and served as commander of the 12th Army Corps in the Kiev Military District. With the beginning of the mobilization deployment of Russian troops, General Brusilov took command of the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front.
Already in August 1914, his army distinguished itself in battles in the Galich region. The skillful actions of the commander were awarded the Order of St. George of the 4th degree, and less than a month later he was awarded the same order, but already the 3rd degree - for the skillfully carried out Gorodok operation. Since then, in the military circles of Russia, an opinion has been strengthened about Brusilov as a talented military leader who is able to correctly assess the situation, unravel the enemy’s plan and forestall his actions.
In less than a year and a half of the war, Alexey Alekseevich mastered the skills of commanding an army in various types of combat activities. The offensive and defensive operations he developed and carried out were alien to the pattern characteristic of many top military leaders of the Russian army of that period. He strove for initiative, decisive action, imposing his will on the enemy, using everything possible to achieve at least partial success. The troops, in turn, strove to conscientiously carry out their assigned tasks, believing in the military talent of their commander. October 27, 1915 Brusilov was awarded the St. George weapon.
It should be noted that Aleksei Alekseevich was a man of high moral principles, court flattery and sycophancy, which were widespread at that time among the top military leadership, were alien to him. This, however, did not prevent Alexei Alekseevich from soon getting a promotion. On March 17, 1916, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, in this position he remained for more than a year, more precisely, 430 days.
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“I am not ambitious, I did not seek anything personally for myself, but, having devoted my whole life to military affairs and studying this difficult matter continuously throughout my life, putting my whole soul into preparing troops for war, I wanted to test myself, my knowledge, their dreams and aspirations on a larger scale.”
Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov
During this time, under his leadership, offensive operations were prepared and carried out, which played a significant role and had a great influence on the strategic situation on the entire Russian-German front. The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916 went down in history as the Brusilovsky breakthrough and became one of the most striking events of the First World War. Alexei Brusilov became, perhaps, the only commander of that war who was able to find a way out of the so-called positional impasse. The troops of the front under his leadership achieved great success, but the passivity of the high command and the commanders of the troops of neighboring fronts did not allow him to complete the work he had begun.
Nevertheless, in the summer of 1916, Alexey Alekseevich became essentially a national hero of Russia, his name was on everyone's lips.
Revolutionary Intertime
He enjoyed exceptionally great prestige among the troops even after the February Revolution of 1917. For 59 days, Brusilov acted as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, replacing General Mikhail Alekseev in this post. General Brusilov did his best to restore discipline and order in the army, which was rapidly losing its combat capability. It was painful for him to watch how the Russian army, in which Aleksey Alekseevich was proud to serve and to which he devoted his whole life, was falling apart before his eyes. However, the leaders of the Provisional Government did not allow Brusilov to restore order in the army, the fate of the country now began to be decided not in military headquarters, but on the sidelines of political parties. On July 19, 1917, the combat general was dismissed.
Alexei Alekseevich and his wife left Moscow, where his brother's family lived. Here the general was caught by the October Revolution. Brusilov tried to stay away from politics, but he failed to stay away from political battles. The revolution literally flew into his house.
“My first gunshot wound in my life, it was received from a Russian shell,” he says. Indeed, on November 2, 1917, during the shelling of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, an accidental artillery shell hit the building where the general lived. Brusilov was seriously wounded, his right leg was broken in several places by shrapnel. For all his many years of military service, Alexei Alekseevich had no injuries, but here he was struck in his own apartment ...
After a serious operation, he had to be treated for several more months. In the hospital, he was repeatedly visited by representatives of various anti-Bolshevik organizations, trying to win Brusilov over to their side. The former subordinates of the general, who stood at the origins of the White movement, in particular, Lavr Kornilov and Anton Denikin, would like to see such an authoritative military leader as Brusilov in their ranks. But Aleksey Alekseevich did not consider it possible for himself to take part in the fratricidal Civil War.
By the way, the head of the British special mission under the Soviet government, Robert Lockhart, tried to have the same effect on Brusilov (the British were always engaged in double-dealing), but also received a categorical refusal. Meanwhile, the Cheka intercepted a letter from Lockhart, in which an English diplomat announced plans to make Brusilov a white leader. As a result, the general was immediately arrested and taken into custody. After the intervention of Felix Dzerzhinsky, he was released and placed under house arrest, which was lifted in December 1918.
But the position of the honored military general turned out to be unenviable: he was left without a livelihood, his family was starving, worried about the wound, and in December 1919 the news came that his only son had been shot in Kyiv. Brusilov Jr. served in the Red Army and was captured by the Whites. Aleksey Alekseevich took this terrible loss extremely hard...
Appeal and punishment
On April 20, 1920, the Polish army went on the offensive in Ukraine. On May 7, the Poles occupied Kyiv. From that moment on, Brusilov's attitude to the armed struggle that took place on the territory of Russia changed radically. The armed confrontation of Russians against Russians was replaced by a confrontation with the army of a neighboring state, although it was part of the Russian Empire before the revolutionary upheavals. In addition, generals Vladislav Klembovsky and Nikolai Rattel, who went to serve in the Red Army, who in World War I were the closest associates of Alexei Alekseevich in preparing an offensive on the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916, strongly recommended Brusilov to contact the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Lev Trotsky.
General Brusilov categorically refused to enter into any kind of correspondence with Trotsky, but he expressed his opinion on the advisability of creating a special meeting under the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic, which would develop a plan for a war with Poland, in a letter to Rattel, who at that time held high position of chief of the All-Russian General Staff.
This letter was enough for the Soviet leadership for the Revolutionary Military Council to issue a resolution the very next day on the formation of a Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic, chaired by Brusilov. The structure of this body included the generals of the old army Akimov, Baluev, Verkhovsky, Gutor, Zayonchkovsky, Klembovsky, Parsky, Polivanov, Tsurikov. On May 30, 1920, the members of the Special Meeting prepared an appeal to the former officers of the Russian army, in which they called on them, forgetting old grievances, to join the Red Army - to protect Russia.
Approximately 14,000 generals and officers of the old army responded to the appeal, who voluntarily joined the Red Army and helped it solve problems in the armed struggle on the Polish front. However, the activity of the Special Conference was limited to this, it was dissolved. Moreover, some of its members were arrested, and some officers and generals who responded to the appeal ended up in the dungeons. Alexey Alekseevich took this as a personal grief and a personal mistake. All his attempts to improve the case were in vain.
After that, General Brusilov held a secondary position as chief military inspector of horse breeding and horse breeding. In 1925, citing health reasons, he submitted a letter of resignation. Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov passed away on March 17, 1926. The cavalry general, the hero of the First World War was buried with military honors on the territory of the Novodevichy Convent.
On August 19 (August 31, according to the new style), 1853, Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov was born - a Russian military leader and military teacher, a general of the tsarist army, perhaps the only one of the tsarist generals of the First World War who was not anathematized by Soviet history. His name is still known to the general public thanks to the famous Brusilovsky breakthrough.
A.A. Brusilov was born in Tiflis, in the family of a general. The origin, as well as the brave appearance, allowed him to enter the Page Corps in 1867, an elite military educational institution, after which in 1872 he was released into the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment. In this regiment, Brusilov's military career began: from 1873 to 1878, he served here as an adjutant of the regiment. With the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Brusilov in the army, he distinguished himself in the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Ardagan and Kars, for which he received the Order of St. Stanislav 3rd and 2nd degree and the Order of St. Anna 3rd degree. Then, in 1878-1881, Brusilov continued to serve as head of the regimental training team.
Since 1883, Brusilov continued his military pedagogical service at the St. Petersburg Cavalry Officer School, where he became an adjutant, then assistant chief and head of the riding and dressage department; head of the dragoon department. In 1900, Brusilov was promoted to major general, and since February 10, 1902, he has been head of the school. In those years, Brusilov became known not only in Russia, but also abroad as an outstanding expert in cavalry riding and sports.
