Andrey Teslya- Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, an expert in the field of Russian social thought. His research interests include: the history of Western European political and legal thought of the 17th-19th centuries. (primarily conservative and reactionary doctrines); Russian socio-philosophical and social thought of the 19th century; Russian civil law XIX - early. XX century.
I feel bad where there is no powerful river, sea or ocean
– You were born and worked for a long time in Khabarovsk, and you will soon move to Kaliningrad. You are one of the few people I know who intellectually unite Russia with their geography of life and work. You travel a lot, travel a lot, including abroad. Please tell us about yourself.
- I am a native Far East in the third generation. This is a rather rare phenomenon, because the city itself was founded in 1856 as a military post, and it officially became a city quite late, and in essence - even later. Therefore, the main urban population, as in many cities of this type, in Khabarovsk, of the oldest residents, are those whose local roots date back to the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, and the second and third waves are the 1930s and then the 1950s - 1960s. These are those who are usually called native Far Easterners, with a certain degree of conventionality, of course.
I myself, and my ancestors on the maternal side, and on both lines from the side of my wife, constantly lived in the Far East. It rarely happens that three generations of two families live in the same city in the Far East. Because usually there are always some trajectories of movement, at least within the Primorsky, Khabarovsk Territories or the Amur Region.
"On autopilot" I wanted to say that I really love the Far East ... But then I thought about it and decided that, apparently, it would be more correct to say that I really love Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. My hometown is located on the banks of the Amur, and I can hardly imagine myself without a lot of water. I am used to living near a huge river, so I feel bad in those places where there is no powerful river, or sea, or ocean.
In this regard, when I managed to travel around Russia, I was always surprised if there was no big river in the city. I remember when my wife, already at a fairly mature age, first came to Moscow and was amazed. After all, they say all the time: “Moscow River”, “Moscow River”. And they call it a river?
Andrey Teslya with his wife. Photo from personal archive
Then we traveled along all the famous European rivers - along the Vistula, Oder, Rhine ... Well, yes, the formal criteria are met, these are rivers, but in the Far East you get used to the fact that the river is called something completely different. You begin to understand that the word "river" has several meanings. It is difficult to explain to a person who has not seen our Amur open spaces how, in principle, this river can look like, how this space is arranged.
The landscape in which you grow up remains the main one for you. And it's not even about attachment to a small Motherland. You may not like this landscape, but you evaluate everything else on its basis, it becomes a natural norm for you.
The place where you were born acts as a natural environment for you.
It is important to note that the Far Eastern cities are different, and the space, for example, in Khabarovsk, is arranged quite curiously. Khabarovsk has traditionally always functioned as a military-administrative center. It can be considered a city only with some reservations: on the one hand, it is the administrative capital, where the residence of the governor-general, now the presidential plenipotentiary, was located, where the representative offices of most of the central departments in the region are located, on the other hand, it is the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District and endless military units in and around the city. It turns out that everything else that exists, it either exists in connection with this, or between this, in some crevices that have arisen.
- What were they like for you? school years?
- I am immensely grateful to the school, and in many respects precisely because I did not study there. At the school I was graduating from, there was a wonderful director, a close friend of our family, an excellent teacher of Russian literature. And thanks to him, his good will, I had the opportunity to pass a significant part of the subjects in the external study mode.
One of my fondest memories is very specific literature lessons. First, I wrote an essay on some classical text, and then for an hour we discussed the corresponding texts. In the 9th grade, we read and discussed "War and Peace", and the compositions turned into essays.
The novel "War and Peace" was my first great literary love, and it was a love for Tolstoy's philosophy, which is usually not liked by schoolchildren. And I still find this resistance to Tolstoy's position strange - the desire to skip these long discussions, quickly move on to military scenes or a family romance in a novel. I also liked the historical optics he chose, and how he builds it when he talks about time, when he talks about action in time.
But I discovered Dostoevsky very late. Of course, as part of the school curriculum, I happened to read "Crime and Punishment", it seems, even before him, by chance, "The Brothers Karamazov", his first novel was "The Village of Stepanchikovo ...", which somehow turned up under the arm, but Dostoevsky remained for a long time alien to me. Maybe it's for the best.
At one time it seemed to me that Dostoevsky is such a social fantasy that the people and situations described do not exist, that people do not speak and interact like that. And then, much later, another vision came, and another attitude towards Dostoevsky. I would say that the return to Dostoevsky was again predetermined by the lessons at school. The school here is a determining factor in the sense that I was very lucky that it was not a standard education, but an opportunity to study externally.
How did you choose the university? How was the area of scientific interest determined?
- After school, I had a fairly standard path. I went to study law at the Far Eastern State Transport University. It was jurisprudence, and jurisprudence in transport. And at first I was interested in just civil law - that is, I initially had and remained a civil law specialization, and then I became more and more interested in the history of Russian civil law.
Even before the university there was a great interest in history for children. Then, at the stage of growing up - everyone seems to experience this with very few exceptions - I developed an interest in philosophy. So, largely thanks to a wonderful mentor, the then head of our graduating department, Mikhail Alexandrovich Kovalchuk, a specialist in the history of railway law, it turned out to combine all these hobbies. He was sympathetic to my then, very disparate, hobbies and in every possible way encouraged an interest in the history of law and in the history of political doctrines - that is, that which allowed me to fruitfully combine the three main areas of my interests: history, philosophy and law.
In this sense, all my subsequent intellectual movements in the disciplinary plan were an attempt to unite, combine my three basic interests: interest in history, law, philosophy, and social thought in general.
Therefore, on the one hand, judging by the formal rubricator, there were changes in my scientific interests, but, by and large, there was no fundamental change. I always do the same thing, but with different accents, sometimes a little more in one direction, then a little more in the other.
I am interested in how intellectual communication works, how ideas function in the social environment, how they are discussed and interact with other ideas.
In this regard, I am still interested in what, in the 19th century, clichédly pompously in the magazine jargon, was called “eternal thoughts”, “eternal ideas”: I have always been interested, on the contrary, not “eternal”, but temporary - as it seems, in the same words, in the same phrases put completely different content.
For example, when talking about Western European medieval Christianity, one wants to ask what is meant by Christianity at this moment. What does it mean to be a Christian, for example, in the twelfth century? In the 18th century? What does it mean to be Orthodox, for example, for an eighteenth-century Russian landowner? For a 19th century peasant? Or for us now? These are completely different and sometimes divergent things, although it seems that we are talking about Christianity there, and there, and there. But it turns out they are all completely different.
– Can you give an example of how it was perceived before and how it is now?
- I would say that this is a topic for a huge separate conversation, it is insanely interesting. In particular, the one who does this phenomenologically is Konstantin Antonov and the circle that is associated with him, with the Orthodox St. Tikhon University, modern researchers in the philosophy of religion, the Russian nineteenth century. In my opinion, Konstantin Mikhailovich has a very beautiful idea, which can be cited precisely as an example of the difference. That during the first half of the 19th century we observe how the language of the Church, with which she addresses the audience, and the language of educated society diverge. And it's not about the fact that they talk about different things, it's about the fact that they, in principle, speak differently.
If you like, there is no change of language in the Church that occurs in secular society, in the language of magazines, in the language of an educated society. As a result, when people from theological academies speak, they speak, perhaps very accurately and very correctly, but in a language that others do not hear.
Accordingly, when those same Slavophiles (I am referring here to the thought of Konstantin Antonov) begin to talk about secular theology, when they strive to make their own, then their rejection of the Theological Academy is connected not only with the fact that they do not agree with something specific, how much with the fact that it seems to them that these are all words. The reaction of spiritual circles is similar in many respects - this reaction is largely due to the different cultural environment: there is a catastrophic misunderstanding between the two sides, they speak different languages.
Faith becomes a subject of individual choice
- And when did this misunderstanding arise?
– If we look at the 18th century, we will see that this is one cultural space, people from the spiritual environment are active figures here, and there is no wall here yet. In the second half of the 19th century, to be in modernity, you must reject your past: you must leave the seminary, break with your past, or, according to at least, you have to distance yourself from it in many ways.
To break with my past - I, of course, exaggerated, because there is an absolutely wonderful work about priests, which traces what happened to them: this is the recently published very talented work of Lori Manchester, "Priests in the world" ... They themselves come from, fugitives from the clergy , subsequently evaluating their experience, told how they placed themselves in a different cultural context. And there we are talking about much more complex patterns of behavior.
Accordingly, for the 19th century, one of the important problems is the problem of the second Christianization, the problem of the transition to individual confession. At this time, the question “Why are we Christians” is replaced by “Why am I a Christian? How can I be a Christian?
