in history

topic: "Development of Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century."

Completed:

1. Introduction. one

2 Totalitarian socialism. 2

3 Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 7

collapse of the USSR, formation of new states

in Eurasia.

4 China. eleven

Introduction.
This chapter will focus on the countries that entered the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the Cold War. They created a socio-political system, largely copied from the USSR. These countries are very different. Among them are China, the most populated country in the world, and tiny Albania, developed Czechoslovakia and backward Laos. Most of them were compactly located to the west of the USSR: from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic Seas - the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. Others in Asia are Mongolia, China, North Korea (DPRK), Laos and Vietnam. Finally, this is the Latin American state - Cuba.

^ totalitarian socialism.
Eastern Europe after World War II . The formation of totalitarian socialism in these countries proceeded in different ways. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the defeat of fascism led to the restoration of independence where it had been lost, or a change in the political regime where it had been preserved. A democratic system, universal suffrage and a multi-party system were established everywhere, agrarian reforms were carried out that destroyed large land ownership, the property of traitors and active supporters of fascism was confiscated.

The development of events in the West and in the East of Europe was very similar in the first post-war years. The difference was that Eastern Europe was liberated Soviet army, and there was a much more significant role communist parties. Firstly, because in some of them (Yugoslavia, Albania) the Communist Parties led partisan movement and, relying on it, became the most influential political force; secondly, because they enjoyed the support of the USSR, under its pressure, the communists became part of all the post-war governments of these countries, occupying, as a rule, “power” ministerial posts. When the Cold War began, relying on the positions already won and direct pressure from Moscow, the communists relatively easily and bloodlessly established their undivided power in 1947-1948.

Asian countries. The communists came to power in North Korea in much the same way. In Mongolia, China, Vietnam and Laos, the coming of the communists to power, although it was associated with the support of the USSR, was to a lesser extent. Much more it had to do with that. That the communists in these countries led the liberation, anti-colonial movement. Thanks to this, they became an influential political force and were able to come to power.

Changes in the political system . Having come to power, the communist parties set about "building socialism." The experience of the USSR was taken as a role model. The political system has been transformed. The multi-party system was either eliminated, or the parties lost their political independence, becoming part of coalitions and fronts led by the communists. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist parties. Judicial and representative power lost their independence. Following the example of the USSR, mass repressions were carried out. All rights and freedoms of citizens were actually abolished. Democracy was done away with, although constitutions were formally preserved, universal suffrage was formally preserved, "elections" were held regularly, and the leaders of these countries proudly called them countries of "people's democracy."

Planned Economy . In the field of economics, “building socialism” meant completing the nationalization of industry and finance, carrying out industrialization, cooperating Agriculture. The market economy gave way to the planned one. There was a large-scale breakdown of economic and social structures. Entrepreneurs and independent peasants disappeared. Most of the adult population was employed in the public sector of the economy.

Foreign policy . In foreign policy, all these countries to a greater or lesser extent followed the course of the USSR. Any disobedience to Moscow caused at first a very harsh reaction. As evidenced by the conflict between Tito and Stalin.

Results of socialist transformations . As a result, the social and political system in these countries was radically transformed. And just as we call similar processes in Russia after October 1917 a revolution, we have the right to call these transformations revolutionary as well. These revolutions were socialist, in the sense that they approved state property instead of private property. They led to the formation of a totalitarian political system in these countries. All this allows us to call these countries countries of totalitarian socialism.

political crises. Stalin's death in 1953 brought about major changes. Liberation from the oppressive fear of it exposed the deep contradictions of totalitarian socialism and mass dissatisfaction with it. Political crises arose in the GDR, and then in Poland and Hungary, which proved impossible to overcome without the use of force.

Policy change . In a number of countries in Eastern Europe, the Communist parties found themselves forced to change their policies in order to remove the main causes of discontent. The mass repressions were stopped and the partial rehabilitation of their victims was carried out, changes were made to the envisaged rates of industrialization, the forms of co-operation were softened, and in Poland it was stopped. Restrictions for small business were partially lifted. Later, economic reforms were carried out that weakened the rigid, administrative control over the economy. In many countries, all this was accompanied by a “thaw” in the sphere of ideology and culture.

In other countries, criticism of the most unattractive aspects of the Stalinist regime in the USSR caused alarm. The ruling leaders were concerned about the possibility of the criticism being directed at them. Not only did they not support the changes in Moscow and some Eastern European countries, but they also tried to take their own position. The first signs of Soviet-Chinese contradictions appear. In the early 1960s, Romania and North Korea were increasingly declaring their independence. Albania breaks ties with the USSR.

But. The changes in the USSR and some countries of Eastern Europe that took place after Stalin's death turned out to be shallow. Totalitarian socialism was not eliminated there, but only softened to make it more acceptable to the masses. But even this easing of the regimes after some time began to be seen by the Communist parties as a dangerous concession. The events in Czechoslovakia became clear evidence of such a danger to them.

Strengthening totalitarianism . After the intervention in Czechoslovakia, in all the countries of Eastern Europe that survived attempts to renew socialism, the totalitarian features of their system began to become tougher. Economic reforms were stopped. A backward movement began. The elements of market relations that had arisen here and there were liquidated or limited. All the dissatisfied began to be persecuted. In many countries, in connection with this, a movement of human rights activists, “dissidents”, arose.

The strengthening of totalitarianism began in countries where there were no attempts at reform and renewal. There, totalitarianism took especially extreme forms. In Albania, for example, all religions were banned in the 1960s. In China, they tried to “build communism”: the cooperatives were turned into communes, the peasants were deprived of household plots and personal property. In these countries, cults of personalities of leaders have developed: Kim Il Sung in North Korea, Mao Zedong in China, Enver Hoxha in Albania, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. All citizens were required to unquestioningly comply with their instructions.

Deterioration of the economic situation . However, the economic situation of the countries of totalitarian socialism, starting from the 70s, began to steadily worsen. Many countries in Eastern Europe began to take loans from Western countries trying to use these funds to renew the industry and accelerate development. But in the end, the problem of external debt arose. I had to pay debts. This made their situation even worse. Renewed after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership was forced to make a decision in 1978 to start market reforms in order to overcome difficulties. In the countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were not even thought of. The economic situation there became more and more difficult. Here the conditions for revolution gradually began to take shape.

^ Revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, the formation of new states in Eurasia.
Social problems. The deterioration of the economic situation in the countries of Eastern Europe led, ultimately, to the manifestation of social problems. Unemployment arose, overt or covert inflation devalued wages, food security worsened. Those features of the way of life that were fixed in the mass consciousness as the “conquest of socialism” began to disappear: the absence of unemployment, social stability, fixed prices. Totalitarian socialism has exhausted the last arguments in its defense as a more "advanced" system. The former methods, without which the existence of a totalitarian society is impossible, have become ineffective.

Frustration and discontent took various forms. The population of the GDR preferred to leave for the FRG, which took on a mass form, despite the repressions of the authorities and total surveillance. In Poland, discontent culminated in a strike movement. In 1980, during the strikes, the independent trade union Solidarity was formed, headed by an electrician from the Gdansk shipyard Lech Walesa. Solidarity absorbed almost all the opposition forces and turned into a mass organization: its membership reached 10-11 million people. The government was forced to enter into negotiations with her. A serious challenge was thrown to the authorities .. bound hand and foot by participation in the Afghan adventure, the Soviet leadership did not consider it possible to directly intervene in the events. But it had a powerful impact on the leadership of Poland, demanding a ban on Solidarity. In December 1981, martial law was introduced in the country. All Solidarity leaders were arrested, and the trade union itself was dissolved. But the military government of Poland could not find a way out of the current situation. The decline in production continued. Solidarity retained mass support. Its illegal organizations continued to function.

The crisis of totalitarian socialism has become universal: economic, social, political and moral. But in order for it to be resolved, an external push was needed. This impetus was the beginning of perestroika in the USSR. The changes that have begun have played a twofold role in this sense. M.S. Gorbachev began to support in these countries the supporters of change and “renewal of socialism” in every possible way. The former leadership lost the support of the USSR. In addition, the USSR recognized the right of the people to choose the path of development. For the peoples of Eastern Europe, this meant that Soviet intervention was now hardly possible.

The collapse of the Iron Curtain. In the political sphere, as a rule, the line on the liquidation of totalitarianism continued. In foreign policy, the turn was especially sharp. Democratic forces began to seek the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territory. Everything international organizations, created by the countries of Eastern Europe with the participation of the USSR, were dissolved.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall. More and more insistently the demand was put forward for joining the economic and political unions of the countries of the West. The "Iron Curtain" that had divided Europe throughout the years of the Cold War was collapsing. In the very first days of the revolution in the GDR, free passage to West Berlin was allowed - the Berlin Wall ceased to exist.

The collapse of totalitarian socialism. The 40-year history of totalitarian socialism in Eastern Europe is over. The Communists, having seized power here and started the “building of socialism”, promised a sharp acceleration in the development of these countries. This goal was achieved in 40-50 years. Industry has become the leading branch of the economy. Agriculture has been transformed. Most of the inhabitants of these countries have become city dwellers. The level of education of the population has increased. But having managed with colossal sacrifices to ensure a breakthrough towards an industrial society, totalitarian socialism proved unable to solve the problems of this more highly developed society.

The collapse of totalitarian socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR created a new situation in Europe. Now there is not a single totalitarian state here.

The collapse of the USSR. The changes that began in the USSR in 1985 also touched the foundations state structure. Although the USSR was constitutionally a federal state, none of the 15 union republics had real power. Therefore, they began to demand greater independence from the center. These demands intensified as the economic situation worsened, when the center was unable to stop him. In the elections of 1989-1990, supporters of strengthening the independence of the republics, up to their separation from the USSR, invariably prevailed. The strongest movement for independence turned out to be in the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova.

But the growing movement to strengthen the sovereignty of Russia, the largest republic, played a decisive role. After the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia, the conservative leadership of the USSR tried to stage a coup, remove supporters of the independence of the republics from power and save the USSR. But the path they took in August 1991 failed, on December 8, 1991, the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine - Stanislav Shushkevich, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk - announced in Belovezhskaya Pushcha the termination of the existence of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Section of the armed forces. The collapse of the USSR posed many problems for the new states. The question arose about the armed forces. At first, the CIS countries tried to maintain the combined armed forces, but then each began to create their own. I had to share the military property of the USSR. The most controversial issue remains the division of the Black Sea Fleet by Russia and Ukraine. Having become the successor of the USSR, Russia retained the status of a nuclear power. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, on whose territory there were nuclear weapons, agreed to declare themselves non-nuclear states and transfer them to Russia. The Baltic countries generally refused to join the CIS and demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops. This withdrawal was completed in 1994.