The future Marshal Karl Mannerheim, who served at the school under him before the Russo-Japanese War, recalled: “He was attentive, strict, demanding of his subordinates and gave very good knowledge. His military games and exercises on the ground were exemplary in their design and execution and extremely interesting.
From April 19, 1906, Brusilov was the head of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division; from January 5, 1909 - commander of the 14th Army Corps; from December 5, 1912 - Assistant Commander of the Warsaw Military District. On December 6, 1812, Brusilov was promoted to the rank of general from the cavalry.
In World War I, A.A. Brusilov served as commander of the 8th Army in the Battle of Galicia, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George 4th and 3rd degree. From March 17, 1916 - Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front.
In the summer of 1916, Brusilov carried out a successful offensive on the Southwestern Front, using a previously unknown form of breaking through the positional front, which consisted in the simultaneous offensive of all armies. In accordance with the plan developed by General M.V. Khanzhin (only with the participation of A.A. Brusilov), the main blow was dealt by the 8th Army under the command of General A.M. Kaledina in the direction of the city of Lutsk. Having broken through the front on the 16-kilometer section Nosovichi - Koryto, the Russian army occupied Lutsk on May 25 (June 7), and by June 2 (15) defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and advanced 65 km. This operation went down in history under the name "Brusilovsky breakthrough". It is also found in military memoirs under the original name "Lutsk breakthrough", but the name of the true author and developer of the operation, General M.V. Khanzhin was not mentioned almost anywhere. It was known only at Headquarters and personally to Emperor Nicholas II. Immediately after the Brusilov breakthrough, Khanzhin was promoted to lieutenant general, and Brusilov, instead of the previously promised Order of St. George, 2nd degree, was awarded the St. George weapon with diamonds.
Considering his merits underestimated, A.A. Brusilov allows himself to be seriously offended by the emperor. Obviously, under the influence of this, during the February Revolution of 1917, Brusilov supported the removal of Nicholas II and the coming to power of the Provisional Government.
Brusilov was an ardent supporter of the creation of the so-called "shock" and "revolutionary" units. On May 22 (June 4), 1917, Brusilov issues an order along front No. 561, which stated: “In order to raise the revolutionary offensive spirit of the army, it is necessary to form special revolutionary shock battalions recruited from volunteers in the center of Russia in order to instill in the army the belief that the entire Russian people are following her in the name of a speedy peace and brotherhood of peoples, so that during the offensive, the revolutionary battalions stationed in the most important combat sectors, with their impulse, could carry away the wavering ones.
Where and whom the revolutionary battalions were able to "carry" with them became clear already in the summer of 1917 ...
On May 22, 1917, by order of the Provisional Government, Brusilov was appointed Supreme Commander. The last archpriest of the Russian army and navy, Fr. Georgy Shavelsky recalled the meeting of Brusilov at the station at the headquarters (Mogilev) after the appointment: “The guard of honor was lined up, the ranks of the Headquarters were immediately lined up, among which there were many generals. The Supreme Commander got out of the car, passed by the Headquarters officials, only nodding his head in response to their greetings. Having reached the guard of honor, he begins to extend his hand to each soldier. The soldiers, with rifles on their shoulders, are embarrassed - they do not know how to give a hand. It was a disgusting picture…”
The "revolutionary" general, as you know, failed the June offensive. His mistakes had to be corrected by another "revolutionary" general - L. G. Kornilov, who was appointed to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief instead of Brusilov. During their joint stay in the 8th Army, as is known, the generals were not on friendly terms. In addition, Kornilov immediately demanded that the Provisional Government cancel "Order No. 1", according to which the officers had to obey the decisions of the elected soldiers' committees. The new Commander-in-Chief restored the death penalty for desertion in the army, tried to return talented commanders to their former posts, establish discipline and hold the front. A.A. Brusilov did not oppose his actions, but did not want to help either, so he retired from the service and resigned.
After his resignation, Brusilov lives in Moscow as a private individual. According to the memoirs of the participants in the Moscow uprising of 1917 (in particular, S.Ya. Efron speaks of this in the Notes of a Volunteer), a delegation of officers and cadets of the Moscow Alexander School was sent to him. The famous general was offered to lead the white resistance in the capital, but Brusilov, citing his age and an unexpected illness, refused. It is symbolic that he has to pay for his indifference: during the street battles between the Red Guards and the junkers, he was accidentally wounded by a fragment of a shell that hit his house.
General A.A. Brusilov did not accept the ideas of the White Movement and did not participate in the Civil War on either side. His son Alexei, an officer of the Life Guards of the Horse Grenadier Regiment, was arrested by the Cheka and spent six months in prison, after which he agreed to join the Red Army. According to one version, Alexei Brusilov with a group of officers deliberately went over to the side of the Whites and was shot by the Drozdovites as a traitor and traitor. The attitude towards "defectors" in the White Army was not always so harsh, but General Drozdovsky and his subordinates were particularly intransigent towards the officers who offered their services to the Bolsheviks. In his memoirs, A.I. Denikin also confirms the episode of the massacre of Brusilov Jr. and sincerely regrets it. According to the Commander-in-Chief, Alexei fell victim to the sincere hatred of the White Guards for his father, General Brusilov. From the point of view of the white warriors, the legendary hero betrayed his duty, disowned the Volunteering, betrayed the interests of Russia. According to another version, Brusilov Jr. survived and entered as a simple shooter in one of the units of the Volunteer Army, but soon died of typhus in Rostov.
It is possible that not only resentment against Nicholas II, but also the tragic fate of his son inspired the hero of the First World War A.A. Brusilov for further cooperation with the Soviet authorities. Since May 1920, he headed the Special Conference under the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Soviet Republic, which developed recommendations for strengthening the Red Army. Since 1921, Aleksey Alekseevich was the chairman of the commission for the organization of pre-conscription cavalry training, since 1923 he was with the Revolutionary Military Council for especially important assignments. In 1923-1924 he was an inspector of the cavalry.
A.A. Brusilov died on March 17, 1926 in Moscow from pneumonia at the age of 73. He was buried with full military honors at the Novodevichy Cemetery.
Brusilov left behind memoirs called "My Memoirs", dedicated mainly to his service in the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia.
The second volume of memoirs of A.A. Brusilov was transferred to the White émigré archive in 1932 by his widow N.V. Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who went abroad after the death of her husband. It touches on the description of the general's life after the October Revolution and is sharply anti-Bolshevik in nature. This part of the memoirs was allegedly written during treatment in Karlovy Vary in 1925 and, according to the will, was subject to publication only after the death of the author.
The Soviet edition of "Memoirs" (Voenizdat, 1963) does not include the 2nd volume. According to a number of Soviet scientists, its authorship belonged to Brusilov's widow herself, who thus tried to justify her husband before the white emigration. However, it is very possible that the general really revised his views and sincerely repented of his mistakes. Before death, as you know, do not lie ...
Compilation by Elena Shirokova
Brusilov Aleksey Alekseevich (born August 19 (31), 1853 - death March 17, 1926) - infantry general, took part in the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878) and World War I, commander of the Southwestern Front (1916), Supreme Commander of the Russian Forces (1917), Inspector of the Red Army Cavalry (1920)
Origin. Childhood
Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov was a hereditary military man. He was born on August 19, 1853 in the family of a general in Tiflis. By the time the first child was born, the father was already 60 years old, and the mother was 28. But their marriage was happy. After Alexei, three more boys were born. Alexei's childhood passed in an atmosphere of love and happiness. But when he was six years old, a misfortune happened: his father died suddenly, and after another 4 months, his mother died. Further upbringing of children took place in the family of aunts and uncles, who, being childless, doted on boys. In their house, with the help of governesses and tutors, the children received an excellent education.
Education. Service
At the age of 14, the future commander was taken to St. Petersburg, where he successfully passed the exams for the Corps of Pages and was enrolled immediately in the third class, and in 1872, upon graduation, he was hired as an ensign in the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment, which was located in Transcaucasia, in Kutaisi, and was soon appointed a junior platoon officer in the 1st squadron.