That is, the problem arises as a mass problem of how to combine those principles and those ideas that a person theoretically accepts, but now he introjects them already as his own, personal - not as abstract principles that rest quietly in the realm of abstractions, but as something what should permeate all everyday life: how to reconcile these principles, theoretical beliefs - with accepted practices of behavior.
How can one be Orthodox in real life, being, for example, a Guards officer? This is a question that, for the previous type of religious consciousness, was raised only in very rare, individual cases. But in the 19th century, it is clear that this and similar questions became relevant, everything began to move. It can be said that in every era, not only and not so much the answers change, but the very lines of posing the question change, new oppositions appear. Therefore, there is such a mixing effect when in different time they seem to use the same words, but these words now express something completely different.
- It turns out that the modern church has become much more difficult, it has to work with people on an individual level, and not with the masses, as before.
- Yes. I would say that here we are talking about the church in the social sense, the church with a small letter. Moreover, I would emphasize that individualization itself is also a kind of generalization. As we begin to look at the details, it becomes clear that the individualization of attitudes towards religion became relevant mainly for the educated strata in the 19th century, and in the 20th century it becomes relevant for everyone. Faith becomes a matter of individual choice. Even if I inherited it from my parents, in any case I must be aware of why I remain in it?
In this sense, for the same peasant of the 18th century, the question was not posed in this way. If it was staged for someone, then it was unique. But a person of the 20th century already needs to give an answer, and the answer is aimed not only at changing his faith, but also at preserving it. Even if I just stay in the same position, I have to articulate for myself why this is so? I must give this answer to myself, and most importantly, this answer must be not just rhetorically acceptable, but internally convincing.
- Where do you think this leads? From mass character to individuality, and then? What will happen in 100 years with religion, with individual faith?
- I do not know. It's very difficult for me to make predictions. I have no doubt that both religion and faith in God will be preserved. In this sense, there is no question. It's just that if we think about it within the framework of Christianity, then it's easy to see that over the course of two thousand years of history, this is a constantly changing answer, this is a constantly changing truth. And in such a perspective it is very difficult to speak, because 100 years is very close to us. We see a really long-term trend, and often what we think is important, conspicuous, is actually secondary or just an element of much more important things.
In social networks, everyone is ready for conflict without a reason
- What do you like thinking person gave rise to social networks, the Internet?
- First of all, responses to my statements and books. They give a vision of diversity. This has been said many times, but I think it's a very important thing. AT social networks each builds his own politics and builds his own way of viewing. I understand well those who create a comfortable communication environment for themselves - they communicate with those who are deeply pleasant to them, with a small circle of friends and acquaintances, for whom this is such a space for discussion in their own circle.
For me, social media is often just the opposite: it's a way to hear the voices of people I probably wouldn't hear if I were in my "natural" social circle. Facebook provides an opportunity not only to hear the opinions of people from different parts of the country and the planet, but also to hear a lot of voices that are obviously absent in your social circle, if only because you won’t be able to personally communicate with these people for a long time.
– Do you ever block your readers in social networks, maybe for some radical positions?
- I, perhaps, block in exceptionally rare cases, and then you have to try very hard. I prefer to ban only when they are already directly insulting, and not me, but other friends. But I am very afraid to make this decision, I am very afraid to clear the tape of people who think differently. I am very afraid to create such a comfortable position when nothing will annoy me, when there will be only views that suit me, only positions that I share, when we will argue only about commas, or on a specific situational issue, because in general we agree on everything .
It is very important for me that there should be no such agreement in general. Again, these are very rare cases. If it's completely overkill. In this regard, even if two strong quarreled friends sort things out among themselves, then this is their right. As a last resort, let them mutually ban each other.
I thought that the peak of mutual aggressiveness and mutual irritation in 2014 is hard to beat, but the events of recent months surprise me.
It seems to me that the degree of irritation, the desire to go into conflict is now stronger than ever. Today, it is the readiness for conflict that prevails in social networks in the absence of a reason for it.
There are very unpleasant incidents that have to be observed many times when the parties use a random reason to break off relations with each other. When some completely random thesis, some random formulation, which, in principle, does not attract much attention, suddenly turns into a subject for showdown, for very deep quarrels and conflicts.
In this sense, the desire for conflict, the readiness for conflict is much greater than the existing reason - and the reason is only sought. Accordingly, a constant tension is felt, ready to come to the surface when there is a suitable excuse for everyone, when it will not have to be looked for.
- It's cold Civil War?
- I would not exaggerate, because if there really was a civil war, we could not fail to notice it. Now, thank God, we manage to notice it only thanks to Facebook.
In Facebook, with its speaking function, the interlocutor often finds himself in a situation where he cannot or does not consider it possible for himself not to notice the statement. Facebook has a feature - it promotes speeches "to the city and the world" addressed to everyone. Therefore, there are always those for whom these words are not intended.
Moreover, it simultaneously contributes to the appeal to the city and the world, while maintaining a certain individual intonation. There is such an unusual state of both public and private speech at the same time, and it is not clear where the border between them lies. I can say that this is my private space, I express only my own, not even just a private opinion, but a private feeling.
- Yes, but feelings, irony and humor are often not read through the Internet, and the statement is perceived as harsher and more categorical than the author might have wanted.
- Yes, and at the same time it turns out that it is still addressed to a circle of people, both personally familiar to you in a variety of contexts, and unfamiliar.
- I am saddened by statements on Facebook, when someone generalizes and says something on the topic “liberals are all like that”, and then some odious quote is given, although liberals are very different. Perhaps when you write something negative about liberals, then all this should be read in an ironic way, but it sounds like a kind of sentence.
– In recent years, I have tried not to use the term “liberals” itself, although, in my opinion, this is also a huge problem, because we are succeeding ... I will generalize again now, perhaps extremely unreasonably, but nonetheless. Speaking at the level of such conditional generalizations, it turns out that, on the one hand, there is some kind of community of people with fairly recognizable views. There is some kind of identification of “friend or foe” and “approximately ours”.
On the other hand, how to call this community? Well, for the "liberal" something else is read, it is clear that this does not work. Okay, how else? Moreover, because each side always uses exactly one trick.
The wonderful Evgeny Gubnitsky, translator, not so long ago had a vivid remark about the peculiarities of how we build the image of our group and how we perceive others. What do we always do in public debate if we are correct, careful, and so on and so forth? In relation to our own, we always understand that ours are different, ours are completely diverse. We understand that there are inveterate ones, but they do not characterize us. We always make allowances for the fact that even if he, in principle, is not inveterate, but there are some extreme you
sayings, extreme positions, then even they are generally not characteristic of him, and so on.
Others we imagine as an aggregate in which we not only do not distinguish shades, but also prefer to pay attention to the extremes, to the bright, to the eye-catching. If we want to fight them, we tend to choose extremes, and so on.
As a result of small corrections, it turns out that we, by a series of such light and, I emphasize, completely unintentional movements, create a situation where the difference between the two positions at one moment becomes obvious at times. When it turns out that we are complex, we are diverse and, of course, we are guided by the reality principle, while our opponents are quite the opposite. Once again I emphasize that this is all done in good faith, even if we are not aiming for deliberate overexposure.
We strive to divide people into ours and not ours
– You studied in detail the history of Russian thought in the 19th century. When you read contemporary discussions between liberals and conservatives, between people of different persuasions, do you now see echoes of the disputes between Slavophiles and Westerners?
Yes and no, that's what I would say. Yes, there are echoes, only I would specify which ones. These are echoes of a common language. We still use the language of public speech, the language of discussion, which was created by Russian intellectuals in the 19th century. Another thing is that we often put other meanings into it. Since we were talking about echoes, yes, of course, they are. Another thing is that the illusion arises that we are not hearing echoes, but the same ever-repeating dispute.
- Developing in a spiral.
– Of course, we use the same words in many ways, but as soon as we start turning to history, we see that the meanings that we pack into these words are different. This was discussed at the very beginning of the conversation. In this case, the effect of false recognition occurs. When we turn to 19th-century texts on the knurl, what happens? We strive to divide people into ours and not ours, to understand who was there in the past, who can be placed in our line, who in another? Although in fact they fought in other wars, played other games, discussed other problems. The dead, of course, can be recruited into our army, but it is still important to understand that we do the recruiting. In this regard, we do not find like-minded people in the past, but create them.
– But have global issues changed? What to do? Who is guilty? Is Russia Europe or not Europe? To what extent is it Asia-Europe? Or did they think differently?
“In many ways, they thought differently. Moreover, if we look at the Slavophiles, then yes, they think in terms of “world epochs”, for them the Slavic world must come after the Germanic world. In this sense, this is such a European logic.
