A criminal case has been transferred to the Kuibyshevsky District Court of Samara against a group of natives of the Caucasus accused of attacking a military camp and servicemen of the 81st motorized rifle regiment of the Volga-Urals military district.
The incident happened on January 20 last year in the village of Kryazh, where the regiment's units are stationed. On that day, several Dagestanis living in Samara, unidentified by the investigation, decided to visit a fellow countryman who was doing military service. They tried to enter the territory of the military camp through checkpoint No. 2. The officer on duty at the checkpoint, Private Sazhin, tried to block their way. A scuffle ensued. The commander of the reconnaissance platoon, Senior Lieutenant Zinoviev, intervened in it. As a result, the uninvited guests managed to be escorted out.
However, at about 7 pm on the same day, a crowd of about two dozen natives of Dagestan drove up to the checkpoint. The investigation managed to identify only the most active of them - Sadullayev, Shogenov and Abdurakhmanov. Moreover, as it turned out, Abdurakhmanov had previously served first in a reconnaissance company, and then in an anti-aircraft missile battalion of the 81st regiment. For a military crime, a Dagestani was sent to a disciplinary battalion by a military court. And only recently retired.
Judging by the cries, the Caucasians intended to settle scores with Senior Lieutenant Zinoviev. The outfit that was on duty at the checkpoint was blocked by the attackers, threatening with knives. Telephone communication with the regiment on duty captain Belov was cut off. And they broke into the reconnaissance barracks without hindrance.
From the testimony of sergeant Antsifrov, on duty in the company: “I heard the cry of the orderly Sultanov:“ Duty, go out! there was an intercom telephone on the bedside table, the receiver of which was torn off. The Caucasians were looking for senior lieutenant Zinoviev, they beat everyone they came across. "
A group of raiders raided the repair company. There, too, soldiers were beaten, rummaged through their pockets, and confiscated money, cell phones, and other valuables. A total of 18 soldiers were injured.
The raid lasted no more than half an hour. After that, the Dagestanis calmly left the location of the regiment.
Sadullaev, Shogenov and Abdurakhmanov were charged under articles 213 (hooliganism), 161 (robbery) and 116 (beatings) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which lasted for about a year.
Opinions
Alexander Sharavin, retired colonel, director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis:
If military units in "hot spots" are seriously fortified and duty officers serve there in bulletproof vests, helmets and do not part with machine guns for a minute, then ordinary military camps, unfortunately, are poorly protected from attack. Of all the means of notification - an antediluvian telephone. I think that it is high time to equip all checkpoints of military units with alarm buttons, as is done in banks. And illegal entry into a military facility, especially with aggressive intentions, should be regarded as a particularly serious crime.
Alexander Samodelov, lieutenant colonel:
In principle, it is not difficult to get into many of our military units. Whether with good or evil intentions. Unless in Chechnya, the 42nd division reliably guards itself. In the late 90s, I served in Dagestan. Thus, at nighttime, even militants entered the 136th motorized rifle brigade stationed in Buynaksk through gaps in the fence, as if they were at home. It used to be with weapons. The soldier was kidnapped. I remember that in 1998, bandits in camouflage took privates Stepanov, Yerzhanov and Aleev right from the military camp of the brigade. They were transported to Chechnya, and then returned for a ransom. Now there is no such mess there, still a hot spot. But in the depths of Russia, military camps are not so carefully guarded.
The Russian army, as a military entity that inherits the traditions of the Soviet Army, has many heroes, both among people and among entire units. One of these units is the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MSP), called Petrakuvsky. The full name of the regiment consists of a list of many military awards, which are real evidence of its valor and glory, and looks like this - the 81st Guards Petrakuvsky twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Motorized Rifle Regiment.
The history of the Petrakuvsky Regiment can be divided into several stages, which, smoothly flowing one into another, stretch to our days. In this article, we will try to consider the regiment's combat path, focusing on the last heroic and at the same time inglorious battle, which is still fresh in people's memory - the assault on Grozny in the first Chechen campaign of 1994-95.
BEGINNING: THE PRE-WAR YEARS
The time leading up to World War II was a period of high-profile political transformation in Europe, saber-rattling by two European predators, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, either the Union was preparing for aggression, or it was preparing to repel aggression from other countries (read Germany), but in any case, the army was urgently reorganized. This reorganization affected both the equipping of existing units with new types of weapons, and the creation of new units, formations and even armies.
Against the background of such a process in the army, the 81st motorized rifle regiment Petrakuvsky was created. True, at the time of creation it had a different serial number. It was the 210th Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Division. The regiment was formed in the late spring of 1939, the regiment was registered in the Urals military district. This year for the Soviet Union was characterized by military operations in Manchuria, so the 81st Petrakuvsky Regiment (we will call it that, a more familiar name) was hastily transferred to Khalkhin Gol, along with the native 82nd Infantry Division.
Here, the Petrakuvsky regiment received its first baptism of fire, while receiving gratitude from the command. The tension in the region did not subside even after the end of hostilities, and it was decided to leave the units that fought in Manchuria in a new place. So the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment moved from the Urals to Mongolia, to the city of Choibalsan.
START: WAR
The 81st (210th) motorized rifle regiment met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War at the place of permanent deployment in Mongolia. And only in the autumn of 1941, when the situation on the Western Front was very tense, the 81st regiment, as part of its native division, received an order to go into the thick of things - to fight for Moscow. The 81st motorized rifle regiment fought its first battle with the German invaders on October 25, 1941 in the area of the station village of Dorohovo. The battles for Moscow were long and bloody, only in the spring of 1942 significant success was achieved. Many parts have received government awards. Among these units was the 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which for courage and heroism in the battles for Moscow received the right to be called Guards. At the same time, the regiment received a new serial number, from March 18, 1942, it was called the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. A little later, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
On June 17, 1942, the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment was reorganized into the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade. The brigade was part of the 6th mechanized corps of the 4th tank army. The further battle path was no less glorious than its beginning in this bloody war. The brigade participated in many iconic battles of the Great Patriotic War. The end of the war was partly caught in Czechoslovakia. For special courage in battles, the brigade was awarded the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. And for the capture of the town of Petrakow, the brigade received the title of Petrakow, this happened in January 1945.
MATURE YEARS: POST-WAR
In the post-war period, the 17th mechanized brigade was again reorganized into a mechanized regiment, which received all the rights to the awards of its predecessors, and became known as the 17th Guards Mechanized Petrakuvsky Regiment twice Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov, Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. At some point, the regiment was even turned into a separate mechanized battalion, this happened against the background of the post-war reduction in the army.
