Summer campaign 1942
(June - December)
Preparing for the campaign
Faced with the prospect of continued large-scale military operations on the Eastern Front, German strategists were forced to admit that operations built on the same principles as the previous summer's offensives were unlikely to produce the desired result. The large length of the Eastern Front inevitably led to the conclusion that in order to obtain a satisfactory result it was necessary to concentrate the maximum possible forces in one particular area. Therefore, it was decided to conduct the main fighting on the southern sector of the front with the goal of capturing the Caucasus (which would cut off the Soviet Union from its main sources of oil and at the same time provide Germany with oil) and open the way to the Middle East simultaneously with Rommel’s strike through Egypt in the Mediterranean theater.
The first condition necessary for the implementation of this plan was the complete occupation of Crimea, necessary to cover the southern flank German troops. Therefore, during April, Soviet troops were driven out of the Kerch Peninsula, and only stubbornly defending Sevastopol remained in Crimea. In May, the VIII Air Corps was transferred from the central front to the Crimea and was subordinated to the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, about 600 aircraft of various types were concentrated at the airfields of Crimea, which were ready to take part in a full-scale assault on Sevastopol. The place of the VIII Air Corps in the central sector of the front was taken by the V Air Corps, withdrawn from the southern sector at the beginning of 1942. It was renamed Luftwaffe Command East and given air fleet status (see Map 17).
The selection of VIII Air Corps for this assault was consistent with the established practice of sending this formation under Richthofen's command to support the most important operations, given its experience and effectiveness in participating in massive ground support operations.
At this stage of the war in the Soviet Union, the Germans attached great importance to operations in the Crimea, since the success of their summer offensive in the Caucasus depended on the occupation of the peninsula. Kerch had already fallen, but Sevastopol continued to stubbornly resist. Accordingly, the VIII Air Corps, which during this period of the war was usually assigned to carry out the most important operations, was transferred from the Moscow direction to the Crimea, where it became available to the 4th Air Fleet. The support of the VIII Air Corps undoubtedly contributed greatly to overcoming resistance Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula.
The section of the front vacated by the VIII Air Corps was occupied by the V Air Corps, which was renamed Luftwaffe Command East. This command had the status of an air fleet and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. In March, the IV Air Corps had to bear the burden of repelling the powerful and successful offensives of Soviet troops in the south of the USSR, so to strengthen it, direct support units of ground troops were transferred from other air corps fighting on the Eastern Front.
The assault on Sevastopol began on June 2 and ended on June 6, and all this time the fortress was subjected to massive air strikes. On average, about 600 flights were carried out per day, with a maximum of more than 700 (June 2). Some 2,500 tons of high explosive bombs were dropped, many of the maximum caliber. However, on June 4, the German infantry, which went on the offensive, suddenly discovered that the fortifications were largely intact, and the morale of the defenders was not broken. However, the Germans stormed so stubbornly that the resistance Soviet soldiers managed to overcome in a relatively short period of time.
While operations against Sevastopol were underway, a surprise Soviet offensive on Kharkov forced the Luftwaffe to transfer some forces from the Crimea to help stop the enemy advance, and intense air action was required to save the situation. The pre-emptive strike by the Soviet army not only caused casualties that needed to be replaced, but also delayed preparations for the planned main summer campaign. However, in early June, the VIII Air Corps was again transferred to the north. Its headquarters were located near Kursk, in the northern part of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet (see map 18). From May to June, active measures were taken to accumulate large reserves of bombs, fuel, etc. on the Southern Front, for which the railways were fully involved. At the same time, reinforcements were returning to the Eastern Front, rearmed after six months of fighting and additionally reinforced by aviation withdrawn from Mediterranean Sea after the completion of the air offensive against Malta. Thus, by the beginning of July, the strength of German aviation on the Eastern Front had again reached 2,750 aircraft and thus reached the level of forces involved in the operations of the previous summer. However, now 1,500 of them were on the Southern Front as part of the 4th Air Fleet. That is, in the central sector of the front there remained a containment force - about 600 aircraft, in the Leningrad direction - no more than 375, and another 200 aircraft were based in Northern Norway and Finland.
Fighting in July - August 1942
The German offensive began in the first week of July with the VIII Air Corps on a relatively narrow sector of the front, where its aircraft supported the first German attack towards Voronezh. Gradually, the corps' area of operations expanded to the south as tank units advanced along the Voronezh-Rostov railway east of the Donets River. The direct support forces of the ground forces quickly followed the German units advancing along the Don, and after the transfer of part of the long-range bombers to the south in the Voronezh region, which was subject to strong attacks by the Soviet army from the northeast to the flank of the advancing Germans, only insignificant forces remained. However, near Voronezh, Soviet troops were contained without resorting to the forces that participated in the offensive to the south with the constant support of long-range bomber aircraft and close support units of ground troops.
Having completed its mission in the extreme southern sector of the Eastern Front, the VIII Air Corps was now transferred to a new important direction. The corps was transferred from the southern section of the 4th Air Fleet's zone of responsibility to the northern. The redeployment took place during the German preparations for an offensive from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh.
As a result of the movement of the VIII Air Corps, the southern sector of the front, adjacent to the Black Sea, was occupied by the IV Air Corps.
All the time, while German troops were rapidly advancing along the Don from Voronezh in the direction of Stalingrad and from the Rostov region to the Caucasus in the direction of Maykop and Armavir, a significant part of the long-range bomber aviation participated in systematic raids on communications behind enemy lines. These operations covered wide areas, including North Caucasus, in which bridges, ferry crossings and railways were subjected to massive attacks. Strategic bombing was also carried out on communications deeper in the rear in order to cut off supply routes between Stalingrad and Moscow, but no attempt was made to bomb cities located far behind the front line and not under immediate threat of occupation. In contrast, long-range bomber aircraft focused their efforts solely on indirect support of the offensive, trying to disrupt Soviet communications. For this purpose, attacks were carried out on the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus up to Poti, and attempts were also made on a small scale to mine the Volga and ships on the Volga were subjected to air strikes all the way to Astrakhan.
Unlike the attack on Stalingrad, which was supported by about 1,000 aircraft of all types, the German offensive in the Caucasus after crossing the Don received almost no air support until the advance was slowed by hilly terrain that prevented the massive use of tanks. Then the need arose to strengthen the IV Air Corps, which was responsible for air operations in the Caucasus, and fighter units armed with single-engine and twin-engine fighters were transferred to bases located along a line running approximately from east to west through Krasnodar.
