German Chancellor Angela Merkel arrives in Paris for talks with Faancia President Francois Hollande. The purpose of the meeting is to develop new ideas in strengthening the eurozone. The day before, France received an additional two years from the European Union to cover its own deficit.
The topic of Franco-German disagreements has been one of the main topics in European political discussions for a month now. It all started with the following passage contained in the draft program document of the Socialist Party now ruling in France. Fragments from it were published on its website at the end of April by the French newspaper Le Monde.
"The European project is now threatened by a marriage of convenience between the Thatcherist aspirations of the current British Prime Minister, who only accepts a Europe that is always yielding to his demands, and the selfish intransigence of Chancellor Merkel, who thinks of nothing but the deposits of German savers, the balance of trade and the prospect of her own re-election. … Friendship between France and Germany is not the same as friendship between France and Chancellor Merkel's European policy". This is perhaps the sharpest criticism of Germany and its leader in many decades by the political representatives of France - a country that, despite the fact that historically relations between Paris and Berlin were very difficult, has long been considered Germany's closest ally in Europe.
Smile no matter what happens
Fuel was recently added to the fire by former French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, who said during a visit to Berlin that relations between the two countries "few times were so bad". Fillon, representing the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement, of course, has his own political interest. The right is still reeling from its defeat in last year's presidential election, which was won by Socialist leader Francois Hollande. Now it is beneficial for them to present their rivals, firstly, as a split party (which Hollande himself indirectly confirmed, who did not agree with Merkel’s criticism), and secondly, as a force that seeks to undermine cooperation with Germany and thereby stability in Europe. But the scale of the discussion that has begun in the European press, political and intellectual circles, suggests that it is not only a matter of political rivalry, but something more serious. Problems have indeed accumulated in Franco-German relations. And they are connected primarily with the unequal views of Paris and Berlin on the way out of the economic crisis in which the countries of the eurozone and, more broadly, the European Union found themselves. Angela Merkel's government is emphasizing austerity and tight budgetary parameters as a key to economic recovery. On the contrary, the socialists of François Hollande consider the main measures to stimulate economic growth - even if for this it is necessary to slightly weaken financial discipline.
After the publication of the text with accusations against Angela Merkel, the leadership of the two countries diligently pretended that nothing had happened. Assurances followed from both sides: they say that the Franco-German tandem, which is considered the main pillar and engine of the European Union, is as strong as before. Oaths of friendship have become traditional for meetings between the leaders of the two countries since half a century ago, when French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer laid the foundations of modern Franco-German partnership. François Hollande also paid tribute to this tradition by proclaiming in German during his first visit to Germany as President: Es lebe deutsch-französische Freundschaft! "Long live German-French friendship!"
In recent weeks, when discussing relations with France, the German press tried to be as correct as possible and not offend the neighbors with sharp attacks. Nevertheless, the "i" were dotted, for example, in an editorial comment in the newspaper Die Welt: "As unemployment in France rises, as does the budget deficit, while the popularity of President François Hollande continues to fall, the attempts of the ruling socialists to achieve some kind of political breakthrough become more and more desperate".
In Paris, of course, the situation is viewed somewhat differently. Here is what Alfred Grosser, a French publicist and expert on Germany, says: French socialists are not the only ones attacking Merkel. These attacks have become a fashion almost everywhere. Even those who have been loyal to Merkel until now also say that it is impossible to go on like this, because some countries may simply die, observing the strict economy regime prescribed by him. And France, too, fears a fiasco if forced to economize on too much."
So, the leader of the most economically powerful European country becomes a target for attacks. Will this affect Germany's relations with France, which have been slowly but surely improving throughout the post-war decades? The German writer Michael Kleeberg, who lived in Paris for many years, believes that the disagreements between the French and the Germans are not only politics. They also have a certain psychological background. In a recent radio essay entitled "German-French Friendship and Enmity", Kleeberg noted:
"The Germans often use the word "friendship" in relation to the French. The times of war are over, but the scheme of French-German relations has not changed much. Strong hugs from our German side - and constant fears about German power with the French. Meanwhile, we still do not President François Mitterrand's attempts to prevent the unification of Germany and the fact that he agreed to it only in exchange for the consent of Chancellor Helmut Kohl with the introduction of a single currency in the future - the euro, as he assumed that the rejection of the mark would weaken the German economy, are forgotten.But we Germans, we love France, and the French do not trust us. It was and still is. If the current, compared to the past, still less tense relations continue, then this should be to our advantage. But we should add to relations with the neighboring country a little cold rationality. But can the Germans love and think at the same time?"
New fashion trend - flexibility
However, there is no talk about the revision of cooperation between the two leading European countries either in Berlin or in Paris. Both leaders - Merkel and Hollande - still expect to work out by the end of May joint recommendations on the economic development of the European Union. To do this, Angela Merkel travels to Paris on May 30. There, however, she will have to face such approaches to overcoming the European economic crisis, which in many respects contradict her own. An example is the position of the French Minister of Finance, Pierre Moskovisi, who visited Berlin in early May. He stated on the eve of the visit: "We are the second economy in Europe and the fifth in the world. And I'm already tired of listening to lamentations. We - big country, and our president rules it accordingly, as a large country, attractive and competitive. I can understand why German liberals and conservatives are now campaigning against France. They do it because recent events have not brought them success. After all, we are talking about a change in the fundamental doctrine of the European Commission, which for the first time stated: we should also worry about economic growth. Structural reforms are needed, yes, but without this fetishism about a three percent budget deficit by a predetermined date."(Referring to the 3% budget deficit limit prescribed by Brussels and supported by Berlin).
Nevertheless, both Angela Merkel and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble agreed with either the request or the demand of France to give it an additional two years to consolidate the country's budget within the framework of the all-European prescriptions. Merkel stated: "At the end of May, the European Council will consider and assess the balance between the necessary structural reforms and economic development. I am optimistic and await the consent of the majority". And Schäuble said in an interview with WDR: "We will not publicly criticize France. It is very difficult with strong French trade unions to carry out the necessary reforms developed by the European Commission".
Over the past year, the direction of EU economic policy has changed somewhat, not without the clear influence of Paris. Here is what Martin Winter, a columnist for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, thinks about this: “The new magic bullet in Brussels is called flexibility. It should first of all reassure those countries that are already dependent on European aid. The same flexibility should save others, such as Italy or France, from having to apply for financial assistance. The idea is simple: reforms, reducing public debt and budget cuts are being postponed: what was planned and promised failed this year, nothing - the fulfillment of promises will be postponed for a year or two. It can be doubted that economic growth and the creation of new jobs will be achieved along this path. states are still in debt, and their opportunities to invest will not be in a year bó bigger than now.
Interestingly, some French experts agree more with their German counterparts than with their own politicians. Here is the opinion of Isabelle Bourgeois, an employee of the French Center for Information and Research on Modern Germany (CIRAC).
Why do French socialists criticize Angela Merkel?
- First of all, because they cannot criticize Europe itself, because France is the founding state of the EU. Besides, it is easy to criticize Angela Merkel, making such a fuss, one can pass over in silence the fact that France's current troubles, in particular the problem with competitiveness, are the result of the fact that French politicians did not implement the necessary reforms. France has an overly expensive social security system. It needs to be reformed a long time ago. They don't. Of course, it is easier to criticize Angela Merkel and tell the French that we can continue to live beyond our means.Merkelsimply playsthe role of the scapegoat.
- French journalists write that the problem is that personal relations between Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel did not work out, while recalling that Hollande's predecessor in the presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy, had much warmer relations with the German Chancellor. Do you agree with this?
- Francois Hollande hopes that the Social Democrats will come to power in Germany, with whom it will be easier for him to find a common language?
– It is too early to make predictions about the outcome of the elections in Germany. Neverthelesstillone gets the impression that it is hardly worth waiting for a change of power. But even in the event that the rulingmuChristian Democraticmuunionatthe Social Democratic Party comes, François Hollande is mistaken if he thinks thatGerman social democratswill holdqualitativelyother European politics. It will be the same policy, because in Germany there is a consensus among the major parties on EuropeanOhpoliticianAnd.
– Are the French today trying to revise bilateral relations with Berlin, which long years served as the basis of European construction, and find new partners?
- Really, the French are now trying to do it, but this is nothing more than a tactic. And unsuccessful, because France and Germany are simply forced to work together, whether they want it or not. Otherwise, Europe will stall. Certainly, you can try to create a coalition with the British, with the southern European countries, but sooner or latereback to basics, tointeractionFrance and Germany.Hour two countries are so closely connected that they can no longer live each otherwithout a friend. Let's remember that the most important stepsincommon europeaneth politicianeweremadethanks to these two countries (of course,with the consent of the others), for example, adoption of a common European currency. Today, when it is necessary to decide which political institutions in Europeshouldcreateand which ones to reform, France and Germany, undoubtedly, should work together.
- What is needed to improve relations between the two countries today? What does Angela Merkel expect from François Hollande?
– What is the attitude towards the union with Germany today in French society?
Hto share the political sphere, where relations are currently not very good, and howboth peoples relate to each other.
MWe admire Germans, German industry. Deep down, the French even dream of a president who looks like Angela Merkel. As for the attitude towards the European Union, it is also not bad, bute- still worse thansomeother countries. The fact is that in France they do not explain to us what advantages the European Union has given us. Politicians who do not want reforms complain all the time that Brussels is forcing us todo this and that. At the same time, they forget that if Brussels obliges them to do something, it is only becauseitselfFrance signed the corresponding agreement.
Economics and politics, quantity and quality
Perhaps the current divergence between Berlin and Paris is a kind of "transition of quantity into quality." There are many differences between the economic models of the two countries, and in times of crisis, when it is the economy that becomes a factor of the first magnitude, these differences acquire political significance. The German economy is about a quarter larger than the French economy - probably hence the constant fears of the French about German power, which Michael Kleeberg spoke about. (And at the same time - the admiration for German industry and its successes, mentioned by Isabelle Bourgeois.)
Contrary to stereotypes, the French work no less and no worse than the Germans. Labor productivity is measured by international organizations as the share of GDP produced by one worker during one working hour. So, in France this figure is 58 dollars, and in Germany - 56 dollars. The difference is quite small, but it is, and in favor of France. Nevertheless, the French economy is in recession, while the German one manages to avoid it. One of the reasons for this can be considered the greater inclination of the French state to dirigisme, direct intervention in economic processes. Last year, a conflict between the French Ministry of Economy and the world's largest steel company Arcelor Mittal, which decided to close part of the production at one of its factories in eastern France, made a lot of noise. The head of the economic department then said that he did not exclude the possibility of nationalizing the enterprise, and then added that France was not at all interested in the presence of Arcelor Mittal in the country. Then the parties reached some kind of compromise, but such behavior of officials, of course, does not inspire investors. A similar situation arose soon around the enterprise of the American company good year(best known for its car tyres) in northern France.
There are other factors as well. So, in France - the highest social payments of business in the European Union - those deductions that the employer makes for his employees in social insurance and pension funds. The average wage in French industry is higher than in German, 34 and 30 euros per hour, respectively. The retirement age, on the contrary, is lower: the French retire at 62, the Germans at 65. In Germany, in 2003, a profound reform of labor legislation was launched. It provided, in particular, the reduction of unemployment benefits - both in monetary terms and in terms of payment. The intention was clear: to stimulate the search for work by those who lost it. This caused a lot of resistance from the unions, but the reform was eventually implemented. The result is obvious: the unemployment rate in Germany - 5.5%, in France - twice as high, 11%. Recently, the lower house of the French parliament approved a bill on labor market reform, but it is less radical than the German one. In general, the French enjoy more social guarantees than the Germans (although Germany is also a welfare state) and seem to pay the price for the excessive amount of these guarantees with the sluggishness of the economy and its decline.
Most likely, the differences between the recipes for overcoming the crisis offered by Berlin and Paris will still not lead to a rupture between the two countries. The realization by their leaders of the fact that without Franco-German cooperation European integration and, in general, a normally functioning Europe is simply impossible will play a role. Actually, the aforementioned "fashion for flexibility" is already a consequence of this. Berlin and Paris do not want to quarrel, but so far the German side, despite all its economic trump cards, has to make a few more concessions than the French side. It seems that now the entire EU may face a choice between reconciliation between Berlin and Paris, even external, and decisive anti-crisis efforts. This is the case when it is difficult to say whether a bad peace is really better than a good quarrel.
