Pages of the history of Afghanistan. Special forces of the armies of the world Cobalt special forces detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR

In addition to units and institutions Soviet army In Afghanistan there were separate units of border troops and bodies of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Important role in those conditions the squad was called upon to play - and played - special purpose Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR "Cobalt", the first detachment of which began operational combat work in Afghanistan in the summer of 1980. "Cobalt" was aimed at operational search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, personnel were deployed in teams in key provinces (the territory of the DRA is divided into 26 provinces), from where they traveled to districts as part of operational combat groups.

In total, from August 1980 to April 1983, three Cobalt trains were replaced in Afghanistan. The commander of the first two was the deputy head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Major General Beksultan Beslanovich Dziov. Under his leadership there were constantly 23 operational combat groups and one reserve unit in Kabul.

The staff of each group included seven people, armed with, in addition to small arms There were an armored personnel carrier, a Niva vehicle and a field radio station. They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th combined arms army of the TurkVO, participated in intelligence support for its combat operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.

The war in Afghanistan provided the first significant experience in the use of operational search activities in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in conditions civil war. Particular weight is given to the operational developments of those years by the fact that guerrilla, or so-called “small” war, has become the main type of armed conflict on the planet today. Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, the need to generalize the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars for the purpose of effective practical use in the future is obvious.

It is now generally accepted that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.

The international mission of our specialists, including the Cobalt special squad, was to provide assistance in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy. The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the Tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to carry out combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, were prone to panic and defection to the enemy’s side.

The direct participation of the Cobalt special squad in the unfolding events began in March 1980 and continued until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units, work on the reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of gangs by intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Therefore, Cobalt consisted mainly of employees of the criminal investigation apparatus and other operational services, and for their force cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.

In the eight security zones created in Afghanistan, Tsarandoy battalions were formed with the participation of Cobalt. Already from the second half of 1981, with the support of Cobalt, they actively opposed local gangs in the provinces and effectively interacted with government army units and units of the 40th Army during large-scale or local operations. A special feature of the operational-search activities of the first Cobalt detachment was the recruitment of an intelligence network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, were already working with the agents assigned to contact. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in premises specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.

The "Cobalt" detachment was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.

However, the Kobalt operational staff, unlike their colleagues from Cascade, already had experience in operational investigative work against gangs. They generously shared this experience with state security soldiers, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience in participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to include the criminal police in intelligence? Because no other department had the kind of experience in operational investigative work that was necessary for Tsaranda, whose units needed to be trained in operational investigative activities in order to quickly support combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians. In addition, “Cascade” needed to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers from the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps, but also equipped them the latest types weapons, but also took part in sabotage actions.

In addition, the subordination of “Cobalt” to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relationships with the military administration and officers of the commandant’s offices implementing the corresponding regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.

To assess the experience of the operational-search work of the Cobalt special squad in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its enemy and the features of the operational-search work with him. The Mujahideen militia included dozens of different associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic adherents of the revolution in Iran. Most opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran. The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished by new armed units trained in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and by the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of land and water reform.

Soviet troops fought actively together with government Afghan formations and units. The armed forces of the opposition, having suffered a number of defeats, switched to tactics guerrilla warfare. Their main groups moved to mountainous areas, where military equipment could not reach.

Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual lifestyle of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, fully provided for and, most importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational search work and the conduct of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was focal in nature, and in this war there was no division into the front and rear. The enemy could appear in any place and from any direction, using kariz (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried river beds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impassable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance and had an extensive network of informants and observers. At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to means of communication, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.

The tactics of the rebels and the difficult terrain predetermined in these conditions the high importance of reconnaissance activities, including the operational search activities of the Cobalt special squad, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, forecasting enemy actions and ending with identifying the numerical composition of enemy gang groups, their locations location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of entering Soviet troops In Afghanistan, the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased 4 times. The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. However, as combat practice has shown, these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information. By directive General Staff Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of the forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (KGB of the USSR - “Cascade”, “Omega”, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - “Cobalt”), as well as with the intelligence agencies of the DRA were measures have been taken to fully develop their interaction. All military and human intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special detachment, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 40th Army. “For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence data in the Combat Control Center every day,” recalls Colonel General B.V. Gromov, - even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was established to regularly hold morning meetings. The meeting began at seven o'clock with a report from the intelligence chief. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all intelligence agencies of our missions in Afghanistan gathered. They came from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - this was mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, US plans, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the “Alliance of Seven” (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of the Afghan opposition parties located in Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which had intelligence centers, carried out radio interception, etc.; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representative offices of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from Cobalt) in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th Army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, individual regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data, new goals, including especially important ones, appeared within a day, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite effectively. There were, as they say, some hiccups when decisions were not made quickly enough by the relevant military commanders, which resulted in a disruption in the implementation of the received information, including bombing strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from which the dushmans had already left, or even on their own units that had already moved out to the search location. Late management decisions sometimes resulted in irrevocable losses. Thus, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of OKSV units with the participation of the “Cobalt” and “Cascade” detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, officers of “Cascade-1” Alexander Puntus (previously fought in members of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.