Ways of economic development of the republics. After becoming independent, the republics of the former USSR took different paths of economic development. The ruble ceased to be a common currency, they all acquired their own monetary systems.

China.
After World War II, China was divided into two parts. Northeast China was under the control of the Communists, the rest-Kuomintang. In 1949 the communists were victorious. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was formed. Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek took refuge on the island of Taiwan with the remnants of his troops. The Chinese Communists began a profound transformation in the country. They carried out agrarian reform and agricultural cooperatives. Rapid industrialization began. In the course of "building socialism," China took a major step in overcoming backwardness. In its foreign policy, China at that time was guided by the USSR and received help from it. China's success prompted Mao Zedong to put forward a plan for even more accelerated development. He proposed a "great leap" to build a communist society in China. At the same time, the Chinese leadership began to reconsider its relations with the USSR. The Great Leap Forward failed. An economic crisis broke out in the country. There was opposition to the plans of Mao Zedong. He tried to deal with her during the "cultural revolution". The country ended up in chaos. Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated completely. China has acquired its own nuclear weapons. There were border clashes. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, "pragmatists" led by Deng Xiaoping came to power in China. They restored order in the country, rehabilitated the victims of the “cultural revolution”. Economic reforms were carried out: market relations developed, foreign investment was encouraged, land was distributed to peasants in the form of a family contract, small and medium-sized businesses appeared. China has emerged from the crisis and entered a period of high economic growth. But all attempts to supplement economic reforms with democratization were severely suppressed. The “pragmatists” supported the West in its attempts to isolate the USSR, but after 1985 they went to normalize relations with it. In China, along with the totalitarian political system, there are significant elements of market relations. This form of development turned out to be acceptable for other countries of totalitarian socialism - Vietnam and Laos.

Used literature: A.A. Creder " recent history 20th century".

With the defeat of fascism, coalition governments came to power in Eastern European countries, in which anti-fascist parties were represented (communists, social democrats, liberals, etc.). The first transformations were of a general democratic nature, were aimed at eradicating the remnants of fascism, restoring the economy destroyed by the war. With the aggravation of contradictions between the USSR and its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USA and Great Britain, the beginning of the Cold War in the countries of Eastern Europe, political forces were polarized into supporters of a pro-Western and pro-Soviet orientation. In the 1947-1948s. in these countries, most of which had Soviet troops, all those who did not share communist views were forced out of the governments.

Eastern Europe: features of the development model. The remnants of a multi-party system have been preserved in the countries that have received the name of people's democracies. Political parties in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, which recognized the leading role of the communists, were not dissolved, their representatives were allocated a quota in parliaments and governments. Otherwise, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet model of the totalitarian regime was reproduced with its inherent features: the cult of the leader, mass repressions. According to the Soviet model, the collectivization of agriculture (Poland was a partial exception) and industrialization were carried out.

Formally, the Eastern European countries were considered independent states. At the same time, with the creation of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Informburo) in 1947, the actual leadership of the "fraternal countries" began to be carried out from Moscow. The fact that in the USSR they will not tolerate any amateur performance was shown by the extremely negative reaction of I.V. Stalin on the policy of the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - G. Dimitrov and I. Tito. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia included a clause on counteracting "any aggression, no matter which side it comes from." The leaders of these states came up with the idea of ​​creating a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would allow them to independently choose a development model.

The task of modernizing was undoubtedly relevant for the Eastern European countries. The ruling communist parties in them sought to solve these problems by socialist methods, copying the experience of modernization in the USSR during the first five-year plans. At the same time, it was not taken into account that in small countries the creation of industrial giants is rational only if they integrate with their neighbors. A confederation in Eastern Europe, pooling the resources of the Eastern European countries would be economically justified. However, the Soviet leadership saw in this idea a threat to its influence on the countries liberated from fascism.

The USSR's response to attempts to manifest independence was the severance of relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the regime of Tito, who was accused of going over to the positions of bourgeois nationalism. Transformations in Yugoslavia proceeded in the same way as in neighboring countries. Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. For all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.

Totalitarian regimes in most Eastern European countries remained unstable. The post-war history of Eastern Europe is replete with attempts to free themselves from the regimes supported by the USSR and to revise the ideological foundations of socialism. For the population of Eastern European countries, despite the wall of information blockade between the East and West of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the economic policy of the ruling communist regimes was a complete failure. Thus, before the Second World War, the standards of living in West and East Germany, Austria and Hungary were approximately the same. Over time, by the 1980s, in countries building socialism according to Soviet recipes, the standard of living was three times lower than in neighboring states where a socially oriented market economy had developed.

The crisis of the Soviet model of socialism in Eastern Europe began to develop almost immediately after its establishment. Death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, which gave rise to hopes for changes in the "socialist camp", caused an uprising in the GDR.

The exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 led to a change in the leaders of the ruling parties nominated and supported by him in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over internal politics Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, new leaders, theorists of communist parties, including the ruling ones (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), made attempts to comprehend new phenomena and trends in social -economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts provoked sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the integrity of the established order in Eastern Europe.

USSR policy towards Eastern European countries. Attempts to dismantle the totalitarian structures of power in Hungary in 1956, the transition to a multi-party system, undertaken by the leadership of the ruling party, grew into an anti-totalitarian, democratic revolution. These aspirations were suppressed by the Soviet troops. An attempt at reform, a transition to "socialism with a human face", undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968, was also thwarted by armed force.

There was no legal justification for the deployment of troops in both cases. The reason was the request of the "group of leaders" for assistance in the fight against the "counter-revolution", allegedly directed from outside and threatening the foundations of socialism. Loyalty to the principle of its collective defense was repeatedly declared by the ruling parties of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. However, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the leaders of the ruling party and state raised the question not of abandoning socialism, but of improving it. The persons who invited foreign troops into the country were not authorized by anyone to do so. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has arrogated to itself the right to decide what is in the interests of socialism not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. Under L. I. Brezhnev, the concept of real socialism was formulated, according to which only the understanding of socialism accepted in the USSR had the right to exist. Any deviations from it were considered as a transition to positions hostile to progress, to the Soviet Union.

The theory of real socialism, which justifies the right of the USSR to carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the "Brezhnev doctrine" in Western countries. The background of this doctrine was determined by two factors.

First, there were ideological considerations. Recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU among the peoples of the USSR as well.

Secondly, in the conditions of the Cold War, the split of Europe into two military-political blocs, the weakening of one of them objectively turned out to be a gain for the other. The rupture by Hungary or Czechoslovakia of allied relations with the USSR (this was one of the requirements of the reformers) was seen as violating the balance of power in Europe. Although in the era of nuclear missile weapons the question of where the frontier of confrontation lies lost its former significance, the historical memory about invasions from the West. It prompted the Soviet leadership to strive to ensure that the troops of the potential enemy, which was considered the NATO bloc, were deployed as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. At the same time, the fact that many Eastern Europeans felt like hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation was underestimated, realizing that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the USA, the territory of Eastern Europe would become the main battlefield for interests alien to them.

Deepening the crisis of "real socialism". In the 1970s reforms were gradually carried out in many countries of Eastern Europe, limited opportunities for the development of free market relations opened up, trade and economic ties with states were intensified Western Europe limited repression against dissidents. In particular, an independent, non-partisan pacifist movement emerged in Hungary. The changes, however, were limited, carried out with an eye on the position of the USSR leadership, which disapproved of them.

The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in the Eastern European countries strove to maintain at least minimal internal support and the need to reckon with the rigid position of the CPSU ideologists intolerant of any reforms in the allied countries.

The events in Poland in 1980-1981 became a kind of turning point, where the independent trade union "Solidarity" was formed, which immediately took an anti-communist position. Its members included millions of members of the Polish working class who rejected the right of the communist bureaucracy to rule in its name. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. Martial law was introduced in Poland and the authoritarian rule of General W. Jaruzelski was established. This marked the complete collapse of the idea of ​​"real socialism", which was forced to be replaced, with the approval of the USSR, by a military dictatorship.

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

From the memoirs of M. Djilas, a member of the Central Committee of the SKYU, in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993." M., 1995. S. 222-223:

“Stalin pursued two goals. The first is to subjugate Yugoslavia and through it all of Eastern Europe. There was another option. If it doesn't work out with Yugoslavia, then subdue Eastern Europe without it. He got the second<...>

This was not written anywhere, but I remember from confidential conversations that in the countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, Romania, Hungary - there was a tendency towards independent development<...>In 1946 I was at the Congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague. There Gottwald said that the level of culture of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is different. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia is an industrialized country and socialism will develop in it differently, in more civilized forms, without the upheavals that were in the Soviet Union, where industrialization overcame very difficult stages. Gottwald opposed collectivization in Czechoslovakia In essence, his views were not very different from ours. Gottwald lacked the character to fight Stalin. And Tito was strong man <...>Nor did Gomułka succeed in defending his position. At one meeting of the Information Bureau, Gomułka spoke about the Polish road to socialism. Dimitrov also thought about independent development.”

From the statement of N.S. Khrushchev May 26, 1955 in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993". M., 1995. S. 221:

“We sincerely regret what has happened and resolutely brush aside all the accretions of this period<...>We thoroughly studied the materials on which the grave accusations and insults that were then leveled against the leadership of Yugoslavia were based. The facts show that these materials are fabricated by the enemies of the people, the contemptible agents of imperialism, fraudulently infiltrated into the ranks of our party.

We are deeply convinced that the period when our relations were overshadowed is over.”

From the memoirs of Z. Mlynarzh, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "The frost hit from the Kremlin." M., 1992. S. 130:

“The years of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia only strengthened in the national consciousness those ideals that the authorities tried in every possible way to eradicate. The dictatorship clearly showed what their oblivion leads to, and this prompted even "ideologically convinced" Stalinists to take the path of reforms. In the minds of peoples, the values ​​of democracy and humanism were rehabilitated long before 1968<...>To live in fear, acting on orders, and not in the way that deep down you think is right, worthy, is a heavy burden for an individual, and for a social group, and for the whole people. Therefore, getting rid of such fear is welcomed as resurrection.

QUESTIONS AND TASKS

1. What factors determined the choice of the model for the development of the states of Eastern Europe after the Second World War? What was common and what distinguished the post-war development of these countries?

