Part III. Defense of the Taman Peninsula

This article does not claim to be 100% accurate. It is rather an attempt to rethink, and somewhere to criticize the official data.

The alignment of forces and the course of events.

(who is familiar with the situation on the Crimean peninsula in May 1942, this paragraph can be skipped)

On October 18, 1941, the assault on the Crimean peninsula began. The fighting lasted almost a month and ended on November 16 with the almost complete capture of the Crimean peninsula, with the exception of Sevastopol. Both the Soviet command and the German command considered Crimea the most important strategic foothold. Because the struggle for the Crimea did not subside throughout the war. Already a month and a half after the capture of the Crimea by the Germans, the Soviet troops carried out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, during which the entire Kerch Peninsula up to Feodosia was occupied. During the winter-spring of 1942, both sides launched repeated attacks and offensives, but neither side was able to achieve strategic success. The war in the Crimea took on a protracted character. This continued until May 1942.

Preparing the next offensive, the Soviet command thought that Manstein's 11th Army, sandwiched between two fronts (the Sevastopol line and the Crimean Front), would be easily defeated, that the Germans were not thinking of advancing, but would simply hold their positions. This apparently explains the almost complete absence of reconnaissance activities on the part of the Soviet troops. However, the German command thought differently. By the end of April, the German General Staff developed a plan to clear the Crimea from Soviet troops, which was called "Hunting Bustard". The Germans actively conducted reconnaissance, at the same time erected all sorts of false fortifications and firing points, to divert eyes. They performed all sorts of maneuvering actions, the movement of equipment in their rear. In a word, they stubbornly misled the Soviet command.

As early as the end of January 1942, L. Z. Mekhlis was sent as a representative of the headquarters to the Crimean Front. He immediately began to do his usual business: cleaning and shuffling personnel. For example, Mekhlis removed Tolbukhin, the chief of staff of the front, putting Major General Vechny in his place.

The Soviet units on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942 were represented by the Crimean Front, under the command of Lieutenant General Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich, it included the 44th Army (63rd Mountain Rifle, 157th, 276th, 396th, 404th rifle divisions, 124th and 126th tank battalions), 47th army (77th mountain rifle, 224th, 236th, 271st, 320th rifle divisions), 51st army (138 -I, 302nd, 390th, 398th, 400th rifle divisions) and units of front subordination (156th rifle division, 12th, 139th rifle brigades, 83rd marine rifle brigade, 72 1st cavalry division, 151st fortified area, 54th motorized rifle regiment, 39th, 40th, 55th, 56th tank brigades, 79th, 229th separate tank battalions).

Most of these units were badly battered either during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, or in the recent (January-April 1942) offensives of the Red Army on the Crimean Peninsula itself. Some barely gained 50% of the payroll. For example, back in January 1942, the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division suffered huge losses in the Feodosia region, and experienced constant hunger from a lack of replenishment. Most felt a shortage of 20-40% of the personnel. Only the 396th, 271st, 320th rifle and 72nd cavalry divisions, which had recently crossed over from the Taman Peninsula, were fresh.

Absolutely the same picture was observed with tank formations. In the recent frontal attacks of the winter-spring offensives, the armored units of the Crimean Front also suffered huge losses. So only the 39th tank brigade from March 13 to March 19, 1942 lost 23 tanks.

The German units, on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942, were represented by the 11th Army (Colonel-General Erich von Manstein) it included: 30th Army Corps (28th Jaeger, 50th, 132nd, 170 -I infantry, 22nd tank divisions), 42nd army corps (46th infantry division), 7th Romanian corps (10th, 19th Romanian infantry, 8th Romanian cavalry divisions), 8- th air corps (about 400 aircraft) and units of army subordination (18th Romanian infantry division, Groddek motorized brigade, Radu Korne mechanized brigade, tank reconnaissance battalion).

German troops were also not full-blooded. So some infantry divisions experienced a shortage of up to 30% in personnel. For example, by the end of March 1942, the 46th Infantry Division had lost up to a third of its personnel and almost half of its heavy weapons. However, the German and Romanian units stationed near Kerch received significant reinforcements by mid-April 1942. This can be seen at least from the fact that the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade was deployed into a cavalry division, and this is an increase in personnel by 2.5-3 times. The mechanized parts of Manstein were mostly full-blooded. For example, in April, the 22nd Panzer Division received 15-20 Pz.IIIs and Pz.IVs with long-barreled guns, especially to combat the Soviet T-34s and KVs.

Among other things, the troops of both opposing sides were actively supported by the local population: Russian-speaking partisan formations on the side of the Red Army, and Crimean Tatar companies and self-defense battalions on the side of the Wehrmacht. Also on the side of the Wehrmacht were a number of Russian, Ukrainian collaborationist units and a Cossack cavalry squadron.

If you sum up all the units, then the number of troops on both sides will not differ much. But the presence of von Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, and fresh mechanized units, tipped the scales in favor of the Germans in the upcoming battle.

The Kerch defensive operation began on May 7 and ended on May 20, 1942, with the complete defeat of the Crimean Front. During it, the commander of the 11th German Army, Erich von Manstein, carried out the Blitzkrieg plan, only on a reduced scale. Having managed to correctly assess the situation and make the first move. Using the effect of surprise, Manstein struck where he was not expected: he launched a tank and mechanized attack in the only place where the Soviet positions had an anti-tank ditch. Having cracked the defenses of the Red Army, the main part of the units of the 11th Army turned north (the main forces of the 22nd Panzer Division, most of the infantry divisions), to encircle and destroy the 47th and 51st Soviet armies. And the mobile units (the motorized brigade of Groddek, the mechanized group of Radu Korne, the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd tank division, the 8th cavalry division of the Romanians and a number of infantry divisions) rushed into the gap to the east.

