Prut campaign. They don't like to remember this in Russia

Prut campaign
	R. Prut, Moldova
	Russian defeat
Opponents
Commanders
Tsar Peter I	Vizier Baltaci Mehmed Pasha
F.-Marshal Sheremetev	Khan Devlet Giray II
Side forces
Up to 160 guns	440 guns
37 thousand soldiers, of which 5 thousand were killed in battle	8 thousand killed in battle

Prut campaign- a campaign in Moldova in the summer of 1711 by the Russian army led by Peter I against the Ottoman Empire during the Russian-Turkish war of 1710-1713.

With the army led by Field Marshal Sheremetev, Tsar Peter I personally went to Moldova. On the Prut River, about 75 km south of Yassy, ​​the 38,000th Russian army was pressed to the right bank by the allied 120,000th Turkish army and 70,000th cavalry Crimean Tatars. The decisive resistance of the Russians forced the Turkish commander to conclude a peace agreement, according to which the Russian army broke out of the hopeless encirclement at the cost of ceding to Turkey the previously conquered Azov and the coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov in 1696.

background

After the defeat in the Battle of Poltava, the Swedish king Charles XII took refuge in the possessions of the Ottoman Empire, the city of Bendery. French historian Georges Houdart called the escape of Charles XII Peter's "irreparable mistake". Peter I concluded an agreement with Turkey on the expulsion of Charles XII from Turkish territory, but the mood at the Sultan's court changed - the Swedish king was allowed to stay and threaten the southern border of Russia with the help of part of the Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars. Seeking the expulsion of Charles XII, Peter I began to threaten Turkey with war, but in response, on November 20, 1710, the Sultan himself declared war on Russia. The real cause of the war was the capture of Azov by Russian troops in 1696 and the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Sea of ​​Azov.

The Turkish war was limited to a winter raid of the Crimean Tatars, vassals of the Ottoman Empire, into Ukraine. Peter I, relying on the help of the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, decided to make a deep campaign to the Danube, where he hoped to raise the Christian vassals of the Ottoman Empire to fight the Turks.

On March 6 (17), 1711, Peter I went to the troops from Moscow with his faithful friend Ekaterina Alekseevna, whom he ordered to be considered his wife and queen even before the official wedding, which took place in 1712. Even earlier, Prince Golitsyn with 10 dragoon regiments moved to the borders of Moldova, from the north from Livonia, Field Marshal Sheremetev with 22 infantry regiments came out to join him. The plan of the Russians was as follows: to go to the Danube in Wallachia, prevent the Turkish army from crossing, and then raise an uprising of the peoples subject to the Ottoman Empire, beyond the Danube.

Peter's allies in the Prut campaign

• On May 30, on the way to Moldova, Peter I concluded an agreement with the Polish king August II on the conduct of hostilities against the Swedish corps in Pomerania. The tsar reinforced the Polish-Saxon army with 15 thousand Russian troops, and thus secured his rear from hostile actions from the Swedes. Draw the Commonwealth into Turkish war failed.
• According to the Romanian historian Armand Grossu, “delegations of Moldavian and Wallachian boyars were knocking around the thresholds of St. Petersburg, asking the tsar to be swallowed up by the Orthodox empire…”
• The ruler of Wallachia, Constantin Brâncoveanu, sent a representative delegation to Russia back in 1709 and promised to provide a 30,000-strong corps of soldiers to help Russia and undertook to provide the Russian army with food, and for this, Wallachia was to become an independent principality under the protectorate of Russia. The Principality of Wallachia (the modern part of Romania) was adjacent to the left (northern) bank of the Danube and was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire since 1476. In June 1711, when the Turkish army set out to meet the Russians, and the Russian army, with the exception of cavalry detachments, did not reach Wallachia, Brynkovyanu did not dare to take the side of Peter, although his subjects continued to promise support in the event of the arrival of Russian troops.
• On April 13, 1711, Peter I concluded a secret Lutsk treaty with the Orthodox Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir, who came to power with the assistance of the Crimean Khan. Cantemir brought his principality (a vassal of the Ottoman Empire since 1456) into vassal dependence on the Russian tsar, receiving a privileged position in Moldavia and the opportunity to inherit the throne as a reward. Currently, the Prut River is the state border between Romania and Moldova, in the XVII-XVIII centuries. The Moldavian principality included lands on both banks of the Prut with its capital in Iasi. Cantemir attached to the Russian army six thousandth Moldavian light cavalry, armed with bows and pikes. The Moldavian ruler did not have a strong army, but with his help it was easier to provide food for the Russian army in arid lands.
• Serbs and Montenegrins, upon news of the approach of the Russian army, began to deploy an insurrectionary movement, however, poorly armed and poorly organized could not provide serious support without the arrival of Russian troops on their lands.

hike

In his notes, brigadier Moro-de-Braze counted 79,800 in the Russian army before the start of the Prut campaign: 4 infantry divisions (generals Allart, Densberg, Repnin and Weide) each with 11,200 soldiers, 6 separate regiments (including 2 guards and artillerymen) with a total strength 18 thousand, 2 cavalry divisions (generals Janus and Rennes) each with 8 thousand dragoons, a separate dragoon regiment (2 thousand). The regular number of units is given, which, due to the transitions from Livonia to the Dniester, has significantly decreased. The artillery consisted of 60 heavy guns (4-12 pounds) and up to a hundred regimental guns (2-3 pounds) in divisions. The irregular cavalry numbered approximately 10 thousand Cossacks, who were joined by up to 6 thousand Moldovans.

The route of the Russian troops was a line from Kiev through the Soroca fortress (on the Dniester) to the Moldavian Iasi through the territory of friendly Poland (part of modern Ukraine) with the crossing of the Prut.

Due to food difficulties, the Russian army during June 1711 concentrated on the Dniester - the border of the Commonwealth with Moldova. Field Marshal Sheremetev with the cavalry was supposed to cross the Dniester in early June and then rush to the Danube in a direct way to take the places of possible crossings for the Turks, create food stores to provide the main army, and also draw Wallachia into an uprising against the Ottoman Empire. However, the field marshal encountered problems in supplying the cavalry with fodder and provisions, did not find sufficient military support on the ground and remained in Moldova, turning to Iasi.

After crossing the Dniester on June 27, 1711, the main army moved in 2 separate groups: 2 infantry divisions of generals von Allart and von Densberg with Cossacks were ahead, followed by Peter I with guards regiments, 2 infantry divisions of Prince Repnin and General Weide, as well as artillery under the command of Lieutenant General Bruce. In the 6-day transition from the Dniester to the Prut through waterless places, with exhausting heat during the day and cold nights, many Russian soldiers from the recruits, weakened by lack of food, died of thirst and disease. Soldiers died, having seized and drunk water, others, unable to withstand the hardships, committed suicide.

On July 1 (New Style), the Crimean Tatar cavalry attacked Sheremetev's camp on the eastern bank of the Prut. The Russians lost 280 dragoons killed, but repulsed the attack.

On July 3, the divisions of Allart and Densberg approached the Prut opposite Jassy (Iasi is located behind the Prut), then moved downstream.

On July 6, Peter I, with 2 divisions, guards and heavy artillery, crossed to the left (western) bank of the Prut, where the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir joined the tsar.

On July 7, the divisions of Allart and Densberg connected with the corps of Commander-in-Chief Sheremetev on the right bank of the Prut. The Russian army experienced great problems with fodder, it was decided to cross to the left bank of the Prut, where they expected to find more food.

On July 11, cavalry with a baggage train from Sheremetev's army began crossing to the left bank of the Prut, while the rest of the troops remained on the eastern bank.

On July 12, General Renne with 8 dragoon regiments (5056 people) and 5 thousand Moldovans was sent to the city of Brailov (modern Braila in Romania) on the Danube, where the Turks made significant stocks of fodder and provisions.

On July 14, the entire Sheremetev army crossed to the western bank of the Prut, where troops with Peter I soon approached it. Up to 9 thousand soldiers were left in Iasi and on the Dniester to protect communications and keep the local population calm. After joining all the forces, the Russian army moved down the Prut to the Danube. 20 thousand Tatars crossed the Prut swimming with horses and began to attack the small Russian rear units.