Fighting in September - October 1942
In September and October, the determining factor in air strategy was the failure of the German High Command to achieve decisive success either at Stalingrad or in the Caucasus. At Stalingrad, active operations were carried out by the VIII Air Corps, which made up most forces of the 4th Air Fleet. Dive bombers were especially active, often making 4 or more sorties per day.
Despite four months of intense fighting, Luftwaffe strength remained remarkably stable until October: 2,450–2,500 aircraft. During August and September, many aviation units were withdrawn to the rear for rearmament, but their places were taken by fresh units, fully equipped with equipment and crews. Nevertheless, the concentration of forces in the south left only small forces for the Moscow and Leningrad directions. It is likely that Soviet aviation had air superiority in this area, since the advances of Soviet troops near Rzhev and in the area of Lake Ilmen forced the Germans in September to transfer to the north part of the aircraft that participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. However, the Luftwaffe reinforcement in the Leningrad area that occurred in September was planned, as well as the reinforcement of ground troops in this direction, in preparation for a full-scale offensive, planned with the expectation that Stalingrad would not hold out for long. By the beginning of October, 550–600 aircraft were concentrated on the Leningrad sector of the front, but Stalingrad did not fall, and preparations and movements of Soviet troops in the Moscow region and, to a lesser extent, in the south forced the Luftwaffe to redistribute forces and weaken the group near Leningrad. In the second half of October, at least 300 aircraft were withdrawn from this sector.
At this stage, the dangers to which German air power was exposed in the Soviet Union became apparent: its supply lines were stretched; it moved away from the bases equipped in the winter of 1941/42 and operated from poorly prepared airfields; its main forces were so involved in the fighting at Stalingrad that it was impossible to ensure air superiority anywhere else; units of direct support for ground troops operated intensively, many crews made three or four sorties per day, which affected the condition of equipment and crews and ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. At the same time, a continuous series of local operations and the threat of an offensive by Soviet troops in the north required constant redeployment of units, leaving no pause for rest and restoration of combat effectiveness.
In the Soviet Union, by the end of the summer, IV Air Corps' area of responsibility had expanded to the Caucasus, and VIII Air Corps was tasked with supporting the attack on Stalingrad. Taking into account the concentration of VIII Corps forces and the situation in the Don basin, it was decided to create a new operational formation to direct operations north of the 4th Air Fleet's zone of responsibility, on the Voronezh sector of the front. Accordingly, the I Air Corps was transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet (where it fought from the very beginning of the campaign), which received a new designation - Luftwaffe Don Command and, presumably, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. There was not a single air corps left in the 1st Air Fleet.
The map shows the approximate position of the German armies on the Eastern Front.
Combat operations from November 1942 to January 1943
The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began at the end of October and was accompanied by the preparation and concentration of troops in the middle reaches of the Don below Voronezh, where the Germans had only a small force of 70–80 aircraft covering a front of about 500 km. However, this section of the front was considered important enough for the I Air Corps to be transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet, which received the designation Luftwaffe Command “Don”. Thus, in addition to a frontal attack from the east, the Germans also faced the threat of a flank attack from the northwest. Aviation operations near Stalingrad and in the Don bend were hampered by disruption of communications, lack of fuel and bad weather, and by mid-November a decision was made to stop the offensive and switch to defense.
The Soviet offensive from the Don bend in a southwestern direction deprived the Germans of forward airfields and forced them to withdraw direct support aircraft for ground forces to the rear. As a result, Stalingrad was out of range of German single-engine fighters, and Soviet aviation gained superiority in the skies over the encircled German group. At the same time, the stress of constant fighting began to take its toll, and the withdrawal of some units to the rear for reorganization became an urgent necessity. With the start of the allied offensives in Libya and Tunisia, it was necessary to remove from the front additional forces, to strengthen the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, and by early December the strength of German aviation in the USSR had dropped to about 2,000 aircraft, a significant portion of which were inoperative. The strength of the VIII and I Air Corps in the Don region, which previously reached 1000 aircraft, fell to approximately 650–700 aircraft.
After the transfer of approximately 400 aircraft to the Mediterranean, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to cope with all the tasks on the Eastern Front, and activity in the Caucasus direction began to decline. After the transfer of almost all long-range and dive bombers, as well as some single-engine fighters to other sectors of the front, the initiative in this direction passed to the Soviet troops, who took advantage of their numerical superiority in the air to support the offensive through the Kalmyk steppes to Rostov and through western part Caucasus in the direction of the Kerch Strait.
The encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad and the subsequent almost complete encirclement of the 17th Army in the Kuban posed another serious task for the Luftwaffe: supplying the encircled troops by air. For this purpose, Xe-111 bombers were removed from combat missions and transferred to transport aviation. They suffered heavy losses not only due to unfavorable weather conditions, but also due to constant attacks on transport aircraft in the air and on the ground. These strikes forced the Germans to assign fighter escorts, reducing the number of single-engine fighters that could be dedicated to close support of ground forces. By the end of December 1942, there were only about 375 single-engine fighters on the entire Eastern Front, and it was this lack of fighter cover that may have been one of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses during the last few weeks of 1942. However, there was another reason for the high losses: non-combat losses of aircraft left on the ground during the retreat and losses due to adverse weather conditions. If we add to this the losses of combat aircraft used as transports, then the losses in the second half of 1942, apparently, will be equal to the losses in the last six months of 1941, which, as is known, led to a noticeable weakening of the striking power of German aviation in 1942 year, reducing its number to less than 4,000 vehicles by the end of the year after another peak of 4,800 vehicles in July 1941.
The shortage of first-line aircraft at the end of 1942 is evidenced by the introduction of second-line units into battle and the use of obsolete types of aircraft (Xe-146) and reconnaissance aircraft to carry out bombing strikes. During December, the number of German first-line aircraft in the East was reduced by about 150 aircraft, despite the fact that the Soviet offensive required action slightly less active than before the onset of winter.
Analysis of the 1942 campaign
The significant weakening of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942, which was greatly facilitated by the previous six months of the Eastern campaign, is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. It will therefore suffice here only to briefly talk about the strategy and tactics of the Germans and the development of new ideas for the use of air power that became apparent towards the end of the year.