During the Kerch defensive operation, the Germans did not wait for the actions of the Soviet troops, but imposed their tactics. The coherence of the actions of aviation, tank troops and infantry gave excellent results. The presence of an effective 8th Air Corps and fresh mobile mechanized units gave the German command a huge advantage.

The Supreme High Command saw the following as the reason for the complete defeat of the Crimean Front. The grouping of troops was offensive, not defensive. Too much congestion of troops in the first echelon. Lack of interaction between the military branches. The disregard of the command towards its troops. Poorly trained, in engineering terms, defensive and lack of rear lines. Bureaucratic and sometimes repressive method of work of the front command and personally L.3. Mehlis. Lack of understanding and sober assessment by the command of the rapidly changing situation. The direct culprits of the Kerch catastrophe were named: L.3. Mehlis, D.T. Kozlov, F.A. Shamanin, P.P. Eternal, K.S. Kolganov, S.I. Chernyak and E.M. Nikolaenko. All of them were removed from their posts and demoted in ranks.

Side losses.

In the works of the Soviet period, the Kerch defensive operation (among the Germans, the operation was called “Hunting for bustards”) was not considered in detail. Accordingly, the losses in this operation were mentioned, somehow in passing. In various modern scientific and near-scientific works, figures from 160,000 to 200,000 people are mentioned. irretrievable losses . (In the late 1980s, these figures could be as high as 300,000). The average figure is 170,000 people.

How were such huge numbers calculated? Virtually no part of the Crimean Front was able to provide lists of casualties. The command of the North Caucasian Front calculated the losses of the Crimean Front as follows: data were taken on payroll composition at the beginning of May 1942, the number of those who crossed to Taman before May 20, 1942 was subtracted and the figure was 176,566 people.

However, let's look at everything in more detail.

Immediately make a reservation that everything that is described below is nothing but a hypothesis. It is not possible to accurately calculate the true losses of the parties in this operation due to the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the sources, or even their absence. I am sure of one thing: the order of the numbers is exactly that.

A very important point in this topic is the determination of the size of the Crimean Front at the beginning of May 1942.

When it is written about 300,000 (or more) people at the beginning of May in the Crimean Front, then the entire payroll is counted. And indeed, if you sum it up, it turns out that in May 1942 there were more than 300,000 people in the Crimean Front. However, as shown above, there simply could not be such a number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Krivosheev G. F. estimates the number of troops of the Crimean Front (plus part of the forces of the Black Sea Front and the Azov Flotilla) at 249,800 people. However, these figures are also highly overestimated. In addition, Krivosheev takes into account both the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. However, the authoritative researcher Nemenko A.V. believes that at the beginning of May 1942 there were “just over 200,000 people” in the Crimean Front. Taking the arithmetic mean of these two figures (249800 and 200000), we will be close to the real figure of the composition land(excluding the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) the forces of the Crimean Front: 224,900 people.

The second important point will be the calculation of the number of evacuees to Taman. On May 21, Kozlov gave the following information in a telegram to Stalin: 138,926 people were taken out, of which 30,000 were wounded. But there, he adds that the calculation of the total number is indicative, since there is no data on two marinas and those who crossed on their own (and there were such, although not very many). In addition, those who crossed on airplanes did not succumb to accounting. In the report of military communications of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, figures are given of 119,395 people, of which 42,324 were wounded (by the way, this figure, rounded up to 120,000, was included in many official publications). However, this figure shows the number of crossings only for the period from 14 to 20 May. But in fact, the redeployment of the Crimean Front to Taman began on May 8: Vsevolod Abramov, referring to the archival documents of the 6th separate motor-pontoon bridge battalion, writes that from May 8 to 13, the wounded were transported to Taman. In the report of the military operations of the KVMB units, the figure is "about 150,000 people, excluding those who crossed on their own." As you can see, the numbers vary.

All data on those who crossed are taken from documentary sources, and not calculated. Therefore, in my purely personal opinion, it would be correct to take the average of the above data as the number of evacuees: 136,107 people.

On April 30, Commander-in-Chief Budyonny presented to the headquarters and personally to Stalin another plan for the liberation of the Crimea, in connection with which he asked to strengthen the troops stationed on the peninsula. To which Stalin ordered to go over to the defense of the positions occupied, however, replenishments were nevertheless sent to the Crimean Front. In May, about 10,000 people were transported to the Kerch Peninsula from Taman.

Now about losses.

Let's start with German sources: Manstein writes in his memoirs about 170,000 captured soldiers and officers of the Red Army. Franz Halder indicates 150,000 prisoners. Fedor von Bock first writes about 149,000 prisoners, but then points out that "another 3,000 prisoners were taken, thus about 170,000 prisoners were captured" . Great math, right? Maximilian Fretter-Pico is more cautious in his assessment of the prisoners: he gives the figure of 66,000 prisoners. Moreover, the Germans, as a rule, name only the number of prisoners. Only Robert Furzhik writes about the killed Russians: he writes about 28,000 killed and 147,000 prisoners. Now let's turn to our sources.

According to G. F. Krivosheev, on the Kerch Peninsula from January to May 19, 1942, irretrievable losses amounted to 194,807 people. According to the same Krivosheev G.F., only in another study, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army only for May 8-19, 1942 amounted to 162,282 people. Let's say. Although the well-known researcher of the Crimean defensive operation, Abramov V.V., considers this figure to be overestimated by at least 30,000.

Now let's try to calculate in a different way. To the received number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula at the beginning of May, we add the replenishment arrived for May and subtract the received number of evacuees. We get 224900+10000-136107=98793 people. But this number also includes people who remained in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

The number of Adzhimushkay garrisons should be discussed in more detail.

Trofimenko in his diary estimated the number of Adzhimushkais at 15,000 people. The head of the food supply of the garrison Pirogov A.I., after the war, gave an estimate of “more than 10,000 people”. But it seems that Pirogov and Trofimenko estimated the number of defenders only in the Central Quarries. German estimates for the number of defenders were as high as 30,000. But apparently “the eyes of fear are big” - the Adzhimushkais really caused a rustle, as if there were 30,000 of them. Vsevolod Abramov himself is inclined to the figure of 20,000 defenders of the quarries, meaning those who remained in all the quarries.