On July 18, the Russian avant-garde learned about the beginning of the crossing to the western bank of the Prut near the town of Falchi (modern Felchiu) of a large Turkish army. Turkish cavalry at 2 pm attacked the vanguard of General Janus (6 thousand dragoons, 32 guns), who, lining up in a square and firing from guns, on foot in complete encirclement of the enemy, slowly retreated to the main army. The Russians were saved by the absence of artillery from the Turks and their weak weapons, many of the Turkish horsemen were armed only with bows. At sunset, the Turkish cavalry withdrew, which allowed the vanguard to join the army in the early morning of July 19 with an accelerated night march.

Battle with the Turks. Environment

July 19, 1711

On July 19, the Turkish cavalry surrounded the Russian army, not approaching closer than 200-300 paces. The Russians did not have a clear plan of action. At 2 p.m. they decided to advance to attack the enemy, but the Turkish cavalry pulled back without accepting the battle. The army of Peter I was located in the lowlands along the Prut, all the surrounding hills were occupied by the Turks, who had not yet been approached by artillery.

At the council of war, it was decided to retreat at night up the Prut in search of a more advantageous position for defense. At 11 pm, having destroyed the extra wagons, the army moved in the following battle order: 6 parallel columns (4 infantry divisions, guards and the Janus dragoon division), in between the columns they led the convoy and artillery. Guards regiments covered the left flank, on the right flank, adjacent to the Prut, Repnin's division was moving. From the dangerous sides, the troops covered themselves from the Turkish cavalry with slingshots, which were carried by soldiers in their arms.

The loss of the Russian army killed and wounded that day amounted to about 800 people.

By this time, the army consisted of 31,554 infantry and 6,692 cavalry, mostly horseless, 53 heavy guns and 69 light 3-pounder guns.

July 20, 1711

On July 20, by the morning, a gap had formed between the lagging far-left column of the guard and the neighboring division of Allart due to the uneven march of the columns over rough terrain. The Turks immediately attacked the baggage train, which was left without cover, and before the flank was restored, many guardsmen and members of officer families were killed. For several hours, the army stood, waiting for the restoration of the combat march formation. Due to the delay of the Turkish infantry, the Janissaries with artillery managed to catch up with the Russian army during the day.

At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the army rested its extreme right flank against the Prut River and stopped for defense near the town of Stanileshti (rum. Stănileşti, Stanileshti; about 75 km south of Iasi). On the opposite eastern steep bank of the Prut, the Tatar cavalry and the Zaporozhian Cossacks allied to them appeared. Light artillery approached the Turks, which began to fire at the Russian positions. At 7 pm, the Janissaries attacked the location of the divisions of Allart and Janus, moving forward somewhat according to the conditions of the terrain. The Turks, beaten off by rifle and cannon fire, lay down behind a small hill. Under the cover of powder smoke, 80 grenadiers bombarded them with grenades. The Turks counterattacked, but were stopped by rifle salvos in the line of slingshots.

The Polish General Poniatowski, a military adviser to the Turks, personally observed the battle:

Brigadier Moro de Brazet, who was not at all treated kindly in the Russian service, nevertheless left such a review about the behavior of Peter I at a critical moment in the battle:

At night, the Turks made sorties twice, but were repulsed. Russian losses as a result of the fighting amounted to 2680 people (750 killed, 1200 wounded, 730 captured and missing); the Turks lost 7-8 thousand according to the report of the British ambassador in Constantinople and the testimony of the brigadier Moro de Braze (the Turks themselves admitted to the losses).

July 21, 1711

On July 21, the Turks surrounded the Russian army, pressed against the river, with a semicircle of field fortifications and artillery batteries. About 160 guns continuously fired at Russian positions. The Janissaries launched an attack, but were again repulsed with losses. The position of the Russian army became desperate, ammunition was still left, but the supply was limited. Food was scarce even before, and if the siege dragged on, the troops would soon face starvation. There was no one to help. In the camp, many officer wives cried and howled, Peter I himself at times fell into despair, “ ran up and down the camp, beat his chest and could not utter a word».

At the morning military council, Peter I with the generals decided to offer peace to the Turkish Sultan; in case of refusal, burn the convoy and break through " not on the stomach, but on death, not merciful to anyone and not asking anyone for mercy". A trumpeter was sent to the Turks with an offer of peace. Vizier Baltaji Mehmed Pasha, without responding to the Russian proposal, ordered the Janissaries to resume their attacks. However, those, having suffered heavy losses on this and the previous day, became agitated and raised a murmur that the Sultan wanted peace, and the vizier, against his will, was sending Janissaries to be slaughtered.

Sheremetev sent the 2nd letter to the vizier, in which, in addition to a repeated offer of peace, there was a threat to go into decisive battle in a few hours if there was no answer. The vizier, after discussing the situation with his commanders, agreed to conclude a truce for 48 hours and enter into negotiations.

The Turks from the besieged army were appointed Vice-Chancellor Shafirov, endowed with broad powers, with translators and assistants. Negotiations have begun.

The conclusion of the Prut peace treaty

The hopeless situation of the Russian army can be judged by the conditions that Peter I agreed to, and which he outlined to Shafirov in the instructions:

• Give the Turks Azov and all previously conquered cities on their lands.
• Give the Swedes Livonia and other lands, except for Ingria (where Petersburg was built). Give in compensation for Ingria Pskov.
• Agree on Leshchinsky, a protege of the Swedes, as the Polish king.

These conditions coincided with those put forward by the Sultan when declaring war on Russia. To bribe the vizier, 150 thousand rubles were allocated from the treasury, smaller amounts were intended for other Turkish bosses and even secretaries. According to legend, Peter's wife Ekaterina Alekseevna donated all her jewelry to bribery, however, the Danish envoy Just Yul, who was with the Russian army after she left the encirclement, does not report such an act of Catherine, but says that the queen gave her jewelry to the officers and then, after the conclusion of peace, she gathered them back.

On July 22, Shafirov returned from the Turkish camp with peace conditions. They turned out to be much lighter than those for which Peter was ready:

• The return of Azov to the Turks in its former state.
• The ruin of Taganrog and other cities in the lands conquered by the Russians around the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov.
• Refusal to interfere in Polish and Cossack (Zaporozhye) affairs.
• Free admission of the Swedish king to Sweden and a number of minor conditions for merchants. Until the terms of the agreement were fulfilled, Shafirov and the son of Field Marshal Sheremetev were to remain in Turkey as hostages.

On July 23, the peace treaty was sealed, and already at 6 p.m. The Turks even allocated their cavalry to protect the Russian army from the bandit raids of the Tatars. Charles XII, having learned about the start of negotiations, but not yet knowing about the conditions of the parties, immediately set off from Bendery to the Prut and arrived at the Turkish camp in the afternoon on July 24, where he demanded that the contract be terminated and that he be given an army with which he would defeat the Russians. The grand vizier refused, saying:

On July 25, the Russian cavalry corps of General Renne with attached Moldavian cavalry, not yet knowing about the truce, captured Brailov, which had to be left after 2 days.

On August 13, 1711, the Russian army, leaving Moldavia, crossed the Dniester in Mogilev, ending the Prut campaign. According to the recollection of the Dane Rasmus Erebo (secretary Y. Yul) about the Russian troops on the way to the Dniester:

The vizier was never able to receive the bribe promised to him by Peter. On the night of July 26, the money was brought to the Turkish camp, but the vizier did not accept it, fearing his ally, the Crimean Khan. Then he was afraid to take them because of the suspicions raised by Charles XII against the vizier. In November 1711, thanks to the intrigues of Charles XII, through English and French diplomacy, the vizier Mehmed Pasha was deposed by the Sultan and, according to rumors, was soon executed.

The results of the Prut campaign

During his stay in the camp across the Dniester in Podolia, Peter I ordered each brigadier to submit a detailed inventory of his brigade, determining its condition on the first day of entry into Moldova and the one in which it was on the day the order was given. The will of the tsarist majesty was fulfilled: according to Brigadier Moro de Braze, out of 79,800 people who were present at the entry into Moldova, there were only 37,515, and the division of Rennes had not yet joined the army (5 thousand on July 12).

Perhaps in the Russian regiments there was an initial shortage of personnel, but no more than 8 thousand recruits, for which Peter I reproached the governors in August 1711.