2. What events of the 1940s-1980s showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?

3. What was the Brezhnev Doctrine, what was its main ideological, political meaning?

Zagladin N. The World History: XX century. Textbook for schoolchildren in grades 10-11

Chapter 12

According to the views of many geopoliticians, due to the population, abundance of resources, and a fairly high level of economic development, the territory from the Rhine to the Urals is the "heart of the Earth", control over which ensures hegemony over Eurasia, and, accordingly, the world. Eastern Europe is the center of the "heart of the Earth", which determines its special significance. Indeed, historically, Eastern Europe has been a battleground for powers and an arena for the interaction of different cultures. In past centuries, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Germany, and Russia claimed dominance over it. There were also attempts to create strong West Slavic states, the largest state formation of them was Poland, which was divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia in the 18th-19th centuries.
Most of the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary - appeared on political map world after the First World War. Being mainly agrarian and agrarian-industrial, having territorial claims to each other, in the interwar period they became hostages of the relations between the great powers, a bargaining chip in their confrontation. Ultimately, in the role of satellites, junior partners, occupied protectorates, they were subordinated to Nazi Germany.
The subordinate, dependent character of the situation in Eastern Europe did not change even after the Second World War.

§ 38. EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY

With the defeat of fascism, coalition governments came to power in Eastern European countries, in which anti-fascist parties were represented (communists, social democrats, liberals, etc.). The first transformations were of a general democratic nature, were aimed at eradicating the remnants of fascism, restoring the economy destroyed by the war. With the aggravation of contradictions between the USSR and its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USA and Great Britain, the beginning of the Cold War in the countries of Eastern Europe, political forces were polarized into supporters of a pro-Western and pro-Soviet orientation. In 1947-1948s. in these countries, most of which had Soviet troops, all those who did not share communist views were forced out of the governments.
Eastern Europe: features of the development model. The remnants of a multi-party system have been preserved in the countries that have received the name of people's democracies. Political parties in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, which recognized the leading role of the communists, were not dissolved, their representatives were allocated a quota in parliaments and governments. Otherwise, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet model of the totalitarian regime was reproduced with its inherent features: the cult of the leader, mass repressions. According to the Soviet model, the collectivization of agriculture (Poland was a partial exception) and industrialization were carried out.
Formally, the Eastern European countries were considered independent states. At the same time, with the creation of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Informburo) in 1947, the actual leadership of the "fraternal countries" began to be carried out from Moscow. The fact that in the USSR they will not tolerate any amateur performance was shown by the extremely negative reaction of I.V. Stalin on the policy of the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - G. Dimitrov and I. Tito. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia included a clause on counteracting "any aggression, no matter which side it comes from." The leaders of these states came up with the idea of ​​creating a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would allow them to independently choose a development model.
The task of modernizing was undoubtedly relevant for the Eastern European countries. The ruling communist parties in them sought to solve these problems by socialist methods, copying the experience of modernization in the USSR during the first five-year plans. At the same time, it was not taken into account that in small countries the creation of industrial giants is rational only if they integrate with their neighbors. A confederation in Eastern Europe, pooling the resources of the Eastern European countries would be economically justified. However, the Soviet leadership saw in this idea a threat to its influence on the countries liberated from fascism.
The USSR's response to attempts to manifest independence was the severance of relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the regime of Tito, who was accused of going over to the positions of bourgeois nationalism. Transformations in Yugoslavia proceeded in the same way as in neighboring countries. Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. For all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.
Totalitarian regimes in most Eastern European countries remained unstable. The post-war history of Eastern Europe is replete with attempts to free themselves from the regimes supported by the USSR and to revise the ideological foundations of socialism. For the population of Eastern European countries, despite the wall of information blockade between the East and West of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the economic policy of the ruling communist regimes was a complete failure. Thus, before the Second World War, the standards of living in West and East Germany, Austria and Hungary were approximately the same. Over time, by the 1980s, in countries building socialism according to Soviet recipes, the standard of living was three times lower than in neighboring states where a socially oriented market economy had developed.
The crisis of the Soviet model of socialism in Eastern Europe began to develop almost immediately after its establishment. Death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, which gave rise to hopes for changes in the "socialist camp", caused an uprising in the GDR.
The exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 led to a change in the leaders of the ruling parties nominated and supported by him in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over the domestic politics of the Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, new leaders, theorists of communist parties, including the ruling ones (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), made attempts to comprehend new phenomena and trends in social -economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts provoked sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the integrity of the established order in Eastern Europe.
USSR policy towards Eastern European countries. Attempts to dismantle the totalitarian structures of power in Hungary in 1956, the transition to a multi-party system, undertaken by the leadership of the ruling party, grew into an anti-totalitarian, democratic revolution. These aspirations were suppressed by the Soviet troops. An attempt at reform, a transition to "socialism with a human face", undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968, was also thwarted by armed force.
There was no legal justification for the deployment of troops in both cases. The reason was the request of the "group of leaders" for assistance in the fight against the "counter-revolution", allegedly directed from outside and threatening the foundations of socialism. Loyalty to the principle of its collective defense was repeatedly declared by the ruling parties of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. However, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the leaders of the ruling party and state raised the question not of abandoning socialism, but of improving it. The persons who invited foreign troops into the country were not authorized by anyone to do so. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has arrogated to itself the right to decide what is in the interests of socialism not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. Under L. I. Brezhnev, the concept of real socialism was formulated, according to which only the understanding of socialism accepted in the USSR had the right to exist. Any deviations from it were considered as a transition to positions hostile to progress, to the Soviet Union.
The theory of real socialism, which justifies the right of the USSR to carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the "Brezhnev doctrine" in Western countries. The background of this doctrine was determined by two factors.
First, there were ideological considerations. Recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU among the peoples of the USSR as well.
Secondly, in the conditions of the Cold War, the split of Europe into two military-political blocs, the weakening of one of them objectively turned out to be a gain for the other. The rupture by Hungary or Czechoslovakia of allied relations with the USSR (this was one of the requirements of the reformers) was seen as violating the balance of power in Europe. Although in the era of nuclear missiles the question of where the line of confrontation lies has lost its former significance, the historical memory of invasions from the West has been preserved. It prompted the Soviet leadership to strive to ensure that the troops of the potential enemy, which was considered the NATO bloc, were deployed as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. At the same time, the fact that many Eastern Europeans felt like hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation was underestimated, realizing that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the USA, the territory of Eastern Europe would become the main battlefield for interests alien to them.
Deepening the crisis of "real socialism". In the 1970s reforms were gradually carried out in many countries of Eastern Europe, limited opportunities for the development of free market relations were opened up, trade and economic ties with the states of Western Europe were intensified, and repressions against dissidents were limited. In particular, an independent, non-partisan pacifist movement emerged in Hungary. The changes, however, were limited, carried out with an eye on the position of the USSR leadership, which disapproved of them.
The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in the Eastern European countries strove to maintain at least minimal internal support and the need to reckon with the rigid position of the CPSU ideologists intolerant of any reforms in the allied countries.
The events in Poland in 1980-1981 became a kind of turning point, where the independent trade union Solidarity was formed, which immediately took an anti-communist position. Its members included millions of members of the Polish working class who rejected the right of the communist bureaucracy to rule in its name. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. Martial law was introduced in Poland and the authoritarian rule of General W. Jaruzelski was established. This marked the complete collapse of the idea of ​​"real socialism", which was forced to be replaced, with the approval of the USSR, by a military dictatorship.
DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
FrommemoriesM. Djilas, memberCentral CommitteeSKU, incollection: "Russia, whichwenotknew, 1939— 1993". M., 1995. C. 222-223:
“Stalin pursued two goals. The first is to subjugate Yugoslavia and through it all of Eastern Europe. There was another option. If it doesn't work out with Yugoslavia, then subdue Eastern Europe without it. He got the second<...>
This was not written anywhere, but I remember from confidential conversations that in the countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, Romania, Hungary - there was a tendency towards independent development<...>In 1946 I was at the Congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague. There Gottwald said that the level of culture of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is different. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia is an industrialized country and socialism will develop in it differently, in more civilized forms, without the upheavals that were in the Soviet Union, where industrialization overcame very difficult stages. Gottwald opposed collectivization in Czechoslovakia In essence, his views were not very different from ours. Gottwald lacked the character to fight Stalin. And Tito was a strong man<...>Nor did Gomułka succeed in defending his position. At one meeting of the Information Bureau, Gomułka spoke about the Polish road to socialism. Dimitrov also thought about independent development.”
FromstatementsH.FROM. Khrushchev26 of May1955 incollection: "Russia, whichwenotknew, 1939— 1993". M., 1995. C. 221:
“We sincerely regret what has happened and resolutely brush aside all the accretions of this period<...>We thoroughly studied the materials on which the grave accusations and insults that were then leveled against the leadership of Yugoslavia were based. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, the contemptible agents of imperialism who tricked their way into the ranks of our party.
We are deeply convinced that the period when our relations were overshadowed is over.”
Frommemories3. Mlynarzha, memberCentral CommitteeHRC, "FreezinghitfromKremlin". M., 1992. C. 130:
“The years of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia only strengthened in the national consciousness those ideals that the authorities tried in every possible way to eradicate. The dictatorship clearly showed what their oblivion leads to, and this prompted even "ideologically convinced" Stalinists to take the path of reforms. In the minds of peoples, the values ​​of democracy and humanism were rehabilitated long before 1968<...>To live in fear, acting on orders, and not in the way that deep down you think is right, worthy, is a heavy burden for an individual, and for a social group, and for the whole people. Therefore, getting rid of such fear is welcomed as resurrection.

QUESTIONS AND TASKS
1. What factors determined the choice of the model for the development of the states of Eastern Europe after the Second World War? What was common and what distinguished the post-war development of these countries?
2. What events of the 1940s-1980s showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?
3. What was the Brezhnev Doctrine, what was its main ideological, political meaning?