This means that the number of irretrievable losses is 78,793 people. It is clear that neither 150,000 nor 170,000 prisoners can "fit" into this number. Therefore, we will take the data of Maximilian Fretter-Pico as the only real figures for the number of prisoners, 66,000 people (although this figure seems to me too high). After not tricky calculations, we get the number of 12793 people killed.

The number of wounded was indicated above, and according to various estimates ranges from 30,000 to 42,324 people (average - 36,162 people).

Thus, in our opinion, the total irretrievable losses of the Crimean Front during the Kerch defensive operation amount to 78,793 people, of which 66,000 were captured, 12,793 were killed. It also mentions a number of missing people. But the “missing” are, as a rule, captured or (to a lesser extent) unfound dead and unidentified seriously wounded. So, in this case (taking into account the specifics of the operation) they are already taken into account in the previous figures. The total losses, together with 36,162 wounded who were safely evacuated to Taman, amounted to 114,955 people.

Perhaps the averaging of some figures catches the eye. Well, let's try to substitute for comparison first all the maximum (a) data, and then all the minimum (b):

a) 249800+10000-150000-66000-30000=13800 people.

b) 200000+10000-119395-66000-10000=14605 people.

As you can see, the numbers are about the same. Taking into account all the "about" and "about" up, this number could rise to 20,000 people.

This is exactly the order of losses of the Crimean Front killed in the Kerch defensive operation. This thousands, maybe tens of thousands. But by no means hundreds of thousands as it is officially considered.

Further. I consider it simply necessary to say a few words about the losses of the Germans in the operation “Hunting for bustards”. Here it is even more difficult with sources. The number of fascist troops involved in the operation “Hunting for Bustards” is given by the famous researcher A.V. Nemenko at 147,000 people, but this does not include units of army subordination: the 18th Romanian Infantry Division, the Groddek motorized brigade, the Radu Korne mechanized brigade, etc. d. The real number was at least 165,000 people.

The Germans evaluate their losses differently. Robert Furzhik writes that the total losses of the troops amounted to 3397 people, of which 600 were killed. Fedor von Bock writes in his memoirs about 7,000 irretrievable losses. Our historians call approximately the same numbers of German losses: Nevzorov names 7588 dead soldiers and officers and Nemenko points out 7790 dead. I note right away that many of our and German publications take a rounded figure of 7,500 people killed as the official losses of the Germans in Operation Bustard Hunting.

Of course, we will not take the data of Robert Furzhik as a basis, because the number of 600 Germans killed seems to us to be completely underestimated. Let's take the average figure of 7500 as officially accepted (besides, as we can see, most sources indicate approximately the same number: 7000, 7588, 7790). But these losses are exclusively German. It is known that the German command considered only its own losses, the Romanian - its own, the Italian - its own, etc. Moreover, among the Germans, even by combat arms, losses were recorded by different departments. Luftwaffe separately, Wehrmacht separately, SS separately, etc. Therefore, among the 7500 killed Germans, 2752 killed Romanians were not taken into account, that is, the losses of the Nazis on May 7-20, 1942 amount to approximately 10252 people killed. However, this figure is not entirely accurate: it does not take into account the prisoners (and although their number was not large, they were), the missing, the wounded, as well as the losses of the 8th air corps of von Richthofen (which, no doubt, also suffered significant losses: the 72nd Cavalry Division alone destroyed at least 36 enemy aircraft).

So what are the total losses of the 11th Army in the May battles on the Kerch Peninsula?

In my purely personal opinion, the total losses of the 11th Army on the Kerch Peninsula in May 1942 are characterized by an entry in the diary of the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder, I will quote it verbatim: “Requests for replenishment of the 11th Army cannot be fully satisfied. 60,000 people have been requested; a maximum of 30,000 people can be allocated. This means a shortage of 2-3 thousand people for each division. The situation is especially bad in the artillery units of the RGK. These words perfectly characterize the general losses of the Germans. These losses were indeed great. They are so large that a number of units of the 11th Army lost their combat effectiveness and were withdrawn to the rear.

Opponents during the May battles of 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula suffered fairly comparable losses in the dead. Despite the fact that Manstein brilliantly fulfilled his strategic tasks (in fact, he implemented the Blitzkrieg plan on a reduced scale), this was a Pyrrhic victory for him. Serious losses of the 11th Army forced the German leadership to abandon the implementation of the Blucher I operational plan, according to which the 11th Army was supposed to force the Kerch Strait and advance into the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula after the capture of Crimea. From all this it is very clear that the courage and ability to fight the Soviet soldiers were not much inferior to the Germans. After all, losses killed in open battle amounted to 10,252 people from the 11th German Army and 12,793 people from the Crimean Front. The blame for the defeat of the Crimean Front lies entirely on the shoulders of the command of the front itself.

This operation had grave consequences for the Red Army: the Sevastopol defensive region was placed in a difficult situation. Oil fields, oil pipelines and oil depots of the USSR were located in the Caucasus, the Germans had the opportunity to carry out a landing from Kerch to Taman. Crimea was an excellent springboard from which it was possible to carry out constant air raids on Soviet troops and facilities located in the Caucasus. The Germans were able to free part of the forces and transfer them from the Crimea to other parts of the theater of operations.

Nevertheless, the Kerch defensive operation showed the high morale of individual units of the Crimean Front. The units that did not panic and did not flinch in the face of a superior enemy showed a fine example of valor and resilience. The personal courage of individual units and the fighters themselves is what made it possible to delay the advance of the Germans for so many days and evacuate a large number of people of the deceased Crimean Front to Taman.

Gerasimenko Roman.