The Franco-German couple in the eyes of France continued to be a necessary element of internal European harmony, but the balance of power and roles in it changed after the unification of Germany. Already E. Balladur spoke about the renewal of the "Franco-German contract", referring to three areas: - the transition to a single European currency, - cultural rapprochement between the two countries, which implies not only mutual acquaintance with language and culture, but also with political culture " in the spirit of relations of solidarity between two peoples respecting their 344 identity”, new principles of rapprochement between the two countries: no enhanced solidarity without France and the FRG and no enhanced solidarity between France and the FRG, which would not be open to other EU members who are willing and able to participate in these relationships. In the light of changes in the balance of power in the EU, J. Chirac introduced a new aspect to the issue of renewing relations in the Franco-German couple: in this context, he spoke about the need for close European cooperation with Great Britain. During J. Major's first visit to Paris, J. Chirac said: “In the current state of European integration, the quality of Franco-German relations is the main thing for further progress, but this is not enough /./. We cannot build Europe without England.”177 It should not be forgotten that both de Gaulle and Mitterrand resorted to similar "triangle" tactics in order to balance the influence of the FRG in Europe. At the same time, Germany by that time maintained much closer ties with England. Speaking about the role of Great Britain in European construction, together with the Franco-German couple, Chirac hinted that the concert of sovereign nations would remain for him a fundamental principle of European politics. In addition, one should not forget that, having joined the idea of the European Monetary Union, Chirac attached great importance to the potential participation of England in it: emphasizing important role the latest in the progress of the EU, the French president thus wanted to push the British prime minister to decisively join the EMU. At the same time, the above statement is intended to remind that the Franco-German couple will continue to play a central role in the integration process. Chirac's resolute support for the transition to a European currency and the convergence of the defense concepts of the two countries, in particular, France's steps in the Atlantic direction, spoke in favor of the latter. In retaliation, in 1997 Germany strongly but unsuccessfully supported the French demand that NATO's Regional Command South be transferred to a European. Cooperation in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia also led to the consolidation of the Franco-German couple: in Bosnia, the Franco-German brigade carried out its first peacekeeping operation. A major achievement of Franco-German cooperation was the conclusion of a bilateral agreement in Nuremberg (December 9, 1996), supplemented by the signing of the "Unified Franco-German Concept in the field of defense and security." It was not only about rapprochement of positions, but also about moving towards the autonomy of European defense. Germany agreed to the integration of the WEU into the EU. In return, France was forced to refuse to recognize its own exclusiveness in the nuclear field, since the text of the Concept stated that "the highest guarantee of the security of the Allies is the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, in particular the nuclear forces of the United States"178. This undermined France's desire to make its own nuclear forces the basis of an autonomous European nuclear deterrence. Justifying such a compromise, D. Vernet recalls the story of France's rejection of the EOC treaty (ETS - French): “We are no longer in 1954, but it takes a little while for a cohort of integrists179 of Europe, specialists in anti-Germanism, to emerge from the ranks of the ruling majority and the opposition, longing for "national defence". By refusing Europe into NATO, they will get a NATO without Europe, just as the opponents of the EOC, by refusing to rearm Germany in Europe, got the rearmament of Germany into NATO. Recall that the Gaullists were ardent opponents of the EOC, so the conclusion of the Nuremberg Agreement by J. Chirac can be regarded as a manifestation of realism. The French president put up with NATO, primarily American tutelage, being aware of the impossibility of creating a purely European defense. Not surprisingly, such a departure from the Fifth Republic's security tradition has drawn sharp criticism. A. Jox said that the text of the Franco-German concept is in the interests of the United States: “submission to the intentions of the United States today takes the form of actively creating an autonomous support of the Alliance around the Franco-German core, which could free America from the obligation to maintain order in Europe by classical methods of intervention, and allowed she would realize her great dream: to reign by her technological and financial superiority and never again use her 349 ground troops. Franco-German relations are not free from contradictions. A number of important French steps in the field of security - the transition to a professional army, the resumption of nuclear tests - were taken without prior consultation with the FRG. At the same time, France's important initiatives in the field of a joint weapons program remained unfulfilled due to the weak interest of the FRG: in the late 90s, it refused to finance the joint program of reconnaissance satellites Helios 2 and Orus. Serious tensions are raised by the question of contributions to the EU budget, and they especially escalated on the eve of the Berlin summit in 1999, dedicated to the budgetary reform of the Union in the next seven years. Reform 351 is intended to ensure that new members can be admitted. Germany and other donor countries (Netherlands, Austria and Sweden) demanded budget savings by cutting spending on the common agricultural policy and supporting lagging regions. France was strongly opposed as its agriculture is the main recipient of EU structural and environmental subsidies. Chirac's stubbornness did not allow German Chancellor Schroeder to achieve a more equitable distribution of the financial burden in the EU, although he has repeatedly stated that Germany cannot constantly pay for all the problems of the EU. France agreed only to a slight reduction in the FRG's net contribution to the Community budget. One of the reasons for Schroeder's compliance was the desire to restore the shaken prestige of the EU after the scandal with the resignation of the European Commission, accused of corruption. In the field of common EU foreign policy, despite Germany's concessions to French proposals to establish the post of General Commissioner for Foreign Policy (“M. PESC”), in the 1990s, France and Germany lacked a common vision of Europe's future role in the world: dreaming about returning to a strong Europe (in the geographical sense - to Western Europe), France had no idea how an expanding Europe with its changing geometry could be. In fact, behind these doubts lay an important question for France about the future world role of a united Germany. The coming to power in Germany of Chancellor G. Schroeder gave rise to fears in France about the future of the Franco-German couple, especially since he said that he “does not feel obliged to make any concessions in favor of France181. It was primarily about the issue of financing the agricultural policy of the EU. Schroeder's words reflected the new balance of power in the EU: Germany, remaining an "economic giant", ceased to be a "political dwarf", while France, on the contrary, lost a number of advantages that provided it with a special political weight in Europe, because they were derivatives of the post-war geopolitical order: permanent membership in UN Security Council, possession of its own nuclear weapons, monopoly influence in the Francophone world, role in the East-West dialogue. However, we should not forget that even before the FRG showed indifference to some advantages offered to it by France in exchange for firm partner support, especially in the nuclear field. On the other hand, the basis of the viability of the Franco-German couple was and remains a joint orientation towards a united Europe as a condition for ensuring their international weight. It is no coincidence that J. Chirac and G. Kohl, like their predecessors, starting with de Gaulle and Adenauer, avoided discussing geopolitical issues, preferring to reach compromises where common interests required it. The discussion of the Franco-German initiatives for the Intergovernmental Conference on Amendments to the Maastricht Treaty went in the same spirit: both sides gave priority to the euro, i.e. a decisive step towards deep economic integration through the transition to a single currency, but were cautious on the issue of institutional reform, in which there were significant differences between them. France and the Federal Republic of Germany always believe that the political dimension of the EU must be deepened and that no European initiative can take place without their active participation. The Franco-German summit meeting in Toulouse (May 1999) showed that joint initiatives on a common EU foreign and defense policy are proceeding along the lines outlined in Nuremberg. It was about endowing the EU with autonomous means in case of crises and about creating a European Rapid Reaction Corps for this purpose. In June 2000, at the Franco-German summit in Mainz, the FRG announced its decision to participate in the joint construction of 356 cargo military aircraft and a reconnaissance satellite with France. There have been some shifts in terms of convergence of positions on the future institutional architecture of the EU. The experience of German unification determined some transformation of the position of the federal government. Analysts then predicted that it would no longer continue to actively promote the project of a European federation and force the expansion of the EU to the East. The discussion of the treaty in Nice showed that both countries are in favor of expanding the Union while maintaining and strengthening the existing Western European backbone of the EU, giving it greater unity. Germany was aware of the difficulties associated with the expansion of the EU to the East. Therefore, she, together with France, defended the principles of the distribution of votes, providing an advantage to large countries. In addition, Germany and France advocated the creation of areas of "enhanced cooperation", although the German project of a "hard core" of the EU was not supported by France for tactical reasons. She did not want accusations of seeking to establish a "two-speed" Europe. At the same time, on the eve of Nice, France was irreconcilable on the issue of granting Germany additional votes in the Council of the EU, because it did not want to allow the Franco-German parity in this body to be violated. Then Schroeder urged Chirac to yield, as required by the duty of a hospitable chairman striving for agreement. This remark reminded the French President of his own words to the German Chancellor at the height of the EU agricultural market financing debate in 1999, when Germany was its 358th chairman. In the pair J. Chirac - G. Schroeder, relations continued to develop spasmodically, from crisis to crisis, however, to the pleasure of France, one trend gradually began to be determined. The FRG was increasingly declaring its commitment to a European foreign policy identity as opposed to the US forceful pressure in the world, and in this its positions were drawing closer to those of France. The reason lay in the pacifism of the main electoral base of the ruling coalition of socialists and environmentalists. Despite disagreements over the draft European constitution, France and Germany jointly opposed the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty. The foreign ministers of the two European countries accused the US of unilateral action, emphasizing the importance that France and Germany attach to the consultation process launched by the US government (on missile defense) and the US's willingness "to conduct them in close cooperation with EU partners" . It can be seen from this statement that the turn towards strengthening Franco-German diplomatic cooperation reflects not only the internal political alignment of forces in the FRG. The Franco-German couple drew closer due to a similar attitude towards the development prospects of the world community, thanks to the rejection of a unipolar world, the US hegemonic strategy and their tactics of forceful problem solving. The peak of the Franco-German political agreement was the joint position in the Iraqi crisis, declared in the winter of 2002-2003. * * * Still relying in European construction on a tandem with Germany, France tried to compensate for the increased imbalance of forces in this pair by rapprochement with other EU countries. An example of this is the search for Mediterranean solidarity with Spain and Italy and, in particular, the steps towards strengthening the Thraco-British relations in their European aspect. In modern conditions, the UK is becoming an increasingly important factor in European integration. Initially, this country was regarded by France as a "Trojan horse" of the United States in Europe, which served as the main reason for de Gaulle's stubborn opposition to its entry into the EEC. Whereas previously Great Britain played in Europe primarily the role of a privileged partner of the United States, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the situation in Euro-Atlantic relations has changed significantly. The role of a privileged interlocutor and reliable ally of the United States in Europe was challenged by London and Berlin and Paris (moreover, the main factor of this reliability is not like-mindedness and unconditional support, but the strength and determination to defend common ideals and interests). In addition, the UK represents in the EU its own vision of the prospects for integration, which cannot be ignored by the Franco-German couple, since there is no complete coincidence of positions on this issue in it. The mutual desire of France and Great Britain for closer cooperation in Europe manifested itself at the time of the unification of Germany, in the face of a possible shift in the axis of European integration to Central Europe, and therefore corresponded, first of all, to the political ambitions of the two countries. Paris constantly emphasizes the closeness of the historical traditions and geostrategic situation of France and Great Britain: - both countries cannot refuse influence in world politics: the two old nations have been great powers for too long to focus only on their own problems. However, in the face of US claims to the sole world leadership and the growth of the expansion of Asian countries, the UK and France can only rely on the EU in search of influence. Both countries are the only EU countries with their own nuclear weapons and permanent members of the UN Security Council, so the old Entente partnership would have to be revived within the EU; - they are brought together by the joint upholding of the principle of Europe of states, opposition to supranational tendencies in the EU, which Germany has been the conductor for a long time. Together with Germany, France defends the idea of a strong Europe based on common interests and EU institutions, however, together with Great Britain, the French would prefer weak institutions (in particular, the European Commission) with a redistribution of powers in favor of national governments and parliaments. During his visit to Great Britain in May 1996, J. Chirac made European problems the central theme of his speeches. In the House of Commons, he declared: "Gentlemen of the British, Europe will take place, and it will not take place without you." At the same time, he did not forget to emphasize that, although "the participation of the United Kingdom and Franco-British friendship are necessary for the European design, /. / Franco-German cooperation remains its defining element.” 182. The combination of these statements raised the prospect of a Franco-Anglo German triangle or, as Chirac's press conference in London put it, a “threesome marriage” between the three countries. When asked about a possible leader in such an alliance, J. Chirac replied that there is no leader in a “marriage of three”, emphasizing that “in any case, there is no effective European construction without the British: “This 362 is the subject of our constant efforts” . The main goal of Chirac's statements was to overcome a certain Euroscepticism of the English society and join the UK to the euro. In exchange, the French president promised support within the EU on British beef exports. However, London continues to refrain from adopting the euro, defending its vision of the future of the EU, primarily as a single market, which is at odds with the French desire to give Europe a political dimension. The most successful example of the development of the Franco-British partnership are joint initiatives in the field of European security, which can form the core of "increased solidarity" within the EU. In Bosnia, Franco-British troops formed the backbone of the rapid reaction force and later the multinational IFOR force; J. Major was almost the only European leader who supported the resumption of French nuclear tests in 1995 (Kohl expressed understanding, but not approval). It was said above about the Franco-British program for the production and development of weapons. In this area, the Franco-British cooperation line is the most successful of all 363 bilateral lines within the EU. However, one should not conclude from this that the views of France and Great Britain on the future of the Euro-Atlantic partnership coincide: London does not support France's desire to redistribute powers in NATO regional commands in favor of the Europeans and, in general, continues to be the most faithful defender of the American point of view on NATO reform. If you think about the content side of the concept of the Franco-Anglo-German triangle, then it should be recognized that it is of great importance for French policy in Europe. First, the development of a privileged dialogue with the British side allows France to compensate for the growing imbalance in the Franco-German pair. The fact is that the Franco-British and Franco-German lines cannot be called parallel: as a rule, France intensifies the search for agreement with one of the partners when cooperation with the other is stalling. In many ways, it was the support of Great Britain (and Spain) that allowed Chirac to defend the interests of the single agricultural market in the face of the FRG at the Berlin EU summit in March 1999. In turn, the Franco-German tandem serves to realize France's desire for a "political Europe". In 2002, the special position of Paris and Berlin, which condemned the military resolution of the Iraqi crisis, could become an example of a European foreign policy identity if it could find the support of Great Britain and other EU members. However, it was precisely in this crisis that the main line of London in relation to European initiatives in the field of diplomacy and security manifested itself - to use its participation in the EU for the success of Anglo-American military-political cooperation. The interests of this tandem will apparently be increasingly represented in the EU as it expands to the East. The French tactic of increasing cooperation with Great Britain in European construction, combined with the strengthening of the Franco-German tandem, was aimed at creating a semblance of a "triumvirate" capable of moving forward a united and enlarged Europe in the future. In addition, France hoped to achieve enhanced cooperation with Britain in areas in which it could not expect German support (in upholding the powers of EU intergovernmental bodies, in peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans, in the strategic dialogue on nuclear issues, which began was laid down by the creation of the Franco-British nuclear commission, in the refusal of France from military duty)183. The implementation of the European foreign and security policy began with the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998. Great Britain saw the development of its diplomatic strategy “in all directions” in cooperation with France. In part, it was directed against the Franco-German predominance in the EU, which in London was considered too dirigiste and illiberal in terms of the socio-economic policy of the EU. Contrary to French intentions, Blair's tactic is to create combinations of cooperation between various countries interested in certain specific programs and projects. Thus, in addition to the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative, in February 2002, an Italian-British action plan was adopted to liberalize the labor and energy markets, which France strongly opposes. But at the same time, a Franco-Spanish-British proposal was put forward for an elected President of the EU, who should head the Community Council. This tactic of looking for changing partners to advance joint European initiatives allows the UK to occupy a central position in the EU and influence the course of the most important negotiations (except those underway over the euro). In this regard, the desire of France and Germany to strengthen the political core of the EU is at odds with British tactics, which makes it difficult for the formation of a “triumvirate” capable of dynamically moving Europe of twenty-seven forward. Fundamental disagreements hinder the success of French plans in this direction. “As long as London oscillates between Brussels and Washington, as long as the British population is en masse opposed to European integration, and as long as the Franco-German rapprochement stumbles over agricultural market financing problems, the three countries will not be able to exercise the leadership they so desperately need. EU,” concludes Hans Stark, an expert on Franco-German relations. In my opinion, these reasons are far from equivalent. At present, the main contradiction between the Franco-German couple and Great Britain lies in the different strategic vision of the future of the international community and the role of Europe in it. Great Britain, as well as France, is concerned with maintaining world influence in an environment where they are no longer great powers. They have different ways of solving this problem. London is satisfied with the role of a privileged ally of the United States - the only great power modern world and so American leadership fits into this strategy. For France and Germany, a multipolar world and multilateralism in global decision-making are priorities. Only the EU as an independent center of power can support the preservation or restoration of world influence. This sees the prospects for maintaining the Franco-German tandem in European construction. One of the leading French Germanists, A. Grosser, believes that despite the similarity of views on the need to establish the global role of the European Union, there is one fundamental difference between France and Germany. If France has been striving for half a century to build a Europe whose general power can strengthen its position in the world, then after the Second World War it was assumed that Germany would no longer have global ambitions. After unification, Germany, despite the difficulties of integrating the eastern lands and economic problems, is certainly on the rise in terms of its foreign political prestige. However, her diplomacy is characterized by "self-restraint" (Selbstbeschr?nkung) - a concept that, according to A. Grosser, is not used at all in French. We are talking about "a voluntary rejection of prestige, and even more of petty vanity in the name of the concept of international relations, which should not 366 be too national" . A. Grosser loves and knows modern Germany. His social circle - German intellectuals, of course, invariably gave him evidence of the truth of these words. Many statements of today's leaders of German diplomacy in connection with the role of the Franco-German couple testify in favor of A. Grosser's statement. Germany showed great interest in overcoming the Franco-German differences of 1999-2001. (regarding the financing of the agricultural market and the reform of EU institutions). Talk about the isolation and weakening of France's position in Europe puts German diplomacy in an awkward position. Remaining the largest state in the EU, she does not want to take on the role of the sole leader of the community, especially since her position usually finds more understanding among small countries, and her economic presence and political influence in candidate countries is much stronger than France's. But in a spirit of "self-restraint," she fears that the thought of her sole leadership might frighten her partners and thereby damage her interests in Europe. J. Fischer said, returning from Nice: "We cannot afford to cross the forbidden line in order to move from European Germany to German Europe." Hence his interest in maintaining the Franco-German tandem and the statement that "the temptation to isolate France will have fatal consequences." In the same speech, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG confirmed the idea of the differences between the French and German views on Europe, expressed by A. Grosser: “For France, Europe has always been a means to advance its national interests, while for Germany, Europe has been a national interest”184. At one time, the sincerity of Willy Brandt, who professed a similar position of moral self-restraint, aroused the suspicions of J. Pompidou. French historians and analysts often return to the concept of "uncertainty", reflecting the attitude in France towards the strength of the Franco-German community. The well-known historian J. Suttu called his book on the political and strategic Franco-West German relations “Dubious Alliance”185. A special issue of the socio-political magazine Esprey, whose theme was contemporary Germany, was called "The Germany of Our Doubts" in order not to call it "The Germany of Our Anxiety", paraphrasing the famous novel by J. Steinbeck186. I can only note that "self-restraint" is a concept that has been in German politics for half a century, but only half a century, and how much it will become a constant of Germany's foreign policy identity can be judged through the generations. However, the events of early 2003 (the common Franco-German position on the Iraqi issue, the January declaration of a close political union) allow us to say that forty years after the conclusion of the Franco-German Elysee Treaty, cooperation between the two countries in European construction remains an important vector for the development of the EU. Whether it will remain decisive depends on the new alignment of forces in the Europe of twenty-seven. But even now it can be argued that the preservation of the Franco-German motor of European integration is more favorable for the survival of "European" Europe and for the overall strategy of a multipolar world.
Requisites
Dating:
A source:
Secrets of diplomacy of the Third Reich. 1944-1955. M.: International Fund "Democracy", 2011. Pp. 226-233
CA FSB of Russia. H-20912. In 4 vols. T. 2. L. 85-96. Script. Typescript. Autograph. Handwritten original in German - vol. 2, l.d. 97-115rev.
Moscow
Translation from German
After the First World War, the question of attitude towards France was the central issue of German foreign policy. Almost all the questions that arose as a result of the defeat and the Treaty of Versailles concerned primarily France. The French Government has always been the representative of the Allies towards Germany. The conference of ambassadors charged with negotiating with Germany on the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles met in Paris.