§ 39. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS OF TOTALITAR SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

The 20th century witnessed not only the rise, but also the decline of totalitarianism, the collapse of totalitarian political regimes in many countries. This is not a whim of history, but rather a natural product of social development.
The Soviet Union demonstrated an ability to solve large-scale problems that amazed the imagination of contemporaries. In a record short time, the USSR turned into a powerful industrial power, managed to defeat the main ground forces of Germany in the Second World War, overcome its lag behind the United States in the creation of atomic weapons, and be the first to start space exploration.
At the same time, in the process of its development, the USSR fully demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in any totalitarian regime, which determined the inevitability of its collapse.
The collapse of the administrative-command system. In a system of decision-making without extensive discussion, one leader or a group of leaders often erroneously determined the priorities in the allocation of resources. Resources were spent on projects that did not give returns, and even turned into damage.
Both in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe, many “constructions of the century” were carried out, the economic feasibility of which was doubtful, and the environmental inferiority was indisputable. At the same time, no special attention was paid to the development of energy-saving and resource-saving technologies. For ideological reasons, a ban was imposed on research in the field of creating artificial intelligence, genetics, which led to a serious lag in these important areas of scientific and technological progress. Based on ideological considerations, solidarity with the "anti-imperialist" regimes in 1957-1964. The USSR provided economic assistance to more than 20 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It covered up to 50% of Egypt's expenses for economic development, up to 15% - of India. Readiness N.S. Khrushchev to help any regime that expressed an interest in the ideals of socialism, led to a waste of the resources of the USSR, without bringing any significant economic or military-political benefits. Subsequently, most of the regimes that received assistance entered the orbit of influence of the developed countries of the West. Due to a purely volitional decision, taken even without discussion by the leading bodies of the ruling party and the state, the USSR in 1979 supported by force of arms a pro-Soviet-oriented group in the ruling elite of Afghanistan. This action was regarded by the people of Afghanistan and most of the developing countries as an act of aggression. The USSR was drawn into a senseless and hopeless war that cost a lot of human and material losses and undermined its international prestige.
The centralized, administrative-command management of the economy, as its scale grew, required the growth of the administrative apparatus, working with diminishing returns. One "center of power" in principle is not able to monitor, control and plan, especially for several years in advance, all communications between tens of thousands of large, small and medium-sized enterprises, changes in world market conditions. This created anarchy in the economy, which remained centrally planned only in name. During the entire existence of the USSR, the tasks of the five-year plans have never been fully fulfilled (not to mention the “seven-year plan” of N.S. Khrushchev, the results of which were not summed up at all). In the 1980s the growth rate of production became zero. The tasks formulated by the ruling party to transfer the economy to an intensive path of development, using the technologies of the information age, were not fulfilled. One of the reasons for this was that the heads of industries, regions, and enterprises feared the emergence of mass unemployment and were not ready to solve the social problems of modernization.
Crisis of ideology. Ensuring mass support for itself with the help of ideology, the totalitarian regime had to constantly demonstrate success, confirm the realism of the formulated super-tasks, otherwise enthusiasm gives way to disappointment and irritation.
The leaders of the USSR and other countries that proclaimed themselves to have reached the lower phase of communism were bound by the obligation to build the most progressive and just society in the world, where the needs of people (of course, reasonable ones) would be completely satisfied. So, the leader of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, put forward the slogan - "Five years of hard work, ten thousand years of a happy life." In the Program of the CPSU, adopted under N.S. Khrushchev, contained an obligation to achieve communism during the lifetime of his contemporary generation Soviet people, by 1980 to surpass the most developed country in the world - the United States in the main indicators of development.
The ideologists of the CPSU and other ruling related parties offered various explanations for the reasons why the goals set were unattainable. However, these explanations, even taken seriously, objectively weakened the foundations of totalitarian statehood. References to the intrigues of external and internal enemies intensified the atmosphere of general suspicion in society, which was used for career purposes by self-serving factions of the bureaucratic elite, cracking down on the most talented and creative part of the intelligentsia. Exposure of miscalculations, mistakes and crimes of previous leaders, often being fair, discredited the totalitarian regime in general.
Criticism of leaders is a common and habitual thing in a democracy. In the USSR, after the doxology to the wise and infallible leaders I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, one turned out to be guilty of genocide, the extermination of millions of his own fellow citizens, the other of voluntarism, unwillingness to reckon with objective realities, the third - in stagnation, inertia. Since the totalitarian regime is built on the deification of the leaders, their debunking or obvious physical infirmity (Yu.V. Andropov, KU Chernenko) were the source of the fall in trust in him. Lies about alleged success played a large role in ensuring the stability of the regime, but with the development of means mass media and their globalization, thanks to international broadcasting, satellite television, it became more and more difficult to hide the truth.
Over time, the enthusiasm of the masses was inevitably replaced by apathy, irony, the desire to find alternative ways of development, in the 1980s. engulfed the leadership of the CPSU, the CPC, and other ruling parties.
Disappointment in ideology befell not only the ruled, but also many parts of the administrative apparatus. Only at the origins of the communist movement were leaders who were sincerely convinced of the correctness of their idea, capable of conveying their conviction to others. For many representatives of the hierarchical, bureaucratic management mechanism, ideology has become not so much a symbol of faith as a tribute to ritual, a means of covering up their personal interests, including in the area of ​​enrichment.
According to a number of theorists - from a former associate of V.I. Lenina L.D. Trotsky to M. Djilas, a Yugoslav Marxist branded as a renegade in the USSR, the totalitarian regime, even if it is initially built on the ideas of social egalitarianism, inevitably gives rise to a new ruling class - the bureaucratic elite, the nomenklatura. Over time, its desire to legalize the accumulated wealth creates a layer in the leadership of the totalitarian regime, for which the socialist idea becomes a burden. In the regions, in the localities, their own layer of the oligarchy is being formed, for which control over its activities by the center of power turns out to be an obstacle to enrichment, which becomes a source of separatist tendencies.
Isolation in the international arena. The Soviet totalitarian regime, due to its inherent distrust of the policies of countries dominated by a different ideology, aspirations for complete control over all spheres of society, was very apprehensive about international cooperation. The possibilities of using the advantages of the international division of labor, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation were deliberately limited. The desire for self-isolation was fueled by the policy of restrictions on trade pursued by the countries of the West during the Cold War, which was also a factor in the loss of momentum.
Initially, with the coming to power in the countries of Eastern Europe, the communists, each of them, following the Soviet model, began to carry out industrialization, striving to move to full self-sufficiency. With the creation in 1949 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance between the USSR and the Eastern European countries, a system of international division of labor was formed, but the pace of its development was inferior to that of Western Europe.
The establishment of direct links between enterprises, the formation of international firms in conditions where integration was carried out within the framework and on the basis of interstate agreements, required countless approvals and received practically no development. Planning for the development of foreign trade relations with the establishment of fixed prices for a five-year period led to the separation of prices within the CMEA from the global ones. Thus, with an increase in world energy prices after 1973, the USSR continued to supply them to its partners at the same, low prices, to the detriment of its interests. But in the 1980s. prices for Soviet oil and gas were higher than the world average. This has become a source of economic difficulties already in the countries of Eastern Europe.
The low effectiveness of integration within the framework of the CMEA intensified the hidden dissatisfaction of its participants with the established model of relations. The aspirations, including those of the largest CMEA country, the USSR, to develop trade and economic ties with highly developed countries of the West, the acquisition of high technologies produced by them, consumer goods. The share of Western countries in the foreign trade turnover of the USSR in just 20 years, from 1960 to 1980, doubled - from 15% to 33.6%. At the same time, finished products were mainly purchased, instead of establishing its joint production, which is much more economically profitable. (One of the few exceptions was the creation of the Soviet-Italian automobile plant in the city of Togliatti, which began producing Zhiguli cars.)
If the USSR had the opportunity through the sale of natural resources, oil, gas, which in the 1970s. became the main ones in its exports, to conduct a balanced trade with the countries of the West, then its CMEA partners very soon faced an increase in debt, inflation, and an undermining of development prospects.
The difficulties of relations with countries that were previously ranked among the reliable allies of the USSR, in the world of socialism, undermined confidence in the ideology professed by the CPSU. Claims that relations of a new type were developing between the countries building socialism looked unconvincing. Friction between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the conflict between the USSR and China, which escalated into clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border, the war between China and Vietnam in 1979, dissatisfaction with the CMEA clearly showed that totalitarian socialism is very far from peacefulness.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
N.S. Khrushchev(1894-1971) - successor to I.V. Stalin as First Secretary of the CE £ CPSU (1953-1964), at the same time Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1958-1964).
N.S. Khrushchev was born in the village of Kalinovka, Kursk province, worked as a shepherd, a mechanic at factories and mines in Donbass. In 1918 he joined the Bolshevik Party, participated in civil war. He graduated from the working faculty of the Donetsk Industrial Institute and began to move up the party hierarchy quite quickly: from the secretary of the party cell of the workers' faculty to the secretary of the party committee of the Industrial Academy (1929), then the secretary of the district committee in Moscow, since 1934 - a member of the Central Committee of the party, head of the Moscow city and regional party organizations. From 1938 to 1949 he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in 1949-1953. - Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
N.S. Khrushchev was a typical nominee Stalin era, a period when not education was most valued, but a worker-peasant origin, a fanatical faith in the communist idea, personified by the supreme leader. The lack of deep knowledge among Stalin's nominees was compensated by self-confidence, the belief that, possessing an advanced ideology, they were able to solve problems of any complexity. Career advancement, especially under the conditions of mass repressions, constant search and exposure of "enemies of the people" required sophistication in intrigues and demagogy.
The nomination of Khrushchev to the first role in the party in the conditions of the struggle for power that began after the death of I.V. Stalin, was a compromise between the leaders, much more famous in the country (L. Beria, V. Molotov, G. Malenkov and others). They, however, underestimated Khrushchev's acumen and peasant ingenuity. L. Beria was the first to fall in 1954, accused, in the spirit of the Stalinist trials, of crimes against the people and the party, including espionage activities and sentenced to death penalty. In 1956, Khrushchev spoke at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, exposing the mass repressions of the Stalinist period, in which the entire Stalinist guard, including Khrushchev himself, had a hand in carrying out. It is difficult to say whether Khrushchev really suddenly realized the criminal nature of the repressions, but their condemnation gave him strong arguments in the struggle to consolidate his power against the Stalinist guard. An attempt to remove Khrushchev, undertaken in 1957 by Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, ended in failure, its initiators were expelled from all posts, expelled from the party and retired.
Strictly speaking, the groundlessness of many repressions in 1938 was recognized by I.V. Stalin, who laid the blame for their scope on the subsequently executed N.I. Yezhov, although the repressions continued after that. Since the resumption of the "great terror" after the XX Congress of the CPSU did not follow, many of the repressed were previously rehabilitated, the society became more open, the name of N.S. Khrushchev is often associated with the "thaw". Nevertheless, there is no reason to consider Khrushchev a supporter of liberal democracy. He was characterized by the same authoritarian decision-making style as Stalin, which, combined with impulsiveness of character, incompetence in many matters, fanatical faith in the truth of learned dogmas, caused great harm. Subsequently, already retired, Khrushchev said: “Deciding on the arrival of the“ thaw ”and going for it consciously, the leadership of the USSR, including myself, were at the same time afraid of it: no matter how because of it there was a“ flood ”that would overwhelm us and with whom it will be difficult for us to cope<...>We were afraid of losing our former opportunities to govern the country, holding back the growth of sentiments that were objectionable from the point of view of the leadership. Otherwise, such a shaft would have gone, which would have demolished everything in its path. It was feared that the leadership would not be able to cope with its functions and direct the process of change in such a direction that it would remain Soviet. We wanted to unleash the creative forces of people, but in such a way that new creations would contribute to the strengthening of socialism. (Khrushchev N.S. Memories. Selected Fragments. M., 1997. S. 507.)
Among the most unsuccessful actions of Khrushchev, it is customary to attribute the transfer of the Crimean region to Ukraine in 1954, experiments with agriculture: directives on the widespread, without regard to climatic conditions, the introduction of corn, increasing the level of socialization of the peasantry's personal economy, up to the prohibition to keep livestock. A negative role was played by constant ineffective administrative reforms (the creation of economic councils, attempts to divide party structures into industrial and agrarian ones). Khrushchev could not resist attacks on the creative intelligentsia, attempts to teach artists what and how to write to them.
Foreign policy was also inconsistent. Under Khrushchev, relations with Yugoslavia first improved, then again aggravated, a conflict with China began to flare up, large resources were wasted on helping the countries of Asia and Africa, which subsequently broke off relations with the USSR. Increased openness in foreign policy, readiness for personal communication with leaders foreign countries, the search for compromises was combined with adventurism, unpredictability, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war during the Caribbean crisis of 1962. Khrushchev's threats to "bury" America, produce missiles, "like sausages", were perceived as evidence of the impossibility of stable relations.
In 1964, the party-state elite, nominated and supported by Khrushchev - Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest and others, took advantage of the moment when the aging leader was resting in the Crimea, and decided to remove him from power. Being retired, actually under house arrest, N.S. Khrushchev dictated the memoirs, which, despite the restrictions of his contacts, ended up abroad and were published.