According to Brigadier Moro de Braze, during the battles of July 18-21, the Russian army lost Major General Widman, 4,800 people, killed. Rennes lost about 100 people killed during the capture of Brailov. Thus, they deserted, were taken prisoner and died, mainly from disease and starvation on initial stage campaign, more than 37 thousand Russian soldiers, of which about 5 thousand were killed in battle.

Having failed, according to the Prut Agreement, to expel Charles XII from Bendery, Peter I ordered that the fulfillment of the requirements of the agreement be suspended. In response, Turkey at the end of 1712 again declared war on Russia, but the fighting was limited only to diplomatic activity until the conclusion of the Adrianople Peace Treaty in June 1713, mainly on the terms of the Prut Treaty.

The main result of the unsuccessful Prut campaign was the loss of Russia's access to the Sea of ​​Azov and the newly built southern fleet. Peter wanted to transfer the Goto Predestination, Lastka and Sword ships from the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov to the Baltic, but the Turks did not allow them to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, after which the ships were sold to the Ottoman Empire.

Azov was again captured by the Russian army 25 years later in June 1736 under the Empress Anna Ioannovna.

To the 305th anniversary of the Prut campaign of Peter the Great.

The Prut campaign of 1711 can be safely considered the biggest failure of Peter the commander. Rufin Gordin, a popular author of historical novels, called the Prut campaign "a cruel embarrassment of Tsar Peter". The failure was aggravated by the fact that it was no longer about a young, inexperienced tsar, as Peter was during the period, but about a mature military leader who had many convincing victories behind him. And under his command was not the streltsy army, pampered during the reign of Fedor and Sophia, slightly diluted with "regiments of the new system", "elected" regiments and "amusing" guards, but real regular troops and real guards, moreover - tested in battles and campaigns veterans. Nevertheless, the campaign against the Turks ended for Peter in a military disaster, and the peace that followed it ended in territorial concessions. The impression is compounded by the fact that this disaster happened exactly 2 years after the brilliant victory at Poltava, which Peter won over one of the best commanders of the then Western Europe. And it was the fact that the poorly organized troops of the Turks, who did not have a regular army, opposed the Europeanized army of Peter on the Prut. There was reason to raise their heads against the opponents of Petrine reforms inside Russia!

It was all the more unexpected for me to come across the book "The Prut Campaign: Defeat on the Way to Victory?" written by E.V. Belova. The author of the book has his own, very fresh and unexpected look at the events of 305 years ago, taken in the general context of Russian-Turkish, Ukrainian-Turkish and Russian-Ukrainian Relations XVII- XVIII centuries. And also in the context of Russia's relations with the oppressed Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

So what happened in 1711? And something happened that Peter managed to safely avoid 16 years before. History sometimes plays a bitter joke on the winners. In fact, Peter repeated the mistake of his predecessor, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, who destroyed his army in the Crimean campaigns because he moved through deserted and waterless steppes.

The Prut campaign was not a political adventure. Peter can be blamed for anything, but not for adventurism. Waging a difficult long-term war with the Swedes for possession of the Baltic coast, he made every possible effort to maintain the neutrality of Turkey. For the time being, for the time being, he succeeded, but in 1711 Turkey fell off the diplomatic leash. The Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Count Pyotr Tolstoy, was arrested and thrown into the Seven-Tower Castle. Why this happened - I had the honor of this, but here I am simply stating an undoubted fact: the blame for unleashing the war lies entirely with the Turkish side, while Russia was forced to defend itself.

Peter had a choice - not to go with the army to the Prut, but to wait for the Turks in the Right-Bank Ukraine. Here the Russian army could rely on the friendly Ukrainian population and the allied Polish army. However, this would mean leaving to their own fate the oppressed Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, in which the Poltava victory of Russia aroused hopes for an early liberation from the Turkish yoke - as soon as an Orthodox great power arose in Europe. With the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, these hopes began to take on more or less concrete outlines. Moreover, Peter did not drive away emissaries from the Balkan and Danubian Christians, on the contrary, he welcomed them in every possible way. In European Turkey, national liberation uprisings began to flare up one after another. Peter, realizing the benefits of this national liberation movement, tried to encourage the rebels with his letters in every possible way, sent out appeals to the wavering ones. Peter's refusal to support this movement would not have been understood by the Church - it would have looked like a direct betrayal. And Peter, with all his disregard for the representatives of the clergy, the meaning Orthodox Church excellent for Russian society. And the second consideration, which Peter could not disregard in any way: while waiting for the Turks in Ukraine, he subjected the Russian-friendly Ukrainian population to all the horrors of foreign invasion, and possibly occupation. Yes, and relations with Poland could well deteriorate if the Turkish army entered the territory of the Commonwealth because of Russia. Poland was an ally of Russia against the Swedes, but - according to at least, officially - not against the Turks. After Poltava, Peter did not doubt his abilities. The Turks as an enemy were already well known to him - he personally beat them near Azov. And the army marched.

The rulers of the Danubian principalities vassal from Turkey - Moldavia and Wallachia - called Russian troops to their territory, promising all kinds of assistance. In general, Moldova had already asked several times for Russian citizenship, and only the absence of a common border prevented Peter and his predecessors - Alexei Mikhailovich and Fyodor Alekseevich - from satisfying their request. These petitions on the part of the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir resumed with the start of the Russian-Turkish war. Accordingly, Peter and his formal commander-in-chief, Boris Sheremetev, had a firm hope of replenishing both food supplies and numerous volunteers in the principalities.

Peter had to hurry. If the Turkish army (and, according to available information, it outnumbered the Russian one) had managed to occupy the principalities before Peter, it would have taken advantage of all their resources, crushing any resistance. And resources - and above all food - were vital to Peter. Therefore, Peter urged his Field Marshal Sheremetev, demanding at all costs to reach the Danube before the end of spring, and to requisition horses and oxen for carts from the townsfolk if necessary. " For God's sake, do not hesitate to the appointed place, - wrote Pyotr Sheremetev, - for even now we have received packs of letters from all Christians, which they ask God Himself to hasten before the Turks, in which they are of great benefit. And if we succumb, then it will be ten times harder or hardly possible to fulfill our interest, and so we will lose everything by slowing down.

Boris Petrovich Sheremetev - formal commander in chief
Russian troops in the Prut campaign

On May 24, the Russian army crossed the Dniester. At the same time, a clash with the Turks took place, which cost the Russians two killed, and the Turks - 20. It seemed that Peter's calculations on the tactical superiority of the Russian army were beginning to be justified. The army entered Moldova, whose inhabitants began to sign up as volunteers. In response, Peter strictly forbade requisitions from the Orthodox population - food and horses were actively purchased at market prices. Looting was punishable by death.

On June 1, a military council was convened, at which it became known that the Turks were 7 crossings from the Danube. General Allart offered, having captured the Bendery fortress, to stay on the Dniester and wait for the enemy here. In this case, the Turks would expect to cross the deserted and waterless steppe, which would certainly tire their army and destroy a significant part of it. However, Allart's plan deprived the Russians of the opportunity to use the resources of Wallachia - and in Moldova the army was well replenished with volunteers and just as well got hold of supplies. Yes, and the refusal to support the Wallachian ruler Brynkovyan would not have been interpreted in favor of Peter and would not have contributed to the continuation of the anti-Ottoman uprisings in the Balkans. Taking these considerations into account, Peter rejected Allart's reasonable proposal. The army marched on the Danube. Now all the inconveniences of a campaign across the waterless and deserted steppe fell on the shoulders of the Russian troops.

Dmitry Cantemir, Moldavian ruler

On June 5, Russian troops approached the Prut, where they joined up with Cantemir and volunteers, who were gathered and brought by the Moldavian ruler. And on June 7 it became known that the Turks had crossed the Danube and were moving towards the Russians.

The further movement of the Russian army was greatly hampered by heat and drought. The horses died of thirst and starvation, the death rate among the soldiers reached 500 - 600 people a day. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Peter's post was standing, and the bread was destroyed by the invasion of locusts. The Russian command was forced to issue a special order for the soldiers to eat meat. But it turned out to be problematic to get it because of the loss of livestock. Is it any wonder that the advance detachment of the Russian cavalry, faced with the advanced forces of the Turkish army, who crossed the Prut, did not try to prevent them, but turned back?