The Great Patriotic War Soviet Union 1941-1945: Short story. The team of authors under the leadership of Telpukhovsky B. S. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1984. p. 86.

Shtemenko S.M. The General Staff during the War: From Stalingrad to Berlin. - M.: AST: Transitbook, 2005. p. 68.

Nemenko A. V. Crimea 1941-1942. Riddles and myths of the peninsula. Electronic version, posted at http://www.litsovet.ru, (accessed 11/12/2013).

Kerch landing operation - a major landing operation of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. It took place from December 26, 1941 to May 20, 1942.

Despite initial success, the operation ended in a major setback: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer attack on the Caucasus.

Previous events

The battles for the Crimea began at the end of September 1941. On September 26, units of the 11th Wehrmacht Army broke through the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus and entered the peninsula. The remnants of the 51st Army were evacuated to the Kuban by November 16th. The only center of resistance remained Sevastopol with the adjacent fortified area. An attempt by the Wehrmacht to take Sevastopol on the move during October 30 - November 21, 1941 failed. To continue the siege of Sevastopol, the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, pulled most of the available forces to the city, leaving only one infantry division to cover the Kerch region. The Soviet command decided to use this circumstance to deliver a retaliatory strike by the forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet.

Operation plan

On December 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the command of the Transcaucasian Front (commander - D.T. Kozlov, chief of staff - F.I. Tolbukhin) the task of preparing and conducting a landing operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks. The plan of the operation drawn up by Tolbukhin was to encircle and destroy the Kerch enemy grouping by the simultaneous landing of the 51st and 44th armies in the Kerch region and in the port of Feodosia. In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, unblock Sevastopol and completely liberate the Crimea.

The main blow, in the region of Feodosia, was to be delivered by the 44th Army removed from the Iranian border (gen. . N. Lvov). The landing of troops was planned to be carried out on a wide front (up to 250 km) at several points simultaneously in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver with reserves and pin him down in all the most important directions.

1st stage: landing

Side forces

Soviet troops

The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:

• 44th Army (Major-General A.N. Pervushin) consisting of: 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th rifle divisions, 9th and 63rd mountain rifle divisions, 1st and 2nd detachments of sailors 9th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet under the 44th Army.
• 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov)) consisting of: 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th Rifle Divisions, 12th Rifle Brigade, 83rd Marine Brigade

For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, in total over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

• Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky)
• Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

The air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula, as of December 20, had a total of about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft), the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet had about 200 aircraft.

The 156th, 398th and 400th rifle divisions and the 72nd cavalry division were also in reserve on the Taman Peninsula.

German troops:

The wounding of the Kerch Peninsula was carried by:

• Part of the troops of the 46th division (42nd army corps of the 11th army)
• 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
• 4th Mountain Brigade
• 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions

Landing

At the end of December 1941, units of the Transcaucasian Front, with the support of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov-Black Sea Flotilla, made an amphibious assault: on December 26 in the Kerch region and on December 29 in the Feodosia region. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand people,

In Feodosia, the landing forces were unloaded at the port. The resistance of the German garrison (3 thousand people) was broken by the end of the day on December 29, after which reinforcements began to arrive in Feodosia.

In the Kerch area, the landing was much more difficult: the infantry landed directly into the icy sea and went chest-deep in water to the shore. Hypothermia caused great losses. A few days after the start of the landing, frost hit and most of the 51st Army crossed the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait.

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, who guarded the area of ​​the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, an order was received from Manstein to keep the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein wrote:

However, the 51st Army, advancing from Kerch, did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia, with its main forces, moved not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

When planning the operation, significant miscalculations were made:

• there was not a single one on the bridgehead medical institution, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded fighters, having received the initial dressing in the regimental squadron, were brought from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.
• air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, before January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: Krasnogvardeets, Zyryanin, and others; the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

Losses

During the operation, the total losses amounted to 40 thousand people, of which more than 30 thousand were irretrievably: killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

2nd stage: battles for the Parpach Range

By January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Given the weakness of the German defense, the Headquarters pointed out to General Kozlov the need for an early exit to Perekop and strikes at the rear of the Sevastopol enemy grouping.

The enemy also understood the danger of a possible offensive. According to E. von Manstein:

However, the front commander D.T. Kozlov postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

Loss of Theodosius

In the first half of January 1942, the troops of the Crimean Front were preparing for a further offensive deep into the Crimea. To support the future offensive, the Sudak landing was landed. However, Manstein was ahead of Kozlov by several days. On January 15, the Germans suddenly went on the offensive, delivering the main blow at the junction of the 51st and 44th armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the presence of armored vehicles, the enemy broke through the positions of General Pervushin and recaptured Feodosia on January 18. The troops of the Caucasian Front were forced to leave their positions and retreat behind the Ak-Monai Isthmus. Among other losses suffered the Soviet side, there was a Jean Zhores transport with a load of ammunition. The Sudak landing force, which had heroically defended the captured bridgehead for almost two weeks, also almost completely perished.

Despite the loss of the port in Feodosia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.

Crimean front

On January 28, the Stavka decided to detach the troops operating in the Kerch direction into an independent Crimean Front under the command of General Kozlov. The front was reinforced with new rifle divisions, tank units and artillery. In early February, the 47th army of Major General K. S. Kolganov, withdrawn from Iran, crossed the strait and became part of the front. Troops in the Crimea were significantly reinforced with armored vehicles. The 39th and 40th tank brigades each had ten KBs, ten T-34s and 25 T-60s, the 55th and 56th tank brigades each had 66 T-26s and 27 flamethrower tanks. The 226th separate tank battalion consisted of 16 KV heavy tanks.

The headquarters also decided to strengthen the headquarters of the new front. Army commissar 1st rank L. Z. Mekhlis arrived in Kerch, accompanied by a group of officers, as a representative of the Headquarters.