In other words, if we define the Slavophile position very briefly, then, in their opinion, if we want to be a historical people, then we can only be one as Russians. In this sense, Russians can be a historical people only as Russians, it just won't work out otherwise.
Accordingly, it will not work to become a European in the sense that there are no Europeans at all. There are Dutch, Belgians, French and so on. Therefore, the desire to turn from Russians into Europeans is a strange desire. In this sense, you can be a European only if you are not in Europe, and in this perspective, the desire to be a European is just a demonstration of a gap, a demonstration of innocence. Like, I want to be a representative of European culture in a non-European space, in a non-European environment.
If you think that you are in the global space (and for the Slavophiles, as well as for the people of the 19th century in general, it practically coincides with the European one), then it is somehow strange to define yourself as a European, you will still define yourself somehow more locally , in a more specific way. Accordingly, you will no longer relate to European culture as a whole, but you will argue with something much more specific.
Therefore, yes, the concept of the West is very important for the Slavophiles, but it is important to note that this is a religious West. In this sense, the border still more often passes not according to the logic of "West-East", but according to the logic of "Catholic Rome - Orthodoxy" with further distinctions. Let me remind you of such a classic Slavophile favorite motif - this is the idea that England is especially close to Russia.
In this sense, when it comes to the "West", then from the "West", for example, England is often excluded - it has its own special place, which requires reservations. When we begin to concretize what the West is that Herzen speaks of, it turns out that this West does not include Italy and Spain. It turns out that the West, which seems to be considered the Herzen West, is France, Germany and, to some extent, England.
- The United States did not play such a role back then either.
- Yes, the USA has a special status here - for example, for Kireevsky in the early 1830s there are two new peoples, Russians and Americans, who can act as carriers of new beginnings, but the advantage is given to the Russians, since the Americans are shackled by the one-sidedness of the Anglo-Saxon education. Therefore, we can say that we can see how the usual scheme arises - both the disputes between Westerners and Slavophiles, and subsequent discussions are connected with this rigid delimitation, but we will not find it in their usual form.
After all, we will not find it at all in any disputes of any people. We will find it already in the variant of non-substantive serious conversation, we will be able to find it only in extremely ideologized simplified concepts. Here, yes, it turns out that when we begin to simplify more and more, to schematize more and more, such schemes can coalesce in our output.
– How would you describe the position of the Westerners?
- Firstly, Westerners were called Westerners by their opponents, there was such a cross-naming. Secondly, depending on whom to take as Westerners. In short, the Western camp is such figures as Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky, Timofei Nikolaevich Granovsky. Of the younger generation, of course, Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin. Here it is noteworthy that they conceive of Russia as part of that same West, according to the unity of world history.
If you like, here the gap in position lies in the fact that for the Slavophils we are talking about a new word, a new principle, while for Westerners we are talking about the possibility of a new modulation of already existing principles. A more significant political distinction is that for the Slavophiles, their optics is the optics of national construction, and for the Westerners, it is the imperial optics.
By the way, in our modern and very painful context, it is noteworthy here that, within the framework of their national project, the Slavophiles were much more, not just tolerant, but often provided direct support and assistance, for example, to the Ukrainophiles. In turn, for the Westerners of the 1840s, the Ukrainophile movement was completely unacceptable.
In this sense, the angry anti-Ukrainian philippics in the 19th century originally came from the camp of the Westerners, and not the Slavophiles, but for the latter, these are quite recognizable and native things. Therefore, it is interesting to see how the historical confrontation is changing. Where we seem to be ready to see the usual scheme from our today's distinctions, we see that in the situation of the 1940s and 1950s everything happened almost exactly the opposite.
– Is it possible to say that after the revolution of 1917 these disputes did not end, but were only interrupted for 70 years, and you are now trying to clear these discussions of modern stereotypes?
- I wouldn't put the task so pathetically. Everything is much simpler and more specific here. First, every time brings many questions that we turn to the past. In this sense, the changed historical experience, the changed understanding of the 19th century does not provide answers that cancel the previous ones, but raises new questions and, accordingly, gives new answers to other questions. In the former formulations, one suddenly hears something that was not heard before, or maybe our experience makes us more sensitive to the former meanings? In the same plan, it turns out that we always speak from our time. Our experience and our situation determine the questions that are addressed to the past.
The most striking example here is from a completely different area - this is antiquity. New studies and new answers do not cancel previous studies, but they put before us another question - for example, for Rostovtsev after the world war and the revolution of 1917, it is a task to understand the society and economy of the Roman Empire as a very large-scale, pathos and powerfully working historical project.
In any historical work, as soon as it goes beyond the technical, this word always occurs - in worn out academic language it is called actuality. It is clear that, bound by academic canons, we all react nervously to the question of the relevance of the study, but if we talk about live content, this is exactly what prompts us here and now to ask these questions to the past.
The previous answers haven't gotten any worse, but they're starting to feel irrelevant to us. The questions may be good, and the answers are great, but these are questions that we are not particularly interested in right now. Maybe it's our problem that they have ceased to be of interest to us. It may be that things are very bad with us that now it has gone out of focus.
Andrey Teslya. Photo: Irina Fastovets
Conservatism is an awareness of the fragility of the existing
– The area of your scientific interest is the conservative and reactionary doctrine of the XVIII-XIX centuries. What is the reason for such an interest in these doctrines - specifically conservative and reactionary? What are you looking for there? What answers do you find?
- I was initially interested in one thing among conservatives and reactionaries - this is what, it seemed to me and it seems now, they are simply not well studied. This is that part of Russian intellectual life, which, on the one hand, has been poorly studied, and secondly, without it it is impossible to understand the whole. In this regard, even if you are not specifically interested in conservatives, if we simply want to understand the intellectual space and discussions of the 19th century, then we need this, I say again, regardless of our preferences, in order to see exactly how the debate was conducted, how it was arranged talk. So even within the framework of interest in Russian XIX century in order to assemble the whole, it is necessary to restore the entire context of the discussions of those years.
Now for a more personal answer. Russian conservatives are interesting to me because they try to forge their own path in many ways, they think in an original way. In this regard, Russian liberalism, again, I allow myself a value judgment, is overwhelmingly boring. It's boring, at least for me, because often it's just a repetition of existing positions. Russian liberals are the spokesmen for what other white people have said, this is such a true retelling of all that is good.
It is possible that in these reflections, in fact, everything is good and beautiful. Perhaps everything that is said is absolutely true. But I am interested in my own thought - most likely, incorrect, but my own. Let them go at random, but on their own. Here the Russian conservatives present a very original picture, they are almost all interesting people, they almost all live in isolation, they do not sing common songs. They are not all people of common thought. It turns out that even conservatives of the second plan are trying to invent some interesting construction (even if we think we know that they are trying to reinvent the wheel).
– Unusual train of thought! It turns out that you are not interested in the bike itself, whether it rides fast or how reliable it is, but are our Russian wheels on it? Sorry, I'm exaggerating a little.
- Yes, if you like. It seems to me that, from the point of view of intellectual history, it is not so interesting to listen to retellings of other people's judgments. If we are interested in these judgments themselves, then let's turn to the original source. This is first. In my opinion, this is a much more logical approach. Secondly, the main question that conservative thought asks is the question that - well, okay, let's say, with a general scheme, with ideals and aspirations, we have decided, we are for everything good. The question is, how will these schemes work here, on the spot?
In this regard, the most striking example of a discussion between conservatives and liberalism is Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev, who created the Moscow Collection, a text that is amazingly interesting in construction. For the most part, Pobedonostsev does not speak in his own voice, he collects other people's texts, and texts are often characters, regarding which it is difficult to expect Pobedonostsev to place them, and this is again significant for the compiler. He puts there not just other people's voices, but the voices of those who are important to his opponents. This is the same Herbert Spencer, these are authors who do not belong to the conservative circle.
The main message of the Moscow Collection is conservative. It is as follows. Traditionally, we compare Russia with the West. But Pobedonostsev says that let's compare the real Russia not with the imaginary West, but with the real West, let's see how it works there.
This is not about how we all should live, but the question is how it will look if we transfer the excellent principles from the West to Russia, because they will certainly work not like in a textbook, but taking into account our conditions. Accordingly, what will be their effect?
The conservative question is still largely connected with the recognition of the enormous value of the existing. You can talk about the disorders of the existing as much as you like, but it has one huge plus - it simply exists. We somehow exist in this situation, we succeed. The alternative to all this always has one huge disadvantage - this alternative does not yet exist. Accordingly, we always compare reality with the ideal. The big question is what will happen when we really try to implement this very alternative.