The uniform of the Russian army during the Prut campaign.
Agree, not a very comfortable form for traveling in thirty-degree heat

And then the next one began. Early in the morning of July 8, 1711, the Turkish commander-in-chief (and concurrently the grand vizier, that is, the prime minister of Sultan Turkey) Baltaji Mehmet Pasha sent a "small" detachment of 3,700 cavalry men for reconnaissance. This detachment squeezed itself into the gap between the forward detachment of Janus (to which Ensberg's division approached to help) and the main Russian forces. Sheremetev immediately lined up the troops and rolled out the cannons. It was ordered to shoot from an extremely short distance in order to ensure maximum destructive fire power. One Turk who came too close to the Russian battle formations was immediately taken prisoner and interrogated. According to him, the strength of the Turkish army was 100,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry.For comparison: the numberThe Russian army in the Prut campaign consisted of 38 thousand people plus 5-6 thousand people of a poorly trained Moldavian militia. Despite such a huge advantage, Baltaji Mehmet Pasha did not dare to fight - the glory of the Poltava winner became too loud, and the Turks themselves experienced the heavy hand of Great Peter. In addition, two Swedish officers who defected from the Russian army to the Turks significantly overestimated the number of Russian troops (defining it at 70 thousand).

So, the alignment before the battle did not look in favor of the Russians. Peter's army was exhausted by the long march and starvation, the horses were brought to extreme exhaustion, while the Turkish cavalry had fresh horses and greatly outnumbered the entire Russian army. They did not know about the indecision of the Turkish commander-in-chief at Peter's headquarters. Therefore, it was decided to retreat, to protect the place of the new camp with slingshots and line up in a square, while the main forces of the Turkish army had not yet crossed the Prut. In order for the retreat to go as quickly as possible, Peter ordered the generals and officers to reduce the number of their carts with luggage, and to burn everything left.

At 11 p.m. July 8th Russian troops began to withdraw. At the same time, the guardsmen, who were marching in the rearguard, hesitated due to several overturned wagons. The Turkish-Tatar cavalry poured into the gap between the Preobrazhensky regiment and the rest of the army, trying to cut off the Preobrazhensky from the main forces and destroy them. Heroes-Guards, as in 1700 near Narva, had to prove by deed that Peter knowingly calls them "Life Guards", knowingly trusts his former "amusing". Preobrazhensky stood against the enemy cavalry for 6 hours - and still managed to get through to their own.

Transfiguration during the Prut campaign of 1711
Grenadier and drummer.

At 5 pm the next day, July 9, the Russian army stopped on the banks of the Prut near Stanileshti, where they built a fortified camp, set up slingshots, and then began to build battle formation according to linear tactics. The Turks did not dare to attack for some time. The slow, insecure Baltaji Mehmet Pasha not only allowed the Russians to build a fortified camp without hindrance, but also to build a rampart half the height of a man against the positions of his army. The Turks, however, surrounded the Russian positions, occupying the dominant heights. And, alas, there was nothing to oppose to their multiple numerical superiority of the weakened army of Peter.

Peter called a council of war. At the same time, the vizier also convened a military council. Each side wanted to discuss their next steps, weighing the pros and cons. However, the Russian generals were not allowed to confer for a long time: having installed cannons on the dominant heights, the Turks began to shell the Russian camp. And although the effect of the Turkish fire was small, Peter ordered his generals to take their place in the ranks. The Prut battle, which began with a skirmish between the Preobrazhensky Regiment and the Tatars, resumed.

The first attack of the Janissaries on the Russian battle formations was spontaneous: Baltaji Mehmet Pasha at that time was still conferring with his deputy, and the army did not have time to complete focus on starting positions. But the Janissaries were eager to cross arms with the "infidels", and their commander, Yusuf-aga, with an unfurled banner in his hands, led them into battle. The Turks ran to the slingshots, but when they saw that the Russian camp was fortified, and it would not work to take it on the move, they rushed back, hiding behind one of the hills. 80 Russian grenadiers, on the orders of Sheremetev, launched a counterattack and threw the Janissaries back another 30 steps. However, when they returned to their positions, the Turks rushed into pursuit.

In general, the fight was fierce. Peter himself, whose fearlessness is well known, paid tribute to his opponents: "The Turkish infantry, although discordant, fought fiercely fiercely." The Russians were able to repel the second attack of the Janissaries only with massive artillery fire, and they hit both with cannonballs and grapeshot. Despite the fact that the Turkish officers cut down the retreating sabers, the second attack of the Janissaries bogged down.

Turkish infantry of the 18th century

After that, a very symptomatic dialogue took place in the Turkish camp between the deputy commander-in-chief and the Polish count Poniatowski, a supporter of the pro-Swedish party and the head of the Polish detachment in the Baltaji army. "My friend," the Turkish commander told Poniatowski, "we are in danger of being defeated." This was said by a man whose army outnumbered the enemy by six times. Let's remember this phrase: it will be useful to us later.

After that, the Turks went on the attack twice more and both times rolled back with heavy losses. By nightfall, gloom reigned in their camp. The Russian generals, inspired by their success, suggested that Peter gather the troops upset by the battle into a single fist and attack the Turkish camp. Peter, however, did not support this proposal. As we can now judge, this decision was erroneous: the Turks themselves testified that if the Russians went on a decisive counteroffensive, their army would certainly falter and run, abandoning artillery, carts and ammunition. But Peter did not know anything about the mood in the Turkish camp, but he could not risk the army - he still had to force Sweden, defeated at Poltava, but far from resigned to defeat, to peace. Peter himself subsequently pointed to the huge numerical superiority of the Turks as the main reason that forced him to abandon the offensive. In addition, the Turkish army had large masses of cavalry (and therefore had great maneuverability), while the Russian cavalry was exhausted by starvation and a long march across the steppe. And Peter had no confidence that after the withdrawal of the entire army from the camp, this camp would not be captured by the Turkish cavalry, and his troops would be surrounded in open areas.

As a result, a stalemate developed on the Prut. The Turks, beaten back four times, no longer risked attacking. And the Russians did not have enough strength to win. Under these conditions, Peter, after conferring with Sheremetev, decided to start peace negotiations. As a parliamentarian authorized on behalf of Russia to sign peace, the well-known diplomat Baron P.P., who was present at the army, went to the Turks. Shafirov. Peter understood that the Turks, although they were repelled, and, it was to be assumed, were rather demoralized, they had nowhere to hurry. In addition, the Wallachian ruler Brynkovyanu, to join with whom Peter went on his ill-fated campaign, changed, and all the resources prepared by the Volohs for Peter went to Baltaji and his army. Not by storm, but by starvation, the Turks could well have destroyed the small Russian army, whose soldiers had not eaten for three days. Therefore, Peter advised Shafirov to make concessions. The tsar was ready to give Azov to the Turks, along with the newly built fortresses of Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton, to recognize Stanislav Leshchinsky, a protege of the Swedes, as the king of Poland, to freely let Charles XII into his possession. Assuming that the Turks would try in favor of Charles, who had hidden in their possessions, Peter was ready to cede to the Swedes all the lands conquered from them, except for St. Petersburg. In return for Petersburg, Peter agreed to give Pskov and the surrounding territories to the Swedes - Petersburg was needed as an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Without him, the long-term war with the Swedes was completely depreciated. The tsar probably expected to win other lands in the course of further battles: there was no talk of peace with the Swedes. Moreover, Peter instructed Shafirov to appease the pasha in every possible way, so that he would not try too hard in favor of Karl. Thus, we see that Peter, even in such desperate circumstances, remained a far-sighted politician who understood that the root of his troubles was in the Turkish-Swedish alliance, that this alliance was a temporary and fragile phenomenon, and that it was entirely within his power to break it. Peter also knew perfectly well about the level of corruption in the Ottoman Empire going off scale beyond all conceivable and inconceivable limits, he knew from his ambassador, Count P.A. Tolstoy - and hoped to take advantage of this circumstance.