The offensive of the Red Army

The headquarters approved the start date for the offensive on February 26-27, 1942. By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division, several separate tank battalions with heavy KV and medium T-34s and artillery units of the RGK. Of the total number of troops, 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front.

The offensive began on 27 February. At the same time, the Seaside Army attacked from Sevastopol, but failed to break through the encirclement. The offensive on the Kerch bridgehead developed very slowly: the actions of the tanks were hindered by heavy rains and the enemy repelled all attacks of the attackers. Only the 18th Romanian division could not resist, in the northern section of the isthmus. Manstein had to throw his last reserve into battle - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units. Stubborn fighting continued until March 3. The troops of the Crimean Front failed to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth.

In the period from 13 to 19 March, the offensive resumed. Stubborn battles ensued, which E. von Manstein recalled:

This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades advanced in the first echelon. Of the latter, during the first three days of the offensive, 136 tanks were knocked out. Nevertheless, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [infantry division], in the zone of which the main blow was delivered, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.

Despite all efforts, decisive success was not achieved this time either.

3rd stage: German counteroffensive

In early April, reinforcements began to arrive in Manstein's army: for the first time since the start of the offensive on the Crimea, it was given tank division(22nd etc.) - 180 tanks.

At the insistence of L. Z. Mekhlis, Soviet troops were concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front line, not having sufficient depth. In addition, most of the forces of the Crimean Front were concentrated in the north of the Parpach Isthmus. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command planned a detour maneuver from the south (Operation Bustard Hunting). Important role aviation was assigned to the operation, for which, by special order of Hitler, the 8th Luftwaffe Air Corps (commander Wolfram von Richthofen) was transferred to the Crimea.

The offensive began on 8 May. As a result of an aimed air strike, the command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, the commander, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, was killed, and the deputy commander, General K.I. Baranov, was seriously wounded. A distraction was carried out in the north, while the main attack came from the south. As a result, within two weeks the main forces of the Crimean Front were pressed against the Kerch Strait. On May 18, the resistance of the encircled group of the Red Army ceased.

Consequences

According to German data, the number of prisoners was about 170,000 people. The plans of the Soviet command to liberate the Crimea did not come true. After the liquidation of the Crimean Front, Manstein was able to concentrate his forces against the besieged Sevastopol.

Losses of the USSR Total: more than 300,000 people, including 170,000 prisoners. Losses of Nazi Germany Total: about 10,000 killed.

Special project "Cities-Heroes". Chronicle of Kerch.

The annals of the Great Patriotic War included the exploits of the defenders of Adzhimushkay, who from May to October 1942 held the defense in the quarries behind enemy lines, the heroism of the paratroopers of the Kerch-Feodosia operation of 1941 and the Eltigen operation of 1943.
April 11, 1944 Kerch was liberated.

During the fighting in Kerch, more than 85% of the buildings were destroyed, the liberators were met by a little more than 30 residents of the city out of almost 100 thousand inhabitants in 1940. For the heroism, courage and merits of the population and the exploits of soldiers in the Great Patriotic War, the city of Kerch was awarded the title of hero city.

In November 1941, Kerch was occupied by fascist troops.
Partisan bases were set up in the Adzhimushkay and Starokarantinsky quarries. On December 30, 1941, the Soviet troops liberated Kerch during the first offensive amphibious operation of the Kerch-Feodosiya operation in the entire war.
Kerch-Feodosiya operation 1941 was the largest of the amphibious assault operations in the Great Patriotic War. For only a month and a half, the occupiers were in charge for the first time, but the consequences were monstrous. "Bagerovsky ditch" - here the Nazis shot 7 thousand people.
It was from here that the Soviet commission to investigate the crimes of fascism began its work. The materials of this investigation were presented at the Nuremberg trials.

During February-April 1942. troops of the Crimean Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, fought offensive battles. On May 19, 1942, our troops left Kerch. Part of the troops in the combined detachment of Colonel P.M. Yagunov descends into the Adzhimushkay quarries.
In the Small Quarries, the underground garrison was headed by Senior Lieutenant M.G. Honorable. From May to the end of October, burned with thirst, poisoned by gases, hungry, in dampness and cold, the soldiers of the garrison fought.
On October 31, 1943, the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation began.
In the forty-day battle on the Tierra del Fuego of Eltigen, more than 60 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. On the night of November 3, the main landing began in the Gleika-Zhukovka-Dangerous area. The front stood here for five and a half months. 58 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
And only on April 11, 1944 the city was completely liberated.
In total, in the battles for Kerch, 137 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 21 units and formations were given the honorary name of Kerch.

"Kerch lay in ruins. Its famous metallurgical plant was smashed as mercilessly as the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. Its quarters resembled the ruins of a city excavated by archaeologists,"- wrote one of the eyewitnesses - the writer P. Pavlenko. The exploits of the defenders of Adzhimushkay.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Adzhimushkay quarries became the base partisan movement. The legendary feat was accomplished by the soldiers of the underground garrisons of the Big (Central) and Small Adzhimushkay quarries.
In May 1942, the Nazis, having superiority in military equipment, especially in aviation, broke through the defenses of our troops at the Ak-Monai positions. Exhausted by continuous battles, the troops of the Crimean Front retreated to Kerch.
On May 14 and 15, especially fierce battles unfolded in the Adzhimushkay area. The defenders had almost no artillery, lacked ammunition. On May 16-17, the combined detachment of Colonel P.M. Yagunov found himself in an enemy environment. Not having an order to withdraw, the detachment made its way to the Adzhimushkay quarries. May 19, 1942 ended the defense of the city.
Two separate underground garrisons arose in the quarries: in the Bolshoi - approximately 10 thousand people, in the Small ones - up to 3 thousand. The heroes of the dungeon faced severe trials. After all, the quarries were not prepared for defense in advance, so they did not make special stocks of weapons, ammunition, food, and medicines.