– The fact is that Russia was not given a chance to realize this prospect. We hardly had any normal elections, nor decades of normal economy, decades without war. Conservatives are arguing: let's leave everything as it is, in Russia everything is valuable. It would make sense to talk about this if we ever tried to live in a European way, and this project would already fail.
- Here it is worth concretizing the conservative position. Let's start with the fact that, firstly, conservatism, like liberalism, has existed for a couple of centuries. And there are a lot of different positions in it. Moreover, when it comes to the fact that there are conservative views of Valuev and conservative views of Pobedonostsev, and we say that Aksakov is also a conservative, the question arises: what do they agree on? If we pull up a few more conservatives from outside, then we will have almost a universe of meanings in front of us. We will find a variety of answers.
One version of the conservative interpretation is not that the existing is beautiful. You can talk as much as you want about the ugliness of the existing.
The point is that any change should be based on the principle of responsibility, on understanding that if we change something, the main thing is not to worsen it. This is the main conservative message, and not that the existing is good.
There is an old anecdote that I love to quote because it expresses the conservative position well. When a pessimist looks at the situation and says: "That's it, it won't get any worse." An optimist flies in and says: "It will, it will." In this anecdote, conservatives play the role of optimist. They are always sure that no matter how terrible the current situation is, there is always an option when it will be even worse. Therefore, to the proposal: "Let's change something, because it certainly won't get worse," the conservative will say: "Your imagination is bad."
Andrey Teslya. Photo: Irina Fastovets
But how then to make changes?
- It follows from this that if we change something, then we must, if possible, create conditions when we can back up or compensate for losses, if necessary. Hence the traditional conservative logic that changes should be introduced slowly, they should be introduced first in some limited way. Conservatism is rather the assertion that what exists has value by virtue of the fact that it exists, and we always have something to lose. This does not mean that we have nothing to acquire, it means that we do not start from scratch and the existing is fragile.
We do not appreciate, we do not understand what exists precisely because it seems to us as natural as air. In this sense, conservatism is an awareness of fragility. Everything that exists, our entire social, cultural fabric is very thin. The view of the active transducer is that we can always change something, assuming that this fabric is preserved. In this sense, conservatism is much more alarming, it says that if there were certainty in this, it would be wonderful, but there is no certainty in this, and everything can fall apart, everything is very fragile.
We can say that the key commandment of conservatism is: "Do no harm, do not destroy what is."
Yes, we can say that the existing is bad and insufficient. You can try to improve it, but the main thing is to understand that all changes, if possible, should not injure, not destroy the existing environment, because it may not work to create it anew. The snow avalanche comes down very quickly.
Is it possible to say that reactionism is an extreme degree of conservatism?
- Not really. It can be both conservatism and what is called radicalism or a revolution on the contrary. Conservatism presupposes the preservation of the existing, while reaction presupposes the opposite. The reactionaries are in complete agreement with opponents on the other side that the existing state of affairs is no good. Only some argue that it is necessary to run in one direction, and others - in the opposite direction, but they agree on the thesis that there is no value in the cash order. Conservatives are just the opposite: they say that yes, no matter where we move, even if we try to rewind everything, even if we move forward, we always have something to save. This is the key position of conservatism.
- Are you a conservative?
- Yes. Conservatism comes from an understanding of the fragility of the existing. Our Russian social experience teaches us how thin the social and cultural fabric can be. Therefore, I am ready to agree with any critical reproaches against the existing one right away, I am much more interested in something else - when trying to improve, is the fact that something alive will be preserved enough taken into account?
I emphasize that in the practice of action, radicalism, to a large extent, as a rule, demonstrates power in our country.
Conservatism is not the support or justification of any existing power, it is the recognition that power is valuable in itself.
Again, one of the key conservative values is that any power, mind you, the key word here is “any”, any set of reproaches can be listed, but any power is already good, because there are always options for the lack of power.
- Here, as I understand it, this is a parallel with “all power is from God”, right? Very similar.
- Certainly.
- To this, the liberals will answer that we must first look at what this government is doing, how accountable it is to the people, and so on.
- I wouldn't say. Again, if we talk about the intellectual experience of both Western, and Central European, and Russian, then ... Before that, you asked me if I was a conservative? Yes, of course, but further it is necessary to introduce shades: am I a conservative liberal, or a liberal conservative, who acts as a leader? But in this sense, liberalism as the predominant ideology presupposes certain combinations with conservatism, in any case it does not exclude them.
The conservative position always tends to exaggerate the risks of social transformation. Just as the opposite side tends to underestimate them and say that in any case something needs to be changed, something will change for the better anyway. A conservative position always assumes that we expect bad things from such transformations in the first place. And then we can talk about shades.
Again, if we take the textbook image of the 19th century, then in order for there to be a normal discussion in society, it is necessary that there be both liberals and conservatives. In the end, if the conservative logic itself is ready to move on autopilot to the option that nothing needs to be changed, then, accordingly, the opposite one is ready to stimulate changes.
It is on this very confrontation, on this very controversy, that it is determined on which changes there is consensus, and which ones cause too much anxiety. In some ways, a conservative can be convinced by showing that some planned action, apparently, does not pose a danger, here the fears are not so great. As for others, no, this is too disturbing, a dangerous event for the preservation of the social fabric, and here a compromise is hardly possible.
Andrey Teslya. Photo: Irina Fastovets
It is more interesting for me to understand the time than to act in it.
- If you imagine that there is a time machine, and you would move to the 19th century, which of the Russian thinkers do you see yourself as? Who could you be there: Herzen or Aksakov? Do you see yourself in the place of any of them?
– No, in no way. All these characters are actors. I still take the position of an observer. It is fundamentally different - they are interesting to me, but it is more interesting for me to understand that time than to act in it. For me personally, the feeling of the distance that exists between us is very important, so I don’t think of myself as one of them.
But Aksakov is perhaps the closest to me of all of them. I will explain in what way. Not in terms of specific provisions, which I wrote about in the book “The Last of the “Fathers”” and in articles. Ivan Aksakov seems to me a very likeable person, just like most of Slavophiles. What I like about the Slavophiles, among many other things, is that they are very good people.
- Compared with…
- No, why? Just by themselves. They were very good people and a very good environment, even if you don't agree with their views... After all, you don't have to agree with the political position of a virtuous person, he is good in itself.
- It means that they did not cheat on their wives, did not lie, did not deceive others?
- What's with the wives?
Was everything difficult in your personal life?
- As always. Everything is not so beautiful, they were still living people, made of flesh and blood - someone did not cheat, for example, on his wife, the other - alas, turned out to be the lover of a friend's wife, if we take the example of wives. Let's put it this way, they were hard-living people. They had strength.
They are not saints, of course, but where they committed offenses, where they sinned, they were capable of active repentance, in this they were strong. They really aspired to be virtuous people. They aspired not for someone, but for themselves. They, if you like, had practically no work for the public.
– How was the work on the book about Aksakov going? Have you worked in archives? Where did you get the materials from? Are there any unique materials that were not previously known?
I have been working on the book for a long time. Thanks to the presidential grants that made this work possible. Accordingly, a fairly significant part of the work was in the archives. First of all - in the archive of the Pushkin House of the Institute of Russian Literature, the book uses many previously unpublished materials, and in this case I tried to quote them abundantly.
It seemed to me that this is better than giving cutting and retelling in your own words. Finely crumbling quotes is possible, but, in my opinion, it is deadly. The texts of that time must keep their breath. Maybe I abused this a little in the book, but it was a completely conscious decision - to give the opportunity to hear Aksakov's voice as much as possible. In my opinion, the most interesting letters are published in the book - these are letters from Ivan Aksakov to Mikhail Koyalovich, a key figure in Western Russianism, and the correspondence spans more than 20 years.
Just speaking about the character of the Slavophiles, I tried to give them the opportunity to speak for themselves, because, it seems to me, this is how the peculiarity of the nature of these people is conveyed. For example, in the appendix to the book there is a rather small fragment - these are letters from Ivan Aksakov to his fiancee Anna Fedorovna Tyutcheva, the poet's daughter. He writes wonderful letters to Anna Fedorovna, where he explains his view of the future life together. To what a future wife should be, what a husband should be. These are very touching lyrics.
- Are there any answers?
- Unfortunately no. The letters are touching, because, on the one hand, he tries to talk about the proper position - he must, and on the other hand, there is a very careful and warm feeling behind all this, so he does not maintain his position as giving instructions, he suddenly switches to much warmer and more lyrical style. It seems to me that this is a very Aksakovian trait: on the one hand, he has an idea of how he should say what he should do, and on the other hand, this human goodness affects.