The campaign in the East in 1942, as in 1941, showed that the Luftwaffe continued to strictly adhere to the traditional tactics of massive attacks aimed at directly supporting tank units. Despite some successes in the Battle of France and the Balkan Campaign, by the end of 1942 it became obvious that this approach was not producing the necessary results on the Eastern Front. The reason for this was not only the enormous length of the front, due to which any concentration of forces for an attack left the flank of the German troops unprotected, but also the depth of the theater of military operations. The Soviets took full advantage of these circumstances by retreating, thereby stretching German lines of communication until the Luftwaffe strike forces, cut off from their supply bases, were exhausted by maintenance problems. Thus, despite the enormous successes in initial stage, the specific conditions of the war in the USSR did not allow the Germans to use the proven strategy of combining the most powerful direct air support for troops and massive attacks on factories and rear supply bases to achieve final victory.
By the fall of 1942, the failure to achieve the expected results began to lead to a modification of German tactics and a reorganization of forces, but no radical changes followed. Thus, there was a tendency to increase the flexibility of the structure on a "functional" basis, and new units were specifically adapted to the tactical requirements that were dictated by conditions on the Eastern Front. This trend manifested itself in greater attention to defense issues, which was facilitated by the Soviet strategy of organizing counter-offensives in winter time, when the Germans could not fight on equal terms. Such a doctrine should have led to the creation of a balanced group of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front, in which offensive and defensive functions would be more evenly distributed. It therefore represented a step forward in tactical terms, a more intelligent, if less spectacular, strategy and greater flexibility of use than in previous campaigns.
This concept was manifested in the organization of auxiliary and second line units. These included: units equipped with obsolete Xe-46, Khsh-126 and Ar-66, whose tasks included harassing night bombing of concentrations of Soviet troops; anti-tank units equipped with Khsh-129, Me-110, Yu-87 and Yu-88, which carried special heavy weapons to combat Soviet tanks that broke through the German defense line; and, finally, special squadrons for attacks on railways, equipped with the Yu-88 fighter version and designed to attack the main transport arteries in order to impede the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. All of these units were relatively new categories that did not fall under the traditional Luftwaffe organizational chart. These experiments and innovations mainly took place in early July 1942, after the appointment of the commander of the VIII Air Corps, General Oberst von Richthofen, as commander of the 4th Air Fleet, and there is reason to believe that von Richthofen was the main proponent of the new tactics. His experience as commander of the VIII Air Corps, which was the main formation engaged in direct support of ground forces, could well be used to solve defense problems, the main focus of which would be to eliminate the shortcomings that had negated all the successes achieved earlier in the Soviet Union. However, the events of 1943 showed that these innovations, no matter how original, could not be brought to fruition in the face of the ever-increasing lag of the Luftwaffe in both quantitative and qualitative terms, which became stunningly obvious the following year.
The General Staff headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the summer campaign of 1942 a plan of deep defense, since the main combat units of the Red Army were around Moscow at the stage of reorganization and replenishment. In addition, in the spring of 1942, near Leningrad, near the village of Lyuban, the 2nd Shock Soviet Army was defeated, and its commander, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov, surrendered. However, I. Stalin, despite these unfavorable conditions, insisted on carrying out major offensive operations by the Red Army. In April 1942, in the Crimea in the Kerch region, as a result of the inept actions of the front commander D.T. Kozlov and member of the Front Military Council L.Z. Mehlis, the offensive of our troops ended in defeat: total losses amounted to about 200 thousand people. On July 4, we had to leave Sevastopol, which had heroically defended itself for 8 months.
In May 1942, near Kharkov, the troops of the Southwestern Front (S.K. Timoshenko and N.S. Khrushchev), without preliminary preparation and in the absence of reserves, went on the offensive, but were surrounded by enemy troops and lost 18 - 20 divisions. The initiative in hostilities passed to German troops. In June 1942, they occupied Donbass and Rostov-on-Don, broke through the Red Army front in the Don bend and continued to advance towards Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. There were no defensive structures on the approaches to Stalingrad, so German tank columns soon appeared on the outskirts of the city, and in the North Caucasus they reached the Main Caucasus Range.
On July 28, 1942, I. Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back!”, which introduced severe punishments for commanders and commissars who allowed their units to retreat without orders from the command: they were declared enemies of the Motherland and put on trial by a military tribunal. In addition, penal companies were also formed, where ordinary soldiers and junior commanders were sent “who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability...”. Armed barrage detachments began to be stationed in the rear of some divisions and they were obliged “to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units.” The barrier detachments were abolished only on November 13, 1944, but the punitive counterintelligence agency SMERSH (“death to spies”) continued to operate with unlimited powers.
At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the fascist command transferred an additional 80 divisions and a lot of military equipment to the Eastern Front with the goal of cutting off the Volga region and the Caucasus from the center of Russia and taking Moscow by a roundabout route. Hitler's troops included Austrian, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian units, and Finnish troops blocked Leningrad from the north.
On July 17, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad began, which lasted 200 days until February 2, 1943; The actual battles on the streets of Stalingrad began on September 12, 1942. The defense of the city was held by the 62nd Army of V.I. Chuikov, the 64th Army of M.S. Shumilov and the 13th Youth Rifle Division A.I. Rodimtsev, almost the entire staff who died in stubborn battles for every house.
The general leadership of our troops on the Volga was headed by representatives of the Headquarters, Marshals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and N.N. Voronov. According to the Uranus plan, on November 19, 1942, the Red Army went on the offensive with the forces of three fronts: Southwestern (N.F. Vatutin), Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (A.I. Eremenko). On November 23, 1942, a 330,000-strong group of fascists was surrounded, but did not capitulate, hoping for outside help. December 24, 1942 tank corps of General V.M. Bogdanov, behind enemy lines, destroyed the airfield near the village of Tatsinskaya, from where the group of Field Marshal F. Paulus was supplied by air. Tankers destroyed 430 fascist aircraft.
On January 10, 1943, following the “Ring” plan, the Red Army began the defeat of the encircled enemy group in Stalingrad. Attempts by Manstein's army group to release the encircled Nazis from the west ended in failure, and enemy troops were thrown back 170 - 250 km to the west. Successfully advancing in the direction of Rostov-on-Don, the Red Army cut off the fascist troops operating in the North Caucasus, and they rolled back to the Crimea.
During the period of fighting on the Volga, the enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured, lost 3.5 thousand tanks, 12 thousand guns, 75 thousand vehicles and 3 thousand aircraft. In Stalingrad alone, 91 thousand fascists were captured, including 2,500 officers and 24 generals led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. Hitler declared 3 days of mourning throughout Germany. The military power and prestige of Germany were undermined, the initiative in military operations passed to the Red Army, and a radical change began in the course of the Great Patriotic War in favor of the USSR.