Together with them, two officers of the Kobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, who was wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade; police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded. From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, Cobalt officers faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including separate parts Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of Tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing help and facilitating the bandits.

In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered; there were few employees at Kobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up during operational combat work, learned in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.

The hardships of the highlands were complemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan. more people than during combat operations.

Against opposition armed groups operating by guerrilla methods, it was necessary to use equally unpredictable and unconventional tactics. And already the first clashes showed that creative improvisation in local conflicts is essential condition achieving victory in battle.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, former assistant head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning operations. This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, police officers, state security, police - everyone worked to obtain it. Soon the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not become obsolete in this war either. Each Cobalt soldier had to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of BShU on the accumulation of Mujahideen, including settlements. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of Soviet and government troops, coordinated in terms of tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the “Cobalt” special squad.

Employees of the internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops who were part of Cobalt-1 underwent additional training in August 1980 at the Tashkent high school Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. There they were taught the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, a machine gun, a machine gun, i.e. provided the necessary initial combat training. The teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not know the situation in this country.

The first Cobalt group spent about seven months on a business trip in Afghanistan, gaining some experience from which others later learned. Many employees were deservedly awarded orders and medals, promoted ahead of schedule to the next special and military ranks. And police captain M.I. Isakov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Political School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs named after. On the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol, who previously served in the Airborne Forces and the criminal investigation department in the transport police, a participant in the mentioned battle near the village of Shivaki, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies for the entire many years Afghan war. His name is among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation“Heroes of the Fatherland” is engraved on marble slabs located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops participated in the Afghan war in separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the “Cascade” group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the special squad “Cobalt” was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.

In total, in Afghanistan, the Cobalt special detachment carried out operational support for over a thousand planned and private operations, during which a large number of armed opposition forces were neutralized and the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured. With the participation of Cobalt, the increase in the combat capability of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to deliver serious blows to the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.

Today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

Many wonderful detectives have passed through Cobalt. This includes his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Army General Viktor Erin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, also attended the Cobalt school.

From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:

I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of law enforcement officers into the Cobalt reconnaissance detachment. Priority was given to operatives who had completed criminal investigation school and snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We met each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities. The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He had to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, we started working. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search unit. However, there were many additional difficulties: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there is the psychological barrier. After the entry of our limited military contingent soviet people from desired assistants and allies of people's power, they turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB USSR PV, April 1982:

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the DS from the side, listen to the walkie-talkie, we are on the same wavelength, and can listen to their conversations. A tough, fleeting firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, quite large group. In our area around the city, a mortar battery is actively operating. And from the other end the artillery of the 201st division is hitting the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city and begin a combing operation, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves brutally.

A BRDM with a loudspeaker approaches, a propaganda machine. The Tajik translator begins to broadcast into the city, calling on civilians to go to its outskirts. Whoever doesn’t come out will be considered Basmachi. And the city has a population of about thirty thousand. They fell together, in large crowds. Mostly women with children and old people, few men.

A filter point is being urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Translators and the Afghan State Security (HAD) begin working with them.

This is a surprise for us, a non-Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. “Kobaltovtsy” quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine our right shoulder to see if there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple.

Three young Afghans were identified by local residents; they were trained in Pakistan and are active militants. In the evening we were ordered to put these three on the ground away from the main body of detainees. Give them the opportunity to run, and when they run, shoot to kill. They are irreconcilable militants, and there is no reason to hand them over to the Afghans; they will soon find themselves in a gang again. We waited all night like at a shooting gallery. They didn’t run: either they didn’t have the strength, or they guessed our intentions.

Another prisoner, an old man, had a bloody Soviet uniform found during a search in his house. Neighbors said that a wounded man was kept in his house Soviet soldier, then they killed him brutally. During interrogation, he admitted this, and also said with pride that his son was the leader of one of the gangs.

The detachment became one of the most secret police units; an extremely limited circle of people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB knew about its existence. According to the official version, Cobalt was tasked with training employees of Afghan security forces - tsarandoy (literally “protector”, “intercessor”). In fact, the main function of the detachment was reconnaissance: collecting and analyzing information about armed groups and their leaders, establishing caravan routes for the delivery of weapons, their quantities and storage locations.

Each of the groups of “Cobalt workers” began to adapt to operational work in a foreign country in its own way. Some of the policemen, such as those stationed in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif (the capital of Balkh province), began their acquaintance with the population from the local prison.

Both captured dushmans and criminals sat in it. But there were also many who were treated harshly and unfairly by the authorities. Some ended up behind bars due to slander, others fell under the hot hand of the security forces. It was with them that the operatives agreed to cooperate. The Afghans reinforced their verbal commitment to supply the Shuravi (Soviet) with information with a subscription.