QUESTIONS AND TASKS
1. Expand the role of ideology in totalitarian regimes. Was she the source of their strength or their weakness? Explain the answer.
2. What role does the personality of the leader play under a totalitarian regime? Draw conclusions about the significance of miscalculations, mistakes of leaders for the development of their countries.
3. Show on the examples of the USSR and other socialist states, what was the effectiveness and weakness of totalitarianism.
4. Compare post-war integration processes in Western and Eastern Europe. How do you explain the reasons for the low effectiveness of integration within the CMEA?
5. Compose a short report about N.S. Khrushchev. Assess the significance of his activities for the country. Was he a charismatic leader?

§ 40. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE: EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

The symptoms of the crisis of the Soviet model of totalitarian socialism manifested themselves primarily in the economy (zero growth, obsolescence and depreciation of fixed production assets, lagging behind Western countries in mastering new technologies, low living standards for the majority of the population, etc.).
It is for this reason that attempts at reform from above, intensified with the election of Yu.V. Andropov to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1983 and continued with the nomination of M.S. Gorbachev in 1985, began with the economic sphere.
From perestroika to democratic revolution. The first transformations were carried out based on administrative-command management methods. Measures were taken to tighten labor discipline, introduce product quality control, improve society through an anti-alcohol campaign. The return on these measures turned out to be minimal, which created incentives to search for ways to more deeply reform the entire complex of social relations.
The purpose of perestroika was to release the resources for the development of society. In the international arena, this goal was served by the end of the Cold War and deeper participation in the system of the international division of labor. In the field of economics, it was about expanding the independence of enterprises, introducing elements of market relations. This was supposed to increase interest in the introduction of new technologies, create incentives to increase labor productivity. The ideas of glasnost and democratization were put forward in the hope that they would reveal the accumulated shortcomings and make it possible, by awakening the initiative from below, to renew the composition of the political and economic leadership of the country.
It was about an evolutionary change in the form of the political regime, overcoming such of its features as the total control of power over all spheres of society, the introduction of elements of a real separation of powers, and the promotion of the formation of civil society structures. In the case of the full implementation of the concept of perestroika in the Soviet Union, most likely, a society with a mixed economy, strong mechanisms of social protection of the population, reminiscent of the Swedish model of socialism, capable of further modernization and mastering the technologies of the information age, would have developed.
Processes similar to perestroika unfolded in most countries of Eastern Europe. In some cases, the initiators were the leaders of the ruling parties themselves, who were afraid of change, but considered it their duty to follow the example of the CPSU. In others, as soon as it became clear that the Soviet Union no longer intended to guarantee the inviolability of the ruling regimes in Eastern Europe by force of arms, supporters of reforms became more active, opposition political parties and movements began to emerge.
The only Eastern European state where an attempt was made not to change anything was Romania. The regime of personal power of N. Ceausescu was swept away as a result of a popular uprising in 1989, and he himself was shot.
In most countries of Eastern Europe, the growing wave of mass demonstrations in favor of democratization and market reforms, the actual legalization of the opposition, caused political crises. In the GDR, the crisis was aggravated by the flight of the population to West Germany through the opened borders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia with Austria. Not daring to resort to repression in a situation where the government of the senior bloc partner, the USSR, supported the ideas of democratization, most of the elderly leaders of the communist parties of Eastern European countries who shared the “Brezhnev doctrine” resigned. The new leaders, who had a reputation for reform, tried to establish a dialogue with the opposition, create reform-oriented political coalitions, and ensure a peaceful course of change. However, as a result of the first free elections after the Second World War, the communists were removed from power, which passed into the hands of the opposition.
Eastern Europe after socialism. The result of peaceful democratic revolutions was the refusal of Eastern European countries to participate in the Warsaw Pact Organization, which ceased to exist. The structures of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were liquidated. Economic and political ties were reoriented towards the Euro-Atlantic states. In 1991, most of the Eastern European countries signed association agreements with the European Union. In 1994 they entered into the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. The question of the full membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in this military-political bloc began to be considered. The citizens of the GDR overwhelmingly supported the parties that advocated the restoration of German unity.
The course towards an accelerated transition to a market economy, associated with the privatization of industry, the curtailment of unprofitable, according to Western standards, production, and savings on social programs caused serious problems. There has been an increase in inflation, unemployment, there has been a drop in living standards. To a large extent, this was due to the fact that the new leaders who came to power, who gained popularity as staunch supporters of freedom and democracy, had very schematic ideas about the market economy. This created the conditions for a certain shift to the left in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was not about a return to the Soviet model of socialism. Most of the former communist and workers' parties have changed leaders and revised their program guidelines. Without abandoning the ideals of social justice, they proposed models for their implementation that are compatible with a market economy, political pluralism, in other words, close to social democratic ideas about socialism. This provided them by the end of the 1990s. election success. In Poland, in 1995, the left-wing candidate A. Kwasniewski won the presidential election.
Much more difficult than in other Eastern European countries, the transformations took place in Yugoslavia. This country after the conflict between I.V. Stalin and I.B. Tito was not part of the Soviet system of alliances, but the political regime that initially developed in it had many signs of totalitarianism. The reforms carried out in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, which met with sharp criticism from N.S. Khrushchev and again caused an aggravation of its relations with the USSR, were not associated with a radical change in the nature of the regime. They were aimed at introducing a model of self-management in production, developing elements of a market economy, and allowed a greater degree of ideological freedom than in neighboring Eastern European countries. At the same time, the monopoly on the power of one party, the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, the special role of the leader (IB Tito) was preserved.
Since the political regime that existed in Yugoslavia was a product of its own development and did not rely on the support of the USSR, the force of the example of perestroika and democratization affected Yugoslavia with the death of Tito to a lesser extent than other Eastern European countries. Yugoslavia faced a different problem, namely an inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict, which led to internal armed conflicts and the disintegration of the country.
Crisis in the USSR: causes and consequences. Differences in the pace and direction of transformations in the interests of the ruling elites of the various union republics contributed to the disintegration of such a multinational state as the USSR.
The concept of perestroika initially contained internal contradictions. Under the conditions of a totalitarian system of organization of power, it could only be initiated from above and carried out using administrative-command levers of control. Perestroika assumed their gradual dismantling, replacement by new institutions of power, functioning on democratic principles. However, at least two problems arose that the initiators of perestroika were not ready to solve. The old mechanisms of governance lost their ability to function effectively before the new institutions of power were formed. The new socio-political forces and movements that arose due to perestroika partly rejected, partly revised its goals.
The initiators of perestroika did not take into account that, despite a significant loss of confidence in the CPSU as the ruling party and its ideology, most of the party functionaries got used to unlimited power. A large layer of the party-state elite was not satisfied with the ideological pluralism that reigned in society, considering it a spiritual vacuum, and wanted to fill it with a new higher idea. Dissatisfaction was caused by the desire of M.S. Gorbachev to normalize relations with the countries of the West, his willingness to recognize the legitimacy of changes in Eastern Europe. Democracy of management style M.S. Gorbachev was encouraged to perceive him as a weak leader. Public opinion increasingly endowed B.N. with charismatic features. Yeltsin (since May 1990 - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR), who took a position in opposition to the CPSU and the allied authorities.
The spiritual vacuum in the union republics began to be filled with ideas of nationalism, and, as in Russia, those leaders who demonstrated their independence from the union center of power began to gain popularity. In 1988, the contradictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated, resulting in a war for control over Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1989-1990s. in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, aspirations to secede from the USSR prevailed. The communist parties that ruled in them broke off ties with the CPSU, began to flirt with the emerging popular fronts. There were hotbeds of tension in interethnic relations in Moldova, South Ossetia, Georgia, from which Abkhazia announced its secession. Ethnic cleansing began, the displacement of the Russian population from national regions.
Attempts by the union center of power to solve the problems that arose through dialogue, compromises, limited military actions, and putting forward ideas for the renewal of the Union, as a rule, were delayed or rejected by local leaders. The referendum held in March 1991 showed that the majority of the citizens of the USSR were in favor of keeping it in an updated form. At the same time, the referendums held in the Union republics showed the opposite.
Since 1988, agricultural production began to decline, since 1990 - industrial, inflation reached 10%. Manifestations of economic initiative often contributed to the collapse of production. Most leaders are accustomed to tight control over their actions. The weakening of control from above either caused confusion or was used for personal enrichment.
In the spring and summer of 1991, the deterioration of the economic situation caused an increase in the strike movement, and internal contradictions in Russia itself aggravated. Political groupings that arose among the intelligentsia, youth, leaders who broke with the CPSU, considered it necessary to develop the perestroika processes more dynamically. Part of the administrative-command elite, the military elite, considered the only way out to establish an authoritarian regime and restore the previous system of government. M.S. Gorbachev, who became President of the USSR in March 1990, tried to find a compromise line through political maneuvering. Despite this, clashes between left and right, center and republics continued. His policies were increasingly criticized as inconsistent and not solving a single problem. The President of the USSR did not enjoy support even in the CPSU, which he continued to head.
The CPSU no longer existed as a political party, only nominally it had millions of members. In reality, in 1991, there was only a party nomenklatura that had lost public support, the orthodox, conservative faction of which in August 1991 attempted to remove M.S. Gorbachev from power and the establishment of an authoritarian regime.
The bulk of the population of the USSR took a wait-and-see attitude. Strong condemnation of the coup by the president Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin and the speech in Moscow of several thousand supporters of democratic reforms, the refusal of M.S. Gorbachev to voluntarily transfer power to them caused confusion among the conspirators, forced them to surrender.
The conspiracy and its failure discredited not only the CPSU, whose activities in Russia were banned by B.N. Yeltsin, but also allied power structures. The ruling elite of the republics that were part of the USSR finally lost confidence in them. In August, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced their withdrawal from the USSR, which was recognized by M.S. Gorbachev, who remains the president of an already virtually non-existent state. Real power, including in Russia, passed to the governments and Supreme Soviets of the republics that were part of the USSR. Attempts by the former union center, which has lost influence on the situation, to reform the USSR and create a new one instead public education- The Union of Sovereign States (USG) - met with extremely limited support. The new leaders of Russia reacted coolly to this idea. The desire of the largest republic after Russia, the Ukrainian one, for independence made the idea of ​​the SSG dubious. The main thing was that both the ruling elites of the former Soviet republics and their population, realizing the need to maintain close relations, no longer trusted the central bureaucracy.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
M.S. Gorbachev(b. in 1931) - the last leader of the CPSU, the first and last President of the USSR.
M.S. Gorbachev was born in the village of Privolnaya, Stavropol Territory. While studying at school, he worked as an assistant combine operator, at the age of 18 he received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, joined the party. In 1950 he entered the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University, then graduated in absentia from the Agricultural Institute. The scientific career to which his wife devoted herself - Raisa Maksimovna, M.S. Gorbachev preferred social and political activity in the Komsomol and in 1960 became the first secretary of the regional committee of the Komsomol.
For further successful promotion, Gorbachev had all the data: a peasant origin, two higher education organizational skills shown in the Komsomol work, the ability to get along with people, a respectful attitude towards senior party comrades. In a relatively short time, he becomes the first secretary of the Stavropol city committee of the Komsomol, and then the head of the party organization of the region. In 1978, a well-established regional leader, personally known to the top leaders of the party who came to rest in the resorts of the region, was transferred to Moscow, to the central office of the party, where M.S. Gorbachev is engaged in agrarian policy. As part of the leadership of the CPSU, average age who was approaching 70 years old, Gorbachev looked like a black sheep, but it was precisely this circumstance that opened up the prospect of promotion to the first roles before him. After the death of Yu.V. Andropov in 1984, and in 1985 K.U. Chernenko M.S. Gorbachev is the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
IN national history M.S. Gorbachev got the difficult and thankless role of a reformer. High-ranking Party leaders who had gone through all the stages of their careers in the 1960s and 1970s were aware of the falsity of official propaganda about successes in building a new society, they knew that the USSR was lagging behind the Western countries in many indicators of development. It was no secret to them that the rhetoric about socialist values ​​concealed careerism, unscrupulousness, struggle for power, corruption, and waste of resources. However, firstly, in a system of strict subordination in the power vertical, one could survive only by accepting the established rules of the game, which required duplicity, which became second nature. Secondly, the nature of education, the system of control of political reliability, the force of habit and the inertia of thinking excluded the way to the top for people who doubted the basic principles of organizing the life of society. Accordingly, the reforms, the need for which was recognized by both Khrushchev and Andropov, were associated by them with the improvement of socialism, with a return to the ideals described by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. At the same time, it was not taken into account that this ideal did not exist anywhere and never in life. Attempts to rebuild reality in accordance with the ideal came down to calls, new slogans, measures to tighten discipline and law and order, the implementation of which was entrusted to inert officials or corrupt bureaucrats.
The first steps of M.S. Gorbachev along the path of reforms were consistent with the measures of his predecessors: calls for accelerated development, the introduction of product quality control, an administrative campaign to combat alcoholism, which did not produce any noticeable results.
The main result of M.S. Gorbachev was that he managed to bring reforms beyond the scope of partial, cosmetic measures that could only prolong the agony of the old system. Publicity, opening in the press true facts about the past, about the outside world, the disintegration of power structures in the USSR, the emergence of the possibility of legal or semi-legal activities of the opposition, the emphasis on humanistic values, the deprivation of party structures of the levers of economic power have changed society. The socialist ideal has not been abandoned, but its understanding has come closer to the real model of equality created by the social democracy of Europe.
The main miscalculation of M.S. Gorbachev was the loss of the pace of change, when society approached a milestone where decisive, in fact revolutionary methods were required to update the political system and economic relations. Caution, restraint in setting goals, concessions to the conservative wing of the party were justified and necessary on initial stage reforms. They made it possible to partially neutralize the resistance to change, to avoid a split in society. However, the experience of apparatus work, bureaucratic intrigue, the ability to justify and justify one's actions among the party and Komsomol activists could no longer help when events began to develop with greater dynamics.
The result was the loss of initiative in raising the question of reforming the Union, in carrying out economic reform. The moment was missed when the interests of transformation required a decisive break with the conservative wing in the CPSU and its radical modernization. For the first time created as a result of elections, meeting the criteria of democracy, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1990 elected M.S. Gorbachev as President of the USSR, which gave him a new lever of power. However, the reform of the ruling party did not happen. The concept of reform was outlined at the last, 28th, Congress of the CPSU, but its implementation was belated. M.S. Gorbachev and his inner circle found themselves in political isolation.
Supporters of reforms in the CPSU and outside the ranks, who initially saw Gorbachev as their leader, began to criticize his course as inconsistent, hindering the transformation, and left the ranks of the party. Reproaches of indecision and demands to take a tougher stance were expressed by overt and, what was more dangerous, covert opponents of the reforms. Promoted by Gorbachev to the highest positions in the party and the state as compromise figures, in August 1991 they made an attempt to remove him from power. However, the repetition of the scenario that led to the fall of N.S. Khrushchev, failed, because society has become different. There were no longer those millions of obedient rank and file members of the CPSU who were ready to support any decision coming from above. The passivity of the majority of the population, the active actions of the defenders of democracy in Moscow, whose leader was B.N. Yeltsin, led to the disruption of the conspiracy.
The possibility of such a situation was determined by the reforms initiated by M.S. Gorbachev. But at the same time, despite the personal courage shown by M.S. Gorbachev, who, being isolated, rejected the demands of the putschists to recognize the legality of the state of emergency, he lost real political initiative and, in fact, power. The main levers of influence in the Union republics were in the hands of local political elites, in Moscow - the authorities of the RSFSR, supporters of radical reforms, who achieved the dissolution of the CPSU. The liquidation of the USSR forced M.S. Gorbachev to terminate the duties of the President.
Without denying the seriousness of the miscalculations made during perestroika, it is nevertheless necessary to take into account that most of the problems that arose after the collapse of the USSR were generated by the actions of political opponents of M.S. Gorbachev. The positive, creative part of his program did not have time to find embodiment. His main merit is the peaceful, non-violent dismantling of the deadlocked, incapable of either development or renewal of the totalitarian, administrative-command system of power and control, the end of the Cold War, which is dangerous for the whole world, is widely recognized in the world community.