However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the battalion was again transformed into a mechanized regiment, and in 1957 it received a modern serial number and began to bear the name of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The regiment was in the Western Group of Forces in the town of Karlhost. The 81st regiment managed to take part in the so-called liberation campaign in Czechoslovakia, this was in 1968.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 81st regiment was part of the Western Group of Forces in Germany. During this time, it was reorganized and transferred to new states several times. In 1993, the ZGV was liquidated, and the 81st regiment was withdrawn from Germany to a new location, which was located in the Samara region.
MODERN HISTORY: BLOODY TIME
With the collapse of the Union, the centrifugal forces, having broken ties between the once fraternal republics, continued to tear apart the Russian Federation as well. These forces were multiplied many times over by separatist sentiments fueled from outside in some Caucasian republics. In addition, the country's leadership was worried about the rather large oil reserves in the region, as well as oil and gas communications. All together, this first provoked a conflict with the Chechen Republic, which later grew into a full-scale war.
Serious hostilities in Chechnya began at the end of 1994. From the first days, the 81st regiment, which was part of the NORTH group, also took part in this. While participating in the disarmament of illegal military formations (as this operation was officially called), the regiment was commanded by Colonel Yaroslavtsev (who was seriously wounded during the storming of Grozny), the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov (also wounded in Grozny).
The most serious and significant event for the personnel of the regiment in the post-war years is a military operation called the assault on the capital of the Chechen Republic, the city of Grozny. The purpose of the operation was to capture the capital of the rebellious republic, in which the main forces were located, as well as the leadership of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria. For this task, several groups were formed, one of which included the Petrakov regiment. At that time, the regiment consisted of more than 1300 personnel, 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks and more than 20 pieces of artillery and mortars.
It is worth noting that, compared even with the times of 5 years ago, the regiment made a depressing impression. Many of the officers who were still serving in Germany quit, they were replaced by graduate students of military departments. In addition, the personnel of the regiment's units were completely untrained. The soldiers had only records in military cards about their positions, there was no real knowledge and skills in sight. The mechanics of the BMP and tanks had little driving experience, the shooters practically did not carry out live firing from small arms, not to mention grenade launchers and mortars. In addition, immediately before being sent to Chechnya, the most trained and trained specialists left (transferred) the regiment, the lack of which subsequently cost the units dearly.
There was no preparation for the entry of troops into Chechnya, as such, the personnel were simply loaded onto a train and taken away. According to the surviving participants of those events, combat training took place even during the journey, right in the cars. Upon arrival in Mozdok, the regiment received 2 days to prepare, and two days later made a march to Grozny. At that time, the 81st regiment was staffed according to the peacetime staff, which was only 50% of the war staff. Most importantly, motorized rifle units were not equipped with simple infantry, there were only BMP crews. This fact was one of the main factors in the death of the regiment's units that stormed Grozny. Roughly speaking, the equipment entered the city without infantry cover, which is tantamount to death. This was understood by the commanders on the ground, for example, the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, spoke about this. But no one listened to the words of the command of the units sent to Chechnya.
STORM OF GROZNY
The decision to storm the city was made at a meeting of the Security Council on December 26, 1994. The assault on the city was preceded by artillery preparation. 8 days before the start of the operation, artillery units began a massive shelling of Grozny. As it turned out later, this was not enough, in general, as such, there was no preparation for the military operation, the troops marched at random.
The Petrakuvsky regiment marched along with the 131st Maikop motorized rifle brigade from the northern part, as part of the NORTH group. Contrary to the original plan, according to which the troops of the Russian army were to enter the city from three sides, two groups remained in place, and only the NORTH group entered the center.
It is worth noting that the forces for the assault were clearly not enough, according to some reports, the troops of the Russian Army around Grozny numbered about 14 thousand people, without even having a two-fold advantage. This was clearly not enough for an attack, and even more so in the conditions of the city, and even understaffed units. In addition, there was an acute shortage of maps and clear controls. The regiment's tasks changed every few hours, many did not know where to simply move. The Chechens easily wedged into the radio communications of the Russian troops, disorienting them. Even elementary reconnaissance of the enemy forces was not carried out, so the battalion and company commanders did not know who was opposing them.
The start of the assault on the capital of the rebellious republic was scheduled for the last day of 1994. This, according to the plan of the command of the Joint Forces, was to play into the hands of the attackers. In principle, the tactics of surprise worked 100%, subsequently playing a negative role. None of the defenders of Grozny simply expected an assault on New Year's Eve. That is why the units of the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade managed to quickly reach the city center and just as quickly ... die there.
Later, some sources began to actively promote such an opinion, according to which the Chechens themselves allowed Russian troops to reach the city center unhindered, luring them into a trap. However, such a claim is unlikely.
The first of the divisions of the Petrakov regiment entered the advance detachment, which included a reconnaissance company, led by the regiment's chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov. They had the task of taking possession of the airport and clearing the bridges on the way to Grozny. The forward detachment coped with its task brilliantly, and after it two motorized rifle battalions entered the city under the command of lieutenant colonels Perepelkin and Shilovsky.
The units marched in columns, tanks were in front, the flanks of the columns were covered by the Tunguska ZSU. As the surviving participants of those events later said, the tanks did not even have cartridges for machine guns, which made them useless in the conditions of the city.
The first clash took place near the advance detachment already at the entrance to the city, on Khmelnitsky Street. During the battle, it was possible to inflict serious damage on the enemy, but 1 infantry fighting vehicle had to be lost, and the first wounded appeared.
The regiment's units were rapidly advancing towards the center of the city, practically without encountering resistance. Already at 12.00, after only 5 hours, the railway station was reached, about which the regiment commander reported to the command. Further orders were received to advance towards the palace of the Government of the Republic.
However, the fulfillment of this task was greatly hampered by the increased activity of the militants who came to their senses. A fierce battle ensued in the area of the government palace, during which Colonel Yaroslavtsev (regiment commander) was wounded. The command passed to the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
The swift offensive quickly bogged down in the fierce opposition of the defenders, who fired grenade-launchers at the equipment of the federal troops. The combat vehicles were knocked out one after another, the columns of the regiment's subunits were cut off from each other and divided into separate groups. A big obstacle was created by their own set fire to the car. The dead and wounded already numbered more than a hundred people, Burlakov was among the wounded.
Only by nightfall did the units of the 81st Regiment and the 131st Brigade receive a long-awaited respite. However, immediately after the New Year, the intensity of fire from the militants increased. In agreement with the command of the unit of the NORTH group, they left the station and began to break out of the city. The retreat was not coordinated, they broke through one by one and in small groups. So there were more chances ...