The service of Alexei Brusilov in the regiment was favorable and did not differ in anything special: he did not violate discipline, he was not late for service, he enjoyed training with the dragoons of his platoon. He himself, adoring horses and riding, willingly learned from veterans how to treat a horse. This was noticed, and six months later the young officer was appointed adjutant of the regiment to a position that required accuracy, discipline and tact, which the young ensign possessed in full. April 1874 - Brusilov was promoted to lieutenant.
Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878
The first war for the future general was the Russian-Turkish 1877–1878. Brusilov with his regiment went to the southern border. Young officers perceived the beginning of the war with great enthusiasm, because the salary was increased and the opportunity to receive awards appeared. The Tver regiment was part of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Caucasian Army, under the command of M.T. Loris-Melikov.
Brusilov was able to distinguish himself already in the first battle, when, commanding a detachment of dragoons, he captured the Turkish barracks and the commander of the Turkish border brigade. For distinction in the capture of the Ardagan fortress, he was awarded the first military award - the Order of Stanislav 3rd degree with swords and a bow. Then new awards followed: the Order of Anna 3rd degree, the rank of staff captain and the Order of Stanislav 2nd degree for courage during the assault and capture of Kars. This war gave Brusilov good combat training. At 25, he was already an experienced officer.
A.A. Brusilov Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front
Service after the war
At the end of the war, until the autumn of 1881, Brusilov continued to serve in the Caucasus, and then was sent to study at the St. Petersburg Cavalry School. He studied cavalry science with pleasure, visited the best cavalry units of the Russian army. Brusilov graduated from the course with honors and was transferred as an adjutant to the permanent staff of the school.
1884 - Alexei Alekseevich married Anna Nikolaevna Gagenmeister, his uncle's cousin. Three years later, their son Alexei was born. While working in a cavalry school, Brusilov developed a vigorous energy in improving the organization of training for cavalry officers. His rank rises and positions are changed: adjutant, senior teacher of riding and horse dressage, head of the department of squadron and hundred commanders, assistant head of the school.
1900 - Brusilov received the rank of major general and was assigned to the staff of the Life Guards. This was facilitated by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who at that time was the chief inspector of the cavalry. Aleksey Alekseevich worked a lot, wrote articles about cavalry science, studied the experience of riding and the work of stud farms in France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. After 2 years, he was appointed to the post of head of the St. Petersburg Cavalry School. Relying on the support of the Grand Duke, Brusilov did a lot to improve the business entrusted to him. The school under his leadership became a recognized training center for the command staff of the Russian cavalry.
1906 - Brusilov was appointed commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, where he earned great respect from his subordinates. He paid much attention to training with officers on the map, offensive combat, and maneuver. In the summer, appropriate exercises were carried out. But at that time, things in the general's family deteriorated sharply: his wife was seriously ill and was slowly fading away. 1908 - she died. Brusilov was very upset by the loss. Personal drama, as well as the oppressive atmosphere of life in St. Petersburg after the revolution of 1905-1907. pushed him to the decision to leave the guard for the army. He achieved an appointment in the Warsaw Military District in Lublin as commander of the 14th Army Corps. Along with this, he was promoted to lieutenant general. The 14th Corps was a large military unit with more than 40 thousand soldiers and officers, so that under the tutelage of Brusilov was a huge and complex economy.
In Lublin, Aleksey Alekseevich met Nadezhda Vladimirovna Zhelikhovskaya, whom he knew from the Caucasus in his youth and with whom he was secretly in love. With her half-brother, he took part in the Turkish campaign. Brusilov, who at that time was already 57 years old, offered his hand to 45-year-old Nadezhda. 1909, November - a wedding took place in the church of the dragoon regiment.
May 1912 - Brusilov is appointed assistant commander of the Warsaw Military District and promoted to general from the cavalry. But soon friction began with the Governor-General Skalon and other "Russian Germans" at the headquarters of the district, and he was forced to leave Warsaw and take up the post of commander of the 12th Army Corps in the Kiev military district. Meanwhile, peaceful life was coming to an end, a world war was brewing. In June 1914, the general mobilization of the Russian army was announced.
General A. A. Brusilov with staff officers of the 8th Army
World War I
The beginning of the war found A. Brusilov as commander of the 8th Army, which was part of the Southwestern Front. Under his command were the future leaders of the White movement: quartermaster general, commander of the 12th cavalry division A. Kaledin, commander of the 48th infantry division. In the very first days of hostilities, Brusilov's army participated in the Battle of Galicia. Acting jointly with the 3rd Army of General Ruzsky, units of the 8th Army advanced 130–150 km deep into Galicia in a week of fighting, and in mid-August, near the Zolotaya Linden and Rotten Linden rivers, during fierce battles, they were able to defeat the Austrians.
Galich and Lvov were taken, Galicia was cleared of the enemy. For these victories, Brusilov was awarded the Orders of George of the 4th and 3rd degrees. In the first half of 1915, the fighting took on a positional character. Nevertheless, the 8th Army was able to maintain the blockade of the Przemysl fortress, which predetermined its fall. Visiting Galicia, he honored Brusilov with the rank of adjutant general.
However, in the summer of 1915, the position of the Southwestern Front worsened. As a result of the breakthrough of the German troops near Gorlitsa, the Russian armies left Galicia. March 1916 - Brusilov was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. In April, at a meeting at the headquarters, Nicholas II decided to launch an offensive with the forces of three fronts: Northern, Western and Southwestern. Brusilov was assigned purely defensive tasks, but he insisted on an offensive.
"Brusilovsky breakthrough"
“The first shell, as indicated in the artillery plan, exploded exactly at 4 o’clock in the morning ... Every 6 minutes a heavy gun rumbled, sending a huge shell with an ominous whistle. The lighter guns fired in the same measured manner. Cannons fired even faster at the barbed wire. An hour later, the fire intensified. The roaring whirlwind of fire and steel grew...
Around 10 am, the artillery fire noticeably weakened ... By all indications, an attack by the Russian infantry was to begin. Tired and exhausted Austrians, Hungarians and Germans crawled out of their shelters, stood up to the surviving machine guns ... But the Russian army did not go on the attack. And again after 15 minutes. an avalanche of bombs and shells fell on the front line of the enemy. Shrapnel made terrible havoc among the enemy soldiers ... The enemy soldiers had ceased to be an organized army. It was a gathering of mentally shocked people, thinking only about salvation.
This went on for more than an hour ... Exactly at noon, the Russian infantry rose from their trenches and launched a swift attack ... "- this is how the writer J. Weber described the beginning of the famous Brusilov breakthrough - the only battle during the First World War, named after its developer and leader .
In those aremens, the Battle of Verdun unfolded in France, the Germans rushed to Paris. It was then, on May 22, that the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front began, which was called the "Brusilov Breakthrough." After strong and effective artillery preparation, the Austro-Hungarian front was broken through over 550 km to a depth of 60 to 150 km. The enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, a large number of weapons. Russian troops lost up to 500 thousand people. This victory was of great importance. The French commander-in-chief, General Joffre, wrote in a telegram to Emperor Nicholas:
“The entire French army rejoices over the victory of the valiant Russian army - a victory whose significance and results are felt every day ...” The Austro-Hungarian army was defeated, the Germans and Austrians stopped their offensive in Italy, German units were transferred from Verdun to the Russian front, France saved! For this victory Brusilov Aleksey Alekseevich was awarded the St. George weapon adorned with diamonds.
General A. A. Brusilov - (1916)
Revolutionary years
During the February events of 1917, the front commander A.A. Brusilov was among those top military leaders of the Russian army who convinced Emperor Nicholas II Romanov to abdicate. By this, the Russian generals hoped to save Russia and the Russian army from destruction.
In February 1917, Brusilov became a military adviser to the Provisional Government. In May of the same year, he was appointed Supreme Commander of the Russian Army. But he did not manage to stay in this high post for a long time.