Once again I want to emphasize that this is not an opposition of one to the other. The Slavophiles were a narrow circle, and they had a unique position - other people could not enter this circle, it was a very closely connected circle of friends.
The Westerners as a whole were a much more sparse environment, having a much less dense network of contacts among themselves, they were not so intertwined with each other. It is impossible to characterize all members of the editorial staff of the magazine, to say that they have shared a common lifestyle or something like that for decades. This is not only impossible, it is completely redundant, because the communication of people was carried out on some specific occasion, they converged at some specific point. In the case of the Slavophiles, it is completely different. It was in many ways a shared life in close fellowship.
- In the spring, a collection of articles by Alexander Herzen from the series "Crossroads of Russian Thought" was published. Can you tell us about this series and, in particular, about this first collection?
- Yes. This is a wonderful project. I hope he develops. This is a project of the RIPOL-Classic publishing house. Its goal is to present Russian social thought of the 19th century by addressing a fairly wide range of authors. Moreover, the texts are both well-known and not particularly familiar to non-specialists. It is clear that there will be no innovations for the scientific community, but for the general reader this may be of interest. The aim of the project is to show the versatility of Russian thought of the 19th century and the echoes of the intellectual movement.
At the suggestion of the publisher, I wrote introductory articles for these collections and determined the content of the books. Introductory articles are quite large in volume. In the first book, the article is a compact, review, subsequent texts will be more voluminous. The purpose of the introductory articles is to show the authors in the context of disputes, not in the context of the era, these are not biographical essays, but to show them in the context of the public discussion of their time.
Of the planned volumes, Herzen was chosen as the first author precisely because his figure is at the crossroads of both Westernism and Slavophilism. His mature views are an attempt to synthesize them, therefore the texts included in the collection just demonstrate his theoretical position in the evolution from the late 1840s to the last year of Herzen's life. It is quite predictable that Chaadaev's texts will soon be published.
Then much less predictable and, in my opinion, completely undeservedly underheard, underread Nikolai Polevoy. Further, the publicism of Nikolai Kostomarov. If the series lives on, then I hope that other authors will also be published ... The task here, on the one hand, is to present familiar figures from new angles, and on the other hand, characters that are not very familiar to a wide author, or not familiar from this side. If we take the figure of Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov, then we all read it. But Kostomarov as a publicist, Kostomarov as a participant in many years of political controversy in Russian Empire- this is not his most famous hypostasis. I think it's very interesting.
- Are you going to create a textbook of social thought of the 19th century in order to somehow present the views of different parties to people?
- Yes. There is a good saying: if you want to make God laugh, tell Him about your plans. I really hope that it will be, but it is better to talk about it when such a book appears.
We are afraid of the word "Russian" for no reason.
- On the one hand, I admire, on the other hand, it scares me that you are not afraid to use the word "Russian" in texts, books, and even on the cover. Now the word "Russian" is often replaced by the word "Russian". How do you distinguish situations when you need to write "Russian" and when "Russian"?
- The fact is that I learned about all the intensity of passions around these two words at a fairly mature age. It was quite funny when, at one of the cathedral seminars or at a small conference (either at the end of the university, or at the beginning of postgraduate study), during the discussion, disputes suddenly broke out over whether it is possible to say “history of Russian philosophy”, or “ history of Russian philosophy”, or “history of philosophy in Russia”. And I remember my astonishment when it turned out that this was a painful question, because until that time I perceived the words "Russian philosophy" as a completely neutral statement.
There is Russia, there is Germany. The book is called "History of French Literature" - of course, the history of French literature. "History of French Philosophy" - also understandable. So, how is it in Russia? "History of Russian Philosophy". Where is the subject of controversy? It didn't occur to me to see nationalistic or any other notions in this. It seems to me that anything can be read in any word, but if we are talking about Russia, if we are talking about Russian culture, then I don’t understand why jump away from this word, moreover, in its modern meaning?
Yes, we can say that in the 18th century the word “Russian” was actively used, but this is a high style.
Now it is clear that when we talk about Russian, we are talking about citizenship. We emphasize the legal status of people or organizations. But when we talk about culture, it is somehow strange to define cultural affiliation by registration.
It is somehow strange to include in this cultural space only those who were born within the current geographical boundaries, for example. Or, suppose we introduce some strange formal criterion, which refers, rather, to the wonderful title of a textbook on the history of the USSR. Remember, there was such a “History of the USSR from ancient times” for pedagogical universities? The map of the Soviet Union was projected over the entire thickness of millennia.
If we want to have fun further, then we can create a work called "Intellectual history within the boundaries Russian Federation”And along the contour of the map, all those who were brought here at any time, to attribute. But it is quite obvious that when we talk about the narrow intellectual space of the 19th century, we will not say that this is the intellectual space of the Russian Empire.
Russian debates of the 19th century are not synonymous with debates in the Russian Empire, because the debates of the Russian Empire will certainly include Polish journalism. It's quite a working concept. When we try to remove the word “Russian”, talking about disputes in the Russian cultural space of the 19th century, it seems to me that, firstly, we are frightened of the word for no reason, and secondly, we lose some of the meanings, we lose these very lines of demarcation. Or we start inventing replacement words, because we still need to somehow describe the intellectual space, and we start using more streamlined formulations.
Perhaps I am wrong, but I emphasize once again that I do not see in this word what one should be afraid of. I can easily imagine the fears that are associated, for example, with the growth of nationalist movements - this is easy to understand. But at the moment when the word “Russian” begins to be tabooed, I experience an attack of hostility, not the best feelings wake up in me, which I had not felt until that moment ... Sometimes they say that I should avoid this word, precisely in order not to provoke conflict. But it is at this point that the conflict begins to unfold. It is here, it seems to me, that the boundaries between people of different nationalities grow.
– Is it necessary to distinguish between legal aspects and some essential ones?
- Certainly. We easily understand that a person of Russian culture can easily be a citizen of any other state, these are different issues. In the same way that a person who does not identify himself with Russian culture can legally be a citizen of Russia, this in itself is not yet a problem.
- Excellent Japanese writes books about Japan. He has already published the books Staying Japanese and Being Japanese. He is currently writing the third book in the series. I asked him: “Would you like to write the books “Be Russian” or “Stay Russian”? He says: "I'm not that well-read and I don't own so many sources, although it would be interesting." Would you like to write a book "Stay Russian", "Be Russian" to show people what it means to be Russian in a good way?
- No, I'm afraid that the status of a professional Russian is a little different.
– My question is related to the fact that people sometimes write about you and define you as a Russophile. Do you consider yourself a Russophile?
- Yes, if you like. I know that this word annoys someone, although I do not really understand why. Not so long ago there was a conversation about this in Warsaw. The word “Russophile” irritated a part of the audience very much, and one of the participants in the discussion asked me this question as an option: “How can you use the name “Russophile” for your site? After all, you wouldn’t publish on the Polonophile website?”
I did not really understand the question, because for me personally there is not the slightest problem to publish on a site with that name. I would be much more interested in what it is filled with, what exactly is this very polonophilism. Perhaps, with one interpretation, I would not even come close to such a thing. Let's say, I don't understand what one can fear from the words "polonophilism" or "Russophilism" here.
Who am I? Naturally, I am a person of Russian culture. Naturally, I am a person of the Russian space. I am wholly here. Yes, in my opinion, this is one of the few great cultures that exist. There are not many such great cultures. Therefore, it is understandable that we have various mixed feelings about our culture, but it is strange not to have warm feelings for it, it is strange not to love our native.
I remember how Karamzin begins The History of the Russian State, where he says that the history of the Russian State may be of interest to others, but there are boring places in it. ("Foreigners may miss what is boring for them in our ancient history; but aren't good Russians obliged to have more patience, following the rule of state morality, which makes respect for ancestors a virtue of an educated citizen? .. ")
- He did not write the "History of the Russian State."
- I was just talking about this, that the language of that time is high style in this case. “Russian” here is like a common expression, and if we want to lift it up, talk about high, we are talking about “Russian”. In modern times, this use is rare. By the way, this is what the conversation began with - how the meaning of words moves. It is clear that he has changed a lot.
Karamzin in The History of the Russian State said that for another reader there may be boring places, but the heart of the Russian reader, among other things, cannot be cold to the history of his Fatherland, because in any case he is attached to it. Therefore, the only reproach that is possible here is that Russophilism still presupposes a certain distance.
If we wish to find something that can be reproached here, it is this very distancing. In this sense, it can be said as a reproach that it is natural for a person of Russian culture to love Russian culture. Therefore, why say it separately here, doesn't it come by default? But considering that such articulation itself causes some tension, it seems that it makes sense, since it hurts so much. This means that this is some kind of significant question, because otherwise there was a calm and even reaction here.