QUESTIONS AND TASKS
1. Explain the reasons and goals for what was started in the 1980s. reforming the USSR from above. What was the essence of the concept of perestroika?
2. Reveal the general and particular in the causes and methods of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and in the USSR.
3. Reveal the main problems in carrying out reforms in the USSR.
4. Compose chronological table"Main Stages of the Reformation Process in the USSR".
5. Prepare the message “M.S. Gorbachev is the first and last president of the USSR. Highlight the role of M.S. Gorbachev in democratic transformations in the country, in establishing contacts with the outside world.
6. What are the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR. Which of them do you consider the most important?

§ 41. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: SEARCH FOR THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

The crisis situation in the USSR, not finding a solution, could lead to unpredictable consequences. The way out was found in the signing on December 8, 1991 in the city of Belovezhsk of an agreement between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which the USSR was defined as a former, that is, a non-existent state. This move, the legitimacy of which is controversial to many lawyers, was supported by the rest of the former Soviet republics. Their leaders at a meeting in Alma-Ata on December 21 signed a declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR and joining the CIS. The aspirations of the ruling elites of the former Soviet republics to liberate the union center from power were satisfied, while at the same time, the possibility of a subsequent rapprochement was preserved if the appropriate conditions were met.
Problems of Russia's transition to market economy. The Russian Federation, as a new, sovereign state, faced the problem of determining development priorities and its role in the world. Russia inherited from the USSR the status of a great nuclear power, about 60% of its economic potential, most of the territory rich in natural resources developed system of foreign economic relations. At the same time, serious problems were inherited, such as the debt obligations of the USSR, the depreciation of fixed assets of industry (about 70%), the need to support the huge Soviet Army, and the reforms of the collapsing economy that were declared but not actually started.
As in Eastern Europe, most of the managerial staff had no experience of working in a market economy, or had illusory ideas about it. The Western European experience of overcoming crises was not used; recipes for neo-conservative restructuring of the economy, carried out in the Euro-Atlantic countries in the 1980s, were taken into service. in completely different conditions and with different goals than in Russia.
The government headed by E.T. Gaidar, focused on the methods of shock therapy to improve the economy. It was assumed that its transfer to the rails of a market economy, privatization would lead to the formation of a layer of owners interested in the prosperity of their enterprises, and free competition, including with foreign producers, would create incentives for accelerated modernization. However, this did not happen. According to the UN, Russia's macroeconomic indicators were rapidly deteriorating in the context of reforms.

Table 5
Macroeconomic indicators of Russia

Indicator/year
Production of real GNP in % to the previous year
Industrial output in %
Agricultural production in %
Volume of investments in %
External debt in billions of dollars