Responding to the greetings of the Mogilev Soviet, General A.A. Brusilov defined his role as Supreme Commander as follows: “I am the leader of the revolutionary army, appointed to my responsible post by the revolutionary people and the Provisional Government, in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. I was the first to go over to serve on the side of the people, I serve them, I will serve them and I will never be separated from them.”
But despite all the efforts, the new Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not manage to stop the revolutionary ferment in the army and especially in the rear garrisons. A new revolutionary situation was brewing in Russia, against which the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army was powerless. In July of the same 1917, he was replaced by a much more decisive General L. Kornilov and recalled to Petrograd as a military adviser to the Provisional Government.
After the October Revolution of 1917, Brusilov remained in Soviet Russia, declining an offer to become one of the military leaders of the white movement in the south of the country, where many of his recent colleagues ended up. He settled in Moscow. During the October battles between the Red Guards and the White Junkers, Brusilov was accidentally wounded.
On the side of the Bolsheviks
After the death of his son, who served in the Red Army and was shot by the Whites in 1919, the general sided with the Bolsheviks, where he held a number of high positions. But all of them did not belong to the category of command, and he did not take part in the Civil War directly. The former tsarist general was (successively) chairman of the Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces - created on the initiative of Brusilov himself, inspector of the Red Army cavalry, chief military inspector of horse breeding and horse breeding. Since March 1924, he was at the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR on especially important assignments.
Brusilov in world military history
Aleksey Alekseevich Brusilov died in Moscow on March 17, 1926 at the age of 73 and was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery with full military honors.
Brusilov went down in world military history as the author of an offensive strategy of parallel strikes in several sectors of the breakthrough of the enemy front, separated by non-attacked sectors, but forming a single system. This required high military skill. In the First World War 1914-1918. such a strategic operation was only possible for one person - the commander of the Russian Southwestern Front.
The future hero of the First World War was born in the city of Tiflis on August 19, 1853 in the family of a general of the Russian army, Alexei Nikolaevich Brusilov. His father, in his youth, in the rank of major, as a squadron commander of a cuirassier regiment, participated in the war with Napoleon. At the time of the birth of the eldest son Alexei, he was 66 years old. As a hereditary nobleman, Alexei Brusilov, having received a good home education, easily entered the senior courses of the Corps of Pages, which he graduated in 1872 with the rank of ensign. In 1877-1878, Brusilov, as part of the 16th Tver Dragoon Regiment, took part in the hostilities in the Caucasus during the Russian-Turkish war. For the courage shown during the capture of Ardagan and Kars, he received the Order of St. Stanislav of the 2nd and 3rd degree and the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree. In 1881 he entered the St. Petersburg officer cavalry school, which he graduated in 1883 and was enrolled as an adjutant. Over the next 25 years, he made a career in it and in 1902 became the head of the school, being in the rank of major general. He was widely known as one of the best experts in cavalry riding, and the school he led became a recognized center for training senior officers for the cavalry. In 1906, Brusilov returned to military service, becoming commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. Such a quick career became possible due to the closeness to the highest circles of society from the tsar's entourage. But he was weary of serving in the capital, left the guard, and in 1909 was transferred to the Warsaw district as the commander of the 14th Army Corps.
In 1912, Brusilov was appointed assistant commander of the Warsaw district, but due to a conflict with the governor-general and his entourage, he did not stay in this position for a long time.
General Brusilov during World War I.
In 1913, Brusilov was transferred to the Kyiv Military District as commander of the 12th Army Corps with promotion to general from the cavalry. In this position, he met the beginning of the world war. During the mobilization, General Brusilov is appointed to the post of commander of the 8th Army, which, as part of the Southwestern Front, is sent to the theater of operations in Galicia. There began the Battle of Galicia - the largest and most successful strategic operation of the Russian troops, in which the 8th Army played a decisive role. Within two months, in several battles, the Austrian army was defeated, while losing about 400 thousand people. Almost all of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina were captured, including the cities of Lvov and Galich. During the Battle of Galicia, Brusilov showed himself as a master of maneuver warfare, and for the successful leadership of the actions of the 8th Army, he was awarded the Order of St. George of the 4th and 3rd degrees, and at the beginning of 1915 he was added to the imperial retinue with the rank of General adjutant.
In March 1916, Brusilov was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front, whose troops in May 1916 launched an offensive operation known as the Brusilov Breakthrough. This was the last successful operation of the Russian troops. For its implementation, he was awarded the golden St. George's weapon with diamonds. During the February Revolution, he supported the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and became the Supreme Commander of the Russian armies, but a little later, disappointed, he resigned and lived as a private person in Moscow until 1920. His son voluntarily joined the Red Army and died in 1919 on the Denikin front. In 1920, Brusilov himself joined the Red Army and published an appeal "To all former officers" with a call to go over to the side of the Soviet government. From 1922 until his death in 1926, Brusilov served as chief cavalry inspector of the Red Army. He was the most authoritative tsarist general who went over to the side of Soviet power.
St. George Knights of the 1st World War:
Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov(August 19, Tiflis - March 17, Moscow) - Russian and Soviet military leader and military teacher, cavalry general (from December 6, 1912), adjutant general (from April 10, 1915), chief inspector of the Red Army cavalry (1923).
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Biography
Comes from the noble family Brusilov. Born in Tiflis in the family of the Russian general Alexei Nikolaevich Brusilov (1787-1859). Mother - Maria-Louise Antonovna, was Polish and came from the family of collegiate assessor A. Nestoemsky.
On June 27 (July 9), 1867, he entered the Corps of Pages. He graduated from it on July 17 (29), 1872, was released into the 15th Dragoon Tver Regiment. In 1873-1878 he was an adjutant of the regiment. Member of the Russian-Turkish war in 1877-1878 in the Caucasus. He distinguished himself in the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Ardagan and Kars, for which he received the Order of St. Stanislav of the 3rd and 2nd degrees and the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree. In 1879-1881 he was a squadron commander, head of a regimental training team.
In 1881 he arrived to serve in St. Petersburg. In 1883 he graduated from the course of science of the department of squadron and hundreds of commanders in the category of "excellent". From 1883 he served in the Officer's Cavalry School: adjutant; since 1890 - assistant to the head of the riding and dressage department; since 1891 - head of the department of squadron and hundred commanders; since 1893 - head of the dragoon department. From November 10, 1898 - assistant head, from February 10, 1902 - head of the school. Brusilov became known not only in Russia, but also abroad as an outstanding expert in cavalry riding and sports. K. Mannerheim, who served at the school under his command before the Russo-Japanese war, recalled:
Having no prior experience of commanding either a regiment or a brigade, only thanks to the patronage of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had exclusive influence on the appointment of senior cavalry commanders before the war, on April 19, 1906, he was appointed head of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. From January 5, 1909 - commander of the 14th army corps. From May 15, 1912 - Assistant Commander of the Warsaw Military District. From August 15, 1913 - commander of the 12th Army Corps.
World War I
On the day Germany declared war on Russia, July 19 (August 1), 1914, A. A. Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army, which a few days later took part in the Battle of Galicia. On August 15-16, 1914, during the Rogatin battles, he defeated the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army, capturing 20 thousand people and 70 guns. Galich was taken on August 20. The 8th Army takes an active part in the battles near Rava-Russkaya and in the Battle of Gorodok. In September 1914 he commanded a group of troops from the 8th and 3rd armies. September 28 - October 11, his army withstood the counterattack of the 2nd and 3rd Austro-Hungarian armies in the battles on the San River and near the city of Stryi. During the successfully completed battles, 15 thousand enemy soldiers were captured, and at the end of October 1914, his army entered the foothills of the Carpathians.
In early November 1914, pushing back the troops of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army from positions on the Beskidsky ridge of the Carpathians, he occupied the strategic Lupkovsky Pass. In the Krosnensky and Limanovsky battles, he defeated the 3rd and 4th Austro-Hungarian armies. In these battles, his troops captured 48 thousand prisoners, 17 guns and 119 machine guns.