From the encirclement, the advanced units of the Maykop brigade and the Petrakuvsky regiment emerged significantly thinned, with huge losses in manpower and equipment. According to official information, the regiment lost 63 people killed during the assault, in addition, there were still 75 missing and about 150 wounded.
In addition to two motorized rifle battalions and an advanced detachment, there were also other units of the 81st regiment in Grozny, brought together in one group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stankevich. They took up defense on the streets of Mayakovsky and Khmelnitsky. Properly organized defense made it possible to create an island of resistance, which successfully fought for several days. This group served as a rescue for many soldiers of the advanced detachment breaking through from the encirclement.
Among other things, the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment participated not only in the storming of Grozny on New Year's Eve 1994. The entire January of the new year, 1995, was spent in battles for the regiment. Thanks to the dedication of the guys, Dudayev's palace, an arms factory, and a printing house were taken - an important center of resistance.
For several more months, the regiment was on the territory of Chechnya, and only in April 1995, the unit was withdrawn to the place of permanent deployment.
Now one of the most famous regiments of our time is part of the motorized rifle brigade under the same number.
From the description of the battle: “The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the “station” ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy regiment commander for work with personnel, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich ."one
- tank commander
- driver [?] private TB 6 guards. tp Evgeny Germanovich Efimov (military unit 71432)2
- gunner
From the memoirs of Efimov's mother E.G.: "According to colleagues who accompanied my son Yevgeny Germanovich Efimov to the burial place, my son died in Grozny on Mayakovsky Street on the night of January 31-1, 1995. His tank was hit from grenade launcher with a blow to the side armor, under the turret. The tank caught fire. Zhenya, shell-shocked or wounded, but already burning, crawled out of the burning car onto the armor, where he was shot from small arms. His crew remained in the tank. "3
I believe that the tank was at a checkpoint and was hit, and according to Vladislav Belogrud's version4, the tank was part of the column.
Column formation
The commander of the rs obs 90 td captain S. Spiridonov: “On January 1, in the morning, a new column was formed.<...>And on the first day, when we went, we were met at the very beginning. True, the Chechens did not burn fuel trucks, they wanted to seize them. They fired at armored vehicles. The killed drivers of fuel trucks were replaced by warrant officers and they were taken out of the shelling. "5
A moment that is not entirely clear: 200 paratroopers6, presumably from the 104th Airborne Division, were attached to 81 SMEs. There is information that on January 1 they were transferred from the airport to the city7, but there is no information about their participation in hostilities yet.
According to Vladislav Belogrud's version8, the column consisted of "70 soldiers and four officers".
BMP №435
- BMP commander senior lieutenant Igor Vladimirovich Bodnya
- gunner-operator private Igor Sergeevich Komissarkin (from military unit 738749)
Guards Major A. Fomin: “On January 1, the combined detachment of the regiment entered Grozny to support the units entrenched in the city center. The convoy included vehicles with ammunition, fuel, and vehicles for the removal of the wounded. The crew of the BMP-2 No. 435 had the task of providing the passage of the column, covering it with their fire.<...>As soon as the lead vehicle entered Ordzhonikidze Square, the column of the regiment's combined detachment was fired upon. She was taken into the "fire bag", knocking out cars in the "head" and "tail" of the column. The decision was made to move back. BMP-2 No. 435 took an advantageous firing position and began to cover the withdrawal of the column with its fire. Having brought down all the firepower on the militants, the crew waited for the last car of the column to pass. Ammunition was used up. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the BMP. After several hits, the crew began to get out of the car. Private I.S. Komissarkin was seriously wounded and his comrades-in-arms pulled him out. They continued to fight with personal weapons from the ground, but the forces were unequal ...
Their bodies were found by colleagues not far from the burned-out car. The crew of the BMP-2 No. 435 fulfilled their military duty to the end as befits real men, warriors. "11
Return to checkpoint
From the description of the battle: "For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in a bare place - an open and wide intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area and constantly struck at the enemy. Stankevich competently placed his firepower. He placed the BMP (he had 9 of them), organized the "binding" of the fire of attached mortars in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense of the line, even non-standard measures were taken. So, in order to protect the BMP from the fire of enemy grenade launchers, the lieutenant colonel ordered ... steel gates and cover them with military vehicles on the sides and front. Stankevich's "know-how" turned out to be successful: an RPG shot "slid" over a sheet of metal without hitting the car. After the bloody New Year's Eve, people gradually began to come to their senses. Stankevich's detachment fighters escaping from the encirclement gradually pulled together. "12
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1 Semyonov D. The 81st regiment completed its task in Grozny!
2 Unknown soldier of the Caucasian war. M., 1997. S. 82.
3 Remember and bow down. Yekaterinburg, 2000, p. 158.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 42.
5 Galaktionov V. How it was // Samara newspaper. 2000. January 11. (
More and more time takes away from us the events of the New Year's assault on Grozny. The soldiers who were at the forefront of the fighting were labeled almost "lambs thrown to the slaughter." The names of the units that suffered the greatest losses also became common nouns:, 81st Regiment ...
Meanwhile, in those first days of the Grozny operation, the servicemen showed unparalleled courage. The units that entered that "terrible" city in every sense, stood to the end, to death.
Chechen "abscess"
On November 30, 1994, the President signed the Decree "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic." It was decided to "cut open" the Chechen "abscess" by force. To carry out the operation, a Joint Group of Forces was created, including the forces and means of various ministries and departments.
“In early December 1994, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on official business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army,” recalls Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the January battles in Grozny . - In the midst of the meeting, the bell rang at the chief of staff of the association, General Krotov. Someone from high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general answered the subscriber to one of his questions, “the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment is just with me. I'll get the information to them right now."
After the general hung up the phone, he asked everyone present to leave. In a tete-a-tete atmosphere, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that “we had to prepare.” The region of application is the North Caucasus. Everything else - later.
REFERENCE: The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment - the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment - was formed in 1939. Combat biography began at Khalkhin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War, he participated in the defense of Moscow, liberated Orel, Lvov, cities of Eastern Europe from the Nazis. 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union. There are five orders on the Battle Banner of the unit - two Red Banners, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the war, he was stationed on the territory of the GDR. It is currently part of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga-Urals Military District, is part of the constant combat readiness.
In mid-1993, the 81st Regiment, which was then part of the 90th Tank Division of the 2nd Army, was withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and deployed 40 kilometers from Samara, in the village of Chernorechye. And the regiment, and the division, and the army became part of the Volga Military District. At the time of arrival at the new place of deployment, not a single soldier remained in the regiment. With the conclusion, many officers and ensigns were also “confused”. Most issues, primarily organizational ones, had to be resolved by the remaining small backbone of the regiment.