After the defeat of the fascist troops on the Volga, the Red Army launched a general strategic offensive, which lasted until the end of March 1943. During this time, enemy troops were driven back 600 - 700 km. This made it possible for the troops of the Leningrad (L.A. Govorov) and Volkhov (K.A. Meretskov) fronts to break the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943.
The success of the Red Army was largely determined by the valor of the home front workers, who in 1942 produced 25.4 thousand aircraft, 24.5 thousand tanks, 33.1 thousand guns, while Germany during this time produced only 14 thousand aircraft, 6 , 1 thousand tanks, 14 thousand guns, and almost all of Europe it conquered worked for Nazi Germany.
MAIN BATTLES Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) Battle of the Dnieper - a series of interconnected strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War carried out in the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.
Battle of Stalingrad By mid-summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. The German command includes Stalingrad in the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea). Germany's goal was to seize industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were necessary; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil necessary for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to implement this plan in just a week with the help of Paulus's 6th Field Army. It included 13 divisions, numbering about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. On the USSR side, German forces were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty was also that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.
The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered July 17, when, near the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German Army. Throughout the second half of the summer there were fierce battles near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aircraft began to systematically bomb the city. The battles on the ground also did not subside. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked both day and night. By mid-September, the German army broke through to the city center, and fighting took place right in the streets. The Nazis intensified their attack. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, and German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingrad residents was unparalleled. A lot of European countries conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they only needed 2-3 weeks to capture the entire country. In Stalingrad the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.
The beginning of autumn and mid-November passed in battles. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was too early to declare the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed at the height of the fighting, on September 12. The development of the offensive operation “Uranus” was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to gather the required number of troops.
Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and seven were defeated. During the week of November 23, Soviet efforts were aimed at strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to lift this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), but it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled group of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, Soviet troops moved on to destroy the enemy, which became the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy group was eliminated, which is considered the end date of the battle. 2
Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in Battle of Stalingrad on each side there were about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad is difficult to overestimate. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad was big influence on the further course of the Second World War. She intensified the fight against fascists in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis countries (Hitler's coalition). A crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries has arrived.
Kursk Bulge In the spring of 1943, relative calm established on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased production military equipment at the expense of the resources of all Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Much work has been done to strengthen Soviet army. Design bureaus improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing is after Stalingrad
Stalin and the Headquarters initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky were able to predict the place and time of the future Wehrmacht offensive. The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having gathered together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the bulge of the front line, which had formed in the Kursk region. With victory in this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2 thousand tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.
Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy’s attack with an offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, to meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them out and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank strike of the entire war on the Red Army formations. Methodically breaking down the defenses, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.
The Battle of Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of fascist German troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 in the area railway station Prokhorovka (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops consisting of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, on the positions of the 6th and 7th On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the guard armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (north) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results. Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River .
The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st Division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, supporting its flanks are 2 tank division SS Das Reich and the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf conducted active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, covering the left flank, expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile).
By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction.
On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy grouping (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender on in this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and the 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps(2nd and 2nd Guards), the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st SS Leibstandarte Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".
The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades. At 8 am Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.
At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed. By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.
The Battle of the Dnieper by Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kyiv, as well as creating strong bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed the Wotan defense plan. It provided for the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the line Narva - Pskov - Gomel and further along the Dnieper.
This line was supposed, according to the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of defenders of the Dnieper part of the “Eastern Wall” in Ukraine were parts of Army Group “South” (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K.K. Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin), Steppe (General I.S. Konev), Southwestern (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General F.) acted against them. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the Battle of the Dnieper is shown in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Airplanes 2850 2000
The Battle of the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), units of the Red Army liberated Donbass and Left Bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The Battle of the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbass operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), who managed to break through the German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, responded to this success in a timely manner and, having regrouped his forces, threw the main attack units of the front into the breakthrough. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough to 100 km in width and 60 km in depth, forcing the Germans to begin withdrawing troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.
At the beginning of September, the Red Army’s offensive unfolded throughout Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began to withdraw its troops beyond the Dnieper. Pursuing the retreating troops, the advanced units of the Red Army approached the Dnieper on a 750-kilometer stretch from Loev to Zaporozhye and immediately began crossing this water barrier. By the end of September, in this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The German leadership's plans for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were thwarted. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was waged to expand and retain bridgeheads. At the same time, reserves were being pulled up, bridges were built, and forces were built up for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. On at this stage The Red Army carried out two strategic operations: Nizhnedneprovskaya and Kievskaya.
The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. During the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blocked the Crimean Peninsula and captured the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye (450 km in length and up to 100 km in depth). However, their attempts to break out from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by the fierce resistance of German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Lower Dnieper operation was distinguished by large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (approximately half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).
The Kiev operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with the battles north and south of Kyiv for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kyiv from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the advance of troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P. S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kyiv, who was released on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile units liberated Zhitomir on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in this area, Manstein failed to recapture Kyiv (see Kiev operation).
By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Wall in Ukraine had been broken through almost its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kyiv to Pripyat and from Cherkassy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give its troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces at the “winter line” under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealistic. The Battle of the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid crossing of such a wide water barrier with fierce resistance from large enemy forces. According to the German General von Buttlar, during this offensive “the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it has not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment.” The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall is evidenced by the fact that 2,438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of the total number of those awarded this title during the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the fight on the bridgeheads exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable ones - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kyiv defensive operation), about 1.2 thousand aircraft (without the Kyiv defensive operation).
To fully appreciate the significance of the second German summer campaign in Russia, it is necessary to recall the goals of the first summer campaign. As we have seen, they did not consist in conquering all of Russia, but in attacking the main strategic areas to force the Russian armies to defend them and lose defenders in subsequent battles. The strategic goal was tactical extermination.
We also saw that this strategy failed because the speed of advance was slow, the space too large and the resistance too strong.
If the strategy of destruction had failed in the more favorable conditions of 1941, how could it have succeeded in the less favorable conditions of 1942? Hitler answered this question in the negative; and it would be foolish to resort to it again. Instead of a strategy of destruction, a strategy of attrition should have been used. However, there was no question of solving this problem by tactical attrition; even if it were possible, such a course of action would take too much time. There was also no question of stirring up a revolution against the Bolsheviks. Consequently, the only possibility remained: to undermine the economic power of Russia and strike at the material basis of its armed forces. It was decided that for this it was necessary to deprive Russia of the Donetsk industrial region, the Kuban granary and Caucasian oil. In short, to deprive Russia of important strategic areas in the Kharkov, Stalingrad, Baku, Batumi quadrangle, which would eventually put the Russian army out of action.