Frenchman Paul Boncourt was the chairman of the conference. The chairman of the allied commission for the Rhineland, which dealt with the settlement of issues related to the occupation of the Rhineland, was the Frenchman Tirard. The chairman of the allied military control commission in Berlin, General Nollet was also a Frenchman. The chairman of the reparations commission, despite the special interest of the British in matters of international finance and economics, was also the Frenchman Barthou, later Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Since the United States of America, Italy, Japan, Belgium and other parties to the Treaty of Versailles did not come to the fore relatively, England very soon took up a mediating position between Germany and France.
France acted as a demanding party wherever it was a question of implementing the requirements of the Treaty of Versailles, the implementation of which, especially in the economic and financial fields, was associated with enormous difficulties for Germany at that time.
Despite this, the government of the Weimar Republic did not deviate from the line that sought to establish a direct rapprochement with France. The question of relations with France was for Germany not only a foreign policy problem, but also, to a large extent, a domestic political problem. Spiritual and cultural ties between Germany and France have always been especially close. Since 1789 and since the time of Napoleon, France has been for all the left in Germany, one might say, for most of the intelligentsia in Germany, a political model.
The question of the attitude towards France, both in good and in bad, both in love and in hatred, agitated the minds more than the question of the attitude towards all other countries, with the exception of Russia, since the establishment of Soviet power. Thus, the question of whether the government of the Weimar Republic would be able to reach a compromise with France became at the same time a decisive factor for the internal political stability of the republic. Even while France was ruled by the nationalist majority led by Poincaré, who won the elections in 1920, the German left governments strictly adhered to the line of direct rapprochement with France.
The Treaty of Rapallo was a natural expression of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the only great power that at that time did not make any demands on Germany and, on the contrary, expressed its readiness for economic and, in some areas, also for military cooperation with Germany. This treaty was the first foreign policy action after the war in which Germany participated as an equal member and which strengthened her foreign policy position. But this treaty was not directed against France, although its conclusion at the peace conference in Genoa produced a sensational effect.
After the short existence of the government of the right, from the autumn of 1922 to August 1923, a new government of the left headed by Stresemann was formed, the main point of the program of which was again rapprochement with France, although it was precisely during this period that the struggle for
The Ruhr area led to a particular aggravation of German-French relations, and nationalists still remained in power.
It was only with the French elections in May 1924 that a significant shift to the left occurred and the path was paved for rapprochement with Germany. The triumvirate of leaders of the left parties, Herriot*, Léon Blum and Painlevé, now in power, also proclaimed on the French side the slogan of direct rapprochement with Germany. Thus, the possibility of close cooperation between Stresemann and Briand was opened, which for five and a half years, i.e. from May 1924 until the death of Stresemann, which followed in October 1929, remained the most important factor in the formation of German-French relations.
The remaining stages and results of the negotiations held during this period of time, such as: the Davis plan, the evacuation of the first occupation zone (Kehl bridgehead), the Locarno Treaty, Germany's entry into the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the Young Plan, the evacuation of the entire Rhineland, I have already outlined earlier in my testimony about the role of England in these negotiations. Therefore, I will confine myself to only a few additions that are of particular relevance to the positions of Germany and France.
The Locarno Treaty was a very important political and psychological factor. The French claim to Alsace-Lorraine since 1870 and the ensuing call for revenge were the cause of bad Franco-German relations and led to the fact that France was always to be found on the side of Germany's opponents. If now, on the contrary, Germany insisted on the same demands with regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the old contradictions would continue to exist. The Treaty of Locarno, with the recognition by Germany of the new borders in the West and the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine contained in it, created the first preconditions for a real rapprochement between the two peoples.
Correctly understanding this fact, Stresemann spent a lot of energy to ensure that the treaty was concluded, despite the position of the German nationalists, and Stresemann was supported by the overwhelming majority of the German people, so that the question of Alsace-Lorraine with the conclusion of this treaty was really completely buried.
The awareness of the need for a German-French rapprochement in the following years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno spread more and more on both sides of the Rhine. It was no longer limited to left-wing parties and circles close to them. Thus, the Committee for Cultural Relations "Germany-France" was established, to which representatives of the right and the bourgeois center mainly belonged. Eminent representatives sat on this committee big industry. The chairman on the French side was Peyeranghof, a well-known Lorraine industrialist, on the German side, the then leader of the Center faction in the Prussian Landtag, von Papen, later Reich Chancellor, who for many years had especially advocated a German-French rapprochement.
Stresemann and Briand, shortly after Germany's entry into the League of Nations, worked out during their meeting in Thuary a program for the further expansion of friendly relations between the two countries in political, economic and cultural areas. In the economic field, this program was carried out as a result of the conclusion of a comprehensive long-term trade agreement in August 1927.
However, little was done to implement the program adopted in Touary, because Briand in France, where in the summer of 1926 Poincaré again entered into government in connection with the financial crisis and the stabilization of the French franc he had carried out, met internal political resistance. The deterioration of relations did not mean the evacuation of the Rhineland under the Locarno Treaty, which, although it did not provide for an exact date for the evacuation, was promised by the French side as a consequence of the Locarno Treaty. When Poincaré made the evacuation conditional on a new condition, namely the settlement of the issue of long-term reparations, when the Davis plan was already becoming unfeasible, Stresemann and the supporters of rapprochement in Germany were in a difficult position in relation to the then growing nationalist and national socialist right parties.
When, finally, all obstacles to the evacuation were removed and it was carried out on 30/6/1930, the psychological result on both sides of the Rhine was not quite what the advocates of rapprochement expected. For the French, the evacuation of the Rhineland five years earlier than the date set by the Treaty of Versailles, even if it was not carried out so quickly, still meant great caution and a clear proof of their trust and their readiness for mutual understanding.
When the response in Germany was not as strong and general as expected, it caused disappointment and anxiety in public opinion. On the German side since the existence of the Locarno Treaty, i.e. For five years now, there has been so much discussion about the promised and not carried out evacuation that when it finally came to the evacuation, it lost some of its effect. A certain role was also played by the slogan of the German right-wing opposition about "double payments" for the evacuation as a result of the Locarno Treaty and the Young Plan. For the German Left and all the champions and supporters of German-French understanding, this result was a great disappointment.
The evacuation at the request of these circles was to mark not only a turning point for good between Germany and France, but at the same time a decisive blow against the growing right-wing opposition and an internal political strengthening of the positions of the German government.
These expectations were fulfilled, for the reasons described above, only to a small extent, and in domestic politics other factors emerged, most notably the economic crisis and a frightening rise in unemployment, which were stronger than foreign policy successes, which were also contested by the opposition.
The absence of Stresemann, who had died six months earlier, meant a sensitive void both for the Franco-German policy of understanding and for the defense of that policy against right-wing opposition.
The conclusion of a customs union between Germany and Austria meant an attempt by the German government to create foreign policy success in another direction in order to strengthen its domestic political position. In the objection to the customs union, France was the driving force. The collapse of the customs union had just the opposite result. German-French relations deteriorated again, and the German government for its "defeat" was subjected to renewed attacks from the nationalists.
An attempt during a visit to Berlin by Laval, who meanwhile became Prime Minister, and Briand to continue German-French cooperation in the spirit of Stresemann, although it led to detailed conversations with the then centrist Reich Chancellor Brüning and Foreign Minister Curtius, did not give positive results.
The Hoover moratorium adopted in the summer of 1931, although it gave the Brüning government a certain respite, meant little for Franco-German relations because it was explained by the Anglo-American initiative, to which France more or less voluntarily submitted. The Lausanne Conference, which took place in the summer of 1932, also had no noteworthy effect on Franco-German relations.
When the National Socialists came to power in Germany in 1933, this naturally caused a strong change in the feelings of the majority of the French people and precisely in those circles from which supporters of the policy of mutual understanding were previously recruited, so that the continuation of the policy of mutual understanding was out of the question. not to mention the fact that German circles of the policy of mutual understanding, if they belonged to the Left, were turned off with a single blow, while those belonging to the moderate bourgeois Right were losing their influence day by day.
The attempts of the National Socialist side to create organizations that should continue some kind of policy of rapprochement did not and could not have any success and were, in spite of or, in fact, just because of the state support that was provided to them, doomed to failure in advance. Here we should mention the German-French society, whose manager, Abetz, who left the Ribbentrop bureau, later the German representative during the occupation in Paris, developed great activity, and further Hess's efforts to establish a connection between the fighters on both sides of the front and their organizations * 2.
Although the policy of rapprochement in the old sense, to which the best minds on both sides of the Rhine aspired as a lofty goal of European significance, was thus deprived of its base, the development in foreign policy after 1933 continued to proceed at first at a relatively calm pace.
The French ambassador in Berlin, François Poncet, enjoyed special authority there and had better personal relations with Hitler than any of his diplomatic colleagues. The course of diplomatic negotiations in connection with the most important foreign policy actions of Hitler, such as, for example, with the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the declaration of military sovereignty of Germany, the restoration of German garrisons in the Rhineland, the reunification of Austria with Germany, the annexation of the Sudetenland, I set out in detail in my notes on Anglo-German relations, which also reflected the role of France and individual factors in France. Thus, I can limit myself here to only a few additions that are especially characteristic of Franco-German relations.
Although France was more affected by some of the above actions than England, and despite the fact that especially in March 1936 it was precisely influential French circles who wanted to immediately start a war against Germany, in contrast to the period before 1933, she gave the floor to England in general so that in Germany the impression was repeatedly given that it was actually an Anglo-German question, even when England played the role of mediator in the main, as was the case before 1933. The impression that France was gradually receding into the background grew stronger every year. When then, in the autumn of 1939, England and France actually declared war on Germany, the French government made it quite consciously clear that France in this case was following the British policy.
Whenever negotiations took place directly between Germany and France, in which England did not take part, the French side tried to avoid any aggravation. Thus, for example, the plebiscite in the Saarland in the summer of 1935 passed without any complications between the two countries, although the agitation before the vote provided enough material for unpleasant conflicts. It was clear in France that they had never counted on the fact that the German population in the Saarland would vote for France, and were glad that, thanks to the clear results of the vote, this controversial object was forever finished.
If in England, after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement regarding Czechoslovakia, the mood towards Germany worsened, then in France this was not observed. Daladier personally returned from Munich not in such a bad mood as the British.
In France, he was also not met with harsh criticism, as members of the British government. The French people did not want war and were grateful that war had been avoided. When Ribbentrop, two months after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, in November 1938, arrived on an official visit to Paris and signed the German-French non-aggression pact there, the reception given to him and the mood of the people were, according to the participants on both sides, almost cordial.
Hitler's attack on Prague naturally caused a change of heart in Paris as well, but even then, as I mentioned above, the French still made it clear that in declaring war on Germany they were only following the British policy. External proof of this French position is the acceptance of Mussolini's last mediation proposal, which was then rejected by England through the French government.
To assess the development of German-French relations in the last years before the war, it is not without interest that the General Staffs of both strongest military powers - there was no question of participation in the war of the Soviet Union at that time - did not want this war. According to all information available in Germany, the French General base and personally Gamelin were against the war with Germany. Even in the spring of 1936, when war seemed imminent, the French General Staff was more cautious than the Quai de Orsay, which at the time wanted war.
The position of the German military circles towards Hitler and his plans can be characterized as follows. When Hitler came to power, National Socialism in the army, except for a small part of the young officers, did not find sympathy, but since Hitler was legally called to the Reich Chancellor by Hindenburg himself, who was loved by the entire officer corps, nothing arose from this for the German army. Problems. When in 1933-34. Hitler's internal political methods were revealed, then after the death of Hindenburg in the autumn of 1934, there was, perhaps, a short time with the help of the army to overthrow Hitler. The outcome would, however, be doubtful, since Hitler was firmly established in power.
The murder of Schleicher caused great bitterness in the army. But this mood soon changed when Hitler proclaimed German military sovereignty in the spring of 1935 and enacted an increase in the army (which was desirable for most officers for personal reasons) with universal military service.
Later in officer corps again there were bad moods. This was when Field Marshal von Blomberg married a lady of dubious reputation (with Hitler and Goering acting as witnesses at the marriage) and Colonel General von Fritsch, being commander in chief of the ground forces and a senior officer in service, demanded Blomberg's resignation. Although Hitler dismissed Blomberg, at the same time he also dismissed Fritsch, and the latter with shameful ceremony. But at that time there was nothing to think about the more serious consequences of such a bad mood.
The new commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, and, above all, the chief of the General Staff, Beck, were critical of Hitler's military plans. Beck's stance during the Sudeten Crisis led to his unexpected resignation. He expressed the view that Germany would not be able, in the event of an Anglo-French attack, to wage a war with a confident prospect of success, and furthermore, in the event of an isolated German attack on Czechoslovakia, he proposed a plan that, in Hitler's opinion, would require too much time. to occupy Czechoslovakia. He was required to double-check his plan. A few days later, he reported that rechecking once again confirmed the correctness of his point of view. After that, he was replaced by General Halder. Six years later, Beck took part in the 20 July 1944 conspiracy and was killed or shot himself on Hitler's orders.
The agreement with the Soviet Union, concluded in August 1939, was met with great satisfaction by the leading officers of the army. The officers did not forget the support that Germany found in the Soviet Union during the term of the disarmament orders under the Treaty of Versailles until 1933, and those of the officers who personally worked in the Soviet Union were in favor of close cooperation with it.
In addition, the older senior officers, who looked with increasing anxiety at Hitler's internally increasingly bold foreign policy actions, which at any moment could lead to war, were glad that clear and reassuring Germany had been established with at least one great power. relations. In addition, the supplies expected from Russia were doubly important in the event of a possible war against world powers.
During the Polish crisis, Halder's behavior, although cautious in form, was in essence completely different from that of his predecessor Beck during the Czechoslovak crisis. He also strongly warned against the risk that German actions against Poland could lead to a declaration of war by England and France, and also developed an operational plan for an offensive against Poland, which, allegedly, also did not satisfy Hitler because it provided for too long an operation. As I learned at that time from the military, the duration of the operation against Poland was indeed significantly reduced than was envisaged by the operational plan.
When Halder conceived a German offensive across the western border, Brauchitsch and Halder believed that this offensive, in the form in which it was later carried out on Hitler's orders, was unfeasible. I don't know what exactly their objections were, but I heard at the time that they again talked about the duration of the operation, the number of forces needed and, above all, heavy weapons, as well as the size of the expected losses.
When, despite this, the offensive nevertheless succeeded, and Colonel-General von Reichenau took part as a military leader in the preparation and conduct of the offensive, Hitler finally imagined that he understood more about strategy than all the generals put together. In addition, it was bad that the resistance of the generals against Hitler's plans was weak. Only the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief navy Roeder had enough courage to evaluate an offensive against England, without first achieving air superiority over England, as absolutely untenable.
Due to the fact that German aviation in air raids on England could not achieve decisive success, the attack on England, which had been prepared for many months, conditionally called the "Sea Lion", which required the expenditure of a large amount of materials, was canceled. But the generals, as already mentioned, lost the power of resistance Hitler's plans, and Hitler, after the victory in the West, began to reckon with their opinion even less than before.
Thus, it turned out that the strength of the resistance of the generals against the attack on the Soviet Union turned out to be relatively weak and was already doomed to futility, although the General Staff regarded the military power of the Soviet Union in a completely different way than Hitler.
Hitler, in turn, also considered that the military power of Germany for waging a simultaneous war in the East and West was less sufficient than for a war only against the West, against which he had already spoken out earlier and was in general, according to the position of older officers indicated above in relation to to the Soviet Union, against the war with Russia.
Later, Brauchitsch and Halder, as military experts, again declared their disagreement with Hitler's opinion, when in November 1941 they spoke out against a new offensive against Moscow, but, however, again without success. This led to the resignation of von Brauchitsch on 9 December. Halder remained at his post for some time, but then, due to disagreements with Hitler, he was also dismissed. But both were too late to change anything.
CLODIUS
Translated by: translator of the 4th department of the 3rd Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR senior lieutenant POTAPOVA
Notes:
* 1 We are talking about the French statesman and politician Edouard Herriot.
* 2 So in the document, we are talking about the unions of front-line soldiers in Germany and France - former participants in the First World War.