By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed by the state of the so-called mobile forces. Then in the Armed Forces they just began to create such units. It was assumed that they could be deployed on the first command to any region of the country to solve various problems - from the aftermath of natural disasters to the repulse of an attack by gangs (the word "terrorism" was not yet in use).
With the special status given to the regiment, combat training became noticeably more active, and recruitment issues began to be resolved more efficiently. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town built at the expense of the German authorities in Chernorechye.
In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the inspection of the Ministry of Defense. For the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and arrangement in a new place, the 81st showed that it had become a full-blooded part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks. True, this inspection did the regiment a disservice.
A number of servicemen, who received good training, were eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. Trained specialists were taken there with pleasure. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are drivers, gunners, snipers.
In the 81st, they believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people could be trained ...
Echelons to the Caucasus
The 81st motorized rifle regiment of the PriVO, which was to go to war in December 1994, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 district units. For all fees - a week. I had to select commanders. A third of the primary-level officers were "two-year students", they had behind them only the military departments of civilian universities.
On December 14, military equipment began to be loaded onto the trains (in total, the regiment was transferred to Mozdok in five echelons). The mood of the people was not depressed. On the contrary, many were sure that it would be a short business trip, that they would be able to return by the New Year holidays.
Due to the lack of time, classes with personnel were organized even on the train, along the route of the echelons. The material part of the weapon, the order of aiming, the combat regulations, especially the sections relating to hostilities in the city, were studied.
Another week was given to the regiment for training already upon arrival in Mozdok. Shooting, coordinating units. And now, years later, it is clear: the regiment was not ready for combat operations. There was a shortage of personnel, especially in motorized rifle units.
About 200 paratroopers were given to the regiment as reinforcements. The same young, unfired soldiers. I had to learn to fight already under enemy fire ...
The enemy was not conditional ...
At the time of the beginning of the assault on Grozny, about 14,000 federal troops were concentrated around the Chechen capital. 164 tanks, 305 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 armored personnel carriers, 114 infantry fighting vehicles were ready to enter the city, blocked from the northeast, north, northwest and west. Fire support was provided by 208 guns and mortars.
In military equipment, the federals had an obvious superiority. However, in personnel, the advantage was not even up to two to one. The classical theory of battle requires the advancing advantage by about three times, and taking into account urban development, this figure should be even greater.
And what did he have at that time? According to data that later fell into the hands of our security forces, the size of the Chechen army reached 15 thousand people in regular troops and up to 30-40 thousand armed militias. The regular army units of Chechnya consisted of a tank regiment, a mountain rifle brigade, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a Muslim fighter regiment, and 2 training aviation regiments. The republic had its own special forces - the national guard (about 2,000 people), a separate special forces regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a regiment of border and customs services of the state security department, as well as personal protection units of Chechen leaders.
Serious forces were represented by the formations of the so-called "confederation of the peoples of the Caucasus" - the "Borz" and "Warriors of the Righteous Caliphs" battalions, the "Abd al-Kader" battalion, the "Islamic Renaissance Party" detachment, the "Islamic Community" detachment. In addition, more than five thousand mercenaries from 14 states fought on the side of Dudayev.
According to documents seized in 1995, Dudayev, in addition to regular forces, had at least 300 thousand (!) Reservists. The law “On the Defense of the Chechen Republic” adopted in the region on December 24, 1991 introduced compulsory military service for all male citizens from 19 to 26 years old. Naturally, the service took place in Chechnya, in local paramilitary formations. There was a system of regular collections of reserve reserves: in the period 1991-1994, six full-fledged mobilization exercises were held.
Parts of the Chechen army were replenished even with deserters: on the basis of Dudayev's decree No. 29 of February 17, 1992, Chechen military personnel who arbitrarily left military units on the territory of the USSR and expressed a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic were rehabilitated, and the criminal cases initiated against them were terminated.
Another Dudayev Decree No. 2 of November 8, 1991 established a military ministry in Chechnya. All military formations on the territory of the republic, along with equipment and weapons, passed to him. According to operational data, at the end of 1994 Chechnya had 2 launchers of operational-tactical missiles, 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 aircraft (training, but converted into light attack aircraft), 5 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighters, 6 aircraft An-2, 243 aircraft missiles, 7 thousand air shells.
The Chechen "ground forces" were armed with 42 T-72 and T-62 tanks, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 30 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them, 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-ZO howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them. The Dudayev formations had 5 fixed and 88 portable air defense systems, as well as 25 anti-aircraft guns of various types, 590 anti-tank weapons, almost 50,000 small arms and 150,000 grenades.
For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command created three defensive lines. The inner one had a radius of 1 to 1.5 km around the presidential palace. The defense here was based on the created solid nodes of resistance around the palace using capital stone buildings. The lower and upper floors of the buildings were adapted for firing small arms and anti-tank weapons. Along the avenues of Ordzhonikidze, Pobeda and Pervomaiskaya Street, prepared positions were created for direct fire with artillery and tanks.
The middle boundary was located at a distance of up to 1 km from the boundaries of the inner boundary in the northwestern part of the city and up to 5 km in its southwestern and southeastern parts. The basis of this frontier was made up of strongholds at the beginning of the Staropromyslovsky Highway, nodes of resistance at bridges across the Sunzha River, in the Minutka microdistrict, on Saykhanov Street. Oilfields, oil refineries named after Lenin and Sheripov, as well as a chemical plant were prepared for undermining or arson.
The outer border passed mainly along the outskirts of the city and consisted of strong points on the Grozny-Mozdok, Dolinsky-Katayama-Tashkala highways, Neftyanka, Khankala and Staraya Sunzha strong points in the east and Chernorechye in the south of the city.
"Virtual" topography
The troops practically did not have clear data about the enemy at the beginning of the assault, and there was also no reliable intelligence and intelligence information. There were no cards either. The deputy commander of the regiment had a hand-drawn diagram of where he was supposed to go approximately with his units. Later, the map nevertheless appeared: it was removed from our killed tank captain.
A few days before the assault, Anatoly Kvashnin set the tasks for the group commanders for actions in the city. The main task fell to the 81st regiment, which was supposed to operate as part of the North group under the command of Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky.
The regiment, which was partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range, and partly (by one battalion) was located in the area of a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, was assigned two tasks: the immediate and subsequent. The nearest one was planned to occupy the Severny airport by 10 am on December 31. The next one is to seize the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets by 16 o'clock.