Liberal reformers could not overcome the influence of the ideas of Marxism, they attached great importance to the forms of ownership of capital and means of production. Meanwhile, the experience of the 20th century showed that it can be anything (state, joint-stock, private), important general principles functioning of the economic system.
The Bolsheviks in 1917, conducting a "cavalry raid on capital", believed that the formal socialization of enterprises would increase their productivity. At the same time, they did not take into account that it takes time to train qualified managers, create effective systems for accounting and controlling resources, measures of labor and consumption, and planning necessary to manage the economy from a single center of power. It was not taken into account that the transformation of the state into an institution for the management of socialized property would turn on it the dissatisfaction of workers with low wages, which would require the creation of both a mechanism of repression and overdeveloped systems of social protection.
The transition from a planned to a market economy was not less, but more difficult. This was warned, in particular, by K. Kautsky, who was convinced of the inevitability of the collapse of the USSR. In 1930, he wrote: “After the collapse of the Soviet state, the task of maintaining the uninterrupted course of production will confront its successors with all the greater urgency, the more miserable, as can be foreseen, the economic situation in which they find the country. It is just as dangerous to turn nationalized enterprises into capitalist enterprises at one blow as it is to turn them back into nationalized ones. It is not only possible, but absolutely necessary, that the nationalized enterprises should continue to work on the same basis.<...>Having come to power in Russia, democracy will have before it a completely impoverished country. It can, of course, give this country the possibility of a rapid economic upsurge, but only if it avoids all wastefulness, will it concentrate all its resources on the development of productive forces.
K. Kautsky's warning had quite real grounds. Forced market reforms in Russia were doomed to failure for the following reasons.
Firstly, a market economy cannot exist without a clear system of legal norms governing property relations, mutual obligations of commodity producers and consumers, and taxation procedures that have evolved in capitalist countries for centuries. Since the majority of the supreme legislative body of power that existed at that time, the Supreme Soviet of Russia, had a negative attitude towards the government's concept of reforms, it was not necessary to count on the approval of the legal basis of a market economy. The simultaneous existence of various legal norms, the vagueness of legislation, limiting the development of normal business activities, created a situation of chaos in the economy, favorable for its criminalization. Promising to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to bring it into line with the doctrine of liberal democracy, the government objectively increased the influence of the bureaucracy. The vagueness and inconsistency of the legal framework for private business activities, the decline of privatized enterprises have led to the fact that the bureaucracy has been able to solve many vital problems for the emerging layer of Russian businessmen at its own discretion. This created conditions for the growth of corruption, undermining legal framework functioning of the institutions of power.
Secondly, a market economy cannot function normally with an unstable exchange rate, high inflation rates (depreciation of the money supply). Meanwhile, the government has gone to the liberalization of prices in the face of continuing shortage of goods. As a result, the balance between supply and demand was established spontaneously, by reducing consumption. In less than a year, prices have risen by 100-150 times, while the corresponding compensations in wages are lagging behind. The standard of living of the bulk of the population fell sharply. Government of E.T. Gaidar was unable to control the exchange rate of the ruble, which was rapidly falling against foreign currencies. This was basically impossible as long as the ruble served not only Russia, but also other sovereign states of the CIS. The reform policy adjustment undertaken with the appointment of B.C. Chernomyrdin in December 1992, could not give a quick return. It was only in the summer of 1993 that Russia carried out a monetary reform and introduced its own currency, which made it possible to reduce the rate of inflation.
Thirdly, the modernization of the domestic industry, so that it could produce competitive products, required large investments that could not give a quick return. Meanwhile, the government showed no interest in supporting domestic producers, which required protectionist measures and tax incentives for modernizing enterprises. Liberalization foreign trade allowed to partly solve the problem of commodity shortages through imports, but this had its costs. The cost of growing imports was covered thanks to the export of oil and gas, through external and internal loans. As a result, the country sold non-renewable natural resources, external debt grew while the domestic industry continued to decline. This decline, along with a reduction in the incomes of the bulk of the population, reduced budget revenues, prompted the government to increase taxes, which made production obviously unprofitable and unprofitable.
To cover debts to public sector employees, the government directed funds received from international credit institutions and the International Monetary Fund for current payments, which were provided for the modernization of industry. Due to the misuse of loans, external debt grew, the amount of interest on which by the end of the 1990s. began to approach the total amount of expenditure items in the budget.
An attempt by the Cabinet of S.V. Kiriyenko, who had existed for only a few months, to find a way out of the impasse by freezing the payment of interest on debts, their restructuring, led to another outbreak of inflation, an economic and political crisis in the fall of 1998.
Initially created by the government of E.T. Gaidar, the conditions of economic development contributed to the concentration of significant funds in the hands of a narrow circle of the new financial elite. The movement of these funds was subject to the logic of the interests of capital, which reflected the reality prevailing in Russia. So, with high inflation, any investments quickly depreciate, which gave rise to the desire to transfer free capital into foreign currency and take them out of the country. At high level taxes on producers much faster and easier than in the production sector, it was possible to make a profit through operations in the field of trade, financial speculation, resale of real estate, investments abroad. According to available data, the volume of capital exported from the country far exceeded the amount of external debt.
Political development of the Russian Federation. Both the emerging domestic and foreign capital were repelled by social and political instability from investing in the Russian economy. The fall in the standard of living of the majority of the population, the dismantling of social protection systems that had begun, increased social tension in society.
After privatization, the redistribution of power between the center and the subjects of the federation, a significant share of the blame for non-payment of wages, the emergence of unemployment was borne by the new owners or local authorities. However, the citizens of Russia, accustomed to the fact that all issues are resolved in Moscow, addressed most of the claims to the central government, the apparatus of the federal government.
The emerging and growing opposition to the course of reforms due to the growth of economic difficulties, the fall in the standard of living of the population in the highest legislative body of Russia - the Supreme Council led in 1993 to a constitutional conflict. The referendum in April 1993 showed that the majority of its participants were against early elections of both the president and the Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, the escalating conflict between them caused an armed clash in Moscow in October 1993, which ended in victory for the President's supporters.
The new Constitution, approved by referendum, turned Russia into a presidential republic. However, starting from the first elections to the State Duma (the lower house of the highest legislative body - the Federal Assembly), there has again been a tendency for confrontation between the legislative and executive branches of power. It's not just about political and ideological differences. In Russia, they learned the thesis that the separation of powers is a sign of democracy, but it was not taken into account that the condition for the normal development of the state, especially in a period of deep reform, is their interaction.
The problems of maintaining the territorial integrity of Russia have become more acute. Conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of power deprived the Russian "center" of confidence in the eyes of the regions. The conflict of interests in the distribution of tax revenues to the federal budget and the budgets of the subjects of the Federation, the weakening of domestic economic ties are in many ways similar to the situation that preceded the collapse of the USSR. The subjects of the Federation, which have rich natural resources, whose leaders believe that, acting independently of the federal authorities, they will more likely provide a favorable treatment for attracting investment, achieve internal stability, begin to show tendencies towards separatism. They are especially strong in some of the national subjects of the Federation. At the same time, as the crisis in Chechnya, which unilaterally proclaimed itself the independent Republic of Ichkeria, showed, forceful methods of solving those problems for which there are objective reasons for aggravation are ineffective. The willful decision of the federal authorities to send troops to Chechnya in 1994 led to an internecine war in which tens of thousands of people died. Its result was the aggravation of interethnic relations throughout the North Caucasus, political tensions in Russia. It was only in 1997 that the federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the search for a compromise, political settlement of the contradictions began.
The new government headed by E.M. Primakov in the autumn of 1998 inherited extremely difficult problems. According to some estimates, the damage inflicted on Russia by unsuccessful reforms is comparable to the losses from the Great Patriotic War. Objectively, the Russian economy is in a worse position than before the start of the reforms, its lagging behind the highly developed countries has increased. The resources required for modernization are largely exhausted. The ideas of democracy and the transition to a socially oriented market economy were largely compromised.
Russia in the CIS. Many problems of Russia's development were in one way or another connected with its relations with other CIS countries. Initially, expectations prevailed that there would be no serious difficulties in this area. There were hopes for the preservation of a single defense, economic space, which prompted the Russian leadership to act to the detriment of self-interest. CIS partners were supplied with energy carriers at reduced prices. Russia took upon itself the protection of their borders, and hesitated to introduce its own national currency. The chance of introducing dual citizenship for the Russian-speaking population within the framework of the CIS was not used, which would provide Russia with the opportunity to protect its interests.
Hopes for rapprochement, however, were not realized. Open borders and preferential terms of trade with the CIS countries, many of which have introduced their own customs rules, have created a channel for the semi-legal export of strategic raw materials from Russia. Disputes began over the division of the property of the former USSR: the Black Sea Fleet, its bases, the procedure for using the Baikonur Cosmodrome, and aspirations to create their own armed forces were manifested. In most of the former Soviet republics, policies began to be pursued that caused interethnic conflicts. There, the interests of the Russian-speaking population, which in most of them constituted from 20 to 40% of the population, were infringed upon. Russia was faced with the need to conduct peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR (in Transnistria, Abkhazia, Tajikistan), to accept refugees from neighboring states, which placed an additional burden on its economy.
The pace and direction of the reforms diverged, and significant differences arose between the CIS countries in terms of the degree of political democratization and the level of state control of the economy. Most importantly, economic interests turned out to be different. Although the statements of the leaders of the CIS countries emphasized their interest in strengthening the Commonwealth, several hundred agreements on deepening integration were concluded, most of them remained on paper. All CIS states, not excluding Russia, have shown interest in developing trade and economic ties outside the Commonwealth. Thus, by 1995, only 19% of Russia's exports went to the CIS, 15% to the countries of the former CMEA, and the rest went to non-CIS countries.
The reasons for the sluggish development of integration processes were, first of all, the economic weakness of the largest state of the CIS - Russia, the orientation of its diplomacy to the priority of relations with the developed states of the West. Only in 1994 were relations with the CIS countries recognized as a priority, which brought certain results. However, in fact, the CIS began to turn into a community of "different distances": within the CIS, alliances of individual states began to form. Russia's closest ties are developing with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Special relations are developing between the Central Asian states of the CIS, which have many similarities in development. In fact, they created their own union within the CIS. The Collective Security Treaty was signed by six of the eleven CIS members, and the CIS Charter was adopted by seven countries. With most of the CIS countries, Russia's relations are built on the basis of bilateral agreements, they are most developed with Belarus, with which in 1997 an agreement was signed on the formation of the Union.
There is no doubt that for Russia, both from the point of view of economic interests and security considerations, relations with its closest neighbors in the CIS are of particular importance. However, the question of how they will develop by the end of the 20th century did not receive a final decision.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
Yeltsin B.N., the first president of sovereign Russia, was born in 1931 in the village of Vutka, Sverdlovsk Region. When the future president was six years old, his father was hired to work at a construction site in the city of Bereznyaki. The family lived in a barracks, a kind of commune, in conditions of extreme poverty. In the summer I had to earn extra money at the nearest collective farm.
After graduating from school and the Ural Polytechnic Institute, where Yeltsin showed more interest in technical disciplines and sports than in social work, he began working as a civil engineer. At this work, B.N. Yeltsin fully demonstrated the qualities of an organizer, a leader, demanding of himself and others, able to organize people to solve large-scale problems. At 32, he already heads a large house-building plant. In 1968, he switched to party work and from 197G to 1985 led the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU.
In 1985, with the beginning of perestroika, M.S. Gorbachev begins to update the leading cadres of the party and state apparatus. The first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, who has a reputation as a demanding, tough leader, who, due to his independence and straightforwardness, did not enjoy special sympathy "at court" L.I. Brezhnev was invited to work in the central apparatus of the CPSU, where he soon took one of the key posts - the head of the Moscow Party organization.
Having accepted and supported the ideas of perestroika, glasnost, democratization, B.P. Yeltsin begins to implement them in Moscow. The fight against corruption, the privileges of the party-state elite, personnel purges in power structures at the district level ensured Yeltsin's popularity in public opinion, among the democratically minded intelligentsia, but not among the conservative-minded party nomenklatura.
The conflict between the conservatives and Yeltsin, who was becoming a symbol of radical moods in the party, was beneficial to M.S. Gorbachev. Demonstrating moderation, impartiality, reconciling opponents, he gradually deepened the perestroika processes. B.N. Yeltsin, however, did not like the role assigned to him as a pocket extremist. In 1987, he demanded to be relieved of his posts, accused the leadership of the CPSU and Gorbachev personally of actually sabotaging perestroika. The answer was Yeltsin's "study", organized in the spirit of the trials of the Stalinist period, which showed that the party bureaucracy had not changed at all and, on command from above, was ready to organize the persecution of objectionable people. At the same time, M.S. It was unprofitable for Gorbachev to completely remove B.N. Yeltsin from political life, respectively, he offered him a relatively neutral post of head of the Gosstroy. However, B.N. Yeltsin was not going to give up an independent political role. With the support of democratic forces, he managed by a large margin not only to be elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, but also to become its chairman. The anti-Yeltsin campaign in the media controlled by the CPSU only increased the authority of Yeltsin, who in 1990 announced his withdrawal from the ranks of the CPSU.
B.N.'s attempts Yeltsin to promote the deepening of reforms, democracy in Russia, which received popular support (in 1991, in democratic elections, he became the first president of the Russian Federation), aggravated his conflict with M.S. Gorbachev and allied power structures. The August putsch of 1991, in which Yeltsin and the Russian democracy played a decisive role, ensured the transfer to them of real power, which was finally consolidated with the dissolution of the USSR.
The abilities of B.N. Yeltsin as a strong leader, prone to radical, resolute actions, were in demand at a stage when the policy of M.S. Gorbachev began not to keep up with the course of events initiated by him. At the same time, radicalism and decisiveness, the ability to feel people's moods in conditions when Russia needed to solve the most difficult tasks of transition to a democratic society with a socially oriented market economy, rendered B.N. Yeltsin is not a very good service.
Wanting, like the majority of Russians, to see the results of the reforms as soon as possible, the President of Russia supported the supporters of the most radical actions, inviting a group of young economists headed by E.T. Gaidar. However, the transformation methods they applied, the recipes for which were drawn from the experience of countries with completely different conditions, the theoretical work of foreign economists, led to counterproductive results. The deterioration of the economic situation, the fall in the standard of living of the majority of the population caused a political conflict in society between the president and the Supreme Council.
The forceful solution of the conflict, the establishment of a presidential republic in Russia strengthened the political prerequisites for reforms. However, the political will and the president's readiness for decisive action could not compensate for the weakness of the economic base for reforms and the lack of a well-thought-out reform strategy. The conditions for the struggle of various pressure groups and interests for influence on decision-making, conflicts between the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the center, between the branches of power created a situation in which the strengths of B.N. Yeltsin as a leader could not fully manifest itself. This led to a drop in the president's popularity and an increase in the influence of opposition forces.