* 3 So in the document, we are talking about the French Foreign Ministry.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
Faculty of International Relations
Department of International Relations
Eligible for defense
""__________2008
Head department of MO
THESIS
Cooperation between the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of the European Union
Speciality ___________________
FULL NAME. student __________________
Scientific adviser____________
Astana - 2008
Content
Introduction
Section 1 Features of the economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France within the framework of the European Union
1.1 The economic potential of Germany and the Republic of France and its use
Section 2 The role of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France in the politics of modern Europe
2.1 Main features of political development
Chapter 3
3.1 Cultural life in Germany and the Republic of France
3.2 Main stages of cultural cooperation
Conclusion
Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
EU European Union
CES Commission of the European Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITO International Trade Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNCTAD United Nations Commission on Trade and Development
Germany Federal Republic of Germany
Introduction
Relevance of the research topic. At the beginning of the 21st century, France and Germany are not playing an auxiliary role arising from their obligations within the framework of "Atlantic solidarity", but an ever-increasing independent role in international politics. This was the result of a long historical process rapprochement between the two countries. An important and decisive turning point was the events of 1958-1963, which are still ambiguously assessed in historical science.
The process of European integration since the second half of the 20th century has been under the sign of reconciliation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
At present, in the period of rapid development of scientific and technological progress, the existence of states without their interaction is impossible. Interaction can be identified through political, economic, and cultural relations. This paper discusses economic, political, and cultural issues of cooperation between the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Starting from the history of the Middle Ages, Franco-German relations were largely of a conflict nature. Antagonism between France and Germany was one of the causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, as well as the First and Second World Wars. Only in the second half of the twentieth century. an atmosphere of partnership was established between France and West Germany. the agreement between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on Franco-German cooperation of January 22, 1963 (Elysee Treaty) formalized a qualitative improvement in bilateral relations (Appendix 1). Under these conditions, for a long time, both in our country and abroad, there has been and is an active development of research on the history of relations between the two countries. However, the study of the large array of publications on this problem accumulated over this period has so far been fragmentary.
Today, France and Germany are the leading states of Western Europe, exerting a significant influence on the policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.
It is France and Germany that are the main architects of Europe. Working together, they can create a Europe worthy of its past and its potential.
As the past shows, both countries, both because of their political and economic potential and because of the history of European integration, are simply called to help the EU overcome barriers. Hence arises a special responsibility for the fate of Europe, which both countries bear. Europe needs visionary Franco-German leadership in the sense of putting forward joint forward-looking initiatives that are effective on the outside as well. At the same time, however, one must not allow the impression that together Germany and France are becoming hegemons. None of the smaller member states wants to lose their importance because of the Berlin-Paris axis. In addition, an enlarged EU will no longer operate as a two-stroke engine: France and Germany will have to move forward together with additional “outboard motors”, not to mention the need for close cooperation with the UK for an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. .
The relevance of the topic is enhanced by the importance of the mutual partnership between Germany and France, for each other they represent a priority zone of economic interests in view of the fact that both countries are active participants in international economic relations, and, above all, within the framework of the European Union (EU). The objective need to study the expanding German-French partnership is also due to the growing influence of Germany and France in the world, which should be taken into account by them when concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements in the European region. The German experience of economic regulation can be useful for France as well as French for Germany, in particular, in matters of organizing and managing the most important sectors of the economy, implementing programs within the framework of the concept of a social market economy, in terms of choosing and applying the most effective market mechanisms.
The purpose of this work is to identify current trends in the development of bilateral relations between France and Germany in the context of the deepening process of European economic integration in order to identify the specifics of the development of the German and French economies at the present stage, as well as the development of political and cultural relationships.
To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set and solved:
to analyze the features of the current economic model of France and Germany;
determine the role of the economies of Germany and France in the European Union;
explore the main features of political development, as well as the priority areas of the foreign policy of France and Germany;
to analyze German-French cultural relations and to formulate possible prospects for further strategic partnership between the two countries in the field of culture.
The object of the research is the relations that arise between France and Germany in the field of economy, politics, culture.
The subject of the study is the economic relations that arise between Germany and France in the context of the intensification of the processes of economic globalization with the expansion and deepening of European integration; dynamics, features and trends of socio-economic development of countries, the state of competitiveness, as well as political and cultural relations.
The methodological base of the research used in the thesis is the principle of unity of historical and economic approaches based on systemic, economic-statistical, graphic and cross-country comparative analysis socio-economic processes.
Source base thesis. Among the published official documents, one should mention the "Collection of Basic Documents and Materials on the North Atlantic Block (1963-1964)", which contains the text of the Elysian Treaty of January 22, 1963 /
When writing this work, published French and German documents were used. These publications contain materials on the development of Franco-West German relations in various fields from 1958 to 1964. An important source on this topic is memoir literature. With all the subjectivity and ambiguity of assessments and conclusions, memoir literature made it possible to more fully recreate the atmosphere of the Franco-West German rapprochement, to identify differences in the points of view and positions of the authors on the most important issues.
A separate group of sources is made up of periodicals published in France and Germany in the second half of the 20th century and in our time. These are French editions: "Mond", "Label France", as well as German ones: "Di Welt", "Frankfurter Allgemeine".
In the study of issues of international relations, electronic materials posted on the World Wide Web are of great importance. In connection with the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty in 2003, on the website of the Sh. de Gaulle, a selection of previously published documents was presented, excerpts from the memoirs of famous political figures associated with the Franco-West German reconciliation (Ch. de Gaulle, K. Adenauer, Mr. Kusterer), scientific articles from the Yusnoir magazine by Sorbonne professors dealing with this problem ( J Bled, F. Kersody). Of interest are the sites of the French and German embassies in Moscow.
The thesis also uses the fundamental works of Russian and foreign experts in the field of economic theory, analysis of the economy of foreign countries, European integration and globalization of the world economy, as well as authors who have studied the political and cultural development of Germany and France, their bilateral relations within the European Union. The works of such authors as V. Gutnik, N. Vystoropsky, D. Vladikovsky, S. Bityukov, P. Gamza, S. Borisov, I. Cherny, S. Firsova, E. Avdokushin, P. Akumov were used in the work.
In the article by Akumov P.L. - "Actual Problems of Europe" covers in detail the issues of Germany's interaction with the developed countries of Europe, including France. an economic assessment of the position of Germany in comparison with other countries is given.
Continuing the theme of the economy of modern Germany, Bityukov S. compares the situation and prospects for economic growth, its decline in individual indicators in comparison with different periods.
Gutnik V. in the article "Germany, the road to recovery" analyzes the hidden opportunities and reserves of Germany to increase the rate of economic growth.
German political scientists tell in detail about the prospects of Franco-German relations, their problems and the current state.
M.U. Simychev "Neighbors on the Rhine Yesterday and Today: An Essay on the History of Franco-German and Franco-West German Relations", published in 1988, is more objective in presenting the positions of both sides and has an extensive source base. M.K. Simychev analyzes the development of relations between Germany and France, reproducing them against the backdrop of the process of Western European integration. Unfortunately, the period of interest to us, which was decisive for the further process of rapprochement between the two states, is given insufficient attention.
The sources used, based on their analysis, made it possible to draw up a fairly complete picture of the events that took place, and to comprehensively and objectively consider the issues discussed in the work.
The topic of the thesis is quite extensive and is represented by works of various scientific level. This topic has been of interest to researchers, primarily in France and Germany, since the first steps of the Franco-West German cooperation in the field under study and up to the present.
The structure of the work reflects the goal and tasks that implement it. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of references and applications.
Section 1 Features of the economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France within the framework of the European Union 1.1 The economic potential of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France and its use
The development in depth and breadth of the integration process in Europe, which led to the formation of the European Union, which has a powerful integrated industrial and financial potential that can compete with the United States in many respects, fully met the political interests of France and Germany.
France and Germany are connected to each other by an extremely dense network of trade and investment relations. Both countries are each other's largest trading partners: France accounts for 10% of German exports and 8.7% of German imports; an even larger share of Germany in French exports (14.3%) and imports (15.9%; all data for 2005) / German firms account for 12.7% of total direct investment in France, Germany ranks fourth in this indicator . In turn, France is the third largest investor in Germany (14.1%). 2,700 German and 1,400 French firms and branches are respectively present in the neighboring country.
The economy of France itself in a presidential election year presents a picture full of contrasts. Economic growth since 1995 has been notably higher than Germany's and also above the EU average, but growth slowed in 2006, leading to criticism of the sustainability of the French growth model. Employment rates have risen markedly over the past ten years, primarily as a result of active (and costly) labor market policies. However, the unemployment rate is still above the EU average and the employment rate is correspondingly lower. France is one of the top five industrialized countries in the world, but it has lost some of its markets in the world; since 2000 it has had a trade deficit. Large French concerns occupy leading positions in the world, but medium and small businesses in the country are still underdeveloped. Finally, France's best fertility rates in Europe testify to society's optimism.
Contrasts are also evident when comparing political discussions and economic practices. For example, complaints about the collapse of the economy and deindustrialization of the country do not subside, although economic data refute such catastrophic scenarios. All political parties talk about the threat of transferring production to other countries (delocalization), although this phenomenon remains marginal compared to other problems. The anti-liberalism that emerged during the 2005 European referendum and is also professed by the country's political class is in sharp contrast to the real reorientation of the country towards market structures, which has been going on for two decades. Ex-Prime Minister Domique de Villepin's calls for "economic patriotism" do little to disguise the fact that the French state has little or no direct influence on the international sale of companies.
In the post-war period, the French economy experienced two upheavals. During the thirty glorious years (Jean Fourastier) after 1944, there was a real "leap into modernity": the rapid transformation of a backward, predominantly agrarian-small-industrial economy into a modern industrial-service society. Since the 1980s, a more complex process of structural adaptation and transition from a nationally oriented economy, characterized by centralism and dirigisme, to an open market economy. The economy has become open: imports and exports now account for about 26% of GDP (1970: about 13%). First of all, large companies have globalized their strategy and pursue an active investment policy abroad. At the same time, they are successful: about half of the 40 largest companies included in the French CAC-40 stock index have the world's largest turnover, and one in four of them is even the world leader in the relevant sector /5, 14/. Around the world, 22 thousand branches of French concerns employ about five million workers. At the same time, France has become attractive to foreign investors. The 40 largest listed companies are open to foreign investors on a scale unprecedented in Europe: they own 44% of the capital of these companies. This, however, sometimes leads to outbursts of fear of the dominance of foreigners and causes discussions about "economic patriotism" aimed at protecting French companies from being bought by foreigners /6, 16-21/. In addition, the French economy was involved in a global structural adjustment, which left deep traces - especially in industry. Since 1978, 1.5 million jobs have been cut. This further strengthened the critical attitude of the French towards globalization - in particular, the buying up of French companies by foreign concerns and the deindustrialization of the country.
However, the widely held belief about the collapse of the French economy is unfounded. Constantly progressing deindustrialization, for example, is out of the question. The share of industry in the economic potential of the country has been stable for about 25 years, and numerous subcontractors live off the orders of large industrial enterprises. The same applies to the withdrawal of French production to countries with cheap labor. In fact, these countries account for less than 5% of direct French investment. A careful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the French economy leads to more differentiated estimates. France as a location for investment has a number of advantages, among them the central geographical position, the dynamics of the domestic market, the qualifications of the labor force, the quality of infrastructure. The price competitiveness of enterprises has steadily increased since the 1980s. In general, international ratings confirm that French companies are good at selling their products around the world and entering new growing markets with their offers; "Made in France" products also have a good image in terms of price and quality /8.49, 209-228/. (Appendix C).
Weaknesses are noticeable, however, in terms of quality competitiveness. Thus, France has a number of problematic points in its innovative potential and in the field of NEW technologies: a low level of investment in I - primarily at the level of enterprises; a small number of registered patents; insufficiently favorable business climate for the creation of new enterprises; backlog in the production and application of information and communication technologies, as well as some other shortcomings. In the comparative innovation ranking, which is based on several indicators, France is in the middle zone (9th place out of 25), while Germany (4th place) is in the leading group /9/.
Germany has managed to achieve national economic success through the use of such factors of economic growth as the achievement of scientific and technological progress, the high quality of "human Capital", active participation in world economic relations, and a prudent domestic economic policy. Germany is in abundance or even in excess provided with other factors of production - a workforce of appropriate qualifications, money capital. There is a clear excess, first of all, in the labor market, because the unemployment rate (the ratio of the number of officially registered unemployed to the number of the economically active population) is 10-12%, which creates a certain social tension in society /10, 45/.
After the unification of the western and eastern parts of the country in 1990, Germany became the largest country in Europe in terms of economic potential. In the global economy, Germany is also one of the leaders, ranking third in the world in terms of its GDP. Germany is not rich natural resources. It is possible to note coal and brown coal, potash salts. About 55% of the territory is occupied by agricultural land, 30% is forests. Among water resources countries should highlight the network of rivers and canals. Such a dense network contributes to the development of river navigation, and Duisburg-Ruhrort is the largest port in the world. Among the lakes, the most famous is Lake Constance, located at the junction of the borders of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and attracting many tourists here. Germany has always been characterized by the high role of the state in the economy. The social market economy model is a compromise between economic growth and an equal distribution of wealth. The entrepreneurial activity of the state, which ensures a more or less even distribution of social benefits to all members of society, is placed at the center of the system. Another feature of the economic development of Germany is the so-called "Rhine capitalism", characterized by a significant role of banks in the country's economy. Banks are large shareholders in industrial and service companies in Germany, so it is no coincidence that banks actively interfere in the business decision-making process. Thus, the positions of banks in the German economy, taking into account their real impact on business, turn out to be stronger than in other countries of the world.
Today, Germany is experiencing serious difficulties due to its model of a social market economy. Germany had a rather low GDP growth rate in the late 1990s, which was almost three times lower than that of the United States during the same period. The highest unemployment rate since 1933 was registered, which at its peak (in March 1997) amounted to 11.3% of the economically active population until the summer of 1999, the deutsche mark continued to decline, reaching a level of 1.92 marks per US dollar in end of July. The high level of social guarantees has led to the fact that 40% of the net profit of German companies goes to wages and contributions to social funds. Out of 100 euros of net wages, on average, employers' contributions to social funds account for 81 euros. the level of unemployment benefits is quite high, which contributes to the dependency of a part of the Germans, a powerful fiscal pressure on the population and companies is used to maintain social benefits at the proper level. The level of taxation in the country by the end of the 1990s reached unprecedented levels /12/. So, if in the USA about 32% of retained earnings go to taxes, in the UK - 45%, then in Germany this figure reaches 65%. The high level of taxes and the lack of programs to stimulate foreign investment leads to the fact that Germany is not very attractive for foreign capital. In Germany, despite the tripling of foreign investment in the country's economy over the past 10 years to $58 billion in 2002, foreign investors account for 7.5% /13/ of total investments. The lack of interest of foreign investors in the creation of high-tech industries in Germany leads to a gradual technical weakness of the country. Germany is not a world technological leader; its positions in genetic engineering and microelectronics are especially weak. All this is fraught with the loss of German exports. The trend was clearly visible from the beginning of the 1980s: from 1980 to 1993, Germany's share of the high-tech market fell from 20.3% to 16.2%. even German TNCs carry out up to a third of their R&D abroad, since doing science in Germany is unprofitable. The share of public spending in the German economy is extremely high (about 50%), and the growth of public spending creates a problem with the budget deficit and public debt. Complicating the problem of the social market economy in Germany is the consolidation of the eastern and western lands. In the context of the crisis of the national economic model, it is necessary to solve structural transformations in the eastern lands, giving rise to the closure of unprofitable industries, unemployment and social tension in the territory of the former GDR, investments in the amount of about 2 trillion rubles are needed to overcome the backwardness of the eastern lands. Euro /14/ to equalize the level of development of the western and eastern lands, a special "solidarity tax" was even introduced, which implied an increase in the level of taxes on corporations and personal income. It is also necessary to bring the level of labor productivity in the east to Western standards, about three times higher than it is. Privatization and social policies are needed to protect East Germans from the effects of structural change. All these tasks require new expenses from the federal government, and the country's budget is less and less able to cope with its task.
The German economy is characterized by "super-industrialization", that is, a fairly large share of industry in the production of GDP compared to many developed countries of the world. Only Japan, Ireland and Portugal are more industrialized than Germany. This is not accidental, since Germany's specialization in the world economy is the production of industrial products. There is no doubt that Germany at the end of 2000 reached a certain peak in the development of the national model of the economy, which now needs serious modernization. Most likely, Germany will need economic liberalization and conservative reforms along the American lines. Due to the weakness of structural transformations in the economy, Germany is less and less able to cope with its role as a locomotive for the development of Europe and the EU.