The beginning of hostilities on December 31, as expected, was supposed to be a factor of surprise. That is why the columns of the federals were able to reach the city center almost without hindrance, and not, as was later stated, they fell into a prepared trap of bandits who intended to draw our columns into a kind of "fire bag". Only by the end of the day the militants were able to organize resistance. The Dudaevites concentrated all their efforts on the units that ended up in the city center. It was these troops who suffered the greatest losses ...
Encirclement, breakthrough ...
The chronology of the last day of 1994 has now been restored not only by the hour, but by the minute. At 7 am on December 31, the advance detachment of the 81st regiment, which included a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st, Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, having captured the airport and cleared two bridges across the Neftyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the 1st Motor Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin moved in a column. To the west, through the state farm "Rodina", was the 2nd MSB. Fighting vehicles moved in columns: tanks were ahead, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.
From the Severny airport, the 81st MSP went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 0917, motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from the Dudayev detachment with attached tanks, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the Urals, but the scouts also lost one BMP and several people were wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and stop the advance for a while.
Then the advance resumed. Already by 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. The advance of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to block the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began advancing to Dzerzhinsky Square.
By 12.30, the advanced units were already near the station, and the headquarters of the group confirmed the previously given order to surround the presidential palace. At 13.00 the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings.
But the Dudaevites gradually came to their senses. From their side began a powerful fire resistance. A fierce battle broke out at the palace. Here, the advanced aircraft controller, Captain Kiryanov, covered the regiment commander with himself. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and handed over command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
At 16.10, the chief of staff received confirmation of the task of blockading the palace. But the motorized riflemen were given the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed throughout the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The columns of the regiment began to gradually break up into separate groups. By 5 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, and about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were out of action.
The intensity of the fire impact can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!
Units of the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudaevites unleashed a flurry of fire on them. The fighters under the cover of the BMP took up all-round defense. The main part of the personnel and equipment was concentrated on the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st MSB of the 81st Regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd MSB - at the station's goods yard.
The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were placed in the yard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railway track. At dusk, the onslaught of the enemy intensified. Losses increased Especially in the equipment, which was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.
Relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the shooting continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Savin, asked for permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where units of the 693rd MSP of the West group were defending. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade began to break through from the railway station and the goods station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.
28 people from the 1st MSR of the 81st MSR broke through on three infantry fighting vehicles along the railway. Having reached the Press House, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by militants. As a result, two BMPs were shot down. Only one vehicle under the command of Captain Arkhangelov made it to the location of the federal troops.
... Today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st SME and 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost their commanders, equipment (only in one day on December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), dispersed around the city and went out to their own - one at a time or in small groups. According to official data, as of January 10, 1995, the 81st SME lost 63 servicemen in Grozny killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded...
Let the mother of the enemy cry first
The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in fact on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.
Stankevich competently placed 9 infantry fighting vehicles, organized the "binding" of the fire of attached mortars in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense, non-standard measures were taken. Steel gates were removed from the surrounding Grozny courtyards and covered with them on the sides and front of the combat vehicles. The "know-how" turned out to be successful: the RPG shot "slid" along the sheet of metal without hitting the car. People after the bloody New Year's Eve gradually began to recover. The fighters who escaped from the encirclement were gradually drawn into the detachment. They settled down as best they could, organized rest in the interval between enemy attacks.
Neither on December 31, nor on January 1, nor in the following days did the 81st Regiment leave the cities, remained at the forefront and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were led by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, who was in the hospital complex.
For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from the headquarters of General Rokhlin, it kept nearby. If the bandits knew this for sure, they would certainly have thrown all their reserves to crush a handful of daredevils. The bandits would have destroyed them in the same way as those units that were in the ring of fire in the station area.
But the detachment was not going to surrender to the mercy of the enemy. The surrounding courtyards were promptly cleared, and possible positions of enemy grenade launchers were eliminated. Here, the motorized riflemen began to discover the brutal truth about what the city they entered really was.
Thus, equipped openings were found in the brick fences and walls of most houses at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection, near which shots for grenade launchers were stored. Carefully prepared bottles of Molotov cocktails, an incendiary mixture, stood in the yards. And in one of the garages, dozens of empty boxes from grenade launchers were found: apparently, one of the supply points was located here.
Already on January 3, checkpoints began to be set up along Lermontov Street in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The posts allowed at least to slip along Lermontov Street, otherwise everything was shot on the go.
The regiment survived. He survived in spite of those who tried to destroy him in Grozny. He rose from the ashes in spite of those who at that time in absentia "buried" him and other Russian units that were at the epicenter of the Grozny battles.
For almost the whole of January, "shot", "torn apart" by evil tongues, the 81st regiment participated in the battles for Grozny. Again, very few people know about this.
It was the tankers of the 81st who provided support for the marines storming. It was the infantry of the regiment that captured the Krasny Molot plant, which the Dudayevites turned from a peaceful Soviet enterprise into a full-scale arms production. Engineer and sapper units of the unit cleared the bridge across the Sunzha, through which fresh forces were then drawn into the city. Units of the 81st took part in the assault on the Press House, which was one of the strongholds of the separatist resistance.
“I pay tribute to all the comrades with whom we fought together in those days,” says Igor Stankevich. - These are the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were led by General Vorobyov, who later died heroically in Grozny. These are detachments of internal troops, and groups of special forces of the GRU. These are employees of the special services, whose work, probably, cannot be said much today. Courageous, heroic people, brilliant professionals that any country would be proud of. And I am proud that I was with them on that front line.
Heroes become
The author of these lines in the first days of January had a chance to visit Grozny at war, just at the location of the 81st regiment, which had just moved to the territory of the cannery, having strengthened the checkpoint at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky crossroads. A journalistic notebook is full of notes: the names of people who heroically proved themselves in battles, numerous examples of courage and courage. For these soldiers and officers, it was just a job. None of them dared to call what happened on December 31 a tragedy.
Here are just some of the facts:
“... Senior Warrant Officer Grigory Kirichenko. Under enemy fire, he made several walkers to the epicenter of the battle, taking out the wounded soldiers in the compartments of the BMP, behind the levers of which he himself was sitting, to the evacuation center. (Later awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).
"...Senior Lieutenant Seldar Mamedorazov ("non-combat" of the chief of the club) broke through on one of the BMPs to the battle area, took out several wounded servicemen."
“...Major of the medical service Oleg Pastushenko. In battle, he provided assistance to personnel.
“... The commander of the tank battalion, Major Yuri Zakhryapin. Heroically acted in battle, personally hit enemy firing points.