Baron P.P. Shafirov

In case the Turks did not wish to make peace, Peter gave the order to prepare for a breakthrough. Weakened horses were ordered to be slaughtered, wagons and papers - to be burned, soldiers - to be properly fed, dividing the available food supplies. These measures, however, proved unnecessary. Shafirov managed to make peace on much more favorable terms than Peter expected. Baltaji did not demand concessions in favor of the Swedes at all. Russia gave Azov to Turkey and undertook to tear down the fortresses of Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton. All artillery, banners and ammunition of the Russian army were left intact - instead, guns and ammunition from Kamenny Zaton were handed over to the Turks. Karl received complete freedom to return to Sweden when he wished and as he wished - it turned out that the Turks themselves were pretty tired of him, and they waited - they could not wait for an opportunity to send this restless guest out. Russia managed to defend the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir and his volunteers - they received the right to move to Russia. In addition, Russia pledged to withdraw its troops from Poland and not to pursue the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks-Mazepins, who found shelter in the Sultan's possessions. As guarantors that Russia would fulfill the conditions, the Turks kept Baron Shafirov and the son of the formal commander-in-chief of the Russian army, B.P., as hostages. Sheremetev - Mikhail. Mikhail Sheremetev, Peter ordered to immediately promote from colonel to general and give him a salary for a year in advance, after which Sheremetev Jr. left for the Turks. I will add on my own behalf that this selfless young man, who willingly sacrificed his freedom for the interests of the Fatherland, undermined his health in the Yedikule casemates and died on the way to Russia.

When Charles XII learned about the conclusion of the Treaty of Prut, he rushed headlong to the Turkish camp and began to shower Baltaji-Mehmet Pasha with reproaches, assuring him that victory was in their hands, and that he personally, with a detachment of loyal people, undertakes to bring Peter prisoner to the Turkish camp . Baltaji, who knew the price of this verbal diarrhea, let Karl speak out, after which he remarked melancholy: “You have already tasted them (Russians - M.M.), and we saw them too. And if you want, then attack, and I will peace with them set, I will not break." In general, as Shafirov later recalled, Baltaji did not hide his joy when he heard about the Russian proposal to cede Azov, after which a trusting relationship was immediately established between the vizier and the Russian truce. In a conversation with Shafirov, Baltaji did not hide that he considered Charles XII smart person, but after talking with him, she believes him to be a fool and a madman.

Peace was concluded on July 12, 1711. Immediately after this, the Janissaries, whom the stubbornness of the Russian defense had so recently brought into a state close to panic, began to approach the Russian camp, called the Russian soldiers "brothers" and started trading. Among the Russian officers there were people who spoke Turkish and Arabic, and soon the soldiers of the exhausted army of Peter could not deny themselves food - recent enemies generously supplied them with food. Baltaji himself ordered to donate bread and rice to the Russian army for 11 days of travel.

The complicity of Baltaji Mehmet Pasha gave rise to rumors that the vizier was bribed. They said, in particular, that Empress Catherine, who was present at the army, collected all the jewels of the generals and officers' wives and, together with her own jewels, sent them as a gift to the vizier. Even the figure of the bribe received by the vizier was called - 8 million rubles. It was also rumored that the queen personally appeared at the location of the Turks and gave herself to the vizier in order to negotiate more favorable conditions for her husband. This talk of a bribe ended up costing Baltaji his life. However, on mature reflection, one has to admit the groundlessness of such gossip. It is unlikely that Baltaji dared to accept a bribe from the Russians in the presence of a whole horde of janissaries ready for rebellion, who would certainly have torn him to pieces for treason. The reasons for the complicity of the Turks are much more prosaic. Let's list them.

First. Before the start of the Prut campaign, Peter sent a detachment of General Renne, consisting of 15 thousand cavalrymen, ahead of the main forces. Renne was ordered to go behind the lines of the main forces of the Turks, initiate an anti-Turkish uprising in Wallachia, and then cut off the Baltaji army from crossings across the Danube. Just at the height of the negotiations between Baltadzhi and Shafirov, the vizier was informed that the Rennes dragoons were storming the Brails. Baltaji was not a fool and quickly realized what was going on. Yes, he managed to surround the army of Peter, but (whose number of troops the vizier did not know). And as a result, the Turks themselves found themselves in a strategic environment and risked exchanging places with the Russians . If Peter knew about the actions of his general, his position would probably become tougher, and the limit of possible concessions would be disproportionately smaller. But Peter had no information from Renne, and Baltaji received information about him.

Baltaci Mehmet Pasha

Second. The Janissaries were demoralized by the battle of Stanilesti and refused to go on the offensive again. The Englishman Sutton, whose friend was with the Turkish army, testified: " If the Russians knew about the horror and stupor that seized the Turks, and could take advantage of their advantages by continuing the shelling and making a sortie, the Turks, of course, would be defeated. the camps set out, then the Turks would have left the guns and ammunition ". Let us also recall the words of the Turkish Deputy Commander-in-Chief, said to Poniatowski: "We run the risk of being defeated." But the Russians did not know about the morale of the Janissaries, but in battle the Janissaries just demonstrated extraordinary courage, as Peter's testimony remained.

And third. Having destroyed the Russian army and captured Peter, the Turks simply did not have where to attack. Ahead were those same waterless steppes and villages depleted by locusts, the passage through which destroyed Peter's army. Ahead was a crossing through the territory of the Commonwealth, and neither Baltadzhi nor the Sultan had any intentions to get involved in the Polish-Turkish war. Then it was necessary to force several large water barriers, such as the Dniester and the Dnieper. And then - also measure their strength with the Ukrainian Cossacks, most of whom remained faithful to Russia. What the Ukrainian Cossacks are, the Turks have repeatedly experienced in their own skin and were by no means eager to fight with them. Thus, the peace signed by Baltaji fully met the national interests of Turkey, but it was not part of Turkish plans to fight for the interests of the arrogant and arrogant Swedish king. The sultan understood this perfectly well - that's why he awarded his vizier (as well as the Crimean Khan who participated in the Prut battle) with expensive fur coats and sabers.

Battle of Stanilesti. Map.

So was there a "cruel embarrassment"? I think everyone who reads this article will be forced to admit: it was not. Those who like to accuse Russia of "filling up the enemy with corpses", speaking of the campaign of 1711, could well exercise their wit ... at the Turks: the losses of Russian troops in the battle near Stanilesti amounted to 3 thousand people against 8 thousand among the Turks. Yes, Peter admitted his defeat in the Prut campaign, but this was caused not so much by military failures as by an incorrect assessment of the situation. From the beginning of the campaign to the very conclusion of peace, the Russian Tsar had to make decisions in conditions close to complete uncertainty, while Baltaji had much more information. The army of the Poltava victors nurtured by Peter in 1711 withstood the blows of a many times superior enemy, avoided defeat and forced this enemy to eventually make peace, albeit unfavorable for Russia, but on much more favorable terms than Peter expected when starting negotiations. The enemies of Russia failed to win a convincing victory, which gave rise to numerous rumors about bribes.

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Notes

that is, for the return of historical Russian lands captured by the Swedes during the unsuccessful Livonian War and the Great Troubles for us early XVII century
The Turkish name is Yedikule. The castle was built in the 15th century, where the sultans kept their treasury. And here was the main political prison of the Ottoman Empire.
After that, in Europe, in general, many realized that it was time to take Russia seriously, that the semi-barbarian "Muscovy" remained in the irretrievable past - in its place, a country leading an active foreign policy and able to back up their interests by force of arms. fighting Great Northern war in 1710-1711 they were already conducted on the territory of Western Europe itself, which further strengthened the Russian Tsardom in this new status.
The Russian-Turkish war of 1711-1713 was quite officially declared by Peter to be liberation, and its goal was proclaimed not so much to repel external aggression as to protect oppressed Christians. On the banners of his army in 1711, Peter ordered to inscribe: "For the name of Jesus Christ and Christianity." The banners became red (the color of freedom!), They were decorated with images of the Orthodox cross. “We have the intention,” wrote Pyotr Alekseevich, “so that not only can you help us against the enemy-basurman with an army to attack, but we also enter the middle of his dominion with strong weapons, and the oppressed Orthodox Christians, if God permits, free him from his filthy yoke.” In response, Metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky, who sharply criticized the everyday side of Peter's reforms and his own dissolute life, proclaimed Peter - no more, no less - "the second messiah." See Belova E.V. Prut campaign: defeat on the way to victory? - M.: Veche, 2011. - p. 145.
Cit. by: Belova E.V. Decree. op. - With. 154.
It is we, knowing how it all ended, that we find his proposal reasonable. But let's put ourselves in the place of Peter, whose troops had already managed to win a number of tactical victories in the Russian-Turkish war that had begun and were so warmly received in Moldova. For him, Allart's advice looked at best a manifestation of criminal indecision, at worst - just a betrayal.
However, the exhausted Russian dragoons on their half-dead horses still failed to evade the battle with the fresh Turkish-Tatar cavalry. So we have to agree with E.V. Belova is that if General Janus, who commanded the Russian dragoons, acted more decisively - he might have been able to delay the crossing of the Turks for several days and capture several guns from them.
E.V. Belova gives an even smaller figure - according to her calculations, the Russian army did not exceed 15 thousand people.
"Life Guard" in literal translation - "bodyguards", that is - the personal protection of the sovereign.
Stone Zaton Shafirov even tried to bargain - they say, Russia needs the fortress to defend against Tatar raids.
Shefov N.A. The most famous wars and battles of Russia. - M.: Veche, 2000. - p. 200.
There.
Cit. by: Belova E.V. Decree. op. - With. 195.
Shefov N.A. Decree. op. - With. 200.
Shefov N.A. Decree. op. - With. 198. E.V. Belova names even a smaller number of Russian losses.
Peter, exhausted by the long wait for news from Shafirov, sent him a note in which he advised: "If they truly talk about peace, put with them for all (highlighted by me - M.M.)