The share of agriculture in the post-war period has declined greatly. Nevertheless, agriculture continues to be at a high quality level. About 90% of food needs are met by own agricultural production. Agriculture, like many basic sectors of the economy, receives government subsidies, which makes it not very efficient. The leading industry is animal husbandry. Germany exports meat, butter, grain.
The German industry provides the country with leadership in many world markets for finished products. The most competitive industries are /15/:
automotive industry;
transport engineering (car building, aircraft building);
general mechanical engineering (production of machine tools, various devices);
electrical industry;
precision mechanics and optics;
chemical, pharmaceutical and perfumery-cosmetic industries;
ferrous metallurgy.
Previously, Germany was one of the world leaders in steel production. The main production capacities of the steel industry were concentrated in the Ruhr region. But since 1973, many metallurgical enterprises have been closed. As for the position of this industry in the eastern lands, the local heavy industry was stopped shortly after the unification of the two countries. At present, the main sectors of the German economy are mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, and the food industry. Mechanical engineering is oriented to foreign markets, and therefore it is diversified and multi-structural. Automotive plants are concentrated in the lands of Baden-Württemberg (Audi, Daimler-Benz), Lower Saxony (Volkswagen), Hesse (Opel), North Rhine-Westphalia (Ford, Opel), Bavaria (BMW). ) and Saarland ("Ford"). The production of cars in the eastern lands was discontinued due to non-compliance with the environmental requirements of the products. But "Volkswagen", "Opel" and "Daimler-Benz" quickly mastered and reoriented the East German factories to manufacture cars of their own brands /16/.
Since the end of the twentieth century. Germany began to advance to the first positions in the world in the production of electrical equipment. The center of production was Berlin, where such well-known corporations as Siemens, AEG, Telefunken and Osram were located. After the Second World War and the division of Germany, the most powerful and modern production unfolded in Munich, Stuttgart, Nuremberg and other centers of southern Germany. In the GDR, the electrical and electronic industry was concentrated in Berlin and Dresden. After the unification, this industry in the eastern lands did not receive development, due to severe wear and tear and aging of production facilities.
Since the end of the twentieth century. the rise of the chemical industry also began. The country was actively creating a world market for artificial dyes. The main raw material for the chemical industry is oil. Most of the petrochemical plants are concentrated along the Rhine and its tributaries - in Ludwigshafen, near Frankfurt, and in the Ruhr industrial region. East German factories in Halle and Leipzig were closed due to severe environmental pollution.
The textile sector of the German economy has recently moved its production abroad, but still remains one of the most powerful industries. The textile industry is located in North Rhine-Westphalia and southern Bavaria.
A special place in the industry is occupied by the production of precision mechanics and optics. After the merger, the West German company "Zeiss" acquired a similar production facility in Jena. New and progressive industries have a noticeable influence on the development of industry, reducing the importance of the mining, textile, clothing and food and flavor industries. The industry of the eastern lands of Germany has undergone a significant restructuring due to the fact that its former industries, originally focused on the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, had to be liquidated, putting the construction industry, the food and flavor industry, precision mechanics and optics at the center of development.
The development of the service sector in Germany is somewhat behind the level of other developed countries In Germany, fewer jobs have been created in the service sector. However, Germany in the world economy specializes in banking and financial services, tourism. Germany has a very developed infrastructure: an excellent network of automobile and railways, one of the largest air harbors and seaports in Europe and the world. The most advanced technologies are used in the field of transport.
The largest ports of the country: Berlin, Bonn, Bremen, Bremenhafen, Cologne, Dresden, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Kiel, Lübeck, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Rostock, Stuttgart
Germany's foreign economic relations are notable for being one of the most important exporters and importers in the world. Export consists of; machines - 31%, machine tools and equipment - 17%, chemical products - 13%, metals, food and textiles /19/.
The country's position in the import and export of services is somewhat more modest. In terms of exports of services, the country ranks fourth in the world - 75.7 billion dollars. In terms of imports of services, the country ranks second in the world - 121.8 billion dollars.
For Germany, scientific and technological progress is a very important factor in economic development. Germany has a developed scientific and technical knowledge base dating back to the 19th century. It has a long tradition of world-class scientific research, especially in such fields as chemistry, optical physics, metallurgy, medicine, etc. Advances in scientific research give German companies a great competitive edge. German industrial firms own more patents than firms in the rest of the Western European countries of the EU combined, yielding, however, to American and Japanese ones. Nevertheless, the technological balance of Germany (the ratio of payments and proceeds from the trade in licenses) has been negative since the post-war period, which is associated with significant technology imports by subsidiaries of foreign TNCs located in Germany. Actually, German firms have a positive technological balance.
Modern development The French economy is driven by the following main factors: the influence of scientific and technological progress, growth out of ties and the preparation of the country to complete the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within the EU. These factors largely determined both the structural restructuring of the country's economy as a whole and the formation of a fundamentally new material and technical base of goods and services, stimulated the emergence of new and modernization of traditional sectors of the French economy.
France entered the 20th century with one of the most powerful economies. It produces over 5% of the world's GDP, ranking fourth in the world in this indicator and second only to the USA, Japan and Germany. In terms of GDP per capita and share in world industrial production, France in 2001 ranked 5th in the world, and 4th in terms of its share in world exports. At the same time, the French economy is an "economy of services", the share of which in GDP in 2002 was 71%. This figure is in line with those in the US and UK and is higher than in Germany. The shares of industry and agriculture in France account for 26% and 3%, respectively.
France is the leader in agricultural production among all European countries. In addition, such sectors of the French economy as transport and telecommunications, food and pharmaceutical industries, banking services, insurance, tourism and, of course, the production of traditional luxury goods (leather goods, fashion clothes, perfumes, wines and etc.). Mechanical engineering, in particular, the production of automobiles, electronics, metallurgy are also among the most developed sectors of the French economy.
It is important to note that in recent years, the growth rate of real gross domestic product and industrial production in France has exceeded the corresponding figures on average for the countries of the Eurozone. This was observed against the backdrop of lower levels of inflation and public debt compared to other Western European countries. At the same time, economic growth rates increased in 1999-2000, largely due to the expansion of world demand, reaching 3.8% at the end of this period. However, the slowdown in the growth of the world economy in 2001-2002. led to a slowdown in French economic growth: real GNP in 2002 increased by only 1.1% compared to the previous year, which, nevertheless, exceeds the European average. Similarly, despite a 0.3% decline in industrial production in 2002, as the IM study shows, as early as December 2002, assessments of the current situation and future conditions given by French industrial producers improved. Despite the atmosphere of general uncertainty currently prevailing in the world, many French experts maintain positive forecasts for the production of consumer goods and food industry products. Growth in these industries should prevent a decline in industrial production.
Thus, against the backdrop of the global economic crisis as a whole, France still retains a fairly strong position. However, its position may worsen if the internal contradictions associated with the crisis of the "French model of development" are not resolved. In particular, the prevailing opinion among French businessmen and manufacturers is that France's economic formula, based on higher taxes and social security than in most of the countries whose firms they compete with, has already outlived its usefulness. Currently, the level of taxation of corporations in France is one of the highest in Europe. In the vast majority of countries, an average of 35% of gross profits goes to taxes (in the UK, for example, only 26%), while in France the corporate income tax rate is 42%. Nowhere in the EU do entrepreneurs pay such high social contributions: they reach 10% of GDP. All this negatively affects the competitiveness of French entrepreneurs.
Another characteristic feature of the French economy is a high degree of state participation, a large share of state ownership. Although a number of significant steps towards the transition to an economy based primarily on market mechanisms have already been made. The government of L. Jospin also carried out partial or complete privatization of a number of large enterprises, banks, and insurance companies. But, nevertheless, the share of the state in the French economy is still high. Government spending exceeds 53% of GDP, well above the OECD average of 38%. The state still owns a controlling stake in about 1,500 companies, including such French giants as Franstelecom, Air France, Electricite de France, Gas de France, Renault. The state remains dominant in the field of public transport, in the defense sector, continues to control the prices of natural monopolies, tariffs for healthcare services, prices for most agricultural products. According to many experts, business activities are still overly regulated, which, combined with a high degree of bureaucratization and corruption, negatively affects the position of French companies in Europe. An important feature of the economic development of France is high unemployment, exceeding the average for the Eurozone countries. Although, of course, in this regard, a number of positive results have been achieved: unemployment decreased from 12.2% in 1997 to 9.1% in 2002. But this is still 2 times higher than the unemployment rate in the US and the UK. The reduction in unemployment was due to the economic policy, which in the past 10 years has been aimed at stimulating the creation of jobs in the market sector. Encouraging the introduction of part-time work, reducing social security payments for low-skilled workers, self-employment contracts, encouraging shortened working hours on a contractual basis - in each of these cases, it was a question of the need to incentivize enterprises to abandon the idea that the reduction in the number employees increases management efficiency. The working week was reduced from 39 to 35 hours, in order to compensate for this reduction, entrepreneurs were forced to increase the number of employees. However, this largely artificial expansion of employment against the background of a decrease in labor productivity led to an increase in the extensive nature of the growth of the French economy: the ratio of the contribution to economic growth of labor productivity and employment changed in favor of the latter. Overall, this is not good news, as productivity is the factor that drives economic growth and improved living standards in the long run. In addition, France's youth employment rate is the lowest of any other OECD country, and the employment rate for those aged 55-65 is one of the lowest. That is, the situation is such that in order to return to full employment, it is not enough to eliminate unemployment.
Economists agree that this situation is a consequence of structural unemployment, which can only be reduced by changing the entire economic formula. High social security, encouragement for mothers to stay at home and for workers over 50 to retire have led to an exceptionally inflexible labor market. The result is high unemployment, especially among young people. At the same time, it becomes clear to government circles that in the conditions of European integration and the development of globalization, it is no longer possible to preserve the "French model" in its former form with its inflexible labor market, large government spending, and a large public sector.
Germany and France are among the leading countries in the world community in general and European countries in particular. Today, Germany, due to its economic power, is the undisputed leader in the EU. The German economy accounts for over 30% of the Eurozone economy, while the French economy accounts for about 20%. It follows that 50% of the economies of these two countries are the economies of the European Union. For most EU countries, Germany is the leading trading partner and main investor, while France is the most important investor in Germany (by share of direct investment). Germany is rightly called one of the "locomotives" of the world economy. In terms of the level of economic development, the size of the economic potential, the share in world production, the degree of involvement in the international division of labor and other important criteria, it is one of the most highly developed countries of the world, is included in the so-called "Big Eight". Germany is one of those countries of the world that, without having large reserves of minerals and especially favorable conditions for agricultural production, managed to achieve national economic success through the use of such factors of economic growth as scientific and technological progress, high quality human capital, active participation in world economic relations, reasonable domestic economic policy.
In order to ensure high production performance and achieve the optimal size of enterprises, restructuring and merger-acquisition operations have recently expanded significantly. As a result of the policy pursued by France, it was possible to maintain its leading role in Europe in such areas as aircraft construction, the nuclear industry, telephone equipment and communications, to significantly increase competitiveness in the field of ferrous metallurgy, and to improve quality in mechanical engineering and the automotive industry. In addition, French agriculture has received significant benefits from European integration. As a result of the implementation of the common agricultural policy by the EU countries, France became the 4th in the world in the production of cereals and meat.
Thus, we see that the role of Germany and France in the European Union is very large; 50% of the economies of these two countries are the economies of the European Union.
1.2 Main trends and prospects for the development of Germany and the Republic of France
The countries of the European Union - France and Germany are firmly committed to balanced and sustainable social and economic progress.
The social market economy (Soziale Markwirtschaft), which was developed in Germany, is the most successful concept in the history of the second half of the 20th century and still retains its theoretical appeal and a specific type of socio-economic system in which, in organic unity, it was possible to combine an effective entrepreneurial climate and principles of social justice. This concept still remains the official doctrine in Germany and underlies the economic system that has taken root in public consciousness as a version of the theory of "people's capitalism".
The peculiarity of the social market economy is that this basically liberal system assumes a strong public policy, which, in particular, actively participates in its formation. Germany at all times of its development was characterized by a disproportionately large role of the state in the economy than in the United States or Great Britain.
Over the almost sixty years of the implementation of the principles of the social market economy, the German economy experienced a recession five times:
1966-1967 - the first cyclical crisis of overproduction and at the same time a structural crisis that hit a number of traditional sectors of the West German economy;
1973-1975 - the period of the global crisis, and for Germany, currency shocks, high inflation and stagflation phenomena (a combination of inflation and recession). The cyclical economic downturn was exacerbated by the global energy crisis and the structural crisis in a number of economic sectors in most developed and many developing countries;
1980-1982 - the interweaving of cyclical overaccumulation of capital with long-term factors of deterioration in the conditions of production. During this period, the deterioration of the position of Germany in the world market was noted: increased competition, an increase in the German mark, a decrease in the competitiveness of West German goods and the share of high-tech goods in exports. All these circumstances contributed to profound changes in the concept and practice of state regulation;
1992-1993 - one of the deepest crises in the post-war history of the country, which became a kind of completion of the next stage of the cyclical development of the economy, taking place against the backdrop of the unification of the FRG and the GDR;
2001 - 2003: the basic principle of the inviolability of market mechanisms is forgotten. During this period, the German economy is characterized by: a rigid structure in the production and goods market, too high subsidies, too many settlements that interfere with the forces of the market, and, in particular, too wide use of the social product by the state.
This model has proven its effectiveness and consistency, but today it is quite deformed and far from the classical interpretation of Erhard. Many analysts in Germany itself speak of the "erosion" of the term "social market economy", which is being manipulated for their own purposes by various political forces. For example, in Germany there are several concepts of interpretation of the social market economy. The reasons for such a paradoxical situation can be explained quite simply - political interests, where the stumbling block is the main component in the formula "social market economy" - the definition of "social".
The need to solve the accumulated problems in the German economy is all the more important because the concept of its economic growth is based on a model of a social market economy, which implies an organic combination of competition, private initiative with social progress, ensured by high productivity and the active participation of the state in regulating the economy. In the classical version, such a model of the economy corresponds to an earlier stage in the development of the German economy, and as it "ripens" it requires not only constant renewal, but also significant reform. Due to the weakness of structural transformations in the national economy, Germany is less able to cope with its role as a "locomotive" of EU development and is becoming one of the most expensive economic systems in the world. The desire to change the situation is reflected in the Lisbon Strategy and Agenda - 2010, in accordance with which the modern policy of building a "new social market economy" is being pursued
Based on the analysis and generalization of the practice of its implementation, the role and position of the country in the EU and the world economy were studied.
Germany is a post-industrial, highly developed country with an open economy of an intensive type. Germany's role as a "locomotive" of European integration is ensured not only and not so much by political means, but by its economic might. Not possessing large reserves of minerals, the country has managed to achieve economic success through the use of high quality human capital, achievements in scientific and technological progress and other resources, which allows us to talk about innovation as a key factor in the development of the German economy. At the present stage, it holds the position of one of the leaders of the world economy and the leading power of the European Union, ranking 2nd in the world in terms of exports and imports, 3rd in terms of GDP, one of the leading places in the rankings of international competitiveness. At the same time, the German economy is gradually losing its dynamism (Appendix 3), which is due to a number of reasons: the maturity of the country's economic system, the decline in business activity, the weakening of export positions, the outflow of national capital, the high level of dependence on the global situation, since the main stake in its development is made on external factors (primarily for exports), and not on internal factors of self-sustaining growth.
Thus, Germany can be classified, according to the definition of H. Siebert, to the category of "new economies", the hallmarks of which are maturity, lack of flexibility in correcting the mistakes of economic policy, as well as timely response to the challenges of the time in terms of providing the necessary institutional and organizational and legal modernization.
Based on the analysis of the main difficulties and contradictions of the socio-economic development of the country, carried out in the subparagraph, both internal and external factors affecting the competitiveness of the German economy were identified:
a) the hypertrophied nature of state activity in the economic sphere;
b) the crisis of the concept of the social market economy;
c) relatively high wage costs per unit of output compared to other industrialized countries;
d) haste in the implementation of the declared foreign economic course;
e) the transferability of the economy, due to the convergence of East and West Germany.