So, Hitler’s plan for 1942, apparently, was the following: to cut off and occupy the quadrangle of Voronezh, Saratov, Stalingrad, Rostov with an offensive in two parallel directions: in the north along the Kursk, Saratov line and in the south along the Taganrog, Stalingrad line. Under the cover of this blockade, pass through the Caucasus to Baku.
According to two historians, the existence of such a plan “is confirmed by a document that fell into the hands of the Russians and was mentioned by Prime Minister Stalin in a speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary October revolution". The document outlined the procedure for occupying the following cities: Borisoglebsk, eastern Voronezh, by July 10, Stalingrad by July 25, Saratov by August 10, Syzran by August 15, Arzamas, south of Gorky, by September 10.
The very speed of the planned occupation of the cities is surprising, but even more surprising is what should be clear even to a novice in strategy: the success of the campaign depended not so much on the occupation of important points, but on how much it would be possible to prevent retaliatory actions on the part of the Russians. As can be seen from the plan, the Russian armies located north of the Voronezh-Saratov line were ignored. Given the space of Russia and the strength of the Russian armies, it was obvious that they could not be destroyed tactically, just as it was impossible to break the Russian people due to their high moral fortitude. Therefore, success could only be achieved if they were strategically paralyzed, but not by depriving the Russians of resources that would be needed in the future, such as oil, coal and wheat. Therefore, first of all it is necessary to occupy or besiege Moscow. Just as Paris is the central hub of French railways, so Moscow is the central hub of Russian railways. In 1914, due to the fact that the Germans did not occupy Paris, a disaster occurred on the Marne. In 1942, as we will see below, failure near Moscow led to a disaster on the Volga. If Moscow were in the hands of the Germans, then constant strategic bombing of Vologda, Buy, Gorky, Arzamas and Penza, located at a distance of 250 - 350 miles from Moscow and, therefore, easily accessible to bombers, would not only stop the supply of supplies from Arkhangelsk and reserves from the Asian part of Russia, but also lead to a chaotic state of railway traffic in the central part of Russia, and perhaps stop all traffic.
The armies that were to carry out Hitler's plan were commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. Army morale and training were lower than in 1941, but firepower had increased. An unwieldy tank division of 400 tanks was reduced to 250 improved tanks, and the air force was organized into strike groups that worked more closely with ground forces than before. The Germans adopted new tank tactics, the creation of which is attributed to Field Marshal Rommel. It was called “motpulk” and, in essence, was a modernized copy of the Hussite mobile camp. Colonel de Waterville describes it as follows:
“The mass of mobile assets was located in such a way that tanks and self-propelled artillery were the outer contour, inside which the vulnerable center was located: infantry in vehicles, anti-tank artillery, mobile repair shops and all the modern equipment needed by an army in battle... First of all, it was a combat organism with enormous firepower, extremely mobile and covered with thick armor...”
The main German offensive did not begin until June 28, but it was preceded by important battles. On May 8, Field Marshal von Manstein, who commanded the German 12th Army in Crimea, launched an attack on Kerch and took the city by storm on May 13. As this battle drew to a close, on May 12, Marshal Timoshenko launched a strong attack south of Kharkov to delay the German advance. Quickly moving from Lozovaya in the direction of Kharkov and Poltava, Russian troops occupied Krasnograd on May 16 and broke through the outer defense belt of the “over-hedge” (Kharkov) and two days later began fighting on the outskirts of the city. On May 19, the Germans launched a counteroffensive with large forces. After heavy fighting in the Barvenkovo and Izyum areas, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to leave Krasnograd. During the retreat, a significant part of his troops were surrounded and captured. On June 1, the Germans declared complete victory, but for them this offensive was an unpleasant event.
Four days later, von Manstein began bombing Sevastopol in preparation for the assault on the fortress. The outer defensive belt of the fortress was 20 miles long, the inner – 8 miles. The fortress was defended by a garrison of 75 thousand people under the command of General Petrov. On July 1, after a fierce battle, during which 50 thousand tons of artillery shells were fired at the fortress and 25 thousand tons of bombs were dropped, Sevastopol was taken by storm. Thus, the entire Crimea ended up in the hands of the Germans.
By mid-June, the concentration of German troops on the winter front line west of the Oskol River left the Russians in no doubt about the impending powerful offensive. Von Bock brought the following forces here: to the Kursk area - the 2nd Army, the 2nd Tank Army and the Hungarian Army, all under the command of General von Weich; to the Belgorod area - the 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army under the command of General von Goth; to the Kharkov region the 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal von Kleist; the Italian army remained in reserve west of Kharkov. To the south of this group of armies was the group of General Schwedler, which was to be placed at the disposal of the 12th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein; the latter, together with the Romanian army, was transferred from Crimea in the near future.
The Russians assumed that the German offensive would begin on the Voronezh-Rostov front and would develop along the Saratov-Stalingrad line, so they concentrated a strong group north of Voronezh and well fortified the areas of Voronezh and Rostov, as well as the Donets River line.
On June 22, the Germans suddenly struck from the Izyum area and three days later drove the Russians out of Kupyansk. Then on June 28 came the long-awaited offensive, which began with a strike east of Kursk. On July 1, the Russian front between Shchigra and Tim was broken through. On July 2, the Germans in large forces went on the offensive between Belgorod and Kharkov. Once again the Russian front was broken through, and by July 5 the Germans reached the western outskirts of Voronezh in the north and the Svatovo-Lisichansk line in the south.
The battle for Voronezh began, and, as we will see, for the Germans it was one of the most fatal during the entire war.
On July 6 and 7, von Weich's tanks and motorized infantry crossed the Don and broke into Voronezh, which is located in the corner formed by the Don and a small tributary, so that the city is surrounded on three sides by a water barrier. The German infantry that entered the battle was attacked from the flank between the rivers. “Russian troops, concentrated... north of Voronezh, arrived in time to save the day, they may have saved the Russians the entire campaign.” .
There is no doubt that this was the case. Over the next ten days, while fierce fighting took place in the city, the offensive south of Voronezh developed with tremendous speed. Comparing it with the Russian resistance in Voronezh itself had a strange psychological effect on Hitler.
By July 12, von Hoth took Rossosh and Kantemirovka - stations on the Voronezh - Rostov railway, the next day von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied Millerovo. Voroshilovgrad was outflanked and occupied on July 20. Meanwhile, von Manstein's armies were moving towards Rostov, which the Russians evacuated on 27 July.