Of all the wars between Russia and Turkey, the war of 1711, known as the Prut campaign of Peter I, was the most unsuccessful for Russia. Among the most important reasons for the defeat were the consequences of the conflict Russian state with the Cossacks and, as a result, the insignificant participation of the Cossacks in this war is on the side of Russia.

It was the Cossacks who had the experience of constant and at times very successful struggle against Turkey. In 1641, the Donets fought off a 250,000-strong Turkish-Tatar army in Azov. The Cossacks, together with the Don (exceeding them by an order of magnitude at that time), constantly made sea raids on the coast of Crimea and Turkey. These raids even received the name "Bosphorus War".

But an attempt to catch the fugitives among the Don Cossacks and enroll them (as recruits) in the permanent army being created led to the well-known Bulavin uprising of 1708 and the brutal suppression of the freemen. “For this saryn,” as Peter I wrote, “except for cruelty, cannot be appeased.” And yet, in the spring of 1709, 2000 Cossacks were sent from the Don Cossacks to serve near Smolensk to join the B.S. Korsak.

Peter I left for the Russian army stationed in Ukraine. Even before Peter I finally “pacified” the Don army, hetman Mazepa opposed the emperor. On October 24, 1708, he crossed the Desna and himself arrived at the Swedish outposts. Since the betrayal was being prepared secretly, he took with him about 2,000 people.

On November 6, in Hlukhiv, Colonel Skoropadsky was elected the new hetman of Ukraine. November 12 Mazepa was anathematized in Moscow in the Assumption Cathedral. Mazepa was supported only by the Cossacks. And Peter sent A.D. Menshikov ordered to take and ruin the Sich. Most of defenders were killed, 300 people were captured.

June 27 in the battle of Poltava, the Swedes suffered a terrible defeat. Late in the evening of June 30, the wounded Charles XII crossed the Dnieper. Mazepa crossed with the king and soon died on September 22, 1709 in Varnitsa near Bendery.

The whole year 1710 was especially successful for the accomplishments of Peter the Great in the Baltics. On July 4, Riga capitulated. Participation in the siege of Riga is the only concrete event of the Don people, noted by the first Don historian Rigelman. About others, he speaks sparingly and vaguely: “And in addition to this number, many during the entire ongoing war against the Swedes in many places and in Finland itself were used with usefulness, also in 711 with the Sovereign against the Turks in Moldavia near the Prut River. And leave on the Don in common with the Kalmyks under the leadership of General-Admiral Count Feodor Matveyevich Apraksin to protect the Tatar and Turkish attacks on Russian borders.

One of the consequences of the victory at Poltava was an unwanted war with Turkey. Naturally, in the Ottoman Empire there were forces that aspired to war against Russia, primarily the Tatars. The observance of peace between Russia and Turkey deprived them of their most important source of income - the capture of prisoners and the slave trade. As soon as Peter appeared on the Don and in Azov before leaving for Poltava, the Tatar population became agitated, urging the Turkish authorities to war with the Russians.

In October 1710, Peter demanded that the Swedish king be removed from Turkish territory and threatened with war, but on November 20, at a solemn meeting of the divan, the Turks themselves decided to start a war. The march of their troops, led by the Grand Vizier, was planned in the spring of 1711. The Crimean Tatars were the first to start hostilities. The Turks have been waiting for them for a long time. After the completion of the Azov campaign and the conclusion of peace between the Sultan and the Russian Tsar, the Turkish authorities forbade the Krymchaks to attack Russian lands.

In December 1710, the Crimean Khan Devlet Giray, the initiator of the war, met in Bendery with the Swedish king Charles XII and the Hetman of the Right-Bank Ukraine Philip Orlyk. Calculate the strength. In addition to the Crimeans and the Nogais vassals of the Crimea, the parties had at their disposal the registered Philip Orlik who fled with Mazepa and the Cossacks driven out of the Sich by Menshikov, and Poles hostile to Tsar Peter and King August II were expected from the west.

After conferring, the khan, the king and the hetman decided to strike at the Right-Bank Ukraine with the combined forces of the Khan's son Mehmed Giray with the Orliks ​​and Poles and at the same time at the Left-Bank Ukraine with the forces of the Crimean Khan himself with the Cossacks.

The Russians expected such a raid. Lieutenant General, Prince M.M. Golitsyn, the brother of the Kiev governor, reported from Yaroslav on December 26: “And their intention is very much, how their rivers will become, in order for them to go: to the Khan and Orlik to Ukraine, and to the Turks themselves with the Swedish king and with the forces passing through Kamenetz Podolsky to Poland.”

And on the very first day of the new year of 1711, Peter decided to distract the Tatars, organize a campaign from the Volga and from the Don across the steppe to the Kuban. For this, a corps was deployed near Voronezh under the command of Admiral F.M. Apraksin, subordinating to him cash in the service of the Don Cossacks in the amount of 5 thousand people. In Russia, the war has not yet been declared, but the troops from Livonia moved south. Lieutenant General M.M. Golitsyn advanced to the Moldavian border with ten dragoon regiments.

On Epiphany, January 6, 1711, the Krymchaks crossed Perekop and poured into Ukraine in two streams. Khan's son Mehmed-Girey, at the head of 40,000 Tatars and 7,000-8,000 Cossacks, Orlik, moved along the right bank of the Dnieper. He was reinforced by 700 Swedes of Colonel Zülich and 400 Janissaries. Budzhak Tatars and 3,000-5,000 Poles hostile to Tsar Peter, who crossed the Dniester near Bendery, moved towards Mehmed Giray. Khan Devlet Giray himself with the same number of Tatars and from 2000 Cossacks went along the left bank, 40 Swedish officers were advisers with him.

The raid was resisted by a few troops covering the Right-Bank Ukraine (formally, Polish territory). Prince Volkonsky with four dragoon regiments stood "at the border of the hair and with him the Cossack and hair regiments stand, and Major General Vidman with 4 regiments were placed in the vicinity of him, Volkonsky."

The eleven thousandth corps of Major General F.V. Shidlovsky stood on the left bank of the Dnieper near Kharkov. These troops were clearly not enough for a battle in the field, and the Russians had the hope of defending themselves in the fortresses until the tsar himself came to help with the troops from the north.

On the Russian left-bank side, the khan managed to capture the Novosergiev fortress (in the upper reaches of the Samara River), the population of which, mainly former Cossacks, surrendered without a fight. Then the troops of Devlet-Girey went in the direction of Kharkov and Izyum, but, colliding with the Belgorod and Izyum fortified defensive lines, were repulsed. Khan counted on the help of the Nogays from the Kuban, but the Nogays did not come up, and the Tatars turned in early March to the Crimea. In the Novosergievsky fortress, Devlet-Girey left a garrison - 1.5 thousand Cossacks and Tatars under the general command of the Zaporizhzhya Colonel Nestuley.

On the right bank, the campaign proceeded with mixed success. In the first half of February 1711, the Tatars easily captured Bratslav, Boguslav, and Nemirov. The garrisons there were small and did not show much resistance to the Tatars.