The real socio-market system and economic policy in Germany is a complex of various elements, both complementary and contradictory. There is an "erosion" of the concept of a social market economy, which ultimately results in a high level of unemployment, an inefficient social security system, and a loss of economic development dynamics, which generally negatively affects the functioning of the country's economic system. As a result, the economic system created by its own law develops constantly lacking financial resources, which is accompanied by an increase in the tax burden on entrepreneurs (on average, about 80 euros are paid for every 100 euros in the form of taxes and contributions) and a drop in business activity.
The paradox is that this and other problems of transformation of the economy, which are of a structural nature, are generated by the hypertrophied participation of the state in the economy, but cannot be solved without its participation. Wherein modern system management of the German economy increasingly does not meet the needs of the economy itself and the requirements of the world economy. As a result, the economic base is weakening and it becomes difficult for the country to withstand external threats to the sustainability of economic security. Thus, endogenous growth factors are weakening, resulting in a drop in the competitiveness of individual sectors of the economy. If the gigantic "social distributor" into which the modern German state has become remains unchanged, no long-term economic policy can be pursued.
The modern economy of Germany is characterized by a weak dynamics of growth in labor productivity: a reduction in hours worked per week (41.6 hours per week) against the backdrop of an increase in hourly wages (27 euros per hour) and additional labor costs (about 80% of wages), which gives it the status countries with the highest labor costs in the world.
Germany, being the founding country of European integration, depends more than any other state on the general economic situation of the EU. First of all, this is due to the adopted regulation on the formation of pan-European funds and the EU budget, which actually redistributes the country's financial resources, and the benefit of other states. Therefore, the permanent expansion of the EU for Germany is fraught with an aggravation of its internal problems, including increased competition in the labor market.
The unification of the two Germanys demonstrated in practice how expensive it is for the state and its citizens to realize political interests. To date, the eastern lands consume about 90 billion euros of federal budgetary funds annually. The excess of final consumption over the national production of goods and services has no analogues in world economic history, since the process of convergence of the economies of the two Germanys, in terms of equalizing the competitiveness of the eastern and western lands, has not been completed. At this stage, we can talk about divergence in their economic development.
The unification of the FRG and the GDR had a significant impact on the current economic situation of the state, especially in terms of fiscal policy, which is one of the main reasons for its weak growth. Obviously, over time, the problem will not lose its severity and will not disappear, since financial injections into the economy of the eastern lands have a negative impact on the economic condition of the country as a whole. The situation is aggravated by the fact that in the western lands there are also structurally weak regions that increase the negative impact on the economic growth of Germany.
If the conclusions of a study conducted by the Cologne Institute of Economics are correct, then in 2035 France will become the largest economy in Europe, and in another 10 years - the most populous country on the continent covered by this association. The change in leadership, according to the researchers, will be provided by French women, who now give birth to an average of two children, while among German women one of the lowest fertility rates among 27 countries remains.
France now has a population of about 63 million, while Germany has 82 million.
However, the demographic policy of the authorities of the two countries differs greatly, and not in favor of Germany. In France, the birth rate is stimulated, first of all, with the help of quite affordable children's institutions that allow mothers to work even after the birth of two children, but in Germany, most women have a difficult choice: a child or continuing to work. Therefore, approximately 30% of German women of childbearing age prefer not to have offspring at all.
This situation cannot but disturb the German government. Minister for Family Affairs Ursula von der Leyen - by the way, the mother of seven children! proposed a series of measures aimed at improving the demographic situation in the country. Among these incentives are tax cuts for families with children, expansion of the preschool institutions and lower fees. It is clear that the Germans will not be able to improve the situation immediately, since they will have to make up for lost time: every year in Germany, an average of 675,000 new citizens are born, while in France - about 831,000.
In the meantime, powerful demographic shifts are expected in all European countries in the next half century. The beginning of the retirement of the representatives of the post-war baby boom generation (the period of an all-time high birth rate in almost all European countries lasted until the early 1970s, became the longest in the history of the continent), will significantly affect the labor market, reducing unemployment, but at the same time increasing strain on pension funds and services for the elderly.
However, according to experts from the French National Institute for Demographic Research, in different countries this influence will be different. In particular, in three EU countries - France, Great Britain and Spain - in 2005 the number of young people joining the ranks of working citizens still exceeded the number of people retiring. The actual absence in the Union of borders for the movement of both labor and pensioners can serve to equalize the situation in different countries. i4It is known, for example, that more than 75% of citizens over 75 years old live in nursing homes in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium and France, while in Spain - 4, and in Poland - only 2%. So the reserves in this area are still considerable. In addition, many wealthy pensioners are moving to southern countries, primarily to Spain, Portugal, France and Italy, to spend the last period of their lives there.
If we talk about the prospects for the development of the European Union as a whole, then it makes sense to use a comparison with the United States as a reference model. While the extent to which new economic laws are already in place in the United States is debatable, just looking at driving forces the local economy allows you to understand important things. It turns out that in many respects Europe is developing worse than the US, but the gap between them is narrowing. Undoubtedly, both regions benefit from the deepening international division of labor and the intensification of international competition in the course of globalization. Here Europe is even ahead of the USA in some positions. The internal market, the Economic and Monetary Union and the forthcoming eastward enlargement of the European Union further strengthen these impulses and improve resource efficiency. Along with this, stable macroeconomic conditions are an important fundamental basis for economic success. The reduction of the large budget deficit in the United States of America and the associated reduction in borrowing in the domestic capital market, as well as the skillful monetary policy of the issuing bank, which, when the danger of inflation appears, takes consistent countermeasures, thus strengthening confidence, but without slowing down at the same time without needs of the development of the economy, contributed to the economic success of the nineties. The European Economic and Monetary Union helped the Old World take a similar course in economic policy. To meet the entry criteria, it was necessary to pursue a restrictive monetary and economical tax policy. for some countries, this meant moving away from sometimes loose government spending practices and maintaining internal and external currency stability. References to obligations stemming from treaties concluded at the level of the European Union made it easier to push through these changes in domestic policy, while in the seventies the inflation rate in the EU was still well above 10%, in the eighties it dropped to about 7%. In the past decade, inflation, which clearly exceeded 5% (1990), was reduced to an estimated 2% (2000).
The state budget deficit in some member states of the European Union went through the roof in the seventies and eighties for the mark of 10% of the gross domestic product. Back in the mid-nineties, it was on average in the EU above 5%, but in 2000 it will probably not reach 0.5%. European integration in the process of creating a common internal market has caused tangible improvements in other areas of economic policy. Many product markets and, first of all, service markets in Europe have traditionally been highly regulated. However, after the Anglo-Saxon countries, primarily the USA and Great Britain, twenty years ago began to take decisive measures to liberalize, continental Europe also caught up with them in the 1990s. This is the most striking example of how international institutional competition works. The positive effects of the privatization and debureaucratization of former monopoly markets can be seen today in industries such as telecommunications and energy. Thus, the price of a minute of long-distance and international telephone conversations has decreased by almost 90% since the beginning of liberalization. Still, in many continental European countries, further steps need to be taken in this direction, since markets are still much more strictly regulated there than in most Anglo-Saxon countries. Some progress is observed in the financial and business sectors of continental Europe. Thus, the globalization and debureaucratization of the economy twice forced enterprises, primarily large companies seeking a global presence, to carry out reforms in the past years. On the one hand, the intensity of competition in the sales markets has increased. On the other hand, European joint-stock companies also faced in the nineties with the demands of shareholders to increase profitability. In Germany, the need to finance the unification of the country was added to this, which led, first of all, to an increase in the tax burden. Large enterprises affected by these demands have responded by increasing productivity and reducing costs in a variety of ways, as key concepts such as streamlining management structures, focusing on core activities, and creating independent firms from parts of the company vividly illustrate. How massive this reorganization was is shown by the enormous growth of the PAH-30 index since the early nineties. After the end of the boom caused by the unification of the country, the index increased at a pace comparable, perhaps, with those observed in the second half of the fifties. It increased from 1545 points in 1992 to 6958 points at the end of 1999, i.e. almost four and a half times. As for the reduction of the role of the state in the economy, which is traditionally strong in Europe, only insignificant progress has been noted here. True, some countries, especially in Scandinavia, have significantly reduced the share of government spending in gross domestic product. However, in continental Europe, government spending, which is almost 50% of GDP, is still noticeably higher than in the US (about 31%) and the UK (about 40%). This fact is of particular importance, since empirical studies show that excessive state activity does not already have a productive effect and can slow down economic growth. High taxes and fees are needed to finance large-scale government programs, which has a particularly negative impact on the labor factor in some European countries. As a result, workers' incentives for highly productive work are weakened and the demand of enterprises for labor is falling. the share of taxes calculated as the difference between the cost of labor for the employer (including his contribution to the social security fund) and the net salary of the employee (after deducting income tax and the employee's own contribution to the social security fund) is, for the example of a single worker in Belgium, receiving an average salary, 57% of the cost of labor, in Germany, France and Italy - about 50%, in Denmark and the Netherlands - 44%, in the USA, on the contrary, only 31%. In view of the intensification of international competition, it is becoming noticeably more difficult for enterprises than before to shift social costs to prices.
Thus, the negative impact of these high costs on production and employment became quite clear. In this regard, the tax reform and the planned restructuring of the pension system in Germany are steps in the right direction, although they could be more radical. other social policy instruments of the generous welfare state have also contributed to rising unemployment in many continental European countries. Thus, the high level and form of state transfers lead to the fact that, first of all, low-skilled workers who find themselves out of work often do not make much sense to look for a new job. Added to this is the fact that the system of state social guarantees sometimes provides benefits to those who work at the expense of the unemployed. This is what is promoted, for example, by the establishment of a minimum wage and protection against dismissal. If laying off an employee is more expensive or almost impossible, enterprises are in no hurry to recruit new workers. Although in Germany, for example, there is no statutory minimum wage, in many industries it is defined in tariff agreements. This measure guarantees the interests and protects them, in the final analysis, from competition from those willing to work for more low salary.
A comparison of long-term trends in the formation of the real cost of the labor force, including the salary itself and wage overhead, leads to similar conclusions. Thus, the cost of wages in the private sector of the European economy has jumped by more than 65% since 1970, while employment has increased by only about ten percent. In the United States, the opposite is true: the real cost of labor in the private sector of the economy has increased by about a quarter, while the number of jobs has increased by more than 65%. It is obvious that in Europe they made a big bet on the income of those employed in national economy, as well as the expansion of social guarantees, and at the same time, they deliberately went to ensure that, when rationalizing production, they protect, first of all, the expensive labor factor. In contrast, in the United States, the emphasis was on creating additional jobs. This trend is particularly strong in Germany with its high wage levels. Compared to other countries in the world, the cost of labor in the German industry will be one of the highest in the world. These costs are only partially offset by high labor productivity, so that German industry occupies one of the leading places in the world in terms of such an indicator as the share of wages in the cost of a unit of output. However, recent events - long-term tariff agreements providing for modest wage increases, as well as the devaluation of the euro - have slightly deflated the situation. With regard to reforms aimed at increasing employment, which begin with the elimination of the aforementioned causes of unemployment, a heterogeneous picture is found in Europe.
In addition to Great Britain, many-sided adjustments to their policies were made, often under the influence of a severe economic crisis, primarily by small European countries. They began, for example, to restrain the growth of salaries and rates, changed the structure of wages, providing for the possibility of lowering it in some cases below the level established in tariff agreements, created a system of transfers that stimulate job searches, tightened sanctions in labor market policies, reformed social security systems, as well as increased opportunities to work part-time, for limited hours, allowed businesses to hire temporary workers provided by recruitment firms. the lack of reforms in the major states of continental Europe is confirmed by a study conducted by specialists from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Germany received the worst rating for creating framework conditions for increasing employment. However, the Federal Republic can still turn to its advantage competition for the creation of the best conditions for the location of production and investment and the creative competition of ideas associated with this. In the process of comparison with other states, effective measures to combat unemployment are revealed, which, having adapted them to domestic conditions, can probably be adopted. The experience of other countries teaches that, first of all, it is necessary to carry out supply-side policy reforms, which, among other things, would limit the privileges of the employed part of the population. What follows is a complex adjustment, since an unsystematic series of individual measures, which in themselves have great potential effectiveness, as a rule, does not lead to much success.
The conclusion is this: in the 1990s, the European economy rushed in the same direction as the Anglo-Saxon ones - take, for example, debureaucratization, the concept of baroblade-Valce, the growth of financial markets, a certain decline in the once overflowing state activity and more or less decisive reform of the labor market. resources. However, a complete convergence will not occur. This is impossible already because the fundamental social values differ too much from each other. But copying the Anglo-Saxon system does not seem to be necessary, as the countries of continental Europe that have carried out successful reforms - primarily the Netherlands - demonstrate that a reformed welfare state is quite capable of generating strong economic growth and high levels of employment. Consequently, the "velvet capitalism" of European continental coinage is too early to be scrapped. The fact that numerous reforms in economic policy have been under way recently, and their impact is thus only just beginning to show, suggests that a long-term economic recovery is ahead in Europe with subdued inflation. However, without a fundamental adjustment of the ossified structures in the large countries of Europe, hope for the intended one may perhaps turn out to be in vain.
Section 2 The role of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France in the politics of modern Europe 2.1 Main features of political development
At each new stage of European construction, France and Germany played the leading roles. General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer realized that without reconciliation between France and Germany, the building of a European edifice would be impossible. In 1958, the former leader of the Free French hosted the West German Chancellor, the founder of the Federal Republic, and then paid a return visit to Germany. These joint efforts lead to a Franco-German rapprochement, and. .23 January 1963 the Elysee Treaty was signed. The program of joint activities includes annual Franco-German summit meetings, quarterly meetings of foreign ministers and regular consultations of responsible officials on defense, education and youth policy. The Franco-German Youth Bureau was soon established. This allowed tens of thousands of young men and women from both countries to meet together, study and work together.
As a result of close ties between successive top leaders of both countries, a thirty-year period of privileged relations has brought even more tangible results. Today, Franco-German high-level meetings have become commonplace, as well as contacts to develop a common position and jointly prepare proposals in the field of European construction, which led to the expansion of ties between all echelons of power in both countries, raised bilateral relations to a level of interaction unique in world practice.
Almost all areas are under the jurisdiction of bilateral commissions. state activities Thus, the Monetary Committee includes the chairman of the Bundesbank, the governor of the Banque de France, and both finance ministers. the bilateral defense commission took concrete shape with the creation in 1987 of the Franco-German brigade of the prototype of the European armed forces - the European Corps, formed in 1993 and supplemented by the forces of Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain. In Strasbourg, since 1992, the French television channel “Arte” has been operating, broadcasting joint programs in the field of culture for television viewers in France and Germany, as well as Belgium, Austria and other European countries.
After the scandal in Nice, where France and Germany fell apart over the distribution of votes in the EU Council, the so-called "Blesheim Consultations" were established in 2001, in which France and Germany regularly exchange views at the highest level on European policy goals. It was a mutual confidence-building measure of sorts, as the shock of the Nice dispute left a deep mark on both sides. The summit, designed to prepare the institutional system for the expansion of the EU to the East, then ended in complete failure.
The effect of the new "Bleisham" trust turned out to be, however, rather the opposite: the German-French rapprochement in recent years has begun to cause growing discontent in other EU countries - and not without reason. Beginning in 2001, German-French agreements became more frequent, which met the interests of both Germany and France, but by no means always the interests of the entire Union. An example would be the German-French compromise on agrarian issues, reached in Brussels in October 2002 and agreed by both countries behind the scenes, without consultation with European partners. So the motor turned into a "locomotive without wagons", other EU countries - especially small ones - felt that they were being neglected.
At the same time, it was Germany and France that systematically violated the rules of the Stability Pact, while reproaching other (Eastern European countries) EU countries, for example, that their tax policy was incorrect. A claim to European leadership and, at the same time, a violation of the rules, many European partners began to express bewilderment in this regard. Their patience ran out when France and Germany opposed the US line in the Iraq crisis, while expecting others to follow them and claiming to represent the views of all of Europe. The price of this escapade was probably the deepest split in the history of the European Union. And here it is not worth arguing that the German-French position regarding the war in Iraq was essentially wrong. Germany and France set themselves against the United States and most of the EU partners - this is not how the European Union could work /45/.
The fact that, in such a confused situation, it was no longer possible to direct the German-French energy to the successful completion of the draft European Constitution, was probably one of its most tragic consequences, not only because the text of the Constitution itself in some aspects did not justify expectations; when in 2004 the heads of state and government solemnly received it in Rome, the significance and symbolism of this text had already faded under the thunderclouds of the European split over the war in Iraq, it began to seem insipid and pale, until finally, in 2005, it was rejected by the French - the French.