Strict norms had to be established for the issuance of food. It was especially difficult with water. The wells were outside, and water could only be obtained in battle. The situation of the soldiers in the Big (Central) quarries was also complicated by the fact that there were more than 500 wounded soldiers and officers in them, thousands of women, children and the elderly - residents of the city and adjacent villages - also took refuge here.
The Nazis blew up the entrances and exits of the dungeons. Explosions of great force brought down the roof of underground workings. Smoke bombs were thrown into the dungeon, poison gas was pumped up with compressors. Many fighters and commanders died in the days of the first gas attacks, but when the Nazis tried to poke their nose into the catacombs, believing that the underground garrison was broken, they, as before, were met with fire.
The words of a radiogram signed by Colonel P.M. rushed to the mainland. Yagunov: `Everyone! Everyone! Everyone! To all the peoples of the Soviet Union! We, the defenders of the defense of Kerch, are suffocating from gas, we are dying, but we do not surrender!`. On the night of July 8-9, everyone who could hold a weapon in their hands, who had the strength to throw a grenade, went into battle. The enemy garrison in the village of Adzhimushkay was defeated. However, the success was overshadowed by the tragic death of Colonel P.M. Yagunov. The underground garrison was headed by Colonel G.M. Burmin.
In July 1942, the most difficult tests for the soldiers of the underground garrison came. Overcame hunger and disease. For 170 days and nights the garrisons of the Big and Small quarries of Adzhimushkay fought the enemy. The garrison understood how unreliable the water sources were outside the dungeon. It was decided to hollow out wells inside the catacombs that were inaccessible to the enemy.
In the first days of July, having gone deeper by more than 14 m, we reached the aquifer. One surviving well can be seen even now, when visiting the underground museum "Adzhimushkay". A little away from the well, by the road on a hill, there is a mass grave. On the obelisk there is an inscription: `Eternal glory to the partisan heroes civil war who fell in the battles for the Soviet Motherland in 1919`.

And nearby, in the greenery of trees, an obelisk rises on mass grave Soviet soldiers who fell in battles for the city during the Great Patriotic War. Eltigen operation In the autumn of 1943, the troops of the 18th Army (commander - Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze) were tasked, in cooperation with the 56th Army, to seize a bridgehead in the area of ​​the fishing village of Eltigen, expand it, take control of the Kamyshburun port and then advance into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula, bypassing Kerch.
On the night of November 1, 1943, overcoming a strong storm and minefields, the ships of the Novorossiysk naval base (commander - Rear Admiral G.N. Kholostyakov) headed for Eltigen. It was necessary to cross the Kerch Strait in the widest part: in a place where its width exceeds 16 km.
On the first night, more than 2,500 fighters landed on the shore. The Nazis, pulling up reserves, fell upon the defenders of the bridgehead, trying at all costs to throw them into the sea. On the first day, the paratroopers repulsed up to fifteen attacks and held the bridgehead, despite the enemy's multiple superiority in manpower and equipment. With the onset of darkness, ships with reinforcements approached.

For thirty-six days, under the conditions of a naval blockade, under constant enemy fire, the Eltigen paratroopers fought. While fighting was going on south of Kerch, in the Eltigen area, units of the Separate Primorsky Army managed to land and gain a foothold northeast of Kerch.
The German command set the first task of eliminating the Eltigen bridgehead. The enemy concentrated around the Eltigen "patch" (along the front - 3 km, 1.5-2 km in depth) two divisions, 16 artillery and 8 mortar batteries, up to 30 tanks.

The landing force by that time numbered a little more than 4,500 people and could rely mainly on small arms and anti-tank rifles. On the morning of December 4, after the strongest artillery preparation and bombing, the enemy went on a decisive offensive. Over the next three days, the Nazis managed to push the battle formations of the Eltigens.
The disparity in power became more and more palpable. The ranks of paratroopers were melting, ammunition was running out. At this moment, it was decided to go for a breakthrough towards Kerch, to try to connect with the forces of the Separate Primorsky Army. The breakthrough group consisted of about 1800 people, it had 200 wounded, able to move independently.
About a hundred fighters remained in cover. The Eltigen raid on the rear of the enemy began on the night of December 7, 1943. At dawn, the paratroopers occupied Mount Mithridates and part of the coast near the city embankment. For four days they fought in Kerch.
On the night of December 9-10 and December 10-11, the remnants of the Eltigen landing force were removed from the shore by the ships of the Azov military flotilla. The feat of the landing participants marked the beginning of the liberation of Kerch and the entire Crimea. For the battles at the Eltigen bridgehead, 61 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the occupation of Kerch, the Nazis killed 15,000 civilians and drove more than 14,000 to Germany. The atrocities of the fascists in Kerch were so monstrous that materials about them appeared at the Nuremberg trials of the main war criminals of fascist Germany.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation became one of the largest offensives of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. She went through the most difficult conditions.

As a result of the failure of the operation, the problems of the Soviet army and navy were exposed, which made it possible to avoid mistakes in the future. Until the Allied landing in Normandy, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was considered one of the largest.

background

The occupation of Crimea began in 1941. By the beginning of autumn, the Wehrmacht captured almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. After the fall of Kiev, the hope for a counteroffensive disappeared. Since most of the combat-ready armies of the entire front turned out to be in the "cauldron". The retreat to the East began. In September, the Germans were already on the outskirts of the Crimea. The importance of the peninsula was well understood by both sides. First, it provided control over for the most part Black Sea. Especially because of the hesitant Turkey. Which, although it supported the Third Reich, did not enter the war.