“The entire Russian front was falling apart... the German army crossed the Don on a wide front. The tone of the Russian communiqués became serious, and growing concern was felt in the radio broadcasts... In Russia there were persistent demands to open a second front.”
The rapid advance towards Stalingrad and the unexpected resistance of the Russians in Voronezh apparently prompted Hitler's decision to leave a barrier in Voronezh from von Weichs' army group, and send von Hoth's group directly to the east to act together with von Manstein against Stalingrad. Only after the fall of Stalingrad should the offensive on Saratov be resumed.
From a strategic point of view, this mistake borders on madness. Since no attempt was made to disable the Moscow railway junction, the Russian armies north of Voronezh had complete freedom of movement. The occupation of the Caucasus was the main goal of the German plan. This could only be accomplished in this way: to create a deep defensive area north of the Caucasus, that is, as envisaged by the original plan, to occupy the quadrangle of Rostov, Stalingrad, Saratov, Voronezh, which was necessitated by the need to ensure the depth of defense and space for maneuver. By occupying not a quadrangle, but a triangle of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, the Germans formed a wedge. The northern side of the wedge - the Voronezh, Stalingrad line - was open to the Russian advance in a southern direction from the Voronezh, Saratov line. The change in the line of operations thus prepared the final defeat.
In accordance with the changed plan, von Weichs' armies dug in at Voronezh. Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions were used to protect von Hoth's strategic flank along the western bank of the Don. Meanwhile, von Manstein's group, advancing from Rostov, crossed the Don in the lower reaches at Tsimlyanskaya, while von Kleist rushed south to the plains of the North Caucasus.
During the last week of July and the first week of August, von Hoth's troops quickly moved down the Don, and a fierce struggle broke out for the bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Kalach, where the Don turns south west of Stalingrad. On August 15, the crossing at Kalach was captured, but only on August 25 was the river crossed at Kletskaya. German troops advancing south of the Don were stopped at Kotelnikovo. Only after crossing the river by the troops of General von Hoth were they able to continue the offensive. On September 9, the Stalingrad–Borisoglebsk railway was cut, and Stalingrad was subjected to heavy air bombardment. It seemed to the Germans that the city would soon fall.
While operations were unfolding in this way, von Kleist’s group, which had crossed the lower Don, quickly spread across the steppes of the North Caucasus. On August 4, Voroshilovsk fell, on August 8, the Russians destroyed and abandoned the Maikop oil fields, on August 20, Krasnodar was occupied, on August 25, German troops reached Mozdok in the middle reaches of the Terek, 100 miles from the Caspian Sea; The Russians retreated to Grozny. Finally, on September 10, the naval base on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk, fell. Due to the difficult terrain, Russian resistance, stretched communications and lack of fuel, the Caucasian campaign actually ended there. Everything was thrown into capturing Stalingrad. Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) was a large, widespread industrial city with a population of about 500 thousand people; it stands on the right bank of the Volga, several miles above its bend. The German advance on the city was made more difficult by the fact that the Volga here is 2 - 2.5 miles wide and, therefore, difficult to cross. The city could not be completely surrounded without crossing the river.
The Germans faced the problem of gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Volga. Then a relatively small army could stop all movement along the river and force the Stalingrad garrison to leave the city with a blockade.
In any crossing of a river in battle, the determining factor is not the width of the river, although this is important, but the width of the attacking front. If the front is wide, the attackers will divert the enemy’s attention by making false attempts to cross in several places, build a bridge on some unprotected or weakly defended sector of the enemy’s defense and create a bridgehead. A wide river, such as the Volga, requires more time to cross than a narrow river, therefore, the front for conducting diversionary operations must be wider. The Germans, first of all, had to create such a front. However, they did not do this, but resorted to direct blow, trying to take the city by bombardment and assault.
The assault began on September 15. For a whole month, attack followed attack, but the garrison under the command of General Chuikov put up strong resistance, and the Germans were able to achieve only local, or temporary, successes. The extreme idiocy of such a course of action should have become obvious as soon as it became clear that the city could not be taken at once. A city is not a fortress, but as long as the garrison holds firm and its supply lines are operational, reducing the city to a heap of ruins is nothing more than the easiest way to create an obstacle that is stronger than any of the specially built fortresses.
The losses of the German troops in the senseless assaults were so heavy that on October 15, General Hoth received orders to stop the attacks and wipe Stalingrad off the face of the earth with systematic artillery fire and aerial bombardment. For what? There is only one answer: to support Hitler's prestige, because the city was already in ruins. The industry of Stalingrad was destroyed, the Volga was intercepted, and the movement of transport up and down the Volga was suspended. Oil delivery from Baku to Moscow has stopped. Consequently, now all that remained was to keep the river blocked; the city itself was tactically of no value.
Thus, the Germans let go of the initiative to attack in Russia, and at the same time they increasingly lost it in North Africa. Many factors create and maintain initiative, but the main factor is ensuring freedom of movement for oneself or, on the contrary, limiting this freedom for the enemy. Both in North Africa and in Stalingrad, essentially throughout Russia, there was one common, all-determining factor - the excessive extension of German communications plus the difficulties associated with protecting them.
From Egypt, Rommel's communications extended 1,200 miles to Tripoli and another 1,300 miles as the crow flies to the industrial cities of Germany that supplied his armies. The length of Gotha's communications through Russia was 1000 miles and through Germany to the central regions - 600 miles. In the first case, as long as the British held Malta firmly, they could act against the lines of communication of Rommel's army; in the second case, while the Russians held Moscow, they had freedom of maneuver against von Hoth's troops, while the Russians partisan detachments forced the Germans to defend every mile of their communications and, consequently, diverted hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the front.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1942, Russia's economic situation was desperate, and if not for the constant flow of Anglo-American materials through Arkhangelsk, it is doubtful that the Russians would have been able to take advantage of the ridiculous situation into which Hitler had placed his armies.
Since June 6, 1941, as a result of the German occupation, the population under the rule of the Soviet government decreased from 184 million to 126 million, that is, by more than 30%. Russia suffered huge economic losses. The following were lost: food resources - 38%, coal and electrical energy - 50%, iron and steel - 60%, manganese and aluminum - 50%, chemical industry - 33%.
Consequently, the main idea of Hitler's strategic plan was correct: to strike at the Russian economy, the basis of its military power. While implementing the plan, mistake after mistake was made. The size of Russia did not make it possible to force the enemy into a general battle; Hitler did not understand that it was first necessary to deprive the enemy of mobility and only then occupy important strategic areas. The Russians could be deprived of mobility by occupying the center of Russian communications - Moscow. Instead, Hitler, like Charles XII and more than Napoleon, lost the initiative.