In February 1915, in the battle near Boligrod-Liski, he thwarted the enemy’s attempts to release his troops, besieged in the Przemysl fortress, capturing 130 thousand people. In March, he captured the main Beskid ridge of the Carpathian Mountains and by March 30 completed the operation to force the Carpathians. The German troops fettered his troops in the most difficult battles near Kazyuvka and, thereby, prevented the advance of the Russian troops into Hungary.
When the catastrophe broke out in the spring of 1915 - the Gorlitsky breakthrough and the heavy defeat of the Russian troops - Brusilov began an organized retreat of the army under the constant pressure of the enemy and led the army to the San River. During the battles at Radymno, at the Gorodok positions, he opposed the enemy, who had an absolute advantage in artillery, especially heavy artillery. On June 9, 1915, Lvov was abandoned. Brusilov's army retreated to Volhynia, successfully defending itself in the Sokal battle against the troops of the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies and in the battle on the Goryn River in August 1915.
In early September 1915, in the battle of Vishnevets and Dubno, he defeated the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies opposing him. On September 10, his troops took Lutsk, and on October 5, Czartorysk.
In the summer and autumn of 1915, at his personal request, repeated attempts were made to expand geographically and numerically the scale of deportations of the local German population to the west of Sarn, Rovno, Ostroh, Izyaslav. From October 23, 1915, the expulsion of such categories of German colonists as the elderly over 60 years old, widows and mothers of those killed at the front, the disabled, the blind, the crippled, who still remained in their places by decision of the Special Conference, was carried out. According to Brusilov, they "undoubtedly damage telegraph and telephone wires." 20 thousand people were deported within 3 days.
From March 17, 1916 - Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front.
In June 1916, he carried out a successful offensive of the Southwestern Front, using a previously unknown form of breaking through the positional front, which consisted in simultaneous advance of all armies. The main blow was planned on the sector of one of the four armies that were part of the front, but preparations were made in all four armies and, moreover, along the entire front of each of them. The main idea of deception is to make the enemy expect an attack along the entire length of the front and thereby deprive him of the opportunity to guess the place of a real strike and take timely measures to repel it. Along the entire front, stretching for several hundred kilometers, they dug trenches, communication channels, machine-gun nests, built shelters and warehouses, laid roads, and built artillery positions. Only the commanders of the armies knew about the place of the actual strike. The troops brought in for reinforcement were not withdrawn to the front lines until the very last days. To get acquainted with the terrain and the location of the enemy, from the newly arriving units, it was allowed to send forward only a small number of commanding officers and scouts, soldiers and officers continued to be dismissed on vacation, so that even in this way they would not discover the proximity of the day of the offensive. Vacations were stopped only a week before the attack, without announcing this in the order. The main blow, in accordance with the plan developed by Brusilov, was delivered by the 8th Army under the command of General A. M. Kaledin in the direction of the city of Lutsk. Having broken through the front on the 16-kilometer sector Nosovichi - Koryto, the Russian army occupied Lutsk on May 25 (June 7), and by June 2 (15) defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and advanced 65 km.
This operation went down in history under the name Brusilovsky breakthrough (also found under the original name Lutsk breakthrough). For the successful conduct of this offensive, A. A. Brusilov, by a majority vote of the St. George Duma at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, was presented for the award of the Order of St. George, 2nd degree. However, Emperor Nicholas II did not approve the submission, and A. A. Brusilov, along with General A. I. Denikin, was awarded the St. George's weapon with diamonds.
Revolutionary years
On May 22, 1917, he was appointed by the Provisional Government as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in place of General Alekseev. After the failure of the June offensive, Brusilov was removed from his post as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and replaced by General Kornilov. After his retirement, he lived in Moscow. During the October Revolution, he was accidentally wounded by a shell fragment that hit his house during the battles between the Red Guards and the junkers.
In the Red Army
Since 1921, Alexei Alekseevich was the chairman of the commission for the organization of pre-conscription cavalry training. In 1923-1924 he was an inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army. Since 1924, he was at the Revolutionary Military Council for especially important assignments.
A. A. Brusilov died on March 17, 1926 in Moscow from pneumonia at the age of 72. He was buried with full military honors at the walls of the Smolensk Cathedral of the Novodevichy Convent. The grave is located next to the grave of A. M. Zaionchkovsky.
Brusilov and "Brusilovsky breakthrough", from the point of view of Brusilov
Events immediately preceding the onset
At the end of August 1915, it was officially announced that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich had been removed from the post of supreme commander in chief. Emperor Nicholas II assumed the duties of the supreme. In his memoirs, A. A. Brusilov wrote that the impression in the troops from this replacement was the most negative. "The whole army, and indeed the whole of Russia, certainly believed Nikolai Nikolaevich." Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich undoubtedly possessed a gift for military leadership. This replacement was little understood: “it never occurred to anyone that the tsar would take upon himself, in this difficult situation at the front, the duties of the supreme commander. It was common knowledge that Nicholas II knew absolutely nothing about military affairs and that the title he has taken upon himself will be only nominal.” The absence of a real supreme commander "had a big impact during the hostilities of 1916, when we, through the fault of the supreme high command, did not achieve those results that could easily lead to the end of a completely victorious war and to the strengthening of the monarch himself on the vacillating throne".
I definitely didn’t solicit anything, I didn’t look for any promotions, I never left my army anywhere, I’ve never been to Headquarters and I didn’t talk about myself with any special people, then for me personally, in essence, it was absolutely all the same, whether to accept a new position or stay in the old one
Nevertheless, Brusilov resolved the conflict that had arisen: he asked Diterichs to convey to Ivanov that he had not surrendered the post of commander-in-chief and was “my direct boss”, and that “without his order I will not go to Berdichev and I warn that, without legally accepting the position , I won’t go to Kamenetz-Podolsk to see the 9th Army either. ” Brusilov's statement plunged Ivanov into "great confusion", and he informed the headquarters of the 8th Army that he had been waiting for Brusilov for a long time.
In Kamenetz-Podolsk, Brusilov met the tsar, who, bypassing the guard of honor, invited Brusilov to an audience. Nicholas II asked, "what kind of clash with Ivanov did I have and what disagreements emerged in the orders of General Alekseev and Count Frederiks regarding the change of General Ivanov." Brusilov replied that there were no "collisions and misunderstandings" with Ivanov, and I do not know what the "disagreement between the orders of General Alekseev and Count Fredericks" is. Brusilov told Nicholas II that the opinion about the impossibility of advancing at the moment by the armies of the Southwestern Front was erroneous: “after several months of rest and preparatory work, the armies entrusted to me are in all respects in excellent condition, have high morale and by May 1 will be ready for offensive." Moreover, Brusilov asked the Supreme Commander for the initiative to take actions consistent with the actions of neighboring fronts. Brusilov specifically noted that if his opinion was rejected, he would resign as commander
The sovereign was somewhat flinched, probably as a result of such a sharp and categorical statement of mine, while, by the nature of his character, he was more inclined to indecisive and indefinite positions. He never liked to dot the i's, and even more so he did not like to be presented with statements of this nature. Nevertheless, he did not express any displeasure, but only suggested that I repeat my statement at the military council, which was to be held on April 1, and said that he had nothing for or against, and that I conspire with his chief of staff and other commanders-in-chief
At the military council on April 1, 1916 in Mogilev, it was necessary to work out the order of military operations for 1916. General Alekseev reported that the armies of the Western Front, together with the armies of the North-Western Front, should deliver the main blow in the direction of Vilna. It was decided to transfer most of the heavy artillery and general reserve troops at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the Western and Northwestern Fronts. With regard to the Southwestern Front, Alekseev stated that the troops of the front must remain in their positions. An offensive is possible only when both of its northern neighbors firmly indicate their success and advance sufficiently to the west. General Kuropatkin said that it was difficult to count on the success of the North-Western Front. It is impossible to break through the well-fortified German front. Evert said that he wholeheartedly agreed with Kuropatkin's opinion, did not believe in the success of the offensive, and believed that it was better to stick to a defensive course of action. Brusilov said he was firmly convinced of the success of the offensive. He does not judge others. However, the troops of the Southwestern Front can and must attack. Brusilov turned to Alekseev with a request:
allow my front to operate offensively simultaneously with my neighbors; if, more than hoped, I did not even have any success, then at least I would not only delay the enemy’s troops, but also attract part of his reserves to myself and in this way would significantly facilitate the task of Evert and Kuropatkin
Alekseev replied that, in principle, he had no objections. However, he considers it his duty to warn that Brusilov in this case will receive nothing in addition to the troops he has: "neither artillery, nor more shells." Brusilov replied:
I don’t ask for anything, I don’t promise any special victories, I will be content with what I have, but the troops of the Southwestern Front will know with me that we are working for the common good and facilitate the work of our comrades, giving them the opportunity to break enemy
After Brusilov's answer, Kuropatkin and Evert slightly modified their statements and said that "they can attack, but with the proviso that success cannot be guaranteed."