Also, the peninsula was a good air base. It was from him that Soviet bombers took off, which inflicted strategic air strikes on Romanian oil wells. Therefore, on September 26, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive on the isthmus. Less than a month later, the peninsula was almost completely captured. The Soviet units retreated to Taman. Only Sevastopol remained, whose heroic defense still continued. At this time, the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation was born at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Training

As a result of the withdrawal from the Crimea, Sevastopol became the only place of resistance. city ​​kept heroic defense, despite a complete blockade from the ground and only a partial supply by sea. The Germans made several assaults, but they all turned out to be unsuccessful. Therefore, the commander of the army group Manstein decided to start a siege. It took almost all the armies to surround the huge agglomeration. At the same time, only one division of the Wehrmacht defended the Kerch crossing.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was developed by General Kozlov. For its implementation, two armies were involved. Within two weeks, under the leadership of General Kozlov, possible landing routes were developed. Due to the lack of reserves, an entire army was withdrawn from the border with Iran. As a result, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was scheduled for the twenty-sixth of December. The plan involved a simultaneous attack on Feodosia and the strait. The Soviet troops were supposed to drive the Germans out of the city, and then surround the entire enemy grouping. The command was counting on a quick victory, since the main forces of the Germans were concentrated near Sevastopol. At the same time, only a small German garrison and several Romanian armies covered Kerch. Already at that time, the Headquarters knew that the Romanian formations were extremely unstable to massive attacks and could not conduct a long-term defense.

If successful, the Red Army would be able to destroy the enemy grouping in the area of ​​the peninsula. This would make it possible to freely transport new units to the coast from Taman. After that, the Soviet troops could quickly move west and hit the rear German troops besieging Sevastopol. According to Kozlov's plan, after the release of the city, it would be possible to launch a large-scale offensive in the Crimea.

First hit

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 began on the twenty-sixth of December. The "auxiliary" blow was struck first. He not only fettered the enemy's forces, but diverted his attention from the main goal - Feodosia. With the support of the Black Sea Fleet, Soviet troops secretly approached the shore. After the artillery preparation, the landing began.

The landing took place in extremely difficult conditions. The coast was unsuitable for mooring ships and barges. The Germans also managed to start shelling the attackers. Therefore, the soldiers had to jump into the water as soon as the depth was sufficient to walk. That is, on a cold December day, the Red Army soldiers walked up to their necks in icy water. As a result, there were large sanitary losses due to hypothermia. But a few days later, the temperature dropped even further, and the strait froze over. Therefore, the rest of the 51st Army was already advancing on the ice.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 in the main direction began on the twenty-ninth. In contrast to the landing in Kerch, the landing in Feodosia took place directly in the port. The soldiers landed on the shore and immediately rushed into battle. In total, about 40 thousand people were landed in both directions on the first day. The German garrison of the city was three thousand people. Their resistance was crushed by the end of the day. After landing in Feodosia, the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the Nazis. In Kerch, only one division of the Germans and Romanian mountain riflemen held the line.

Retreat

At Headquarters, they almost immediately learned about the results that the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation had brought. The forces of the parties in the Kerch region were unequal. The Soviet troops outnumbered the Germans by several times. Therefore, General von Sponeck decided to start a retreat to the west. The order began to be executed instantly. The Nazis retreated to avoid joining the two landing armies. However, the front Manstein categorically forbade any retreat. He feared that in the event of a withdrawal, the Soviet troops would be able to catch up with the German and Romanian armies and destroy them.

That was the plan of the Soviet leadership. The defeat of the Kerch garrison would lead to a shortage of German forces.

The road to Sevastopol would have been opened before the Red Army. However, the landing did not begin to advance rapidly. Instead of a quick rush to the west, the 44th Army moved towards Kerch to meet the 51st Army. This delay allowed the Germans to gain a foothold on a new line of defense near Sivash. Reserves and heavy weapons were brought there. In Berlin, they immediately began to take retaliatory measures as soon as they learned that the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation had begun. The 1st stage allowed the Soviet troops to gain a foothold on the coast. However, the hardest part was yet to come.

Difficult position

After the defeat of the Germans in Feodosia and Kerch, the Red Army units were extremely exhausted. This is primarily due to the extreme landing conditions. Ice water, low air temperature, and so on had a bad effect on the well-being of the fighters. There was not a single hospital in the captured bridgeheads. Therefore, the wounded soldiers could only rely on first aid. After that, they were delivered to Kerch and from there, across the sea, to the mainland. The seriously wounded could not always overcome such a long distance.

It was also not possible to establish a crossing due to the constant attacks of German aircraft. Air defense equipment was not delivered on time. Therefore, in fact, the planes did not meet any resistance. As a result, many warships were seriously damaged.

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: 2nd stage

In less than a week, the Red Army recaptured the entire coast. Fascist resistance was crushed fairly quickly. Due to uncertainty in the Romanian units, the Wehrmacht introduced regular German officers into their composition. The defense along the Sivash was reinforced by a reserve infantry regiment.

The main direction of attack for the Soviet troops was Railway, which provided the 11th army of the Wehrmacht. Taking into account the weakness of the Nazi troops, the General Headquarters ordered an immediate advance to the west. According to the plan, Kozlov was supposed to go to the rear of the Germans besieging Sevastopol and defeat them. After that, it was planned to launch another large-scale offensive and liberate the entire Crimea. However, the general hesitated too long. He believed that there were still not enough resources to throw. It would seem that the successful Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation of the Soviet troops brought severe disappointment. The Nazis counterattacked.

The following month, forty-second, a new large-scale offensive was being prepared. To support it, an additional corps was landed in Sudak. Ammunition and reinforcements arrived by sea and ice. However, one of the best generals of the Third Reich was ahead of Kozlov. In mid-January, the Nazis suddenly began their offensive. The main blow fell on the poorly fortified front line at the junction of the two armies. Three days later, the Germans reached their original positions. By the end of January 18, Theodosius had fallen. The troops recently landed in Sudak offered desperate resistance. For almost two weeks, the Red Army fought heroically and almost in full strength gave their lives in battle. Supply ships were destroyed. After the loss of the only port, Soviet troops could only cross the ice to Kerch.