Orlik began distributing station wagons so that local registries would join him and begin the fight against “Moscow captivity”.

But on March 25, the Tatars of Mehmed Giray and the Cossacks of Orlik (over 30,000 people in total) approached the White Church and here, trying to storm the city, were defeated. On the Left Bank, the detachment of F.V. Shidlovsky, with a sudden blow, returned the Novosergievsky fortress, thus clearing the left bank of the Dnieper from the Tatars and Cossacks. After these failures, the Tatar detachments, who felt that they would soon have to return to the Crimea, abandoned pretense and began to rob and capture civilians.

The commander-in-chief of Russian forces in Ukraine, General M.M. Golitsyn assessed the situation in time, gathered 9 dragoon and 2 infantry regiments and put pressure on the Krymchaks weighed down by the crowd. Mehmed Giray, saving the prey, began to leave for Bender, in the Ottoman possessions. Naturally, Orlik began to leave with him. On April 15, 1711, near Boguslav, Golitsyn overtook part of the Crimeans and recaptured over 7,000 captured prisoners. The run is over.

Now the Russians had to pay a return visit to the Tatars and Ottomans.
Formally, the manifesto on the war with Turkey was read out in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin in the presence of Tsar Peter on February 25, 1711. But the war plan was drawn up long before it was announced. For the first time, the plan assumed the conduct of hostilities in three theaters - the Danube, Crimean and Caucasian. And this subsequently became a kind of tradition in the wars of Russia against Turkey.

It was planned to inflict the main blow on the Danube theater. Peter I, hoping for the help of the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, decided to raise local Christians, vassals of the Ottoman Empire, on both banks of the Danube to fight the Turks.

On April 12, a military council was held in Slutsk. Peter conferred with Field Marshal B.G. Sheremetev and General L.N. Allart, as well as Chancellor G.I. Golovkin and the Russian ambassador to the Commonwealth G.F. Dolgorukov. At the council, they decided to approach the Danube before the Turks and capture the crossings. The troops for the campaign planned to concentrate on the banks of the Dniester, in the Polish part of Ukraine. The advanced units of the Russian army were to reach the Dniester by May 15th. Sheremetev with infantry was supposed to go there no later than May 20, having a three-month supply of food. The troops went to the Dniester, but Peter himself was late to them, because he was negotiating with the Polish king and the Saxon elector Augustus II.

Due to the absence of Peter and food difficulties, Sheremetev and his troops crossed the Dniester on May 30, 10 days later than planned. But then it became known that the Turks had already crossed the Danube, they could not be intercepted and held at the crossings, and Sheremetev turned towards Iasi. So, at the Danube Theater, initially, everything did not go according to plan and, as you know, ended in defeat.

In the Crimean theater, the campaign was led by General-in-Chief Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin and Hetman Skoropadsky himself. Russian troops consisted of 7 infantry regiments and 1 dragoon regiment (7178 people), with 20,000 Cossacks with the hetman. Preventing the Russian attack on the Crimea, Nuraddin Bakhti-Girey staged an attack on Tor and Bakhmut. The Tatar raid was repulsed, but the campaign was delayed.

Finally, on May 30, day to day with Sheremetev, Buturlin and Skoropadsky set out from Perevolochna and, weighed down by a bulky convoy, dragged themselves towards the Crimea. On June 7 they reached the Novobogoroditskaya fortress. "Languages" informed them that 30,000 Tatars of Bakhti-Girey were standing in the upper reaches of the Samara River and were waiting for the Russian offensive. To go further to the Crimea means to leave them at your back. But Buturlin was not embarrassed by this. Leaving part of his forces to protect communications, he slowly moved through the Dnieper rapids. He covered himself with the Dnieper from the Yedikul horde and from the Dzhambuylutskaya horde, and the Ingults from the Edisan horde.

On the left flank, in the Caucasian theater, movement also began. Even in winter, the Russians wrote to the Kabardian rulers, urging them to oppose the Tatars. The Kabardians replied that they had “great enmity” with the Kuban Tatars, and until our death there will never be friendship between us.

Later, 20,000 Kalmyk taishi Ayuki approached. All this army moved through the steppe and the Don to Azov, in order to be strengthened by the Azov garrison.

On June 30, Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky wrote to Peter from Kabarda that he had agreed with the local rulers: as soon as the boyar Apraksin with the Russian army and the Kalmyks would go against the Kuban Tatars, the Kabardians would also immediately oppose the Kubans. Distances and the primitive organization of communication did not allow the Russians to strike at all three theaters at the same time.

On July 2, Buturlin's troops arrived at Kamenny Zaton. This fortress was once built on the banks of the Dnieper to prevent the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks from going out to sea along the Dnieper without the royal will, to quarrel the Sultan with the Tsar. The Kamenny Zaton was guarded by the Russian garrison - the infantry regiments of Gulitsa and Yankovsky. From here it was a stone's throw to the Crimea, and the hetman and Buturlin were already making plans on how to land troops on the Crimean coast.

On July 7, intelligence reported about the withdrawal of the main forces of the Tatars from Perekop. The movement of the Russian troops was stopped, they were waiting for the Tatar attack. Only four battalions of Captain Postelnikov were sent forward, who burned the empty kurens of the New Zaporozhian Sich and took four guns there. There were no Cossacks in Novaya Sich; at that time they were fighting for the Dniester with the army of Tsar Peter himself.

The position of Buturlin's troops was extremely difficult. They haven't crossed their border yet, and the supplies have already been used up. Yes, and no wonder - for a whole month they were practically trampling around in one place. Hunger began, I had to eat horse meat. Soldiers and Cossacks began to disperse little by little. The horde loomed not far beyond the Dnieper, distracting. Meanwhile, 15,000 Tatars of Bakhti-Girey moved to Sloboda Ukraine, to the Donets, Mirgorod, Bakhmut and Tor were under threat.

On July 23, Buturlin and Skoropadsky ordered their troops to retreat. Thus, the campaign against the Crimea was unsuccessful. As it became known, the day before, the troops of Tsar Peter himself, having signed an agreement with the Turks, began crossing back across the Prut. On August 1-3, the Russians crossed the Dniester.

But the Kuban campaign, which had been preparing for so long, entered its decisive stage. On August 17, Apraksin, who did not receive information that the war was over and peace had been signed, left Azov with 9,000 soldiers and moved south. The Kalmyk horde also reached there.

On August 26, according to the victorious report of Apraksin, the headquarters of Nureddin Bakhti Giray - Kopyl was ruined.

The Swedish monarch Charles XII took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Peter 1 insisted that the Turkish sultan oust the Swedish king from his country, but he left Charles on his territory. Then the Russian tsar began to threaten the sultan with war, but, taking the initiative, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire was the first to declare war on Russia. It happened on November 20, 1710. But the real reason for declaring war was the desire to return the lost Azov during the second Azov campaign.

After the declaration of war, Turkey was not active in the outbreak of the war. Only Crimean Tatars raided Ukraine. Then Peter 1 decided to take the initiative into his own hands. His plan of action was as follows - to make a trip to the Danube, cross the Danube and raise an uprising of the peoples who belong to the Ottoman Empire, but want to be more independent.

The Prut campaign of 1711 and its main events

Before the start of the Prut campaign, the Russian army was counted. The test results were as follows:

• nearly 80,000 regular army men,
• 60 heavy artillery pieces (from 4 pounds to 12 pounds),
• about 100 guns (caliber from 2 to 3 pounds).

Also, up to 10,000 Cossacks and up to 6,000 Moldovans joined the Russian army. The route of the Russian army was a straight line from Kiev to the city of Yassy, ​​crossing the Prut River.

On June 27, 1711, the Russian army crossed the Dniester River. After the Dniester, the army moved in two groups. The hike from the Dniester River to the Prut River lasted 6 days. This path was very difficult - many soldiers died from dehydration.

Since the Russian army was experiencing problems with fodder, Peter decided to send General Renne with an army to the city of Brailov, where there were large supplies of food and fodder. The army of Rennes consisted of 5,000 dragoons and 5,000 Moldovans. (Renne captured Brailov on July 25, but after 2 days he surrendered the city, since the Prut peace treaty had already been signed).