A few days later, the Kobalt members, through a party adviser, contacted the provincial governor with a proposal to hold an amnesty for prisoners whom, in their opinion, criminal cases had been fabricated. The initiative was approved, and soon a certain number of prisoners were released from the city prison. Similar actions later took place in all provinces of the country. Most informants turned out to be useless or completely disappeared from view. But there were also those who obtained valuable information. Thus, in a conversation with operatives, one of the Afghans let slip that his relative was a member of a large gang. Its core consisted of approximately 350–400 people. But if necessary, the ranks of the Mujahideen could be replenished with up to two thousand bayonets. The armament of this group consisted of mortars, heavy machine guns and various small arms delivered from Pakistan. The guy was persuaded to cooperate, after which a legend was invented, with which he infiltrated the gang. The young Afghan told the Mujahideen that he wanted revenge on those who abused him in prison. They believed him, and soon the agent entered the circle of close associates field commander. After this, the operatives knew everything about the gang’s weapons, its composition, planned attacks, and even the location of the training camp. Based on the results of the intelligence data, a military operation was carried out, during which the rebel base was destroyed. Dozens fell into the hands of the military

Prisoners, a large number of weapons and ammunition. When working with informants, Cobalt employees were guided by an unspoken rule: the informant is responsible for his reports with his head. And therefore, the operatives always took the agent with them to their operations. In this way they tried to stop possible betrayal. The Afghan knew that if he led the group into an ambush, he himself would also die. Using women as sources of information was extremely difficult in an orthodox Islamic country. And yet, Cobalt operatives managed to recruit Afghan women. And sometimes their connections brought police intelligence to the very top of the Dushman hierarchy. The brother of one of the women collaborating with the officers was a nafar (minister) under the head of a large rebel unit, Ahmad Shah, who received the nickname Masud (happy). His group occupied the strategically important Panjshir Gorge, which cut Afghanistan into two parts and stretched from the western borders of the country almost to China. The female agent managed to convince her brother to tell her everything that was happening at Masood’s headquarters, and every week she went many kilometers to visit a relative. From him she brought news from the headquarters of the Panjshir Lion (as Ahmad Shah was also called). This information was very useful when in 1980 the command of the 40th Soviet Army negotiated a truce with Ahmad Shah.

From the agent, the operatives learned what Masud's further diplomatic bargaining would be like. The information was immediately transmitted to army headquarters. This made it possible to adjust the negotiating line of military advisers from the GRU, as a result of which a secret agreement was concluded with Ahmad Shah. He took upon himself the obligation not to carry out hostile actions against Soviet and government troops. In response, they promised him not to carry out air strikes on Panjshir and to allow his caravans to enter and leave the valley. The term of the agreement is until May 1982. And before the designated date, the fighting in the province actually stopped. It has also become calmer on the Salang-Kabul highway. But trouble was not to be expected from the Mujahideen alone in Afghanistan. The enemy sometimes lurked nearby: among “comrades and associates.” It happened that military operations failed miserably, since information about them was passed on to the dushmans in advance. Afghan officers were suspected of leaking data. But how to calculate them? Somehow, one of the Cobalt employees managed to obtain information that the head of finance of the Panjshir front had arrived in his native village for a visit. To detain him, troops were landed on the approaches to the populated area, but they failed to capture the rebel. But in the house destroyed after the battle, valuable documents were discovered: accounting books with the names of government officials and senior army officers and tsarandoi, who received rewards for their services from the Mujahideen. After this operation, several high-ranking officers of the Afghan Army General Staff were arrested in Kabul. Thus, for some time it was possible to return the classification of secrecy to military affairs.

Military operations in Afghanistan with the participation of Soviet troops lasted almost ten years. In February 1989, by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, army units left a foreign country in an organized manner, thus completing their international peacekeeping mission. By that time, the special units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs no longer existed. "Cobalt" and "Cascade" were withdrawn from Afghanistan and disbanded in the spring of 1983. The history of the units ended, but the history of their fighters continued. Many of the officers of the former freelance detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs soon returned to the mountainous republic, but as advisers. Some of them continued to work there after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, until 1992.

The Afghan war became a special stage in the development of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was during that period that internal affairs bodies gained the opportunity to conduct covert operational activities in the territory foreign country. And the experience gained abroad was later useful at home. More than 3,900 police officers went on business trips abroad. For military services, many of them were awarded orders and medals. And police captain Mikhail

Isakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1980, when near the village of Shivaki (east of Kabul) a group of ten Cobalt employees was ambushed and almost completely died (seven killed, two wounded), the captain fought alone all night, not allowing the dushmans to finish off the wounded and abuse over the bodies of the dead.