Preparing for the offensive
Immediately after the military council in Mogilev, Brusilov spoke at a meeting of the commanders of the armies of the Southwestern Front with the decision "by all means to go on the offensive in May." However, Shcherbachev, the commander of the 7th Army, reported that at present offensive operations are very risky and undesirable. Brusilov replied that he "gathered the commanders of the armies not in order to decide on an active or passive course of action," but in order to give the order to prepare for an attack. Brusilov then outlined the order of attack, which was at odds with what was considered exceptionally suitable for breaking through the front in trench warfare. Brusilov's idea was to prepare not one, but all the armies of the Southwestern Front, including the corps, one shock section each. In all these areas, urgently begin earthworks to get closer to the enemy. Thanks to this, the enemy will see earthworks in 20 to 30 places and will be deprived of the opportunity to know where the main blow will be delivered. It was decided to strike the main blow with the 8th Army in the direction of Lutsk. The rest of the armies of the front were supposed to inflict "albeit minor, but strong blows." Each army corps also "on some part of its combat sector concentrated the largest possible part of its artillery and reserves" in order to "strongly attract the attention of the troops opposing it and attach them to its sector of the front."
Brusilov, in his memoirs, described in detail the work done by the armies of the front in preparing the offensive. Thus, through reconnaissance, including air reconnaissance, reliable data were obtained on the location of the enemy, on the construction of fortifications. It was possible to establish exactly which enemy units were in front of the troops of the Southwestern Front. According to the totality of the collected data, it became known that the Austro-Germans were in front of the front with a force of 450,000 rifles and 30,000 sabers. Air reconnaissance from aircraft photographed enemy fortified positions:
With the help of a projection lamp, the photographs were unfolded into a plan and placed on a map; photographically, these maps were easily brought to the desired scale. I have ordered in all armies to have plans of 250 sazhens in inches with the exact marking of all enemy positions on them. All officers and commanding officers from the lower ranks were supplied with similar plans for their section.
The enemy positions consisted of three fortified bands, separated from each other by 3 to 5 versts. Each lane consisted of at least three lines of trenches, separated from each other at a distance of 150 to 300 paces. As a rule, the trenches were of a full profile, taller than a person, and “heavy dugouts, shelters, fox holes, nests for machine guns, loopholes, visors and a whole system of numerous communication passages for communication with the rear were arranged in abundance.” Each fortified strip was thoroughly braided with barbed wire: “a wire network stretched in front of the front, consisting of 19-21 rows of stakes. In some places there were several such lanes, at a distance of 20-50 steps from one another. Some areas were mined, or electric current was passed through them through the wire. As Brusilov noted, the work "of the Austro-Germans in creating fortifications was thorough and was carried out by the continuous labor of the troops for more than nine months." However, Brusilov was sure that the armies of the Southwestern Front had the opportunity to successfully break through the "heavy" front of the enemy, using the element of "surprise":
On the basis of general intelligence, on the basis of all the data collected, each army outlined areas for a breakthrough and submitted its thoughts on the attack to my approval. When these areas were finally approved by me and the places of the first strikes were quite accurately established, the hot work began on the most thorough preparation for the attack: troops destined to break through the enemy front were secretly drawn into these areas. However, in order to prevent the enemy from guessing our intentions in advance, the troops were deployed in the rear behind the battle line, but their commanders of various degrees, having plans of 250 fathoms to an inch with a detailed enemy position, were all the time in front and carefully studied the areas, where they were to act, they personally got acquainted with the first line of enemy fortifications, studied the approaches to them, chose artillery positions, set up observation posts, etc.
In the selected areas, the infantry units carried out trench work, which made it possible to get closer to the positions of the Austro-Germans by only 200-300 steps. For the convenience of the attack and the secret location of the reserves, parallel rows of trenches were arranged, interconnected by communication lines.
Only a few days before the start of the offensive, unnoticed at night, the troops intended for the initial attack were brought into the battle line, and artillery, well camouflaged, was placed in selected positions, from which it made a careful adjustment to the intended targets. Much attention was paid to the close and continuous connection between the infantry and artillery.
Brusilov in his memoirs noted that the work of preparing for the offensive was "extremely difficult and painstaking." The commander of the front, as well as the chief of staff of the front, General Klembovsky and other officers of the General Staff and the headquarters of the front, personally checked the work being done, leaving for positions. By May 10, 1916, the preparation of the troops of the front for the attack was "in general terms completed."
While the front command was making every effort to carefully prepare the troops for an offensive of a "grand scale", the tsar on April 30 with his whole family arrived in Odessa for a review of the "Serbian division". Brusilov was forced to leave the headquarters of the front and meet the emperor. By these actions, the tsar once again confirmed the fact of the complete lack of desire to fulfill the duties of the supreme commander in chief. He, only daily at 11 o'clock in the morning received a report from the chief of staff and the quartermaster general on the situation at the front, and "this was the end of his fictitious control of the troops." The people of his retinue - "had nothing to do with the war." According to Brusilov, the tsar was bored at Headquarters and he “just to kill time” tried all the time “to travel either to Tsarskoye Selo, then to the front, then to different places in Russia, without any specific goal.” And this time, as his close associates explained, “this trip to Odessa and Sevastopol was undertaken by him mainly in order to entertain his family, who were tired of sitting in one place, in Tsarskoe Selo.” As Brusilov recalls, for several days he invariably had breakfast at the royal table in the absence of the queen. The queen did not come to the table. On the second day of his stay in Odessa, Brusilov was invited to her carriage. Alexandra Fedorovna greeted Brusilov coldly and asked if the troops were ready to go on the offensive.
I replied that it was not yet complete, but I hoped that we would defeat the enemy this year. To this she did not answer, but asked when I thought I would go on the offensive. I reported that I did not yet know this, that it depended on the situation, which was changing rapidly, and that such information was so secret that I myself did not remember it.
She said dryly to Brusilov. Alexey Alekseevich saw her for the last time.