On July 14, Sheremetev's army and the army of Peter 1 united on the western bank of the Prut River. About 9,000 soldiers were left in Iasi to protect the rear, the rest of the army advanced along the Prut River towards the Danube River. On the 17th, another review of the troops was held, but this time the army of Peter 1 consisted of only 47 thousand soldiers.

On July 18, at 2 pm, the Turkish cavalry attacked the vanguard of the Russian troops under the command of General Janus von Eberstedt.

The Russian general had 6,000 dragoons and 32 cannons at his disposal.

Once in complete encirclement, the Russian general lined up an army of dismounted dragoons in a square with artillery in the center. The Russians fired back and slowly retreated to the main forces.

The Turkish cavalry were armed mainly with bows and had no artillery - this helped the dragoons to successfully repel attacks.

As soon as the sun went below the horizon, the Turks retreated and this gave the Russians a chance on the morning of the 19th to join the main army.

Battles with the Turkish army and encirclement

On July 19, the Turkish cavalry surrounded the Russian army, but did not approach the Russian soldiers at a distance closer than 300 steps. Since the Russian army was in a lowland, Peter 1 decided to go upstream along the Prut River in order to find a more advantageous position for defense.

At 23:00 the Russian army advanced up the Prut. The army marched in six parallel columns. Particularly dangerous areas were protected by slingshots carried by soldiers in their arms. On that day, the losses of Peter 1 reached 800 people.

The next morning, due to the rough terrain, a large gap formed between the leftmost column of the guards and the neighboring column. The Tatars immediately took advantage of this and attacked the defenseless convoy. Before the columns connected, not a few people died. Due to a hitch, the Turkish infantry (Janissaries) with artillery managed to catch up with the Russian army.

At about 5 p.m., the Russian army stopped and took up defensive positions near Stanileshti, which is 75 km from Yass downstream of the river. Rod.

At 19 o'clock the first attack of the Turkish infantry began, but they were stopped by a volley of guns and rifles. While the Janissaries were hiding behind a hillock, grenadiers began to throw grenades at them. Having jumped out and rushed again to the attack, the Turkish infantry was again stopped by a rifle salvo.

During the night, the Turks attacked the Russians 2 more times, but both times the attacks were repulsed. On that day, Russian losses amounted to almost 2,700 killed and wounded. Turkish losses were between 7,000 and 8,000.

On July 21, the Turks began shelling the Russian army with 160 guns. The Turkish infantry once again tried to attack the Russian army, but was again driven back, losing many soldiers in the process. Once surrounded, the affairs of the Russian army became worse and worse - there was little ammunition left, the food was running out. At the council, Peter 1 offered to start peace negotiations, but if the Sultan refuses, then break through without sparing himself or the enemy.

There was a decision to send a trumpeter with a truce, but the commander of the Turkish troops refused and gave the order to attack. The Janissaries, having huge losses, refused to go on the attack. After an unsuccessful first attempt, Peter decides to send a second letter with a proposal for peace, but this time he added that in case of refusal, the Russian army would go on a decisive attack without sparing himself. After this letter, the Turkish vizier decided to conclude a truce for 2 days and start peace negotiations.

On July 22, Vice-Chancellor Shafirov returned from the Turkish military camp with the terms of the Prut peace treaty. The main articles of the peace treaty were:

• the return of Azov to the Turks;
• destruction of fortresses in the coastal lands of the Sea of ​​Azov;
• destruction of the Azov fleet.

Results

After Peter's army crossed the Dniester River, he ordered to count the army. Of the 80,000 people before the campaign, there were only 37 and a half thousand soldiers + 5,000 soldiers of General Renne. During the Prut campaign, the army lost about 37,000 people, but only 5,000 died in battle, the rest died of hunger, dehydration, surrendered, deserted.

The most important loss as a result of this campaign was the loss of control over the Sea of ​​​​Azov and the loss of the Azov fleet. Three ships, one of them "Goto Predistance", Peter 1 wanted to transport to the Baltic Sea, but the Turks did not allow passage through the Bosphorus. Therefore, Peter had to sell these ships to the Turks.

Map of the Prut Campaign

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Prut campaign of Emperor Peter 1

The so-called Prut campaign of Tsar Peter the Great began in mid-summer in 1711. It was then that on the territory belonging to modern Moldova there was an aggravation of the confrontation within the framework of the war waged between Turkey and Russia. At the same time, the results of these military operations were rather bad for the Russian side. As a result of the war, Peter had to give up the fortress of Azov, which he had previously conquered, which was necessary for Russia both for the development of trade routes and acted as an important naval base. Let's look at the main events of the Prut campaign.

Two years before the events described above, Russia inflicts a defeat on the army of the Swedish king Charles the Twelfth as part of the Northern War. In the battle of Poltava, the entire army was practically destroyed, and the monarch himself was forced to flee to Turkey, where he hid until 1711, when Turkey declared war on Russia. But, military operations stood still, because none of the parties actually wanted to enter into a large-scale war.

Modern historians often blame Peter the Great for the fact that it was because of his omissions that the war became possible during this period. Indeed, if the Russian tsar, after the Battle of Poltava, began the persecution of Charles, then most likely the outcome of events would have been different. However, Peter begins the pursuit of the fleeing king only three days after his flight. This miscalculation cost the Russian ruler that the Swedish king managed to turn the Turkish sultan against Peter.

The Russian side had at its disposal Russian army and Moldovan Corps. In total, about eighty-six thousand men and one hundred and twenty guns were gathered. The Turkish side consisted of the Ottoman army and the troops of the Crimean Khanate. According to the calculation of contemporaries, the Turkish army consisted of four hundred and forty guns and one hundred and ninety thousand people!

For the Prut campaign, the Russian tsar sends an army to Poland through Kiev, bypassing the fortress of Soroca, located on the banks of the Dniester. On June 27, 1711, the army, led by Peter himself and his associate Sheremetev, crosses the Dniester and advances to the Prut River. The implementation of the plan took a little less than a week, and if it were not for the frankly weak discipline in the Russian ranks and the lack of organization, many Russian soldiers would not have had to die from dehydration and exhaustion.

Chronology of the Prut campaign of Peter I

The following events developed in this way:

• On July 1, Sheremetev's troops reach the eastern bank of the Prut River, where they are suddenly attacked by the Crimean cavalry. As a result, about three hundred Russian soldiers were killed, but this raid was repulsed.
• Two days later, the army continues its movement along the banks of the river and goes to the town of Yassy.
• On the sixth day of the same month, Peter the Great orders to cross the Prut. After a successful crossing, Dmitry Kantemir joins the troops.
• Two days later, the Russian army splits up to better provide provisions in this territory, and already on the fourteenth of July they unite again.
• A 9,000-strong garrison remains in Iasi, and the rest of the forces move forward.
• On the eighteenth of July, a new battle begins. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, the Ottoman soldiers strike at the rear of the Russian troops. Despite a significant numerical superiority, the Turkish garrisons retreat. The main reason for this lay in the weakly armed infantry and the lack of artillery.
• On the nineteenth of July, the encirclement of the army of Peter the Great began. At noon, the Turkish cavalry completely surrounds the Russian army, while not entering the battle. The Russian tsar decides to advance up the river in order to choose a better place to take the fight.
• On the 20th, a huge gap is formed during the movement of Peter's troops. The Turks instantly took advantage of this, striking at the convoy, which was left without cover. Then the pursuit of the main forces begins. Russian troops take up a defensive position near the village of Stanileshti and prepare for battle. By evening, the Turkish army also approaches there. The battle begins at seven o'clock in the evening, but the first Turkish attack was repulsed. In total, in this battle, the Russians lost about two thousand soldiers (half fell on the field, while others were wounded). However, the losses of the Turks were much greater. They lost more than eight thousand people, wounded and killed.
• On July 21, a massive artillery attack on the Russian army begins. At the same time, in between the implementation of shelling, the Turks now and then attacked with cavalry and infantry. However, even with such an onslaught, the Russian army continued to take a hit. Peter the Great himself was well aware of the hopelessness of the situation on the battlefield, and therefore he decides to propose the signing of a peace treaty at the military council. As a result of the negotiations, Shafirov was sent to the Turks as an after peace.

This ended the Prut campaign of Peter the Great.

Map of the Prut campaign of 1711:

Table: Prut campaign of 1711

Video lecture: Prut campaign of Peter 1