The first Cobalt landing in Afghanistane.1 hour

Being a participant in the Afghan events through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after so many years, for some reasons, I decided to return to that distant year of 1980, when, by the will of fate, I ended up in a country so distant to me - Afghanistan. The impetus for the report was the page of Riga resident Nikolai Vladimirovich Volkov in “Art Of War” on the Internet, this site contains materials from the memories of participants in Afghan and Chechen wars; other “hot spots” If in the Chechen companies employees of the internal affairs bodies played and are currently playing an active role, then in the Afghan events there is no mention of them in any material, as if they were not there. But this is contrary to the truth. There were thousands of them there, they participated together with paratroopers in combat operations, and, based on the specifics and nature of their activities, obtained important intelligence data that was used in military operations. For their courageous work, thousands of them were awarded high government awards, orders and medals, and a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Latvian SSR became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Based on all this, I decided, albeit in a small material, to show the history of the appearance of internal affairs officers in Afghanistan, their daily work, successes and failures, the first losses of their comrades.

Recruitment for "Adviser"

Dedicated to the first landing of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs officers in Afghanistan. My “recruitment” to be sent to Afghanistan was carried out according to all the rules of the Soviet ideological machine. At the beginning of July 1980, I was summoned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Latvian SSR, where the Deputy Minister for Personnel had a conversation with me, so to speak, on a free topic, and then, taking into account the strength of my family situation and other circumstances, he invited me to provide assistance to the friendly Afghan people as Advisor Tsarandoy (Afghan militia). For the sake of health, it was necessary to take a wife with you. Having discussed all the issues at home with my wife and being flattered by the exoticism of the East, the next day I gave my consent, subsequently regretting my rash act. But the job was done. Medical checks began, the collection of necessary documents, the purchase of necessary things and toiletries, and medicines. To improve my health in August, I was given a ticket to the Borovoye holiday home near Luga, , where I rested until August 29, when in the afternoon I was urgently summoned by telephone message to the ministry in Riga. Straight from the train on the morning of August 30, I went to the Human Resources Department, where, to my surprise, I saw nine more of the same “advisers.” During the briefing we were told that due to changes in the situation, the departure of our group was scheduled for tomorrow. Today we must receive cash and clothing certificates, as well as a 3-month salary. Then they let us go to say goodbye to our families, explaining that the wives would arrive to us later. Our departure was planned for tomorrow, i.e. August 31, by train Riga-Moscow. Before arriving at the place of business trip (as they politely explained to us), I was appointed group leader. I will miss the farewells and tears at the Rizhsky station, since seeing off loved ones is the same everywhere. What could they teach us if they themselves did not know the history of the country, the customs and traditions of the people where they sent us? The height of all stupidity can be called the speech of a specialist in operational work, who proposed to involve mullahs in cooperation. In general, nothing from this study was useful to us. Only through mistakes and the death of comrades did we gain work experience, which later began to bring results.

Leningrad region

Kabul is distant and the lifeless steppe.... (from a soldier's song) September 8, 1980. An IL-76 military transport aircraft with fifty employees of our ninth group, with weapons, a year's supply of ammunition, uniforms and other military equipment, landed at the airport of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. Due to the special flight, there was no customs check. The time showed 7.30 am. Despite the early hour, the sun burned thoroughly, the air temperature was +36 degrees. With all our personal weapons, ammunition, helmets and duffel bags, we were lined up on the airfield runway and the general who flew with us, according to the list, handed us over to a representative of the KGB of the USSR with the rank of colonel, who congratulated us with arrival in DRA. It became clear to us that from now on we will be subordinate to this department. Soon several open army trucks arrived, in which we were placed, and the vehicles started moving. Not far away one could see a tent city, or rather a city. About 10 minutes later we arrived in this tent city, which, as it later turned out, was the camp of the Vitebsk Airborne Division. Later, some of our comrades experienced this themselves. They explained to us that we could only drink boiled water, which we did from now on. Nevertheless, due to the change in food and excessive consumption of fruit, we all suffered from a mild form of dysentery, running to the latrine every five minutes. Here in the camp we learned that together with us, each on his own board, all 600 “advisers” took off, who listened to worthless lectures in the training camp of the internal troops in Uzbekistan, or rather near Tashkent. They, too, 50-60 employees each, were sent to all centers of large provinces. Afghanistan. Kabul explosives and mines, both homemade and industrially made from Western Europe

and America. We learned how to detonate charges, hand grenades, and fire from a standard RPG and a handheld device. We learned how to properly jump in and take our place in an armored personnel carrier, and how to jump off it while moving. Many tried their hand at shooting from a turret heavy machine gun. At will, with full equipment and weapons, we went up the mountain and went down. All this was done in 40 degree heat, when the uniform was wet from sweat, and the lips were cracking from lack of moisture in the body. There were cases when some guys fell in the ranks - the first was an investigator from Riga - Boris Chekotin. At a continuous pace, except for Sundays, we continued field exercises for a whole month. The bellies disappeared, the guys lost weight, some lost almost 20 kg of weight. Many got sick. We didn’t know then that soon, very soon, everything acquired during our studies would be useful in real combat conditions under the hot Afghan sun under the whistling of machine gun bullets.