And also the names of the soldiers, officers, meetings with which then, on that Grozny front line, remained at least an entry in the field notebook. As a maximum - a memory for life. Majors of the medical service Vladimir Sinkevich, Sergey Danilov, Viktor Minaev, Vyacheslav Antonov, captains Alexander Fomin, Vladimir Nazarenko, Igor Voznyuk, lieutenant Vitaly Afanasiev, warrant officers of the medical service Lidia Andryukhina, Lyudmila Spivakova, junior sergeant Alexander Litvinov, privates Alik Salikhanov, Vladimir Ishcherikov, Alexander Vladimirov, Andrey Savchenko ...
Where are you now, those young front-line soldiers of the 90s, soldiers and officers of the heroic, illustrious regiment? Warriors scorched in battles, but not burned to the ground, but survived in this hellish flame to spite all deaths of the 81st Guards? ..
With the kind permission of the authors, I am posting the article in my journal. For the first time the article was published in the newspaper "Tomorrow", in N5 for 2010. Despite the already long time since its publication, the article has not lost its factual value, and, against the background of the works of other authors on the same topic, it looks more than worthy. Illustrative material added by me.THE MYSTERY OF THE DEATH OF THE MAYKOP BRIGADE
15 years ago, the "New Year's assault" on Grozny ended. And in these battles, the Russian army suffered the biggest losses since the end of the Great Patriotic War. One of the mysteries of these battles was the dramatic fate of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, stationed before this war in Maykop. In this article, we will try to deal with the myths that have developed around these events. Based on the facts, we will try to present our version of the actions of the Sever group and about 2 days of fighting: December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995, the most difficult two days in the recent history of the Russian army.
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STORM- the capture of the "Presidential Palace of Dudayev" (the former Republican Committee of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR) went to the "North" group. The general command of the "North" group was carried out by Major General K.B. Pulikovsky. The number of personnel of the units is not clear for certain, most likely, it differs from the official one in a smaller direction, but since. there are no other data at the moment, we will take the official data from the site "chechnya.genstab.ru" as a basis. In total, the group consisted of 4097 people, 82 tanks, 211 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 64 guns and mortars. The group included the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMBR), the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GvMSP) and the 276th GvMSP, as well as attached and auxiliary units and units of the Internal Troops. The consolidated detachment of the 131st brigade under the command of Colonel I. Savin consisted of 1469 personnel, 42 BMP-2s, 26 T-72A tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The 81st regiment under the command of Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev consisted of 1331 people (including 157 officers, it is characteristic that 66 officers in the platoon-company link and had only a military department of a civilian university behind them), 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks (T-80BV and several T-80Bs) and 24 artillery pieces (self-propelled guns "Gvozdika"). The 276th regiment under the command of Colonel A. Bunin consisted of 1297 people, 73 BMP-1s, 31 tanks (T-72B1) and 24 artillery pieces (it must be said that at one time as many as 120 BMPs were attributed to the brigade, but the refutation of this is below).
Hero of Russia (posthumously) Colonel I.A. Savin.
131st brigade - 1 battalion on the southern slopes of the Tersky ridge in the area 3 km north of Sadovoye, 2 battalions concentrated in the MTF area 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky;
81st regiment - from 12/27/94, 3 km south of the lane. Kolodezny with the main forces, since the morning of December 28, 1994, 1.5 km north of Grozny;
276th regiment - on the northern slopes of the Tersky Range.
At least 400 people entered Grozny from the 276th regiment, 426 people entered the city from the 81st regiment, including a tank battalion. From the brigade - 446, including the "help column".
On December 30, at a meeting, the units received orders. The brigade was to advance on the morning of the 31st to the area of the old airfield and take up defense there. The 81st regiment's primary task was to occupy the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection by 16:00, the next task was to block the building of the Republican Committee and occupy the station. The 276th regiment was to take up positions on the outskirts of Sadovoye on the 31st until further notice.
The introduction of troops into the city, scheduled for the 31st, was unexpected for everyone, because. not all parts have yet been replenished with people, not all have properly coordinated.
Be that as it may, but on the morning of the 31st, the units began to move. The Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky crossroads was already occupied by 11 a.m., the second battalion could not pass through the Rodina state farm due to heavy fire from the militants and was ordered by General Pulikovsky to turn back and proceed to the next task, which was done after the artillery had processed the houses of the Ippodromny microdistrict, from where dense fire of militants. At the same time
The 131st brigade completed the task and took up positions on the outskirts of the city, moving on to equipping the defense area. But unexpectedly, she withdrew and went with one battalion to the station, and the second to the market. The regiment reached the square. Ordzhonikidze, where a "traffic jam" formed, leaving one company to cover. But soon the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, ordered the chief of staff of the regiment, Burlakov, to bring everything that could be pulled out to the station. While the regiment was moving towards Ordzhonikidze Square, they were overtaken by the equipment of the 131st brigade. As a result, both the regiment and the brigade reached the station almost simultaneously, where the regiment occupied the freight station, and the first battalion of the brigade - the station, the second rolled back to the freight station after being attacked by militants. After occupying the defense, the brigade and regiment at the station were attacked. The attacks continued until the very exit of the units from the station. Part of the equipment was burned, part was damaged, but fought as long as there was ammunition. Losses at this point were small. But the situation worsened sharply because other units did not fulfill their tasks.
Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin, February 1995
The units of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin that came out to the hospital were very few in number, because. part of the forces were forced to leave at checkpoints along the route of movement, the Internal Troops did not approach. On New Year's Eve, one battalion of the 276th regiment began to change the 33rd regiment at checkpoints. The assembled column has arrived. But having lost a lot of equipment, she could only go to the freight station. It became clear that the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment needed to leave the city, but the brigade's exit turned out to be unsuccessful: the column was ambushed at the motor depot. Two infantry fighting vehicles were lost, most of the wounded died with them, the brigade commander died, when the main part of the regiment left, the battalion commander Perepelkin and the commander of the third company Prokhorenko were killed. The total losses at the end of January 2 were:
In the 131st brigade, 142 people were lost alone, how many were wounded, missing - there are no exact data (according to other sources, 167 people died, including the brigade commander Colonel A. Savin, deputy brigade commanders for armament and educational work, in addition, 60 soldiers and sergeants died, 72 people were missing). Those. out of 446 people who entered the city, 289 remained in the ranks, or 65%;
In the 81st regiment (possibly for the entire period of hostilities): 134 killed, 160 wounded, 56 missing, according to the report of the chief of staff of the regiment Burlakov, 56 people died (of which 8 officers), 146 were wounded (of which 31 officer, 6 warrant officers), 28 people were missing (of which 2 officers), 87 people were sick (of which 8 officers and 3 warrant officers) - these data are more accurate. According to official data, on January 10, the regiment lost 63 servicemen killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded;
In the 276th regiment: at least 42 people were killed, at least 2 of them were missing, there are no data on the wounded.