After the great victory near Poltava in 1709, Peter the Great entered Kyiv. A prayer service was held in the Hagia Sophia Cathedral. The Russian priest Feofan Prokopovich, addressing the Tsar and his soldiers, said: “Our neighbors and neighbors will recognize us and say: it is not into our land, but into a certain sea that the forces of Svei rose up, sank like tin into water, and the messenger from them will not return to his homeland.” .
This is the secret of Russian power, which Hitler did not take into account in his strategy. It could be undermined only by depriving the Russian armies of mobility, then Russian space would turn for them from an ally into a mortal enemy.
A source of information:
Book: World War II. 1939-1945. Strategic and tactical overview
Hitler's inner circle, including leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not help but draw certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" war that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the Battle of Moscow cost the Nazis particularly large losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that fascist Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of her army decreased. A certificate from the OKW operational leadership headquarters dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the inability to fully ensure their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. P. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.
For all their arrogance, Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, while continuing to remain confident in the superiority of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.
What goals did the Nazis set for themselves in 1942, or more precisely, in the spring and summer of this year, when they planned to launch a new offensive? Despite all the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took direct part in it.
Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel General Walter Warlimont, former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to disaster on the Volga. In his book “At the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, writes: “Even during the period of greatest tension in the struggle to repel the offensive of Soviet troops, the confidence of the German armed forces did not weaken for a minute that in the East they would again be able to seize the initiative, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. It is necessary to reach the oil fields, as well as Iran and Iraq... Of course, in addition, he will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad" ( Ibid.).
Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942 the plan for the summer campaign was in general terms ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “For the spring and summer, the Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan. Its goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow... An offensive with the delivery of destructive strikes in certain areas" ( Ibid. S. 241.).
It is noteworthy that Warlimont’s statements in both cases include the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the plan of the campaign, it was initially planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available capabilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to significantly change their outlines. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. P. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the scope of the real strategy. But there was more likely something else going on here. Hitler's policy, adventurous in its essence, could not be built on the basis of deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all, on the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult for Hitler's generals. Warlimont writes the following on this matter: “Halder... for a long time studied the question of whether we in the East should finally go on the defensive, since a repeated offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a break and the American threat increases, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and will never be able to regain it into our own hands. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).
So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began fighting on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubt that a second front would not be opened at least in 1942. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR for some people looked completely different than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity on this.
“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the German high command was faced with the question of what form to continue the war in: offensive or defensive. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of our chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. The year was 1942 last year, in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in the offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a front 3 thousand kilometers long to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that along most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. P. 126.).
The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to the testimony of General Halder, were foreseen in the winter of 1941/42. “At that time, the strategic plan was to stabilize the front on winter period and preparing an offensive in the summer of 1942 with the goal of capturing the Caucasus, cutting off the Russians from oil and disrupting their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941 spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an “offensive operation against the Caucasus” ( Right there.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler prohibited the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at any cost to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.
The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among Hitler's generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed an offensive on the northern section of the Soviet-German front with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also favored resuming the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended launching the main attack on Moscow with the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.
Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to capture the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, the operation to capture Leningrad was planned to be postponed until the troops in the south were released.
The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat the Soviet troops here in successive operations piecemeal. Thus, although Hitler’s strategists first began to show hesitation when planning the 1942 campaign, nevertheless, as before, the highest military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a common point of view.
On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for deploying troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.
Warlimont paints a picture of the meeting this way: “No one raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who had previously repeatedly spoken out both against the strange echelon introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).
Colonel General Jodl from the OKB, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler’s operational plans, a few weeks after the mentioned meeting, told his loyal General Staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Scherff, whom Hitler appointed commissioner for writing military history that Operation Siegfried ( After the winter defeat of 1941/42, Hitler became wary of assigning big names to plans for military operations and crossed out the original code name “Siegfried” on April 5. On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was replaced by "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name might become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of strength of Army Group Center and Army Group North, there would be great risk if the Russians launched a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side would have enough strength and courage for this; they believed that with the start of the German offensive on the southern sector of the front, the Russians would automatically begin transferring troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).
Jodl instructed his deputy and the responsible officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to formalize the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler, in the form of an OKB directive. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to the formulation of “tasks”, without binding the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the “project” on April 4 by General Jodl, stated that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his “historiographer” wrote: “The Fuhrer significantly revised draft Directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself... First of all, he restated that part of the draft that talks about the main operation.” The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and lengthiness, a confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, unclear formulations of the most significant issues and a thorough explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).
It is not difficult to notice that former Hitler generals are in every possible way dissociating themselves from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they were for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the quotes provided. The Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals to counter Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility before the “Führer,” which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden dissatisfaction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Halder, did not change anything. His supposedly inherent independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to claim that at that time they were offered to send the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, was supposed to be of auxiliary importance in securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is not difficult to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler’s plan. It is not for nothing that in his diary, regarding the meeting at Wehrmacht headquarters on March 28, 1942, Halder writes the following meaningful phrase: “The outcome of the war is being decided in the East” ( Galder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. T. 3, book. 2. P. 220.).
All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by German generals who stood for the continuation of an aggressive and adventurist war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and clarified this plan and made the final decision regarding the choice of direction of offensive operations. Most of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis even after the defeat of Germany in the Second World War. Thus, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward his own plan for continuing the war in relation to the situation in 1942.
“Without going into speculation,” he writes, “it would obviously be appropriate here to talk about the prospects that could still bring about a generous reconciliation with France. These prospects must have acquired special significance if we take into account that Germany was now dealing with two major naval powers. If a destructive strike were delivered against sea communications and the enemy fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using large number submarines and all suitable aviation formations, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's assessments - to at least greatly delay the landing of the Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy to achieve superiority in air over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on allied imports by sea, would obviously have been deprived for a long time, as a result of the transfer of the main efforts to the naval and air war in the Atlantic, of the opportunity to conduct large-scale operations, especially if it had been possible attract the Japanese to jointly wage war, at least at sea" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that the combat power of the Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined by supplies from the Western allies. In addition, the switch of funds to create a more powerful submarine fleet of Nazi Germany inevitably had to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the Allied actions in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, the “magnanimous reconciliation” with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly identified the main theater of war than he did. But they also did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe awaiting them.
The plan of the Wehrmacht command for 1942 was most fully set out in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: persistent attempts to implement it determined the enemy’s actions on the Soviet-German front until the late autumn and early winter of 1942.
Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that, while preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy did not at all abandon the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. IN general form this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to completely destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. pp. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same thing on April 3, 1942 in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he said, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deep as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and British assistance will be ineffective, since new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of contact with outside world. They lost their best soldiers and equipment, and now they are just improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 34.).
It should be noted that some authors in Germany are trying to retroactively narrow the objectives of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. Thus, the former Nazi general Mellenthin writes: “In the summer offensive of 1942, our armies in the south had as their task the defeat of the troops of Marshal Timoshenko and the liquidation of the enemy in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent attack on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943" ( Mellentin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. P. 142.).
The absurdity of such statements is refuted by Hitler’s generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “When planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended first of all to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions would, of course, be of great importance if the German army were able to cross the Volga in the area of Stalingrad and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if Caucasian oil were used to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would greatly increase. This was Hitler's line of thinking. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or another route" ( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. P. 153.).
An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with an unfounded narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clearly evident from its text, the Wehrmacht troops, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections.” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of certain representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the Battle of the Volga. At the same time, we must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.
The final military-political goals of the aggressive war of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable to even the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to a certain inconsistency in the document under consideration and the vagueness of the statement in it of the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In general form (without specifying a time frame), it sets out the intentions to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to support the northeastern flank of the strike group of German troops, should be equipped “taking into account their possible use in winter conditions.” The capture of the Lower Volga and Caucasus region, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful group of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to turn large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for carrying out this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. P. 41.).
Thus, the main goal of the enemy’s offensive on the Eastern Front, according to Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the “blitzkrieg” strategy. That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, and take possession of the southern regions of the USSR, rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasus directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task on the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.
Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful implementation “in the first place” of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. This strategic plan of the enemy very much reflected the urgent need of Nazi Germany for fuel.
Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the command staff of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler said that if he did not receive the oil of Maikop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See Paulus's testimony to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg Trials, M., 1954. T. 1. P. 378; see also: Military History. magazine 1960. No. 2. P. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the USSR's loss of oil would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a subtle calculation that was closer to its goal than is generally believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart B. G. Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).
The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.
Enemy troops in the central sector of the front were deeply wedged into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, Hitler’s troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern group of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less strength here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don region, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. It was also of certain importance that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.
The seizure of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to those mentioned above, other important goals: according to the enemy’s plans, this brought the Nazi troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers on armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of connections with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Finally, the Nazis hoped that if the planned offensive was successfully carried out, they would open their way to the Middle East.
In preparation for the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In the search for the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, on Hitler’s instructions, visited the capitals of Germany’s European allies, who were supposed to allocate “all available forces” for the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to obtain a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N.I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. P. 347.). “Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limited himself to only demanding that the Allied troop contingents be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, although in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany but were at enmity with each other, must be separated from each other at a considerable distance, introducing in between there are Italian formations. All these troops were entrusted with defensive tasks, for the fulfillment of which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).
Among the activities of the Nazi command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the plan for the fictitious operation “Kremlin” occupied not the least place. Its goal is to disinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the summer campaign of 1942.
Operation Kremlin was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of Army Group Center. In the “Order for the Attack on Moscow,” signed on May 29 by Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Kluge and Chief of Staff General Wöhler, the troops of Army Group Center were tasked with: “Defeat enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, firmly seize the territory around Moscow, encircling the city, and thereby depriving the enemy of the opportunity to operationally use this area" ( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. P. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations (“Kremlin” and “Blau”) coincided in time.
The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan for Operation Kremlin became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick was a success for the enemy.
By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan for the next stage of the war. It became obvious that it was impossible to continue the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was allowed to perform the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was confirmed in this position.), in his memoirs he wrote that the winter offensive in April 1942 stalled due to the lack necessary forces and the means to continue it. The front troops received orders to go on the defensive.
From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active action. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to recapture the strategic initiative. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.
In what direction will the enemy's new major offensive begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to define as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to take place. At the same time, we all understood perfectly well that the further development of the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942” ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. P. 203.).
Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. P. 112.).
On March 23, state security agencies reported the same to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. This way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( Right there.).
However, the intelligence data was not fully taken into account. Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest group of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I well know, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. P. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.
According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed.. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. P. 64.). It later became clear that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.
An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be the active strategic defense of Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary material resources, followed by a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported in mid-March Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After this, work on the summer campaign plan continued.
The General Staff correctly believed that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not conduct offensive actions on a large scale. Stalin, who had little understanding of the art of war, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of the summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma group, which held an extensive bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( Right there. P. 65.).
At the end of March, Headquarters again discussed the issue of the strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan presented by the command of the South-Western direction for conducting a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of directions: in some - in order to improve the operational situation, in others - for forestalling the enemy in launching offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to conduct private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lgov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.”
How to evaluate the fact that such an authoritative military figure as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country’s highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on the issue, from the right decision on whom so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many, not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the last war, can rightly blame its leadership for failing to prove to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the negative consequences of the decision to defend itself and attack at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, conducting private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of effort. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed firsthand that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, a refusal to carry out offensive operations, such as Kharkov, would have saved the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would have allowed We need to switch to active offensive actions much earlier and once again take the initiative into our own hands.
Miscalculations made by Headquarters and the General Staff when planning military operations for the summer of 1942 were taken into account later, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of military operations in Kursk Bulge» ( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of the historical battle // Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. P. 75.).
Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted the study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it requires further in-depth research. At the same time, one should also take into account the general situation that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. 2nd ed. P. 207.).
By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the country's rear, which supported its struggle, had forces and means, if not sufficient in all respects, then in the main to prevent a new deep penetration of Hitler's troops into vital areas of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people became more confident in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the surprise factor, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all areas of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war acquired an increasingly prominent role. Its first year was a serious exam for the entire command and political staff, the majority of whom acquired both hardening and the skill that is given only by practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved and the abilities and talents of those who led the military operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral power of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which difficult conditions thwarted the plan for a “blitzkrieg” war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm of their actions in the Great Patriotic War.
At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most appropriate use of available forces and means acquired special importance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue an aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the peculiarities of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.
The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against Nazi Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of the armed struggle depended on making the right strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-Soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that depending on the development of events at the front they could be used both in the southwestern and western directions ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. P. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.
Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad and the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was due to the desire to bring the expulsion period as close as possible. fascist invaders from Soviet soil. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this and the decision taken by Headquarters was erroneous.
The ability to solve practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Supreme Command Headquarters gradually, as experience in warfare accumulated.
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