A red rocket is melting in the sky, Tsaranda is calling us to help.... (from a soldier’s song) And so, a month after arriving in Kabul and completing grueling field exercises, by the decision of the joint leadership of “Cascade - Cobalt” of the Kabul garrison, a decision was made on participation in military operations in the vicinity of Kabul and in the province of Parwan, in order to obtain operational information directly on the battlefield, from prisoners and the population. Employees with radio operator qualifications were included in military columns and subordinated to their commanders. Employees assigned to participate in military operations with a full set of weapons and protective equipment left for their gathering places, mainly to the places of residence of KGB officers, where they spent several days waiting for military columns. While waiting, time always passes slowly, the guys did whatever they could. There were poets and musicians. In a matter of hours, poems were composed, music was selected, and soldiers' songs were born. One of these songs gained such popularity that each of the military representatives of the military branches and members of the joint detachment who participated in Afghanistan considered it their own, replaced the words and attributed the authorship to themselves - see the songs on the page of Anatoly Valerievich Drozdov from “Art Of War”. “I will send all dushmans to heaven. There will be peace on the land of Afghanistan, Then we’ll have a feast with you. The days flew by like falling leaves And again “Cascade” left for Kabul And I’m waiting, burning with love, Where are you, blue-eyed shuravi Meanwhile in In the paratroopers’ camp city, by order of the group’s leadership, twelve employees were left to guard our tents and the group’s property. I was worried that I was not taken for the operation, but the group commander obviously knew better who to take and who to leave. Moreover, when I jumped from an armored personnel carrier. I injured my left leg and it needed to be treated (warmed), which was impossible in field conditions. About a week later, on the instructions of the Chief Advisor for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Kosogovsky, seven officers were selected from the remaining employees in the camp, taken to Kabul and placed in a prison. the villa in the center of the city, or rather everyone except me, was moved into a warehouse. The villa, which the staff officers dubbed the “White Stork” due to its white color, was surrounded by a high stone fence, adjacent to the street on one side and had a small garden in which. There were several fruit trees. While in Kabul, Elisov managed to learn about our first losses, but more on that later.

Blessing for battle

“Fate cannot be predicted in advance. Creatures are not with us, Neither in the Bible nor in the Koran will you find the path to your life.” (from a soldier’s song) On October 20, 1980, a military column to which our group, led by Colonel Kirgintsev, was attached, returning from an operation, not far from Kabul, in one of the villages, took on a battle with a large gang of dushmans. Some of the guys from our group were cut off from the main forces by flank fire. The boys fought bravely. Kirgintsev, saving a wounded officer, destroyed a Chinese instructor who jumped out of the cave with machine gun fire. Our comrades, surrounded, died. Wounded in the legs of Art., he blew himself up with a grenade. Lieutenant Rusakov from the VV, if my memory serves me correctly - from Orel. Major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was killed. A resident of Riga, Captain Isakov spent the whole night in a rock crevice, guarding the corpses of his dead comrades and fighting off dushmans. Only in the morning he and the corpses of the victims were picked up by a helicopter that arrived. our comrades, their senseless death, the farewell and farewell ceremony morally undermined the mood in the group. The group became demoralized before our eyes, mass drinking began, and the group’s leadership could not appear in the tent of the participants in the operations. And the results of both operations were disastrous. Two of our employees, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were killed. Cascade suffered the most significant losses; four employees were killed and three were wounded.

In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation, at the end of 1979, a Soviet military group was introduced into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in order to stabilize the situation in the neighboring country, which at that time was already tired of the struggle of the ruling elites for power. Soviet troops brought into the country were involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the government.
Both of our fallen comrades were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, posthumously. The title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” was awarded to our captain Isakov and one wounded Cascade officer. All other participants in the operations were nominated for government awards.
After the death of our comrades, every month when we received our wages, we all put 300 Afghanis into a common treasury to buy valuable things for the children and wives of our dead fathers and husbands. This mission was voluntarily undertaken by the group's political officer, Captain Butkevich from Minsk.
The staff of each group included seven people, armed with, in addition to small arms, an armored personnel carrier, a Niva vehicle and a field radio station. They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th combined arms army of the TurkVO, participated in intelligence support for its combat operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.

The war in Afghanistan provided the first significant experience in the use of operational search activities in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. Particular weight is given to the operational developments of those years by the fact that guerrilla, or so-called “small” war, has become the main type of armed conflict on the planet today. Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, the need to generalize the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars for the purpose of effective practical use in the future is obvious.