Offensive
On May 11, 1916, Brusilov received a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Alekseev, which reported that the Italian troops were defeated and unable to hold the front. The command of the Italian troops asks the Russian armies to go on the offensive in order to pull off part of the forces. Given the current situation, by order of the sovereign, Alekseev asked Brusilov to report on the readiness of the armies of the Southwestern Front for the offensive. Brusilov immediately replied that the armies of the front were ready to go on the offensive on May 19, but “on one condition, on which I especially insist that the Western Front also move forward at the same time in order to pin down the troops located against it (Brusilov).” Alekseev told Brusilov by phone that he was asking to launch an attack not on May 19, but on May 22, since Evert could only launch an offensive on June 1. Brusilov replied that he could “reconcile” with this, provided that there were no more delays. Alekseev replied that he "guarantees". On the evening of May 21, Alekseev told Brusilov by telephone that he doubted the success of "an enemy attack simultaneously in many places instead of one blow with all the assembled forces and all the artillery that I have distributed over the armies." Alekseev conveyed the desire of the tsar: to change the "unusual method of attack", to postpone the offensive for several days in order to arrange one shock section, as has already been worked out by the practice of a real war. Brusilov flatly refused:
I do not find it possible to postpone the day and hour of the offensive a second time, because all the troops are in their initial position for the attack, and until my orders to cancel reach the front, artillery preparation will begin. Troops with frequent cancellations of orders inevitably lose confidence in their leaders, and therefore I urge you to change me
Alekseev replied that the commander-in-chief had already gone to bed and it was inconvenient to wake him up. He asked Brusilov to think. Brusilov writes in his memoirs that he was very angry at this and sharply replied: “The dream of the supreme does not concern me, and I have nothing more to think about. I'm asking for an answer now." In response, Alekseev said: “Well, God bless you, do as you know, and I will report on our conversation to the Sovereign Emperor tomorrow.”
At dawn on May 22, 1916, heavy artillery fire began on the selected areas of the breakthrough along the entire Southwestern Front: numerous passages in barbed wire were arranged with light artillery fire. Heavy artillery and howitzers were assigned the tasks of destroying the trenches of the front line and suppressing enemy artillery fire. Part of the artillery, which had completed its task, had to transfer its fire to other targets and thereby help the infantry move forward, preventing the enemy reserves from approaching with their barrage fire. Brusilov singled out the special role of the chief of artillery in organizing artillery fire: “as a bandmaster in an orchestra, he must conduct this fire,” subject to the obligatory condition of uninterrupted telephone communication between artillery groups. Our artillery attack, wrote Brusilov, was a complete success:
In most cases, passages were made in sufficient numbers and thoroughly, and the first fortified zone was completely swept away and, together with its defenders, turned into a pile of debris and torn bodies.
However, many shelters were not destroyed. The units of the garrison who had taken refuge there had to surrender, since “as soon as at least one grenadier with a bomb in his hands stood at the exit, there was no longer any salvation, because in case of refusal to surrender, a grenade was thrown inside the shelter.”
By noon on May 24, we had captured 900 officers, over 40,000 lower ranks, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bombers; by May 27, we had already taken 1,240 officers, over 71,000 lower ranks, and captured 94 guns, 179 machine guns, 53 bombers and mortars, and a huge amount of any other military booty
On May 24, Alekseev again conveyed to Brusilov that, due to bad weather, Evert could not attack on June 1, but postponed his attack to June 5. Brusilov was extremely dissatisfied with the actions of Evert and asked Alekseev to confirm the transition on June 5 to the offensive by the armies of the Western Front. Alekseev replied that "there can be no doubt about this." Nevertheless, on June 5, Alekseev again informed Brusilov by phone that, according to Evert, “huge enemy forces and numerous heavy artillery were gathered against his shock area” and the attack on the chosen place could not be successful. Alekseev also said that Evert received permission from the sovereign to transfer the attack to Baranovichi.
what I feared happened, that is, that I would be abandoned without the support of my neighbors and that, therefore, my successes would be limited to a tactical victory and some progress forward, which would have no influence on the fate of the war. Inevitably, the enemy on all sides will withdraw their troops and throw them against me, and it is obvious that in the end I will be forced to stop. I believe that it is impossible to fight like this, and that even if the attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin were unsuccessful, the very fact of their offensive by significant forces for a more or less long time fettered the enemy troops against them and would not allow sending reserves from their fronts against my troops
To create a new strike group, in order to successfully attack the enemy’s fortified zone, as Brusilov noted, it would take at least six weeks. During this time, the armies of the Southwestern Front will suffer significant losses and may be defeated. Brusilov asked Alekseev to report to the sovereign about the need to immediately attack the enemy with Evert's armies. Alekseev objected: “It is no longer possible to change the decisions of the sovereign emperor” - Evert was ordered to attack the enemy at Baranovichi no later than June 20. At the same time Alekseev assured that he would send two reinforcement corps. Brusilov replied that two corps would not be able to replace the missed attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin, and their imminent arrival would disrupt the supply of food and ammunition and allow the enemy, using a developed network of railways, "to bring up ten whole corps against me, not two." Brusilov ended the conversation by stating that Evert's belated attack would not help me, but "The Western Front will again fail due to lack of time to prepare the strike, and that if I knew in advance that this would be the case, I would flatly refuse to attack alone." Brusilov understood that "the tsar had nothing to do with it, since in military affairs he can be considered a baby." Alekseev perfectly understood the state of affairs and the criminality of the actions of Evert and Kuropatkin. However, as "their former subordinate during the Japanese war, he did his best to cover up their inaction."
In June, when the successful actions of the Southwestern Front became obvious, the Headquarters, in order to develop the offensive and seeing the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, began to transfer troops first from the Northwestern, and then from the Western Fronts. At the same time, the Headquarters relentlessly demanded that the Southwestern Front take Kovel, which indicated a desire to "push the Western Front, that is, Evert." As Brusilov wrote: “The matter came down, in essence, to the destruction of the enemy’s manpower, and I expected that I would defeat them at Kovel, and then my hands would be untied, and I would go wherever I wanted.” However, I made miscalculations and mistakes:
I should not have agreed to the appointment of Kaledin as commander of the 8th Army, but insist on my choice of Klembovsky, and I had to immediately replace Gillenshmidt from the post of commander of the cavalry corps. There is a high probability that with such a change, Kovel would have been taken immediately, at the beginning of the Kovel operation
Brusilov noted that Kaledin’s desire “to always do everything himself, completely distrusting none of his assistants, led to the fact that he did not have time to be at all places on his big front at the same time and therefore missed a lot.”
By June 10, 4,013 officers and about 200,000 soldiers were taken prisoner by the troops of the Southwestern Front. Captured: 219 guns, 644 machine guns, 196 bombers and mortars, 46 ammunition boxes, 38 searchlights, about 150,000 rifles. On June 11, 1916, the 3rd Army of General Lesh became part of the armies of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov set the task of capturing the Gorodok-Manevichi area with the forces of the 3rd and 8th armies. The 7th and 9th armies of the left flank of the front to continue the attack on Galich and Stanislavov. Central 11th Army - to hold the position. Taking advantage of the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, the Germans and Austrians pulled up reserves and stopped the advance of the armies of the Southwestern Front in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn directions. In the Manevichi area, there was a threat of an enemy strike on the right flank of the 8th Army. It was necessary by decisive action to nullify the Kovel-Mnevichevskaya flank position of the enemy. To this end, on June 21, Lesha's 3rd Army and Kaledin's 8th Army went on a decisive offensive and by July 1, they entrenched themselves on the Stohod River: in many places, the vanguards crossed Stohod and entrenched themselves on the left bank of the river. With this operation, the troops of the front strengthened their positions in Volhynia and neutralized the possible threat. At this time, parts of the 11th army of General Sakharov had a very hard time:
several persistent attacks by the Austro-Germans were made on him, but he repulsed them all and retained his positions. I greatly appreciated this success, since, of course, I sent all my reserves to shock sectors, while Sakharov, with the defensive task given to him, had to act with a relatively small number of troops
By July 1, the 3rd Army and the right flank of the 8th Army had fortified themselves on the Stokhid River. The 7th Army advanced west of the Yezerzhany-Porkhov line. The 9th Army occupied the Delatyn area. Otherwise, Brusilov wrote, the position of our armies remained unchanged. From July 1 to July 15, the 3rd and 8th armies regrouped and prepared for a further offensive in the direction of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsky. At the same time, additional units arrived: a guards detachment, consisting of two guards corps and one guards cavalry corps. To the arriving units, Brusilov attached two army corps. The connection was called the "Special Army", which entered the battle line between the 3rd and 8th armies in the direction of Kovel. At the same time, General Sakharov's 11th Army delivered three strong, short blows to the enemy. As a result of the attack, Sakharov moved his right flank and center to the west, occupying the line Koshev - Zvenyach - Merva - Lishniuv. 34,000 Austro-Germans, 45 guns and 71 machine guns were captured. The actions of the army with a relatively "modest" composition were excellent. The enemy realized that it was dangerous to withdraw his troops from the front of this army. At this time, the troops of the 7th and 9th armies regrouped to deliver a strong blow along the Dniester River, in the direction of Galich. On July 10, both armies were to go on the offensive. However, as a result of heavy rains, which continuously poured for several days, they were forced to postpone the offensive until July 15th. This pause in the actions of the armies led to the disruption of the element of "surprise". The enemy managed to withdraw his reserves to the threatened areas.