Losses of equipment amounted to:
The 131st brigade lost, according to A. Sapronov, 15 tanks and 47 infantry fighting vehicles, military journalist Viktor Litovkin gives other figures: "20 out of 26 tanks were lost, 18 out of 120 infantry fighting vehicles were evacuated from Grozny, all 6 Tunguskas were destroyed";
81st regiment - 23 tanks, 32 - BMP-2, 4 - armored personnel carriers, 2 tractors - 2, 1 "Tunguska" 1 MTLB;
276th Regiment - at least 15 BMP-1s, at least 5 T-72B1 tanks.
SEVERAL VERSIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED what happened to the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, the versions were both official and journalistic, but mostly with a negative connotation that discredits the personnel of the units. Here are some of them: "The brigade missed the right turn and went to the station, where, without reconnaissance, they became columns along the streets", "The columns stood along the streets and froze. The brigade commander did not organize security, did not take up defense, did not conduct reconnaissance. The brigade simply stood and seemed to be waiting for the "Chechs" to finally come to their senses and start burning it. Dudayev sent intelligence three times (!!!) to clarify the actions of the Russians, and three times intelligence reported that Russian columns were standing on Pervomaiskaya and Railway Station without movement, without guards, and that some of the soldiers and officers wander around the neighborhood in search of working shops (New Year is on the nose!). And then Maskhadov ordered to collect all the grenade launchers who were in the city and pull them to the station, "the brigade entered the under "pairs", "Savin died in captivity, he was shot", "everyone was drunk", etc.
Let's try to deal with these myths and tell how things really were.
Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. Here is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Before the storming of the city," says Rokhlin, "I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern group, to command which it was suggested that I should be headed by another general. And it would be expedient to appoint me to command the Northern grouping. On this topic, I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern grouping. "Who will command the Northern one?" - I ask. Kvashnin answers: "I . We will set up a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (Then there were almost no such people in the troops.) "-" And what is my task? "- I ask. "Go to the palace, take it, and we will come up." I say: "Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that the city is not attacked by tanks. "This task was removed from me. But I insist:" What is my task anyway? "-" You will be in the reserve, - they answer. - You will cover the left flank of the main grouping. And they assigned a route of movement. After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom, while the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.
Secrecy was held by Colonel General Anatoly Kvashnin as a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of Kvashnin's "know-how", everything was hidden, and the task was set directly in the direction of movement of the units, the trouble is that the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of interconnection - this is another distinguishing feature of this operation. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the belief that there would be no resistance. It only says that the leadership of the operation was out of touch with reality.
Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know either about their routes or about the tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky crossroads. Before the regiment entered the city, its command was asked how long it would take to bring it to combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because. the regiment is now "naked armor". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the landing of infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters passed by the regiment.
After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather, people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing force, the commander of the regiment Martynychev was sent for them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the BMP landing force, and often not having it at all!
At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Resk, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to block Resk, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. Why the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".
Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, December 1994
Regimental commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in this way: “I ... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, it’s supposed to, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, let's go, the first battalion ... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion advance and surround Dudayev's palace ... they didn’t paint where and what, the battalion commander already made the decision where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was get to the crossroads ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one - the station, the other - Dudayev's palace ... but it was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory each platoon needs to be painted where it should approximately become, where to leave, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought like this: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will pull some about there a negotiating group, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!
We could still suppress a small center of resistance, and with organized mass resistance, they began to crush us. At the same time, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Many died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers."
Hero of Russia R.M. Klupov, 2014
Major Rustem Klupov, assistant chief of reconnaissance of the 131st brigade: “I didn’t know where we were going, I didn’t know our mission. maybe he was afraid that we were being tapped, because he had a closed channel, and I didn’t have a closed channel. 2:00 p.m.) An incomplete battalion of the 81st regiment under the command of S. Burlakov is already stationed here.
Parts of the brigade exactly went to the station and the goods station, so G. Troshev's conclusions that "the combined detachment of the brigade slipped through the desired intersection, got lost and eventually went to the railway station" (see Troshev G. "My War" ) are unfounded. In fact, Colonel Savin exactly fulfilled the task of command. 3 MSR has become a front to the piece of iron, disperses and takes up defense. There was only 1 BMP on the platform. The rest are near the platform, but are hidden either behind stalls or behind buildings. That is, there can be no talk about how they came out somehow carelessly. The equipment was hidden as best they could, but there is actually nowhere to hide it.
I would like to say a separate word about the instructions received by the units before leaving for the city. Units were forbidden to occupy buildings, excluding administrative ones, to break benches, trash cans, etc., to check documents from people they met with weapons, to confiscate weapons, to shoot only as a last resort. What the command was counting on was clear, blind confidence in the absence of resistance from the militants. They learned nothing from the storming of Grozny by the opposition on 26 November.
Station area. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
Station building. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
ALL PARTS CONTROL was carried out by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: "everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...". As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, to his request regarding the position of the neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received an answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have occurred to him that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the consolidated detachment 8 Corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. On Mayakovsky Street, judging by the map, this regiment could only be bypassing the city center and passing by the presidential palace. Therefore, it is not clear whether the command of the group did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking about, or the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or, perhaps, the journalists who interviewed Yaroslavtsev , all mixed up?
In any case, this suggests that no one really imagined the picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their course ... ".
Misunderstanding of the situation leads to the fact that on the morning of January 1, two mutually exclusive orders are issued one after the other:
"7.15 - combat order of O.G.V. No. ... 1.00 h. 01.01.95 map. 50 thousand edition 1985.
The commander ordered:
3/276 SMEs by Z.00 today withdraw to the area where 1/33 SMEs are located (square on Kruglov St.), where they transfer the commander of the operational group of 8 AK to operational subordination.
Units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1/81st SMEs from the occupied areas should organize close fire and tactical cooperation between themselves and the units of the combined detachment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, as they enter the area of the Grozny station loading area. Replenishment of materiel is to be carried out from imported stocks and a consolidated detachment.
By 06:00 today, take at your disposal the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 28th Army Corps of the Siberian Military District in the area of the Grozny airfield and subsequently use it to carry out combat missions in the northern and northwestern directions.
In the morning today, after the transfer of the occupied lines of 503 SMEs to 19 Motor Rifle Division, carry out the disarmament or destruction of bandit formations in the area of the station, the presidential palace, the intersection of Griboedov St. and Pobedy Avenue by the end of the day with the forces of 131 Omsbr, part of the forces of 81 SMEs. and 81 SMEs to capture the presidential palace.