It is now generally accepted that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.
The international mission of our specialists, including the special squad "Cobalt", was to provide assistance in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy. The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the Tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to carry out combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, were prone to panic and defection to the enemy’s side.
The direct participation of the Cobalt special squad in the unfolding events began in March 1980 and continued until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units, work on the reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of bandit formations using intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Therefore, Cobalt consisted mainly of employees of the criminal investigation apparatus and other operational services, and for their force cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.
In the eight security zones created in Afghanistan, Tsarandoy battalions were formed with the participation of Cobalt. Already from the second half of 1981, with the support of Cobalt, they actively opposed local gangs in the provinces and effectively interacted with government army units and units of the 40th Army during large-scale or local operations. A special feature of the operational-search activities of the first Cobalt detachment was the recruitment of an intelligence network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, were already working with the agents assigned to contact. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in premises specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.
The "Cobalt" detachment was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.
However, the operational staff of "Cobalt", unlike their colleagues from "Cascade", already had experience in operational investigative work against gangs. They generously shared this experience with state security soldiers, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience in participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to include the criminal police in intelligence? Because no other department had the kind of experience in operational investigative work that was necessary for Tsaranda, whose units needed to be trained in operational investigative activities in order to quickly support combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians. In addition, "Cascade" needed to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers of the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps and equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage actions.

In addition, the subordination of "Cobalt" to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relationships with the military administration and officers of the commandant's offices implementing the corresponding regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.
To assess the experience of the operational-search work of the "Cobalt" special squad in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its enemy and the features of the operational-search work with him. The Mujahideen militia included dozens of different associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic adherents of the revolution in Iran. Most opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran. The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished by new armed units trained in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and by the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of land and water reform.
Soviet troops fought actively together with government Afghan formations and units. The armed forces of the opposition, having suffered a number of defeats, switched to guerrilla warfare tactics. Their main groups moved to mountainous areas where military equipment could not reach.
Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual lifestyle of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, fully provided for and, most importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational search work and the conduct of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was focal in nature, and in this war there was no division into the front and rear. The enemy could appear in any place and from any direction, using kariz (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried river beds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impassable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance and had an extensive network of informants and observers. At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to means of communication, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.
The tactics of the rebels and the difficult terrain predetermined in these conditions the high importance of reconnaissance activities, including the operational search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, forecasting enemy actions and ending with identifying the numerical composition of enemy gang groups, their locations location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased 4 times. The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. However, as combat practice has shown, these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information. According to Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (KGB of the USSR - "Cascade", "Omega", Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - "Cobalt"), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures to fully develop their interaction. All military and human intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special squad, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the 40th Army headquarters. “For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence data at the Combat Control Center every day,” recalls Colonel General B.V. Gromov, “even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was established to regularly hold morning meetings. The meeting began at seven hours from the report of the intelligence chief. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all intelligence agencies of our representative offices in Afghanistan were gathered. They came from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - this was mainly information on Pakistan, Iran, plans of the United States, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the “Alliance of Seven” (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of Afghan opposition parties located in Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which had intelligence centers, conducted radio interceptions, etc. .; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representative offices of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from Cobalt) in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th Army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, individual regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data, new goals, including especially important ones, appeared within a day, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite effectively. There were, as they say, some hiccups when decisions were not made quickly enough by the relevant military commanders, which resulted in a disruption in the implementation of the received information, including bombing strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from which the dushmans had already left, or even on their own units that had already moved out to the search location. Late management decisions sometimes resulted in irrevocable losses. Thus, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of OKSV units with the participation of the Cobalt and Cascade detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, officers of Cascade-1 Alexander Puntus (previously fought in members of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.
Together with them, two officers of the Cobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade, and police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded. From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, Cobalt officers faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of Tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing help and facilitating the bandits.
In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered; there were few employees at Cobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up during operational combat work, learned in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.
The hardships of the highlands were complemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than from combat.
Against opposition armed groups operating by guerrilla methods, it was necessary to use equally unpredictable and unconventional tactics. And already the first clashes showed that creative improvisation in local conflicts is a necessary condition for achieving victory in battle.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning operations. This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, police officers, state security, police - everyone worked to obtain it. Soon, the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not become obsolete in this war either. Each Cobalt soldier was required to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of ground control attacks on concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of Soviet and government troops, coordinated in tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the Cobalt special squad.
In August 1980, employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of internal troops who were part of Cobalt-1 underwent additional training at the Tashkent Higher School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. There they were taught the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, a machine gun, a machine gun, i.e. provided the necessary initial combat training. The teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not know the situation in this country.
The first Cobalt group spent about seven months on a business trip in Afghanistan, gaining some experience from which others later learned. Many employees were deservedly awarded orders and medals, promoted ahead of schedule to the next special and military ranks. And police captain M.I. Isakov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Political School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs named after. On the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol, who previously served in the Airborne Forces and the criminal investigation department in the transport police, a participant in the mentioned battle near the village of Shivaki, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies for the entire many years Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the marble slabs “Heroes of the Fatherland” located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops participated in the Afghan war in separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the Cascade group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the special squad "Cobalt" was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.
In total, in Afghanistan, the Cobalt special detachment carried out operational support for over a thousand planned and private operations, during which a large number of armed opposition formations were neutralized and the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured. The increase in the combat capability of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy with the participation of "Cobalt" made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to deliver serious blows to the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.
Today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Many wonderful detectives have passed through Cobalt. This includes his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Army General Viktor Erin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, also attended the Cobalt school.