QUESTIONS AND TASKS
1. What is the CIS? When and how was this Commonwealth formed? What countries are included?
2. Expand the main problems facing the Russian Federation as a new sovereign state.
3. By whom and how was the course of reforms carried out in the Russian Federation in the 1990s? Name the causes of the main economic and political complications and difficulties.
4. How do you assess the prospects for further development of the CIS?
5. Assess the significance of B.N. Yeltsin as a political leader, head of the Russian state.

in history

topic: "Development of Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century."

Completed:

1. Introduction. one

2 totalitarian socialism. 2

3 Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 7

collapse of the USSR, formation of new states

in Eurasia.

4 China. eleven

Introduction.

This chapter will focus on the countries that entered the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the Cold War. They created a socio-political system, largely copied from the USSR. These countries are very different. Among them are China, the most populated country in the world, and tiny Albania, developed Czechoslovakia and backward Laos. Most of them were compactly located to the west of the USSR: from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic Seas - the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. Others in Asia are Mongolia, China, North Korea (DPRK), Laos and Vietnam. Finally, this is the Latin American state - Cuba.

totalitarian socialism.

Eastern Europe after World War II . The formation of totalitarian socialism in these countries proceeded in different ways. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the defeat of fascism led to the restoration of independence where it had been lost, or a change in the political regime where it had been preserved. A democratic system, universal suffrage and a multi-party system were established everywhere, agrarian reforms were carried out that destroyed large land ownership, the property of traitors and active supporters of fascism was confiscated.

The development of events in the West and in the East of Europe was very similar in the first post-war years. The difference was that Eastern Europe was liberated by the Soviet Army, and there the role of the communist parties was much more significant. Firstly, because in some of them (Yugoslavia, Albania) the communist parties led the partisan movement and, relying on it, became the most influential political force; secondly, because they enjoyed the support of the USSR, under its pressure, the communists became part of all the post-war governments of these countries, occupying, as a rule, “power” ministerial posts. When the Cold War began, relying on the positions already won and direct pressure from Moscow, the communists relatively easily and bloodlessly established their undivided power in 1947-1948.

Asian countries. The communists came to power in North Korea in much the same way. In Mongolia, China, Vietnam and Laos, the coming of the communists to power, although it was associated with the support of the USSR, was to a lesser extent. Much more it had to do with that. That the communists in these countries led the liberation, anti-colonial movement. Thanks to this, they became an influential political force and were able to come to power.

Changes in the political system . Having come to power, the communist parties set about "building socialism." The experience of the USSR was taken as a role model. The political system has been transformed. The multi-party system was either eliminated, or the parties lost their political independence, becoming part of coalitions and fronts led by the communists. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist parties. Judicial and representative power lost their independence. Following the example of the USSR, mass repressions were carried out. All rights and freedoms of citizens were actually abolished. Democracy was done away with, although constitutions were formally preserved, universal suffrage was formally preserved, "elections" were held regularly, and the leaders of these countries proudly called them countries of "people's democracy."

Planned Economy . In the field of economics, “building socialism” meant completing the nationalization of industry and finance, carrying out industrialization, and cooperating agriculture. The market economy gave way to the planned one. There was a large-scale breakdown of economic and social structures. Entrepreneurs and independent peasants disappeared. Most of the adult population was employed in the public sector of the economy.

Foreign policy . In foreign policy, all these countries to a greater or lesser extent followed the course of the USSR. Any disobedience to Moscow caused at first a very harsh reaction. As evidenced by the conflict between Tito and Stalin.

Results of socialist transformations . As a result, the social and political system in these countries was radically transformed. And just as we call similar processes in Russia after October 1917 a revolution, we have the right to call these transformations revolutionary as well. These revolutions were socialist, in the sense that they approved state property instead of private property. They led to the formation of a totalitarian political system in these countries. All this allows us to call these countries countries of totalitarian socialism.

political crises. Stalin's death in 1953 brought about major changes. Liberation from the oppressive fear of it exposed the deep contradictions of totalitarian socialism and mass dissatisfaction with it. Political crises arose in the GDR, and then in Poland and Hungary, which proved impossible to overcome without the use of force.

Policy change . In a number of countries in Eastern Europe, the Communist parties found themselves forced to change their policies in order to remove the main causes of discontent. The mass repressions were stopped and the partial rehabilitation of their victims was carried out, changes were made to the envisaged rates of industrialization, the forms of co-operation were softened, and in Poland it was stopped. Restrictions for small business were partially lifted. Later, economic reforms were carried out that weakened the rigid, administrative control over the economy. In many countries, all this was accompanied by a “thaw” in the sphere of ideology and culture.

In other countries, criticism of the most unattractive aspects of the Stalinist regime in the USSR caused alarm. The ruling leaders were concerned about the possibility of the criticism being directed at them. Not only did they not support the changes in Moscow and some Eastern European countries, but they also tried to take their own position. The first signs of Soviet-Chinese contradictions appear. In the early 1960s, Romania and North Korea were increasingly declaring their independence. Albania breaks ties with the USSR.

But. The changes in the USSR and some countries of Eastern Europe that took place after Stalin's death turned out to be shallow. Totalitarian socialism was not eliminated there, but only softened to make it more acceptable to the masses. But even this easing of the regimes after some time began to be seen by the Communist parties as a dangerous concession. The events in Czechoslovakia became clear evidence of such a danger to them.

Strengthening totalitarianism . After the intervention in Czechoslovakia, in all the countries of Eastern Europe that survived attempts to renew socialism, the totalitarian features of their system began to become tougher. Economic reforms were halted. A backward movement began. The elements of market relations that had arisen here and there were liquidated or limited. All the dissatisfied began to be persecuted. In many countries, in connection with this, a movement of human rights activists, “dissidents”, arose.

The strengthening of totalitarianism began in countries where there were no attempts at reform and renewal. There, totalitarianism took especially extreme forms. In Albania, for example, all religions were banned in the 1960s. In China, they tried to “build communism”: the cooperatives were turned into communes, the peasants were deprived of household plots and personal property. In these countries, cults of personalities of leaders have developed: Kim Il Sung in North Korea, Mao Zedong in China, Enver Hoxha in Albania, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. All citizens were required to unquestioningly comply with their instructions.

Deterioration of the economic situation . However, the economic situation of the countries of totalitarian socialism, starting from the 70s, began to steadily worsen. Many Eastern European countries began to take loans from Western countries, trying to renew their industry and accelerate development with these funds. But in the end, the problem of external debt arose. I had to pay debts. This made their situation even worse. Renewed after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership was forced to make a decision in 1978 to start market reforms in order to overcome difficulties. In the countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were not even thought of. The economic situation there became more and more difficult. Here the conditions for revolution gradually began to take shape.

Revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, the formation of new states in Eurasia.

Social problems. The deterioration of the economic situation in the countries of Eastern Europe led, ultimately, to the manifestation of social problems. Unemployment arose, overt or covert inflation devalued wages, food security worsened. Those features of the way of life that were fixed in the mass consciousness as the “conquest of socialism” began to disappear: the absence of unemployment, social stability, fixed prices. Totalitarian socialism has exhausted the last arguments in its defense as a more "advanced" system. The former methods, without which the existence of a totalitarian society is impossible, have become ineffective.

Frustration and discontent took various forms. The population of the GDR preferred to leave for the FRG, which took on a mass form, despite the repressions of the authorities and total surveillance. In Poland, discontent culminated in a strike movement. In 1980, during the strikes, the independent trade union Solidarity was formed, headed by an electrician from the Gdansk shipyard Lech Walesa. Solidarity absorbed almost all the opposition forces and turned into a mass organization: its membership reached 10-11 million people. The government was forced to enter into negotiations with her. A serious challenge was thrown to the authorities .. bound hand and foot by participation in the Afghan adventure, the Soviet leadership did not consider it possible to directly intervene in the events. But it had a powerful impact on the leadership of Poland, demanding a ban on Solidarity. In December 1981, martial law was introduced in the country. All Solidarity leaders were arrested, and the trade union itself was dissolved. But the military government of Poland could not find a way out of the current situation. The decline in production continued. Solidarity retained mass support. Its illegal organizations continued to function.