Preparing for a new attack

After that, the command created a separate front in the Crimea.

It included armies already operating on the peninsula and new formations. Soldiers of the forty-seventh army were removed from the Iranian border. The command sent a significant amount of equipment. A special commissar was sent from Headquarters. Preparations for the offensive began. It was scheduled for the end of February. The goal was the enemy grouping near Sevastopol, in fact, for its destruction, and the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation was developed. The Crimean front was reinforced by artillery regiments and heavy tanks throughout the month.

On the twenty-seventh of February the offensive began. It was planned to concentrate the main blow in Kerch. However, weather conditions interfered with the plans. The thaw began, and heavy rains poured down. Muds and mud prevented the advance of heavy equipment. Tanks, especially heavy ones, could not keep up with the infantry. As a result, the Germans managed to withstand the attack of the Red Army. Only in one sector of the front was it possible to break through the line of defense. The Romanian army could not withstand the onslaught. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops failed to build on the initial success. Manstein understood that a breakthrough threatened the exit of the Red Army to the flank of his armies. Therefore, he sent the last reserves to hold the line, and this gave results. Until the third of March, stubborn battles continued. But it was not possible to seriously move forward.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the troops of the Crimean Front continued in mid-March. Eight rifle divisions, supported by two tank brigades, launched an offensive. At the same time, the Primorsky Army struck from the besieged Sevastopol. But they failed to break through to their own. The Germans repulsed ten attacks per day. But the Nazi defenses could not be broken through. Separate formations achieved some success, but could not hold their positions. After that, the front stabilized and the intensity of hostilities decreased.

German offensive

By the end of March, Soviet troops had lost one hundred and ten thousand men since the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation began. The 3rd stage began with the German offensive.

It was planned carefully and for a long time. As a result of the unsuccessful attack of the Red Army, a front ledge (the so-called arc) was formed in the place where the Romanian division was defeated. Main Forces Soviet army focused right here. While in the south, only three divisions occupied the defense.

Manstein decided to make a maneuver, hitting precisely to the south. For this, significant reinforcements were sent to the Crimea. consisting of one hundred and eighty cars, arrived at the outskirts of Sevastopol. The Germans conducted a thorough reconnaissance and revealed the weaknesses of the defense of the Soviet troops. To support the planned offensive, the Nazis intended to use aircraft. For this, on the personal order of Hitler, an air corps was sent to the peninsula. The planes also arrived from Romania. However, the pilots of all the machines were exclusively Germans.

The Soviet troops were located too close to the front. This is remembered by many eyewitnesses of those events. According to historians, it was the inept command of Kozlov and Mehlis that led to the subsequent tragedy. Instead of leaving the divisions in the rear, where they would be outside the zone of artillery fire, they were constantly driven forward.

fatal defeat

The offensive began on the seventh of May. The land attack was preceded by air preparation. The Luftwaffe launched strikes against previously reconnoitered targets. As a result, Soviet troops suffered losses in many directions. The headquarters of one of the armies was destroyed. As a result, command passed to Colonel Kotov.

The next day the infantry attack began. With the support of heavy tanks, the Germans broke through the front to a depth of seven kilometers. A sudden blow in this area could not be repelled. Also in the rear of the Red Army troops landed. Its numbers were small, but a sudden attack from the sea caused panic in the ranks. Soviet soldiers. By the ninth of May, Manstein brought another of his divisions into battle. The Germans managed to finally break through the front and defeat almost the entire southern group. Immediately after that, the Wehrmacht began to turn to the north, threatening to hit the flank of the remaining forces of the Crimean Front.

I take into account the catastrophic situation, on the night of May 10, Stalin had a personal conversation with Kozlov. It was decided to retreat to a new line of defense. But the army left after the German air raid without a commander could no longer advance. A new blow was struck in the direction of the Cimmerian Wall, which was assigned the role of a new line of defense. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Soviet troops failed. The German troops landed from the air helped finally break through the defenses. On May 14, the evacuation of Red Army soldiers from the Crimea began. A day later, the Germans launched an assault on Kerch. The garrison of the city fought until they were left without ammunition, after which the defenders of the city went to the quarries.

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: results

Landing in Kerch initially brought success. A new front was formed, an opportunity arose for one of the first large-scale offensives. However, the inept command of the troops led to tragic consequences. For several months of heavy fighting, the Germans managed not only to hold their positions, but also to go on the offensive. As a result, the Wehrmacht delivered a strategically thought-out blow, which led to the defeat that ended the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation. The battles are briefly described in the diaries of Kozlov and Manstein.

Despite the failure of the operation, it became a harbinger of the already victorious offensive on the peninsula in forty-four.

Second attack

Two years after the tragic defeat, a new landing force landed in the port of Kerch. 1944 was the year of the liberation of the Crimea. When planning an offensive on the peninsula, the command considered all the details of the first operation. The Azov fleet was involved in the delivery of troops. The landing party was supposed to seize a bridgehead for a further large-scale offensive.

At this time, a large-scale offensive operation was being prepared. Therefore, the blows were delivered from two directions. On January 22, about one and a half thousand Red Army men boarded ships and set off for Kerch. To cover the upcoming operation, Soviet artillery began a massive shelling of the coast. At the same time, the greatest fire was delivered not at the landing site in order to disorient the enemy. Also, several boats made an imitation of the landing.

Closer to the night of January 22, troops landed in the Kerch port. 1944 was far from being as cold as 42, so Marines did not suffer significant losses from hypothermia. Immediately after the landing, the paratroopers rushed into battle and achieved significant success. A significant part of the city was captured. However, the army advancing from the other side was unable to break through the German defenses. Therefore, the paratroopers had to break through to their own. During the fighting, one of the battalions managed to capture 170 German soldiers. A few days later, having suffered significant losses, marines broke through the encirclement and connected with the advancing units. In fact, the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation of 1941-1942 was repeated, only much more successfully.