From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:
- I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of law enforcement officers into the Cobalt reconnaissance detachment. Priority was given to operatives who had completed criminal investigation school and snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We met each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities. The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He had to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, we started working. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search unit. However, there were many additional difficulties: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there is the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB USSR PV, April 1982:

The first very large operation, Tashkurgan. Great forces are involved. Two mangroups of border troops, three or four border air assault groups and a considerable number of units of the 201st division of the 40th army. At the same time we surround the city from all sides. In the hills where equipment cannot pass, air assault groups (airborne assault groups) are landed. According to intelligence data, a large number of Basmachi (as we then called dushmans) had accumulated in the city. The encirclement ring closed in time; they were unable to escape.

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the DS from the side, listen to the walkie-talkie, we are on the same wavelength, and can listen to their conversations. A tough, quick firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, quite a large group. In our area around the city, a mortar battery is actively operating. And from the other end the artillery of the 201st division is hitting the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city and begin a combing operation, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves brutally.

A filter point is being urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Translators and the Afghan State Security (HAD) begin working with them.

Some of our group appears in a uniform without shoulder straps and without insignia, all officers appear to call themselves “Cobalt” (later they will tell us that this is a special unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but I still don’t know whether this is true or not). They are interrogating prisoners. We set up a separate tent for them. They bring suspicious Afghan detainees into it for interrogation and interrogate them harshly.
This is a surprise for us, a non-Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. “Kobaltovtsy” quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine our right shoulder to see if there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple.

Another prisoner, an old man, had a bloody Soviet uniform found during a search in his house. Neighbors said that a wounded Soviet soldier was kept in his house and then brutally killed. During interrogation, he admitted this, and also said with pride that his son was the leader of one of the gangs.

11.01.2012 15:05 2 (11512)

Former police chief Chelyabinsk region led the legendary squad "Cobalt"

On December 29, Russia celebrates a day of memory and mourning. 33 years ago, it was officially announced that a “limited contingent” of our troops would be sent to Afghanistan. Very little is known to this day about that undeclared war, which lasted a long nine years, one month and 19 days. It remains a mystery what lessons we all learned from this war.

There is also unusually little information about the highly secret special forces detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR “Cobalt”, which was actively operating in Afghanistan in Afghanistan and carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of bandit formations through intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Even in the collection “Ministry of Internal Affairs 1902 - 2002. Historical sketch", published for the 200th anniversary of the department, there is no proper information about this legendary unit.

The Afghan campaign, according to experts, has once again completely confirmed the harm of underestimating the role of effective intelligence in war. If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed five percent, then subsequently it was forced to quadruple. The collection of intelligence data on gangs was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. The unified intelligence center in Kabul began to provide information to Soviet troops from January 1980, consistently deploying major centers operational intelligence groups that were soon to begin operating in almost all provinces of Afghanistan.

The detectives turned out to be more prepared than the intelligence services

But it just so happened that against the backdrop of the well-known Afghan special operations of the top-secret units of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense “Alpha”, “Cascade”, “Zenith” and “Omega”, the role of the modest Soviet police officers sent across the river was completely undeservedly hushed up all these years. And few people know what more than 3,900 employees of the USSR internal affairs bodies, sent on business trips to Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992, actually did during that strange war...

Although, it would seem, the era of the so-called Afghan war was a completely special stage in the development of the country's internal affairs bodies. It was then that for the first time the Ministry of Internal Affairs had the opportunity to have its own representative office and conduct covert operational activities on the territory of a foreign state. In the distant eighties of the last century, only an extremely limited circle of the country’s leaders knew about the foreign reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the police special forces “Cobalt”.

It so happened that it was the operational police officers in those years who turned out to be the most prepared to conduct intelligence work on the numerous illegal armed groups of rebellious Afghanistan. That is why there was a need to include police detectives in intelligence activities in wartime conditions. Today it can be said with a high degree of probability that at that time not a single law enforcement structure or special service of the state had such experience in operational work and organizing the fight against gangs that our police had accumulated. And it turns out that ordinary police detectives, who lived every day with hard and real operational investigative work, turned out to be more prepared for the hardships of a bloody counter-guerrilla war than representatives of the elite special services, which for decades were staffed mainly by the children of prominent party officials and released secretaries of Komsomol organizations...

That is why, taking into account the specifics of the tasks being solved, the freelance special forces detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs “Cobalt”, numbering up to 600 employees, was staffed mainly by officers who had at least 10 years of experience in operational work with the “secret apparatus”. Priority when recruiting into a secret special unit was given to operational employees, as well as for their force cover - snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who had good physical training.

The Cobalt squad was formed in the strictest secrecy, and each of its employees had their own legend and operational cover. As a rule, police special forces sent to Afghanistan were listed as civilian advisers in various areas of activity, in particular agriculture, a youth organization...