The February Revolution is a complete disaster
– This year there is a lot of talk about 1917, about the centenary of two revolutions. In your opinion, what lessons do the Russian revolutions give us, what can we learn from this 100-year experience? What failed the February Revolution?
– February Revolution, as you know, was a success: the sovereign signed the abdication, the Provisional Government came to power - everything was successful.
- Well, how? We wanted to build a democratic Russian Republic, but the Bolshevik Republic came ...
“I don't know who wanted to. Let's clarify.
- Recently we talked with the mathematician Alexei Sosinsky, and his grandfather, Social Revolutionary Viktor Chernov, the first and last chairman of the Constituent Assembly, wanted this.
The February Revolution is a complete disaster. In this sense, when we talk about February 1917, we are talking about the great catastrophe that happened to Russia when everything went haywire. Another thing is that everything went haywire, largely due to the previous long-term policy of the government. There was an old Soviet joke that in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Order of the October Revolution was awarded posthumously to citizen N.A. Romanov for his outstanding contribution to the organization of the revolutionary situation.
Imagine the collapse of the supreme power in the situation of the most difficult world war - in this sense, it does not matter how you relate to the previous government and to anything else, it really was a catastrophe. This story could not end well. Another thing is that the previous one in time could not end in anything good either. Generally speaking, then general impression about the Russian Empire, especially since the 1980s, is a derailed train that picks up speed. There is only one path ahead of him, there are no more shooters.
Where was the bifurcation point? Where else did Russia have a moment of choice?
- I don't know. But let me remind you what was the reaction of the extreme right when the Bolsheviks came to power. On the one hand, they believed that this was good, because the revolution would discredit itself. On the other hand, that it is at least some kind of power. We have already said that conservatives are characterized by the thesis that any power is better than no power. This is not to say that the Bolsheviks are good. It is about the fact that they have become at least some kind of power.
In a situation of a complete loss of control, a complete loss of power, the Bolsheviks are better, I emphasize once again - this is not to talk about the fact that the Bolsheviks are good. This is about something completely different, about the fact that, it turns out, they received some kind of support from the extreme right in this regard.
– Do you regret that Russia failed to become a bourgeois democracy?
– Yes, there is such regret, but in this sense it is certainly not February 1917, then Russia certainly could not have become a bourgeois democracy. In February 1917, Russia no longer had such a chance.
- Why - there were no leaders, no idea?
- Not. In those days, it was about what kind of social catastrophe would unfold in the coming months. As in the old obscene joke: well, yes, horror, but not horror-horror-horror. You can choose between horror options - absolutely terrible or just terrible. This is a question for a big discussion. The last chance to reach agreement could be seen in the first couple of years of the reign of Alexander III.
We can say that the first years of his reign are lost years for the Russian Empire. Another thing, it is also clear why they are missed. Why did representative bodies of power meet such resistance in the 60s and 70s of the 19th century? I emphasize that this is not only clinging to power, these are quite objective problems, these are problems of how, with a general imperial representation, it is possible to preserve the imperial whole. The resistance to the introduction of a representative body of power was not only situational, not only selfish, it was associated with serious problems.
But the whole epoch since 1883 is politically unambiguous, all significant political issues are driven under the skin of society. Further, everything only gets worse, the level of mutual rejection increases. The level of confrontation that exists by the beginning of the 20th century implies any impossibility for either side to act. Here, after all, there is also the problem that the so-called representatives of the public cannot compromise with the authorities for objective reasons.
Dmitry Nikolaevich Shipov, the leader of the Zemstvo movement, explains this wonderfully. When he is called to the government, he says: “It is useless. You don't call me specifically as Shipova. You need community support. If I accept your offer, I will lose support, at that moment I will become a concrete person, I will lose all my reputation, all my value, and you will not gain anything. It won't be helpful." The level of confrontation by this time was such that few people imagined how to get out of this impasse. As we know, they never came out of it. And 1917 was his consequence.
Andrey Teslya. Photo: Irina Fastovets
I look with interest and concern at what is happening
– Is there a feeling that you are writing into the void? Are you getting the response to your books that you need to continue your research?
– Yes, definitely. I receive a wide variety of responses - books provide an opportunity to communicate with colleagues, the opportunity to express myself. And here it is not only books, in fact, this is how any scientific communication is arranged - various types of communications, various types of communication, running ideas. Moreover, any text is always written from the perspective of an imaginary reader or in a situation of either real or implied conversation. Therefore, if it were not for the social function of authorship, then on the cover it would be worth writing, in some cases, really familiar interlocutors, and in some cases, virtual ones.
- Does it help or hinder you that you live not in Moscow, not in St. Petersburg, but in Khabarovsk?
As usual, there are pros and cons here. First, this is my hometown. Secondly, there are my relatives, my friends, my acquaintances. This is a favorite place. This is an opportunity for quiet work. These are their books, their well-trodden library paths. On the other hand, yes, quite obvious problems are the territorial remoteness and the complexity of communication, including to the banal, to the difference in time and the cost of transport costs. So it's hard for me to say what the balance is here. At a certain point, when you need something, it gets in the way. In another situation, it turns out that the same becomes a plus.
- In a sense, your gaze is geographically directed to the west, and not to the east or south. Maybe in the near future you are planning to look to the east or to the south?
- I would say that, of course, to the west. I will give one example. Khabarovsk has tourism potential, and not only potential, but reality, because Khabarovsk turns out to be a regular place for visiting Chinese tourists. In what logic? Because Khabarovsk is the closest European city accessible to Chinese, partly Korean or Vietnamese tourists. In this sense, it is important to note that when we talk about the West or the East, about Europe and Asia, physical geography is one thing, mental geography is another.
In this regard, I would like to emphasize that for the majority of Chinese colleagues, the movement to Khabarovsk is also a movement to the east, northeast, in fact, if according to the compass. Moving east, they find themselves in a European city, in a European space.
- Very interesting. And the last question. We are now conducting a conversation for the Orthodoxy and the World portal. Can you tell us about how the relationship between Orthodoxy and the world is changing, how it was in the 18th-19th centuries and what it is now?
– This is a very broad topic, and we need to think about it responsibly. In short, I do not understand, I do not really imagine what the future, in the new, clearly changing conditions, will be like for the political dimension of faith. On the one hand, to demand freedom from politics, or to demand that politics be free from faith, is a strange demand. We have to assume such an amazing autoanatomization of the subject, in which he must somehow be able to negate his faith from himself.
On the other hand, the underpinning of this requirement is quite transparent. I look with interest and concern at what is happening. As Baroness Jacobina von Munchausen said in the script by Grigory Gorin: "We'll wait and see." In this sense, the main thing is to be able to see some tangible new trends with your own eyes and evaluate them - preferably from a safe distance.
Video: Victor Aromshtam
The 19th century was the century of historicism, which for us today often looks quite anachronistic, with an attempt to find the “source” of its history, the moment of beginning that would predetermine the future, and peering into which one can the best way understand modernity. The past here played a dual role - as something that defines us and at the same time what we can change, consciously or out of ignorance, from misunderstanding, insufficient awareness of our past. The awareness of history was thus supposed to return the conscious to himself - he had to know who he is, and thereby change.
In the sixth "Philosophical letter" (1829) Chaadaev wrote:
“You have probably already noticed, madam, that the modern direction of the human mind is clearly striving to clothe all knowledge in a historical form. Reflecting on the philosophical foundations of historical thought, one cannot fail to notice that it is called upon to rise in our day to an immeasurably greater height than the one on which it stood until now. At the present time, it can be said that reason alone finds satisfaction in history; he constantly turns to the past tense and, in search of new possibilities, derives them exclusively from memories, from a review of the path traveled, from studies of those forces that directed and determined its movement over the centuries.
For Russian thought, disputes about the past and about the place of Russia in world history were directly addressed to the present - to place oneself in history meant for the 19th century, as in many ways for us today, to determine the position in the world, to justify some hopes and discard others, to indulge in despair. or be inspired by the enormity of the prospect. Determined by the present moment, the interpretation of the past in a return way gives us an understanding of the present, and on the basis of it we act, i.e., we perform actions directed to the future, and, therefore, no matter how true or not our understanding of the past was, it turns out to be real in its consequences.
Interest in past disputes in the history of Russian thought is determined not so much by their seeming “enduring relevance”, but by the fact that to this day we speak largely through an intellectual vocabulary, what arises in that era, we use the oppositions that were determined then, and, meeting with them in the past, we experience the “joy of recognition”, which often turns out to be only a consequence of a false identification.