There are also a number of German-French frictions. Relations between France and Germany, no matter how good they may be at the technical and practical level of cooperation, are complicated by the fact that classical bilateralism in the EU has already outlived itself.
A much larger problem is that Germany and France have not made significant efforts in recent years to shape a larger, modern political Europe. One of the already almost mythical missed opportunities was the famous Schäuble-Lamers declaration of 1994, to which France did not respond. In it, Germany offered France to make an integration leap even before the enlargement of the EU to the north, which was then to be. But the subsequent possibilities: the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, as well as the tandem presidency of Germany (1999) and France (2000) in the Council of the EU - two years during which it would be possible to boldly lay the institutional and financial prerequisites for the expansion of the EU to the East - remained in mostly unused. To Joshka Fischer's speech delivered in May 2000 at the University of Berlin. Humboldt, the French side also did not respond France was once again busy with the presidential election campaign. In the Constitutional Convention, the Germans and the French did not show due activity, and when they realized it at the end of 2002, it was already too late: Europe had already split on the issue of the war in Iraq, and confidence in the German-French tandem was greatly undermined. This failure has two reasons - German and French. German consists in the gradual departure of Germany from the traditional lines of European politics, which has been observed in recent years. It is mainly about three elements: the decommissioning of German policy within the EU, its nationalization and the decline of the Euro-Atlantic dynamics (which Federal Chancellor Merkel is now trying to revive again). Germany has rarely been as hostile to the Commission as under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. At the same time, Berlin moved away from the former pillars of its European policy, primarily from the European Parliament, intensifying its orientation towards the Council of the EU. This could also be described as the "Frenchization" of German policy towards Europe, since for the first time Germany became so explicit about its national interests in Europe - for example, by starting a heated discussion about its net contribution to EU funding, or by advocating for Germany to be given a seat in the Council United Nations Security Council, while convincing European partners that it would, in fact, become a European place. In fact, Germany, with its actions, broke a lot of dishes in the European politics shop. decommissioning led to alienation in relations with small member states, which traditionally relied on the supranational structure of the EU. And the German escapades directed against the United States touched the vital nerve of the European Union - after all, Germany has always been a guarantor that European integration and transatlantic cooperation are two sides of the same coin.
The French reasons for the discord in the work of the German-French tandem are related to the position of France in two fundamental European political discussions: on the Constitution and on the expansion of the EU to the East. In both cases, the marginalization of France was mainly due to the policies of Paris itself. First, the French resisted expansion to the East for many years. Secondly, it was France that blocked the Constitution. Perhaps the reasons for the French “no” were multifaceted and had little to do with the Constitutional Treaty as such, and yet the failure of the referendum and the subsequent position of France on this issue were already perceived by other Europeans as a stubborn unwillingness to reckon with the realities of the current, enlarged, large European Union. The current EU is no longer a continuation of French ambitions, as it undoubtedly was in the first decades of the community's existence. In no other country would the decline in the share and influence of all EU countries after its expansion to the East be as painful as in France: France, offended, retired to a corner. In the coming months, we will see whether Germany, using the dynamics of its Presidency of the EU Council, can lure France out of this “political corner”, and whether the EU will even manage to make the transition from a modern, larger Europe of the 21st century between the German and French Presidency of the Council EU. The German Presidency of the EU gave impetus to change and revitalize the German-French partnership, opened up a new common perspective on the two central themes of the German Presidency: at the spring summit of 2007, this was decided, firstly, European energy policy, which should be considered against the backdrop of a new definition of relations between the EU and Russia; the second key topic will be the European Constitution. In both cases, the rest of the EU countries will be closely watching the behavior of both "giants" whether they will again secretly collude with each other or take a pan-European position.
No less subtle and important is the theme of German-French approaches to the Constitution. N. Sarkozy's proposals on a "small treaty" are known, with the help of which it would be possible to "save" the main sections of the Constitutional Treaty without a new referendum (for example, the refusal to rotate the Council, the introduction of the post of European Minister of Foreign Affairs, the legal personality of the EU). It is necessary to take into account the fact that the situation around the European Constitution is very complex and confusing, and that there are other problem states besides France - for example, Great Britain and Poland. However, the solution found in France could be the first step towards cutting this Gordian knot. At the same time, we cannot talk about any German-French "chord" without the participation of the others, or about an exclusive German-French agreement consisting in the fact that, for example, the Italians or Spaniards, who have already ratified the document, fear that Germany and France for the form agree on a few minimum points to deepen integration in order to retain some constitutional symbolism, while at the same time effectively leaving the EU institutional system in limbo so that active opening of Europe - for example towards the Balkans - will still be impossible. others are afraid to lose in a situation where without Germany and France or against them in the EU - as before - nothing can be done. But others no longer want to meekly follow the leaders.
Six months of the German presidency will not be enough to complete possible constructive German-French strategies - neither in terms of the adoption of the European Constitution, nor in terms of implementing geostrategic concepts in the Bermuda Triangle, consisting of energy policy, EU enlargement policy and neighborhood policy. At the same time, the German presidency may well serve as a springboard for France - especially in the issue of the adoption of the Constitution. Germany can only outline ways to solve problems here. France, on the other hand, will have the opportunity, stepping over its own "no", to bring a fresh stream into the constitutional discussion. Crucial here is how France will approach its EU presidency in the second half of 2008: timidly or reservedly? Or with the same enthusiasm with which François Mitterrand in 1984 at the EU summit in
Fontainebleau brought Europe out of the crisis? 1982 was a decisive year for France's European policy and position in Europe. The question stood as follows: either modernizing the economy with the help of the “strong franc” policy and maintaining positions in the European Monetary System and in Europe, or exiting the EEC and a policy that some experts piquantly called “socialism in a single country.” France then chose Europe, openness and modernization, thus providing Europe with a decade of rapid development. The year 2008, when, along with the issue of institutional reform, the most important financial issues of the EU will be decided again, can again be such a decisive year that the EU then, after 2009, enters a new, dynamic European decade with a new, more compact Commission, a new Parliament, new rules and new finances.
2.2 Foreign policy priorities
The first preparations for the German presidency of the Council of the EU were made by former Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder already in 2001 during the next EU summit. Glancing at the political calendar, Schroeder saw that the presidency was due to take over from Germany in the second half of 2006, followed by Finland in the first half of 2007. "That won't do," Schroeder decided, keeping in mind the Bundestag elections scheduled for autumn 2006. He and his coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens would have to devote a lot of time to work related to the presidency of the EU Council, which would complicate the conduct of election company. Therefore, Berlin and Helsinki came to an agreement to switch places, and the rest is history. Today the Federal Chancellor is Angela Merkel, who became the first woman to hold this post. This year, she is entrusted with the duties of chairing the EU Council and the G8.
Since 1998, Schroeder has gone through a difficult political path. He managed to find a common language with large concerns, not quarrel with trade unions, deftly use ex-communists at the right time, keep his partners - the Greens - in check, get rid of potential competitors in the leadership of the party - O. Lafontaine and R. Scharping, and to establish his personal and indisputable leadership in the party. Moreover, during the years of Chancellorship, Schroeder has completely turned into an American-style politician. He increasingly relied on his charisma and personal popularity, showed unshakable self-confidence, despite catastrophic ratings, which sooner or later begins to be interpreted as proof of leadership abilities. But Angela Merkel also made a profound evolution during her fifteen-year political career, turning from a shy "Helmut Kohl girl" into a self-confident leader, a kind of German analogue of Margaret Thatcher. Merkel had to fight the stereotype of a "woman politician from the east", a political provincial and a loser. After Kohl's departure, she slowly but stubbornly established and eventually established her control in the party and the parliamentary faction.
At first glance, it looks like Merkel could easily make 2007 a year of opportunity. Without a doubt, its activities in the structures of the EU and the G8 will be in the center of attention of the international community. In addition, unlike her predecessors, who, after becoming chancellor, tried not to deal with foreign policy issues, at least in the first half of her first term as chancellor, Merkel already now shows great enthusiasm for foreign policy. Since coming to power on November 22, Angela Merkel has made visits to France, the headquarters of the European Union and NATO, as well as the UK. The German government headed by A. Merkel, like the former leadership, supports the role of “the engine of Germany and France in the EU. However, it strives for the role of a balanced engine, acceptable to different parties. A. Merkel chose France as the object of her first official trip abroad after taking the post of Federal Chancellor in order to emphasize the importance of special German-French relations in Europe. At the same time, she is trying to alleviate the fears of other countries, in particular the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, about the Germany-France axis through her visit to Poland. In Paris, A. Merkel stressed that Germany and France play a leading role in Europe, at the same time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will occupy an important place in Germany's European policy, Germany and France have a common responsibility for helping these countries. Regarding the concern of some EU member states about the "Germany-France axis", F.V. Steinmeier stated that German-French relations are not directed against other countries. The German newspaper Welt published an article on its pages under the heading “Farewell to the Axis, which notes that A. Merkel seems to want to free herself from intolerance, which distinguished German-French relations under the rule of Gerhard Schroeder, is ready to maintain close ties with Paris and at the same time not move away from other European countries, take out the engine of Germany and France and at the same time not hurt the United States. The article points out that the transatlantic relations and the quarrel within Europe show that the EU member states are distrustful of the "rude command of Paris-Berlin" and seek to limit the space of Germany's activities in the international arena. Maintaining a proper distance from France will help to increase Germany's role in Europe.
On the eve of the German presidency in 08 and the European Union, German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave an interview to the BBC in which she spoke about the directions of the state's foreign policy for the coming year. In particular, Merkel outlined the role and place in Europe and the Middle East that she wants to achieve for Germany. According to Merkel, visiting Washington last week, US President George W. Bush agreed that the Middle East needs a new direction of movement, which should be chosen by the so-called quartet - the US, the EU, the United Nations and Russia.
With regard to Iran, Germany has not taken a tough enough position, from the point of view of the United States and Great Britain, even though it recently held talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmer. The same applies to Turkey: although the United States (like Great Britain) would like to see her among the members of the European Union, Merkel is ready to offer Turkey only privileged terms of partnership.
Priority During Germany's EU presidency, Merkel called the long-suffering draft European constitution. At the same time, the chancellor admitted that "the fact that Germany will be the chair country does not mean at all that we will solve this problem by the end of our term."
According to Merkel, one of Germany's most important tasks will be the development of a "road map", which will be presented to voters in 2009, when parliamentary elections are held in the EU.
True, Germany has not yet decided how to deal with the French and Dutch "no" to the Constitution in its current form, as well as Britain's distrust of this document. However, Merkel emphasized that without the UK, Europe's hopes for a new Constitution are doomed: "I cannot imagine the adoption of any important issues without the participation of the UK and other EU members" /
Over the past few decades, the main directions of French foreign policy have remained the pan-European, Atlantic directions, as well as the problems of the countries participating in the Francophonie, i.e. of that geographically scattered area of countries where France used to be the metropolis. Being a world power and striving to maintain this status, France has constantly played and still plays an active role in international organizations. Judge for yourself, France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, its citizens today head the WTO, the EBRD, the European Central Bank and a number of others international organizations and forums. Finally, in 2003, with the support of Kazakhstan, a French representative headed the executive structures of the OSCE.
The French are just as seriously involved in solving the most acute and urgent problems of the modern world, in particular, in crisis zones. Thus, Paris is actively interested in the process of world settlement in the Middle East. French military personnel are part of the peacekeeping force in African countries, participate from the first days in the international forces in Afghanistan. Let's not forget that back in the days of the bipolar world, General Charles de Gaulle pursued an independent foreign policy based on nuclear deterrence and a defense doctrine independent of NATO, and in relation to the Soviet Union he led a course that, by the way, became the forerunner of Brandt-Scheel's "Eastern policy" . As an "orthodox" Gaullist, President Chirac continues this tradition. In particular, he consistently advocates a multipolar world, and it is he who consistently develops the thesis "not to tear Russia away" from European affairs.
In this context, the French policy towards the countries of Central Asia from the first bodies of their independence is marked by activity and realism. At first, Kazakhstan did not look like such a clear favorite as it is today. For a number of geopolitical and predictive reasons, the bet was more likely on Tashkent /
In a recently published short book called Carrying on History, Hubert Védrine, French Foreign Minister in the Chirac/Jospin government (1997-2002), outlines three perspectives for French foreign policy. First, politics is based on the so-called "de Gaulle-Mitterrand-Chirac compromise"; the author defends this compromise not only because he was for a long time foreign policy adviser to François Mitterrand at the Elysee Palace. Second, according to him, there are many possible foreign policy options - both on the right and on the left wing of the political spectrum. And finally, a third perspective: the famous consensus, on which French diplomacy has been working for half a century, is now being questioned by the French, whom Vedrine dismissively calls "human rights guerrillas", that is, something like French neo-conservatives who reject realpolitik in the name of high morals. Vedrin believes that there are especially many of them in intellectual circles and media. mass media.
I would like to object to this that these people are not very dangerous, although sometimes they influence politicians. Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, was carried away by their theses. In the fall of 2006, he gave his first major foreign policy interview to a neo-conservative magazine. The interview took place shortly after his visit to the United States, which caused considerable excitement in France: N. Sarkozy and George W. Bush exchanged a cordial handshake in the White House, which was negatively perceived by a significant part of the French public, critical of the war in Iraq / In addition, in one of his speeches in New York, he criticized the "arrogance" of the French government, of which he was a member at the time of the outbreak of war.
The impression was that N. Sarkozy became close to those neo-conservatives who criticize French foreign policy for its systematic anti-Americanism, emphasize the support of democracy and human rights and do not agree that the French leadership is defiantly friends with governments that poorly observe the principles of the rule of law.
What does this "de Gaulle-Mitterrand-Chirac compromise" consist of? First, it is based on the highly dubious idea that the coordinates of French foreign policy have not changed since its inception, that is, since the return of General de Gaulle to power in 1958. These coordinates are: based on the possession of nuclear weapons, independence from the United States; European cooperation, which implies economic integration, but in the political sphere is oriented towards intergovernmental cooperation; Franco-German reconciliation, but with a safety net in the form of good relations with Moscow; protection of the "third world" - above all, the old colonies that retain the Francophonie, that is, the Mediterranean and Africa.
These elements of De Gaulle's catechism were, of course, corrected over time when the political course changed. Mitterrand, for example, really wanted to leave his mark on history, since he was one of the most implacable opponents of Gaullism and was even considered an "Atlantist". In 1983, he supported the rearmament of Europe, rejected by his predecessor Giscard d'Estaing; he spoke out in favor of a new rapprochement with Israel; despite criticism from hardened Gaullists, he deepened European integration. Jacques Chirac, too, began his first term in 1995 by turning away from Miperan's predominantly pro-Serbian policies. Then he unsuccessfully tried again to get closer to the integrated military structures of NATO, from which de Gaulle left in 1966. It was Chirac, who in the 1970s still saw the “hand of foreigners” in the building of Europe, who continued the policy of his socialist predecessor in this sphere, although with varying conviction; finally, his position led to the European constitution being rejected in a referendum.
During both of Chirac's presidential terms, Franco-German cooperation had its ups and downs; but those who are nostalgic for the good times of agreement between de Gaulle and Adenauer, Giscard K Esten and Schmidt, Mitterrand and Kohl, have a short memory. In fact, in those days there was no idyll in relations between the two countries: every now and then there were moments of tension, misunderstanding, even spalls. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in recent years there has indeed been no significant progress in Franco-German relations - with the exception of the introduction of the euro, but it has been prepared for a long time and carefully.
With the exception of the referendum on the European constitution, the major foreign policy decisions of Jacques Chirac did not cause any serious controversy. A new rapprochement with NATO became a bone of contention between right and left under the T government, but the solution to this problem turned out to be ultimately absurd: the French president offered the Americans conditions that were unacceptable to them. His refusal to participate in the Iraq war was almost unanimously supported by the French - except for those non-conservative circles that welcomed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and recalled the close relationship that once existed between Chirac and the Baghdad regime.
In terms of spending on the armed forces, among 10 countries of the world, France is in 3rd place, after the USA and Great Britain - this is a pretty good indicator, and Germany is in 6th place (Appendix 4).