The secret was revealed after death

I learned only shortly after his mysterious death that the former head of the Chelyabinsk Region Internal Affairs Directorate, Police Major General Valery Valentinovich Smirnov, was the deputy commander of the legendary “Cobalt” during the most intense years of the Afghan war. It so happened that at the Airborne Forces training ground in the Ryazan Seltsy there was a unique opportunity to chat in full with the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General at that time, head of the Ryazan School of Airborne Forces Albert Slyusar. Authoritative people brought us together, and therefore our conversation turned out to be quite frank.

From 1981 to 1984, Albert Evdokimovich was part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, where he commanded the 103rd Airborne Division. Under his command, this unit successfully carried out a number of major military operations. Including the cascade operation included in foreign military textbooks to defeat Dushman gangs in the Panjshir Valley, while suffering, by the way, minimal losses in personnel and equipment. Military operations carried out under the leadership of General Slyusar were distinguished by deep thoughtfulness, high effectiveness, and minimal casualties. The irreconcilable opposition of the Afghan Mujahideen promised a prize of 500 thousand dollars for the capture of General Slyusar and his head.

As it turned out, it was in Afghanistan that the front-line friendship between paratrooper general Albert Slyusar and lieutenant colonel of the Chelyabinsk police Valery Smirnov arose. For a year and a half, Valery Valentinovich personally carried out intelligence work on advanced militant bases near Kabul, in which approximately half of the population at that time clearly supported jihad. His people personally followed all the goat paths, compiled detailed operational maps, and only after that Slyusar and Smirnov launched airborne aircraft into the sky. The bloodiest battles then lasted a week. For a week, the Chelyabinsk policeman fought hand in hand with the “Rexes” from the special forces of the GRU and the Airborne Forces, literally answering with his head for the impeccability of his information. For this most important operation, the army command nominated Valery Valentinovich to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But Smirnov, of course, did not receive the deserved reward. We limited ourselves to the Order of the Red Star. Power has changed in Moscow once again. Following the Secretary General, the Minister of Defense also left. And the new marshal had no time for some “strange” police lieutenant colonel from provincial Chelyabinsk. Valery Valentinovich himself did not remind of his merits. This was not his rule.

It was after that Kabul operation that Airborne General Albert Slyusar changed his opinion about the employees of the Soviet criminal investigation department for the rest of his life. How many of his paratrooper officers and cadets did he tell about his friend Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov... About how many of the best - the flower of the nation - owed their lives to the highest professionalism of the seasoned military intelligence officer Valery Smirnov...

Who made the scouts?

What was the unusual reconnaissance police special forces created by Colonel of the Astrakhan police Gennady Verzhbitsky and his deputy from Chelyabinsk Valery Smirnov in the conditions of the Middle East war? The freelance team of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" in those difficult years consisted of 23 reconnaissance groups stationed in remote Afghan provinces and one reserve unit in Kabul; if necessary, its employees promptly went on a mission to any point in the warring country. Each reconnaissance group usually had seven people, an armored personnel carrier and a radio station. The scouts were based in houses abandoned by their owners. Directly participated in the collection and processing of intelligence data. Directly among the local population, they developed and helped Tsarandoy to carry out multi-stage operations to introduce agents into gangs and refugee camps. As a result, they were often able to obtain information that made it possible to predict the actions of one or another gang leader and to find out where the detachments were meeting. To our deepest regret, the planned system of socialism did not become obsolete even in this war. Each Cobalt soldier, in addition to his main job, had to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with bombing strikes against concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas.

An ordinary bomb attack was usually carried out like this: a couple of fire support helicopters flew in, and a “gunner” agent was placed on one of them, who indicated the target. Each helicopter dropped, as a rule, at least two bombs on an object confirmed by a Cobalt employee. And then the companies moved to the bombing site, if this was, of course, possible...

In the theory taught in military academies, there was a common belief that people living in the border regions of the USSR, attracted and trained by local military intelligence agencies, would solve reconnaissance tasks independently on enemy territory. The practice of the Afghan war showed the opposite. These people were unable to become intelligence officers due to a lack of moral readiness for such activities rather than intelligence qualifications. The real intelligence officers were police officers who did not know a single language of Afghanistan, but had good special training and sufficient experience in intense operational work. And those local residents who had been trained for years to become intelligence officers became just translators for them.

According to retired Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky, former assistant to the head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning military operations in Afghanistan.

At the same time, however, today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the forgotten Afghan war, is not analyzed in the specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Now, looking at the actions of our special forces in certain regional conflicts, you involuntarily notice: it does not seem that in our special theory the lessons of Afghanistan have been truly worked out and taken into account.

The 40th Army, no matter how our enemies slandered it, left Afghanistan with unfurled battle flags and a sense of fulfilled military duty.

Total:0
In contact with 0
Google+ 0
OK 0
Facebook 0