The seeming relevance of the polemics of the past is due to the fact that over and over again we remove the texts of the past from their context - for example, “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles” begin to meet far beyond the disputes in Moscow living rooms and on the pages of Otechestvennye Zapiski and Moskvityanin, being timeless concepts; equally applicable to the 1840s; and by the 1890s; and to the Soviet disputes of the 1960s; "Asiatic despotism" or "Oriental customs" with the same success begin to meet at least in the 20th century. BC; even in the 20th century. from R.H. The temptation to endow history with the function of clarifying the meanings of modernity leads to the fact that historical references themselves turn out to be timeless - history in this case takes on the role of philosophy; as a result, being untenable as a story; not like philosophy.
Against; if we talk about the relevance of the genuine; then it consists primarily in the restoration of the intellectual genealogy - ideas; images; symbols; which are presented as a first approximation "for granted"; almost "eternal"; disclosed at the time of their occurrence; when they are still only sketches, attempts to mark out the as yet undescribed "desert of reality". About the deservedly famous book by Fr. George Florovsky "Ways of Russian Theology" (1938) Nikolai Berdyaev responded; that it would be more accurate to call it “The Debauchery of Russian Thought” - historical analysis all led to the fact that they thought wrong; not about that; in the wrong order, or not at all. But even if we suddenly agree with such a sad assessment; and in this case the appeal to history will not be fruitless; after all business not only in a verdict; but also in understanding the logic of the disputes of the past: "there is a system in his madness." However; we ourselves do not think so - disappointment is usually the result of a previous charm; excessive hopes; waiting to find answers to the "last questions". But; as Karamzin wrote (1815); “any History; even unskillfully written; is pleasant; as Pliny says; especially domestic. […] Let the Greeks and Romans captivate the imagination: they belong to the family of the human race, and are not strangers to us in their virtues and weaknesses, glory and disasters; but the Russian name has a special charm for us […]”.
In the series "Crossroads of Russian Thought" it is planned to publish selected texts by Russian and Russian philosophers, historians and publicists, which are of decisive importance for the development of language, the definition of concepts and the formation of images that exist to this day, through which we comprehend and imagine Russia / the Russian Empire and its place in the world. Among the authors whose texts will be included in the series will be well-known figures such as V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, H. M. Karamzin, M. P. Katkov, A. S. Khomyakov, P. Ya Chaadaev, and less well-known now, but without acquaintance with whom the history of Russian social thought of the 19th century is clearly incomplete - MP Dragomanov, S. N. Syromyatnikov, B. N. Chicherin and others. The purpose of this series is to present the main milestones in the history of the debate about the Russian past and present of the 19th century - the golden age of Russian culture - without ideological straightening and reading into the texts of the past the momentary problems of modernity. It is our deep conviction that getting acquainted with the history of Russian public debates of the century before last without striving to transfer them directly to the present is a much more urgent task than trying to use these texts of the past as a ready-made ideological arsenal.
Alexander Herzen: the first experience of synthesis of Westernism and Slavophilism
On Herzen, as on a gifted sincere person, the evolution of an advanced person is visible. He went to the West, thinking that he would find better forms there. There, revolutions passed before his eyes, and he became disillusioned with the Western system and had a special love and hope for the Russian people.
For decades, Soviet intellectuals A.I. Herzen (1812–1870) was one of the few officially permitted "vents" - with all the fluctuations in the course regarding the interpretation of specific figures, with the constant revision of the pantheon, the promotion of some and the exclusion of others, his place was secured thanks to a largely accidental article by V.I. Lenin, written on the centenary of his birth, in 1912. He was one who was included in the genealogy of the forefathers of the Russian revolution, along with the Decembrists, among the "noble, landlord revolutionaries of the first half of the last century." And, like the Decembrists, for the Soviet world it was a legalized exit to another world - the world of noble life, other, far from "revolutionary ethics", ideas about what should be, other ways to live with oneself and with others.
Teslya A.A. Russian conversations: Persons and situations. - M.: RIPOL-Classic, 2017. - 512 p.
The book is now available for purchase at the 19th Non/Fiction Book Fair. And from the end of next week it will appear in the main bookstores, and within the next 2 weeks - in online stores.
The Russian 19th century is significant for us today, at least because it was at that time - in disputes and conversations, in mutual understanding or misunderstanding - that the public language and that system of images and ideas that we, voluntarily or involuntarily, for good or for our own detriment, continue to use to this day. The series of essays and notes presented in this book reveals some of the key plots of the Russian intellectual history of that time, connected with the question of the place and purpose of Russia - that is, its possible future, conceivable through the past. The first book in the series focuses on such figures as Pyotr Chaadaev, Nikolai Polevoy, Ivan Aksakov, Yuri Samarin, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Afanasy Shchapov, and Dmitry Shipov. People of different philosophical and political views, of different origin and status, different fates - all of them, directly or in absentia, were and remain participants in the ongoing Russian conversation. The author of the collection is a leading specialist in Russian social thought of the 19th century, a senior researcher at the Academia Kantiana of the Institute for the Humanities of the IKBFU. Kant (Kaliningrad), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Andrey Alexandrovich Teslya.
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
instead of an introduction. About memory, history and interest. . . eight
Part 1. NOBLE DISPUTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fifteen
1. Immutability of Chaadaev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Russia and "others" in the views of Russian conservatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3. Retarded person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4. "The myth of the Jesuits" in the absence of the Jesuits. . . . . 171
5. Yuri Fedorovich Samarin and his correspondence
with Baroness Edita Fedorovna Raden. . . . . . . . . 221
6. Positively beautiful Russian people. . . . . . 254
7. "Ladies' circle" of Slavophilism: letters of I.S. Aksakov to gr. M.F. Sollogub, 1862-1878 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Part 2. ACTION AND REACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
8. Russian fate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
9. Russian conservative: about the system of political views of K.P. Pobedonostsev 1870-1890s . . . 366
10. "Starozemets" D.N. Shipov. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
11. Conservatives in search of the future. . . . . . . . . . . 469
12. Publicist of failed Russian fascism. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
List of abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Information about the articles included in the present edition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
Thanks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
Andrey Teslya: Over the past year, you have published three books, one way or another related to Stalin era, - “Socialism in one country”, “Stalin. From Fichte to Beria. Essays on the history of the language of Stalinist communism” and “Totalitarianism. Russian Program for Western Doctrine. You have repeatedly said that this is part of the results of a twenty-year study of Stalinism.
But in the 1990s, you gained a reputation as an outstanding researcher of Russian thought at the beginning of the 20th century, your monograph “Not Peace, But a Sword” (1996), devoted to the history of Russian ideological collections from “Problems of Idealism” in 1902 to “Milestones”, published in 1909 , has become classic and indispensable in the arsenal of any researcher of the intellectual history of this period. Similarly, the series “Studies in the History of Russian Thought”, founded by you in 1997, which continues to this day, has become one of the most authoritative publications on the history of Russian philosophy of the late 19th - first half of the 20th century, and mainly focuses on personalities related to the history of the so-called . Russian religious renaissance, and on the first generation of voluntary or forced emigrants from Russia after the Civil War.
What is the reason for this long-term shift in the center of research attention? Why did the intellectual history of Stalinism take precedence over questions much more consonant with you, as far as I can tell?
Modest Kolerov: The study of Stalin became for me a kind of “duty of a historian” after, as an employee of the State Archives of the Russian Federation, I became the executive editor of the catalog of L.P. Beria (and the author of the preface to it), who placed the NKVD-MVD as a department and forced labor as one of its areas of responsibility on the map of the institutional history of Russia and the USSR. My personal experience study of old Russia, and I felt obliged to write a book about the place of forced labor in the economy of the USSR. Here I considered myself professionally obliged to describe its historical and doctrinal premises, at least within the framework of the preface, where I already had some “natural monopoly” in my hands, previous and parallel studies in the history of Russian Marxism and trans-Marxism in its development and context. I began to apply them to the composition of the preface, which eventually grew to 50 printed sheets which have resulted in separate now books. Such a combination of the ideological history of Russia and the history of state institutions I consider the USSR a happy accident for our science. It turned out to be useful, because it speaks of their really unified landscape.
Edition of the Tsiolkovsky bookstore, 2017
Tesla: One of the most common reproaches against your recent work is the accusation that by presenting "Stalinist communism" as a logical part of Western modernity, you not only explain it, but also present it as a kind of historical inevitability and thereby justify it. Removing the last part of the reproach, I want to clarify - to what extent are you really inclined to consider the development of the Soviet system in the 1920s and 1930s not only as subject to internal logic, but also as inevitable?