Right-wing candidate Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as the next president of France. The victory is quite convincing - 53% of the votes, it did not cause any doubts. The election campaign that ensured his success was conducted almost entirely around socio-economic issues, the first steps he promised also concern this area. But now the head of the French state will be required to make decisions mainly on foreign policy and security issues - such is the function of the owner of the Elysee Palace. True, we must give him some time to get up to speed, to figure out that in itself it is not easy in June, his colleagues from the "troupe of eight", who are going to an annual meeting, are waiting for him.
In terms of foreign policy, two main initiatives are expected from N. Sarkozy. One, as can be assumed, will be aimed at returning to warmer relations with the United States, which under his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, were frankly cool in recent years / At the end of last year, when the election campaign was just gaining momentum, the future president even made a "pilgrimage" to Washington, where he was very well received. Then, when this began to negatively affect his rating, an amendment was made: friendship with the United States, but with respect for the characteristics of each. It was this tone that was preserved, right up to the first speech of the elected president.
The second (and here the matter is more complicated) is connected with European construction. "This evening, France returned to Europe" - he exclaimed in the already mentioned first speech after the victory / This means the desire of the new head of state to actively join in solving the problems of the EU.
At the same time, some features of his approach to this construction are known. First, he is categorically against the admission of Turkey to the EU, with which difficult negotiations began in 2005. Secondly, he is against attempts to revive the European constitution, but he advocates replacing it with a light, simple document. These two positions promise new battles between Brussels and Paris. Thus, Germany presiding over the EU in the first half of 2007 is placing particular emphasis on returning in one form or another to the idea of a European constitution. That is why the first congratulations on his election, showered upon N. Sarkozy in the first hours after the announcement of his victory, contained transparent hints along with the proper politeness. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso included in his text the hope that France would not block negotiations with Turkey, as was also noted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her wish that the Franco tandem would serve the cause of the further development of the EU. Therefore, the further development of the EU will largely depend on the choice of the Elysee Palace, and in a number of fundamentally important areas.
As for the rest, N. Sarkozy's foreign policy course remains an open book. Of course, the change of the president does not mean that the foreign policy interests of France are changing, therefore, major changes should not be expected yet. The word "so far" in the previous sentence means that the leader's personality is still capable of influencing his political course over time. There was a change of generations, figures born after the Second World War, whose youth fell just in the cold war, were promoted to the first roles in Paris. The question is, will the stereotypes of that time be overcome in the new environment, or will they be stronger?
In connection with the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, many supporters of a united Europe nostalgically recall the "golden age" of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Then progress became possible thanks to the ideas and initiatives of major (French) politicians. However, now the project of the European Union is in crisis, and the elites of Europe are no longer able to inspire citizens with a vision of a common future. Indeed, one can observe that today in most European countries the idea of a United Europe is no longer in the spotlight. Increasingly, priority is given to national interests over pan-European ones. Instead of first thinking about how the European project can be moved forward and what could be useful for the further development of a common house called "Europe", and only then, in the second stage, assess the consequences for a particular country and take measures for depreciation possible temporary difficulties, the spirit of the times recommends giving priority to national interests over the famous: how can one "push through" national interests in Brussels with maximum success? A good example of this is the situation with the ELOS concern: it is difficult for France and Germany to even imagine how it is possible to abandon the dual leadership in the JAO when the company is run by two general directors representing, respectively, the interests of France and Germany.
To say that Europe is in crisis because politics no longer believes in the project of a united Europe would, however, be a gross exaggeration. However, European integration has reached a point where the next step means a qualitative change, and this change inspires fear. The EU countries have a common agricultural policy, a common trade policy, a common structural policy of a coherent European space, and even a common currency. But it is difficult for some European politicians to defend what has already been achieved and take responsibility for further European integration. Although no European policy can be bogged down in nostalgia, Europe can become a successful project only through common efforts - if a united Europe is recognized as a value.
The recent election campaign in France is very revealing in this respect. The observations on this side of the Rhine were not intended to lead to speculation about the best candidate, nor to lectures on the best possible European policy from the German point of view, but rather their aim was to continue a positive and constructive dialogue between the German and French partners.
First of all, it rushes into the gas that the topic "Europe" was discussed in the current election campaign in France as a secondary one. This is understandable in principle: domestic political issues that are considered to directly affect the interests of citizens are at the center of the electoral struggle, whether, for example, the purchasing power of the population or the role of the police in the suburbs. However, two parallel campaigns should be distinguished: on the one hand, for the election of the President, on the other, for the election of members of the National Assembly. The President of the French Republic, as a member of the European Council, is a significant institutional unit at the European level and must position himself in the field of European politics. However, one gets the impression that Europe - especially after May 29, 2005 and the French people's "no" to the European constitutional treaty - is a very delicate topic for politicians.
On the other hand, Europeans expect French policy to be against the pessimistic attitude of French citizens towards a united Europe. In June 2007, the German Presidency of the Council of the EU will present a plan for a future Constitutional Treaty. The teams of the new president and prime minister will be in demand in European politics immediately after they take office. In the second half of 2008, the EU Council will be chaired by France, which requires experience on the European policy scene.
Therefore, it is urgently necessary that impulses come from France for the future of European integration.
Many analytical studies claim that France has not been able to digest the latest enlargement of the EU. Quite definitely, the interest in expanding to the East in Germany is higher than in the South-oriented France. In this context, Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal for a "Mediterranean union" should be understood. It is the responsibility of the EU to actively promote the development of the Mediterranean countries towards successful democratic market economies and the rule of law. It can be assumed that Portugal will set the accents accordingly during its Presidency of the EU Council.
Stronger impulses are expected from the new French government for the further development of the EU. At the same time, in parallel with the German-French cooperation, which has been so successful in the past, it should also involve other EU members in a common policy in order to develop a new vision for the future. by developing a common vision for Europe, by carrying out common projects, or by the power of persuasion of their political leaders. However, the European Union is now at a turning point in its further development, without a common vision of the future worked out by both countries. Such a vision is not a matter of possibilities, but a matter of desire. They managed to write a common book on history, now we should continue to write a common history.
Chapter 3. Cultural issue in relations between the two countries 3.1 Cultural life in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France
Germany is a country of poets and thinkers. Germany gave us Goethe, Bach, Beethoven. And yet this cultural nation does not have a truly national cultural competence. Culture is the business of the lands, as it is written in the Basic Law. The Länder see themselves as guardians and patrons of federalism in the field of culture in Germany. Why, strictly speaking, are matters of culture in Germany something that the nation as a whole cannot or should not regulate? German culture as a way of expressing the German nation since the time of Kaiser Wilhelm, since the end of the 19th century, has been suspected of megalomania. The catastrophe of National Socialism eventually led to a gradual reorientation. After the Second World War, the understanding deepened that Germany could only return to the world community if it avoided any appearance of excessive national cultural pathos. This in turn led to the abandonment of any national cultural policy in Germany. Cultural institutions are more scattered throughout the country than in most other states. Cultural federalism arouses ambition in the federal states. Cultural policy is the policy of creating favorable conditions for the economy. Baden-Württemberg openly advertises itself using culture as a "soft investment attraction". Promotion of cinema has also become one of the federal management tools. money comes from wherever there is production. The mining and steelmaking Ruhr region, which is part of North Rhine-Westphalia, has been successfully turning into a cultural landscape since the end of the 20th century. Lig has been in Berlin since 1998 as Minister of State for Cultural Affairs in the Office of the Federal Chancellor. And since then, Germany again perceives this or that cultural issue as the business of the whole nation.
The system of promoting cinematography at the federal level was reorganized, and the Federal Cultural Fund was established. At the same time, Berlin is increasingly becoming a cultural magnet, today it is a unique cultural power field, a melting pot of cultures, in whose museums the entire history of mankind is reflected. The Holocaust memorial in the city center is a test of age carved in stone, demonstrating how a cultured nation like the Germans handles its history. Impressive proof that in the new millennium a nationwide cultural policy has become necessary. Federalism in the field of culture, prescribed by the Basic Law, can be preserved, it remains the guarantor of a versatile, high-quality cultural life throughout Germany.
The cultural scene in Germany is diverse: there are about 400 theaters and 140 professional orchestras in the area between Flensburg and Garmisch-Partenkirchen. 600 art museums with their diverse collections of international importance form a unique museum landscape. Young German painting, well known in other countries, has a lively character. Germany is one of the largest book nations (80,000 new editions and reprints per year). 350 daily newspapers and thousands of magazines testify to the pulsating media landscape. New success marks German cinema - and not only in German cinemas, but also in many countries of the world.
Foreign cultural and educational policy, along with classical diplomacy and foreign economic policy, is the third pillar of German foreign policy. Its goal is to demonstrate the image of modern Germany, to promote the process of European integration and mutual understanding between peoples. The Federal Foreign Office only partially implements its cultural policy on its own. To a greater extent, it entrusts this to intermediary organizations, for example, the Institute. Goethe or the Institute for International Cultural Relations. Institute. Goethe has 144 cultural centers in 80 countries, 16 of them in Germany. They offer German courses, assist German teachers abroad, organize literary readings, theater and film events and discussions. Na focuses primarily on cultural dialogue, organizing, for example, traveling exhibitions and international symposiums. Since 2003 cultural centers and society. primarily in Central and Eastern Europe, financed through cooperation between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and public benefit funds. German schools abroad are of great importance. There are 117 such schools with 70,000 students (of which 53,000 are non-German). Schools are run by private organizations that support them mainly through tuition fees and donations. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the German Foreign Ministry initiated a special program "European-Islamic cultural dialogue", which is designed to help improve mutual understanding.
Shortly before the turn of the millennium, German cinema was roused from its hibernation by Tom Tikwer's explosive film Run Lola Run (1998). An experimental comedy about red-haired Lola, about fate, love and chance, reflects the life sensations of the late 90s. Lola's desperate race against time in Berlin was seen around the world as a metaphor for the restless spirit of the era. With this film, director Tom Tikwer and starring Franka Potente achieved a breakthrough at the international level. In German cinema begins a period of recovery. For the first time since the era of the great Rainer Werner Fasbieder (1982), foreign countries are once again looking with interest at German cinema, which enjoys international success: the Oscar for Nowhere in Africa (Caroline Leik, 2002), the Golden Bear at the Berlinale for Head on the Wall (Fatih Akin, 2004). However, unlike Fassbinder's times, interest is shown not in any particular school of creators of auteur cinema, but in various directors with their own style. Old masters such as Wim Wenders, Volker Schlöndorff and Werner Herzog are still involved in the process, but others are causing a stir today.
German cinema is on the rise thanks to a genre that did not enjoy good fame before - thanks to comedy. The tragicomedy "Goodbye, Lenin" (Wolfgang Becker, 2003) is a success in almost 70 countries, as it tells about the collapse of socialism. In turn, Hans Weingartner's comedy "Educators" (2004) in a radical form raises the themes of the opponents of globalization. German comedies are successful because the "national" stories they tell deal with universal themes. However, the filmmakers draw material for their stories from what is happening in their own country. With breathtaking force, Fatih Akin, a Hamburger of Turkish origin, talks about the life of the Turks in Germany. In his laurel-crowned drama "Head on the Wall" (2004), he harshly and accurately, but without tearfulness, brings to the screen the love story of a Turkish woman and a Turk living in Germany. Authenticity, a clear view of life is also discussed in the social - realistic research films of Andreas Dresen. In his films, he captures everyday life in East Germany with a portable camera. Interest in turning points in the life of society brings out of the stupor and a retrospective look at painful aspects in the history of Germany. The historical drama "Sunset" (2004) by Oliver Hirschbiegel breaks the taboo and shows Hitler not as a monster, but as a man. In "Sophie Scholl" (2005), Julia Yencz creates a grandiose image of the heroine, a resistance fighter and receives a German film award for this. The rise of German cinema is based on many factors. So, German cinema has good prospects ahead.
The richness of the German media landscape is complemented by radio and television. Born in the 1920s (radio) or the 1950s (television) as public law programs, in the late 1980s they formed a motley spectrum of a dual system consisting of public law and private broadcasters. Today, about 300 radio stations compete with each other, mostly of a local or regional nature. Along with about 60 public radio companies, there are almost 240 commercial ones. In general, in its history, radio has experienced a change in its functions. With the advent of television, it has become more of a parallel media, but in terms of its use, radio ranks higher than television, to which Germans devote an average of just over 3 hours a day.
Television is divided into public and private, supra-regional and regional, full-program and thematic. Public law television broadcasts 12 national, 8 regional programs - which are received mainly by cable or satellite - and 3 transnational programs ("Deutsche Welle") as a broadcasting company broadcasting abroad; "arte", German-French channel; German-Austrian cultural channel). Thanks to this number of broadcasters, a total turnover of more than 5 billion euros from TV fees and advertising revenues and other revenues, and a very high market share, German public television is one of the largest institutions among its peers. institutions in other countries.
In 2000, the French Ministry of Culture had a budget of 16.039 billion francs (45 billion euros), which is 0.98% of the state budget. Funding for culture has risen to 75 billion francs (11.43 billion euros) and is provided half by the state and half by the territorial collectives. French families spend an average of 6,700 francs (1,02.41 euros) a year on culture, leisure, sports and games, which is 3.5% of a family's budget.
In 1998, 47,168 book titles were published, 24,514 of them were new editions, and 22,654 were reprints; in 1998, 311 publishing houses sold 415 million copies of books. The turnover of publishers in 1998 amounted to 16. billion francs (2.44 billion euros) Daily 36% of the French read 1 daily newspaper. 7 national periodicals and 160 regional (daily or weekly) Total annual circulation of 9 billion copies Among the top hundred have a circulation of more than 1 million copies, and 8 periodicals more than 500,000 copies There are 1,354 copies of periodicals per thousand inhabitants The French are considered the nation that reads illustrated magazines.
Or "deepening" or advocates their simultaneous implementation. These four "schools" correspond to the real positions of the most important members of the EU - Great Britain, Germany and France. The first school, according to Wessels, prioritizes the enlargement of the European Union. This position is based on the following arguments. First, after the changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, there should be...
From one or more documents - for example, the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms, as well as documents defining the institutional structure of the EU and the degree of their competence); changes in the institutional structure of the European Union. The option of a new delineation of competence between the EU and the Member States and a rethinking of some areas of EU activity (economic, ...
Sputnik International
France and Germany - two of the closest allies in the EU and NATO - continue their cooperation after the re-election of Angela Merkel to the post of German Federal Chancellor. It is important to note that immediately after the election, Merkel made her first foreign visit to France. In Paris, the leaders of the two European countries agreed to bridge their differences and formulate a roadmap for eurozone reforms.
Thus, the newly elected chancellor seeks to fulfill the promise of the new German government - ""to set a new start"" for Europe. As for the French president, since coming to power in May last year, the central goal of his European policy has also been a thorough review of relations in the eurozone. Hence - a new ground for cooperation.
The purpose of the reform, according to politicians, is the economic stabilization of the 19 countries of the eurozone and increase its competitiveness in a single currency bloc. The reform roadmap, which also includes the banking system, budgetary issues, and the tax system, should be ready by June.
In fact, France and Germany once again emphasize their leading positions in the European Union and express their readiness for close cooperation.
However, not everything is going as smoothly as it might seem at first glance. For example, members of Merkel's conservative bloc are wary of more comprehensive European integration, especially if it means that Germany - the European economic powerhouse - will pool risk and debt with other, less financially stable countries.
As for foreign policy issues, in relation to Russia, for example, the West does not change its position. This was once again evidenced by the merging of positions and mutual support from Britain, the United States, France and Germany over the Skripal case.
France and Germany are also united in other foreign policy issues where their opinion contradicts the US approaches, for example, in relations with Iran and the states of the Middle East as a whole. The fact is that the United States and Britain, according to many analysts, are putting pressure on the EU, as well as on NATO, so the mood of independence and freedom from the United States is becoming more and more active in the union.
In addition, back in January, Merkel called on the European Union to ensure the unity of foreign policy against the backdrop of disagreements with major international players, of course, including the United States. However, the seemingly close relations between France and Germany are far from ideal.
Germany, an economically powerful Western European country that is reserved about military interventions, has its own vision on its continent and especially in Central and Eastern Europe. And France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with a powerful army, nuclear weapons and privileged zones of influence in the south, especially in Africa, maintains its ambitions in world politics and is trying to develop relations separate from the European Union with China and India. Germany jealously accepted France's attempt to act as the sole representative of Europe, while Germany was busy with the difficult process of forming a new coalition.
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