"01.01.95, resolution (to the head of the operational department of the corps, room 81 SMEs, 206 SMEs; 131 Omsbr).
Execute the order.
81 SMEs block the area near the palace.
131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, after concentrating at the station, advance north to the palace area along the street. Komsomolskaya, 74 omsbr go to the square. Friendship of Peoples on Mayakovsky Street and block the intersection of st. Griboyedov - Pobedy Ave. part of the forces, along Mayakovsky Street. Subdivisions of the 131st Omsbr to operate in a northerly direction along the street. Chernyshevsky to the palace.
Pulikovsky".
These documents very clearly testify to the dramatic conditions in which the command of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment found themselves, how difficult it was to make decisions in these circumstances and under what psychological pressure they acted.
Separately, I want to talk about intelligence:
Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin assigned us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he didn’t say anything specific. I tell him, wait, what is the northwest, southeast, I’m drawing a route for you, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there.He answers me, here, according to our data, sandbags in windows, here there may or may not be a stronghold.He didn’t even know if the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 "Meteorite") to blow up the barricades, but nothing is blocked there In short, there was no intelligence, either in terms of the number or location of the militants."
Maps were a rarity, no one saw the plans of the city at all. For example, Vadim Shibkov, an ensign of the 131st brigade, a participant in the battles, recalls this: “There was a map, but the scale was 1:50,000 and the old one, from the 70s, it was impossible to correct it and direct it in the city, because of this, the artillery of the brigade beat not very accurate." There were no topographical plans for Grozny in the company-platoon link. The battalion commanders had maps at a scale of 1:50,000. The same was true for the 131st brigade and the 276th regiment.
Because of the maps in Sadovoe, the 276th regiment suffered losses. On the map, the bridge where they were supposed to stop looked large, in fact, no one even noticed this bridge, it was so small, and the BRD moved on, stopping at the next one. Resembling the one on the map, the bridge came under fire.
While the regiment was marching towards Resky and the railway station, the 131st brigade was to take up positions on the outskirts of the city, two kilometers east of Sadovaya, in order to ensure the passage of other troops to the city of Grozny, which was exactly done by 11 o'clock in the morning. There was practically no resistance, only intelligence destroyed the forward patrol of the militants. At 12 noon, on the radio, Lieutenant-General Pulikovsky K. B., commander of the North group at that time, gave the order for the brigade to enter the city of Grozny. The battalions received this order from Colonel Durnev, who came directly to the location of the battalions. At the same time, the brigade did not receive written combat and graphic documents with an order to enter the city of Grozny. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters unexpectedly gave the brigade the command to take the railway station, which was not originally planned at all.
Who gave the order to the brigade to go to the station?
Lev Rokhlin says (based on the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Pulikovsky says that he did not give the command to the 131st brigade to capture the station. The advanced command post of the Northern group was never deployed. They commanded directly from Mozdok. Therefore, find out who gave the command, it's difficult ... I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all in this operation. After all, Kvashnin himself declared himself the commander of everything and everything. Pulikovsky could not draw up a detailed plan of action and give the necessary orders. Kvashnin decided everything."
Retired Lieutenant General K.B. Pulikovsky, 2014.
In the "Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards Army Corps" the words of the commander are recorded: "General. Shevtsov at 16 o'clock was to set them (the brigade and regiment) the task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace." The general received no information. Three years later, on December 28, 1997, Mikhail Leontiev, host of the TV Center TV program "Actually" will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave her that ill-fated order - go to the railway station ... So Pulikovsky's words in the film "Operation without a name" that "I don't know how the brigade ended up at the station" are most likely true.
From the same book ("The Life and Death of a General"):
FROM THE "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":
2 SMEs 81 SMEs - around the palace.
1 msb... (inaudible).
131st brigade - with two battalions takes up defense near the railway. station".
This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.
The 131st brigade had no mission,” says Rokhlin. She was in reserve. Who ordered her to seize the railway station - one can only guess.
Shots taken by militants from A. Sladkov's film "Operation without a name".
So who set the tasks and directly developed this "operation"?
IN THE FILM "NEW YEAR'S EVE OF THE 81st REGIMENT" regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev claimed that Kvashnin personally set the task for him, "drawing and erasing arrows." We find confirmation of this in the above passage from the book:
Rokhlin: And who will command the "Northern" (group)?
Kvashnin: I..."
Later, Kvashnin and Shevtsov would step into the shadows, leaving Pulikovsky to deal with everything. Kvashnin will generally be called a "representative of the General Staff", no written orders given to them were found and he did not bear any responsibility for these events. However, like all the other participants in this story.
FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION YU.I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G.N.
"In accordance with the Decree of the State Duma dated December 25, 1996 No. 971-11 GD "On the consideration of the circumstances and causes of the mass death of military personnel of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and measures to strengthen defense country and the security of the state" I inform: ... the circumstances of the death of the personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, are being checked, during which 25 officers and ensigns were killed , 60 soldiers and sergeants, and 72 servicemen of the brigade were missing.
From the explanations of the participants in these events, the documents seized during the inspection, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the RF Ministry of Defense set the general task of liberating the city of Grozny. Colonel-General A. V. Kvashnin (at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) set the specific task of bringing troops into the city, movement routes and interaction.
The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to ensure the passage to the city of Grozny for other troops. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Neftyanka River and was on it until 11 o'clock on December 31, after which, by radio, Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K. B., who commanded the North group at that time, gave the order to enter the city of Grozny. The brigade received no written combat and graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the brigade was ordered to take the railway station by the headquarters of the corps, which was not originally planned.
Having seized the station, the brigade fell into a dense fiery ring of illegal armed formations and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.
As can be seen from the audit materials, Pulikovsky had to decide on the thorough preparation of the operation, but this was not fully done, which was one of the reasons for the death of a large number of personnel of the 131st brigade.
The actions of Pulikovsky are seen as signs of a crime under Art. 260-1 at paragraph "c" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely, the negligent attitude of an official to the service, which entailed grave consequences.
However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since on April 19, 1995, the State Duma declared an amnesty in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its action.
I would like to end the article with an excerpt from the same book "The Life and Death of a General":
“The operation plan developed by Grachev and Kvashnin became in fact a plan for the death of troops,” says General Rokhlin. “Today I can say with full confidence that it was not substantiated by any operational-tactical calculations. Such a plan has a quite definite name - an adventure. And given that hundreds of people died as a result of its implementation - a criminal adventure ... "
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