Kolerov: Most of all, these are the party reproaches of those who do not have the courage to see the full horror of our history. Anyone who has read my books cannot say that I am justifying Stalin, simply because I am neither his advocate nor his admirer. But I really don't see general modern, general colonial, general historical alternatives to Stalinist slavery in the middle of the twentieth century. To realize this for me, brought up in an anti-Stalinist and even anti-communist spirit, was worth a lot of mental work. From this realization, my current understanding follows that there are much more deaths of peoples and states in history than their linear path to the heights of progress.
Directly answering your question, I will say that the Bolsheviks came to power based on their own internally understandable and motivated picture of the world, and their power turned into Stalin's - based on the impenetrable reality of the world, which they inevitably faced. In this world there was no controlled internationalism, but only the iron jaws of imperialism and colonialism, there was no place and no chance for Russia at all, except to become one of these great powers, which the Bolsheviks were doctrinally not ready, but Stalin turned out to be historically ready and able. That is, it was not the external Leninist-Trotskyist logic of internationalism that lost out to internal Stalinist etatism, but the internal provincial game of the Bolsheviks in mythical internationalism lost out to Stalin's will to power in one country, the only perspective that real "internationalism" opened up for her.
Modest Kolerov, 2017
Tesla:"Socialism in one country" speaks of ideocracy, but interprets the successive tasks facing the empire - first of all, the problem of maintaining or restoring its status or sliding into a peripheral, semi-colonial position. In this regard, is it legitimate to assert that the logic of the political whole is predominant? For the traditional objection is usually to the effect that it is for the good of individuals - and if the price paid for a place in the world as a whole is too great, then a more modest choice would be good. What does this discussion about “price” mean to you and how justified is it?
Kolerov: The good of the individual is the highest value, normative meter. No more. And the reality is that - outside the cave, in the underpants world - the state is the only guarantor and creator of public freedom. Therefore, the logic and value of the whole undoubtedly dominates among the survival factors of any real states. For Russia, a worthy place in the world has been and remains equal to state survival. Yes, the price is too high. In this case, the people and the state lose and do not survive. They - despite the appeals to values - simply have no choice: they either live on or not. The very conversation now that the victims of Russia and the USSR were excessive has no historical meaning - and it is being conducted in Russia (or after Russia) by those who themselves live (or lived) solely because the country made these excessive sacrifices and remained alive . At the same time, it is clear that this is not about the justification or unjustification of the paranoid Great Terror: it is truly paranoid, uncontrollable and many times larger than even the initially bloody plans. In principle, this is about the lack of alternatives to the mobilization practice of military and pre-war, colonial and imperialist modernity, which was not unique in Russia/USSR. In this historical time, it is senseless to place Russia on a par with England, her place is next to British India with all the ensuing consequences.
Tesla: In Stalin, you dwell on a number of aspects of the Soviet national policy and its evolution. To what extent do you see the Soviet experience of the "empire of nationalities" as successful - or do you see it as the only possible way reassembly of the empire in the conditions of the first decades of the 20th century?
Kolerov: The reassembly of the empire within the framework of the USSR on the basis of Soviet national states was the fulfillment of the general task of the European 19th century, and they did not fundamentally differ from the “limitrophes” created by the winners in the First World War in Europe and protectorates in Asia. About this - my next essay, it has already been published and will also be included in the new book on Stalinism. I cannot judge the success of European nationalism: it served justice, but gave rise to fascism. Nor can I judge the success of Soviet nation-building: it also served justice, but it destroyed the USSR and built on its ruins a mass of ethnocracies of varying degrees of barbarism, which tomorrow will either naturally die out or drown in blood.
Edition of the Tsiolkovsky bookstore, 2018
Tesla: Your last works, especially the voluminous "Stalin", are devoted, first of all, to the history of the language, how the "language of Stalinist communism" is formed and by virtue of what logic it develops. How do you assess your position in relation to the history of concepts - is it legitimate to consider your work within the framework of this research direction and to what extent do you share the methodological principles of Skinner or Koselleck?
Kolerov: In the study of historical language, I am a student and do not consider myself even a craftsman who has achieved virtuosity in the possession of an instrument. Skinner is too simple for my task, and I would study Koselleck more. But I won't go back to the subject historical landscape as a historical language, I will only continue it in two new applied studies on Stalinism.
Tesla: Your works are often perceived as predominantly topical statements addressed to the current moment - to what extent, in your opinion, is this true? To what extent do you consider historical research as a way to talk about contemporary?
Kolerov: No, I don't. And if they are perceived that way, then I am very sorry, including such perceivers. What is the “actual statement”, for example, of my archival publications of the correspondence of the great ones? It is clear that in any research there is a large proportion of current journalism or current values, but research without a "dry residue" of science is just rubbish.
Tesla: Describing and analyzing the intellectual life of the past, you constantly talk about struggle and confrontation - is this situation, in your opinion, largely due to time or is the logic of struggle a through, basic in all human affairs?
Kolerov: Both main periods of my research interest - Russian thought of the late 19th - early 20th centuries and the Stalinist USSR - are periods of acute struggle, revolutions and wars. I am not destined to study the fertile "golden age", and it is not interesting. In my youth, when I chose my first subject, I, like many of us, had, of course, the presumption that the culture of the beginning of the 20th century was an unattainable lost peak. But since then I have spent a lot of pens to describe how much socialism really permeated this summit. And in this sense, the Silver Age and Stalin are brothers.
As for personal philosophy, yes, without a fight human life- zero.
Tesla: Not so long ago, under your editorship, Nikolai Ustryalov's book "National Bolshevism" was published. In an extensive preface, you not only dwell on intellectual vicissitudes, but also speak very strongly about the fate and choice of Ustryalov, that he willingly made a sacrifice, but it turned out to be “a victim not to the state, but to the authorities, which did not guarantee and did not intend to guarantee the donor of the justification of the victim and the pursuit of the state interests. To what extent is it possible to choose between these sides of the victim - or, in other words, what in this case is a conscientious error or a situation in which there is no possibility of sacrificing to the state without simultaneously sacrificing the available power?
Kolerov: There is no historical choice here. The state, in spite of everything, remains a "cold monster". But the state of your country in those present conditions is the only means of survival for your people. You can sacrifice yourself, you can croak from exile, you can become a traitor and serve the enemy of your people. Ultimately, nothing will change from this in the life of the state and the people, but in each specific historical second, it is personal actions that create this final score. There are also actions within the government. But this is not a historical, but a moral choice unpredictable in terms of historical weight. Any available power is worse than the idea of a state. Therefore, you should not place too much hope on her. Keeping a healthy distance from the authorities, one can be a sober statesman. But Ustryalov did not want distance, he wanted power, and therefore his choice was simple: go to power for execution in order to pay for his words with it, or not. What Ustryalov did in the intellectual sphere no longer required his suicide. But he decided otherwise.
Tesla: In your recently published works, you deal with the subject matter of the history of ideas and the history of concepts and turn in many respects to individual destinies. By making brief remarks or more or less extended judgments, it seems to me that you follow the human benignity of the face. It is important not only “what is said”, but also “who says”.
In this regard, who for you is the most humanly interesting of those characters, who do you deal with in detail? And at the same time, of those whose lives appear to be properly lived, who, and thanks to what, managed to endure the lesson?
Kolerov: I swear more and more to Semyon Ludwigovich Frank and less and less to Pyotr Berngardovich Struve. The first passed the test, the second did not. At the same time, it is important that Frank was ready to stay in Soviet Russia and die here, while Struve was ready to destroy Soviet Russia by force of arms and - probably - eventually go crazy. The legacy of Pavel Ivanovich Novgorodtsev is very dear to me. Admiring Tikhomirov from my youth, I discover Plekhanov more and more over the years. I am happy to be present at how quickly Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov turns into a national genius before our eyes. AT Soviet time Bryusov, who went to the service of the Bolsheviks, and Blok, who resigned himself to them, involuntarily accomplished a cultural and historical feat: thanks to their loyalty to the Soviet regime and, consequently, to all of us, Soviet people, was saved and justified almost the entire Silver Age. Rozanov, on the other hand, is much more complicated - he will still serve our national culture with his complexity and polyphony. He alone will be able to keep a couple of humanities afloat, just as the once published Soviet Complete Works of Dostoevsky gave life to the Soviet scientific collections Dostoevsky: Materials and Research.
But in general, it is not good to judge the great ones: we all still have many unpleasant lessons to learn, and then we will see who is a croaking clown and who is a suicide.
Archive recent history Russia. Volume IV: " Special folder» L.P. Beria. From the materials of the Secretariat of the NKVD-MVD of the USSR 1946-1949. Catalog of documents / Editor-in-chief M.A. Kolerov. - M., 1996. 681 p.
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