In his memoirs, A. A. Brusilov described in detail the offensive operations of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916, the well-coordinated interaction of brilliant Russian generals: Shcherbachev, commander of the 7th Army, Lechitsky commander of the 9th Army, Sakharov, commander of the 11th Army, Lesha, commander 3rd Army, Kaledin commander of the 8th Army. Excellent use of artillery with the "transfer of fire" and linking its work with the offensive actions of the infantry, with the obligatory condition for the stable functioning of telephone lines. Brusilov especially noted the role of sanitary trains and mobile baths, sapper troops and personally the actions of military engineer General Velichko in the construction of engineering fortifications of the front line, crossings. However, all this was not enough for the final victory over the enemy. The "treacherous" passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin made itself felt. In his memoirs, Brusilov cites the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, General Ragoza. The 4th Army was entrusted with the task of attacking the enemy's fortified position near Molodechno. The preparation for the attack was excellent and Ragosa was convinced of victory. He and the troops were shocked by the cancellation of the long-prepared offensive. Ragosa went to the front headquarters for an explanation. Evert said that such was the will of the Emperor. Brusilov writes that later gossip reached him that Evert allegedly once said: “Why on earth would I work for the glory of Brusilov.”
If there had been another supreme commander-in-chief, Evert would have been immediately dismissed and replaced accordingly for such indecision, Kuropatkin would not have received any position in the army in any case. But under the regime that existed at that time, in the army, impunity was complete, and both continued to be the favorite commanders of the Stavka
The results of the offensive
The Austrians stopped their attack on Italy and went on the defensive. Italy was spared from the invasion of the enemy. The pressure on Verdun decreased, as the Germans were forced to withdraw part of their divisions for transfer to the Southwestern Front. By July 30, 1916, the operation of the armies of the Southwestern Front "to capture the winter, extremely heavily fortified enemy position, which was considered unconditionally impregnable by our enemies," ended. Part of Eastern Galicia and the whole of Bukovina was again conquered. The immediate result of these successful actions was the exit of Romania from neutrality and its accession to the Entente countries. Brusilov wrote in his memoirs:
it must be admitted that the preparation for this operation was exemplary, which required the manifestation of the full exertion of the forces of the chiefs of all degrees. Everything was thought out and everything was done in a timely manner. This operation also proves that the opinion, which for some reason has spread in Russia, that after the failures of 1915 the Russian army has already collapsed, is wrong: in 1916, it was still strong and, of course, combat-ready, because it defeated a much stronger enemy and scored such successes that no army had had before that time.
By the end of October 1916 hostilities were over. From the day of the offensive on May 20 to November 1, 1916, more than 450,000 officers and soldiers were taken prisoner by the troops of the Southwestern Front, “that is, as many as at the beginning of the offensive, according to all the information we had fairly accurate, there were enemy troops in front of me” . During the same time, the enemy lost over 1,500,000 killed and wounded. By November 1916, over a million Austro-Germans and Turks stood in front of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov concludes: “consequently, in addition to the 450,000 people who were at the beginning in front of me, over 2,500,000 fighters were thrown against me from other fronts” and further:
It is clear from this that if other fronts were moving and did not allow the possibility of transferring troops against the armies entrusted to me, I would have every opportunity to advance far to the west and powerfully influence both strategically and tactically the enemy standing opposite our Western Front. With a unanimous impact on the enemy, our three fronts were fully able - even with the insufficient technical means that we possessed in comparison with the Austro-Germans - to throw back all their armies far to the west. And everyone understands that the troops that have begun to retreat are losing heart, their discipline is upset, and it is difficult to say where and how these troops will stop and in what order they will be. There was every reason to believe that a decisive turning point in the campaign on our entire front would be in our favor, that we would come out victorious, and there was a possibility that the end of our war would be significantly accelerated with fewer casualties.
Family
General Brusilov owned the noble estate of Glebovo-Brusilovo near Moscow.
Memoirs
Brusilov left behind memoirs called "My Memoirs", devoted mainly to his service in tsarist and Soviet Russia. The second volume of Brusilov's memoirs (the authorship of the second volume is doubtful) was transferred to the White émigré archive in 1932 by his widow N. V. Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who, after her husband's death, went abroad. It touches on the description of his life after the October Revolution and has a sharp anti-Bolshevik character. This part of the memoirs was dictated by Brusilov to his wife during treatment in Karlovy Vary in 1925 and left for safekeeping in Prague. According to the will, it was subject to promulgation only after the death of the author.
After 1945, it was transferred to the USSR. The sharply negative assessment of the Bolshevik regime in the second volume led to the fact that in 1948 the publication of the collection A. A. Brusilov ”and his name was removed from the guide of the Central State Military Archive:
The manuscript of "Memoirs", which we received in the archive, written by the hand of Brusilov's wife (N. Brusilova) and signed personally by A. Brusilov during his and his wife's stay in Karlsbad in 1925, contains sharp attacks against the Bolshevik Party, personally against V. I. Lenin and other leaders of the party (Dzerzhinsky), against the Soviet government and the Soviet people, leaving no doubt about the double-dealing of General Brusilov and his counter-revolutionary views, which did not leave him until his death.
Soviet editions of "Memoirs" (1929; Voenizdat: 1941, 1943, 1946, 1963, 1983) do not include the 2nd volume, the authorship of which, according to a number of Soviet scientists, belonged to Brusilov's widow Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who thus tried to justify her husband before white emigration, and the 1st volume was censored in places where Brusilov dealt with ideological issues. At present, a complete edition of the memoirs of A. A. Brusilov has been published.
Military ranks
- Lieutenant - April 2, 1874
- Staff Captain - October 29, 1877
- Captain - December 15, 1881, renamed captain - August 18, 1882
- Lieutenant Colonel - February 9, 1890
- Colonel - August 30, 1892
- Major General - May 6, 1900, birthday of Nicholas II
- Lieutenant General - December 6, 1906, the birthday of Nicholas II
- General of the cavalry - December 6, 1912, the name day of Nicholas II
Retinue rank
- Adjutant General - April 10, 1915
Awards
Russian:
- Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd class with swords and a bow (01/01/1878)
- Order of St. Anna, 3rd class with swords and a bow (03/16/1878)
- Order of St. Stanislaus 2nd class with swords (09/03/1878)
- Order of St. Anne, 2nd class (10/03/1883) - "for distinction in service was awarded outside the rules"
- Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree (06.12.1895, name day of Nicholas II)
- Bukhara Order Noble Bukhara 2nd degree (1896)
- Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class (12/06/1898, name day of Nicholas II)
- Order of St. Stanislaus, 1st class (12/06/1903, name day of Nicholas II)
- Order of St. Anne, 1st class (12/06/1909, name day of Nicholas II)
- Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd degree (03/16/1913)
- Order of St. George, 4th degree (08/23/1914) - "for battles with the Austrians, the result of which was the capture of the city of Galich on August 21"
- Order of St. George 3rd degree (09/18/1914) - "for repelling attacks on the Gorodok position from the 24th to the 30th of last August"
- Order of the White Eagle with Swords (01/10/1915)
- St. George's weapon (Vys. Pr. 10/27/1915)
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